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This thesis answers the following questions. (i) What are the relationships 
between the values and functions of natural river floodplains? (ii) Under the 
complicated trade-offs among direct-use and indirect-use values, how should we 
use river floodplains? (iii) What are the institutions and incentives that are 
necessary for the optimal management? 
In this thesis, we (1) define the appropriate social optimisation problem for 
floodplain management, (2) provide theoretical models for the static and dynamic 
problems, (3) develop an applied model and calibrate parameter values from data 
on the Ouse catchment, and (4) carry out simulations in the context of the Ouse 
catchment in order to evaluate several policy scenarios. The thesis attempts to 
make three main contributions. First, it has tried to improve understanding the 
essential problems of floodplain management (two types of environmental 
externalities). Second, it has tried to clarify the policy options for the optimal 
floodplain management. Third, it has explored methods for integrating the 
hydrology, ecology and economics of floodplains. 
The crucial point is that we must take account of environmental externalities. 
There are two types of externalities. First, the development of floodplains has 
opportunity costs in tenns of lost ecosystem services. Second, the development of 
floodplains increases flood risks to people downstream (imposes a unidirectional 
spatial externality). In policy simulations, we obtain the three main results. First, 
the impact of floodplain development on the expected cost of flood risk is 
substantial as compared with prices of developed lands, which implies the 
importance of relevant floodplain management. Second, based on an empirical 
analysis, floodplains in upstream zones currently tend to be overdeveloped 
because of unidirectional spatial externalities. Third, price policies relatively 
function well to internalise external costs and achieve the optimal path, and are 
robust to irreversibility and uncertainty. 
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"All our activities are dependent ultimately on resources found in Nature" 
(Dasgupta, 1996). However, we are often faced with the problems of 
misallocation of natural resources (environmental and ecological goods or 
services) due to market and institutional failures. In the words of Pearce and 
Barbier (2000), "the source of most environmental problems lies in the failure of 
the economic system to take account of the valuable services which natural 
environments provide for us". 
This research project seeks to understand the interdependent relations 
between natural (ecological and hydrological) and economic processes in river 
floodplains (henceforth, simply 'floodplains'). It takes an approach which may 
broadly be defined as 'ecological economics'. "Ecological economics is a 
system-oriented field that considers the interdependence of biophysical and 
economic systems (broadly defined) (Martinez-Alier 1999)" (qtd. in Barnett et aI., 
2003). This approach makes it possible to understand the essence of many 
environmental problems and to identify their relevant solutions. To develop 
appropriate policies, we must consider natural and economic systems, and the 
practical relationships. 
The mam research question m this proj ect IS "What is the optimal 
management strategy of floodplains'?". The optimum is determined by taking all 
the values of ecological, hydrological and economic services of floodplains into 
consideration. This also depends on the discounting factor. The current situation is 
Chapter 1. Introduction 22 
not optimal because our economic system does not have the way of recognizing 
and evaluating the indirect use values of ecological services. Without the proper 
institutions and incentives, the current environmental condition of natural 
floodplains continues to deteriorate. 
Floodplains are important in that they provide us with important 
environmental, ecological and hydrological services. They are multi-functional 
resources. Natural floodplains enhance biological productivity. They provide 
habitats for various species, which have both direct and indirect use values. 
"Wetland-dependent fish, shellfish, fur animals, waterfowl, and timber provide 
important and valuable harvests and millions of days of recreational fishing and 
hunting" (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). In addition, the mix of various species 
determines what kind of ecological function or services it supplies, and it gives 
ecosystem resilience (stability) at the same time (Holling et aL, 1995). 
Hydrologically, natural floodplains play an important role in mitigating floods 
because they can control water discharge volume. Natural floodplains recharge 
ground water (Dister et aL, 1990; Gren et aL, 1995; Acharya, 2000; Acharya and 
Barbier, 2000). Furthermore, natural floodplains improve water quality. They act 
as nutrient sinks for runoff from uplands but as nutrient transformers for 
upstream-downstream flow (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). Because natural 
floodplains contain fertile and nutrient soil, they can be directly used as arable and 
grazing lands. Finally, they can supply the lands that can be easily developed into 
residential areas, industrial areas, roads or so because floodplains are flat. 
The fact that natural floodplains provide various ecological services poses 
the following three problems from the ecological, hydrological and economic 
point of view. In line with the three problems, we can divide the main research 
question into the following subsidiary questions. 
First, the ecosystem functions of natural floodplains are complex and 
interdependent (see Figure 1-1). What are the relationships between the values 
and functions of natural floodplains? Sure, it is difficult to understand their values 
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and the interrelationships. It is difficult to understand how to manage floodplains 
in our economic system. Therefore, the first problem to be solved is to elucidate 
the values of floodplains and their relationships particularly between natural 
system (rivers and floodplains) and economic system (economic activities like 
land use and flood control). In particular, we should note that their values depend 
on different management regimes. What and how much values do they provide? 
How are they related? 
or sink 
Figure 1-1. Interrelationships a/Values and Functions 
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Second, there are trade-offs between ecological-hydrological functions and 
economIC activities on floodplains. Floodplains are easily developed into 
residential areas, roads, industrial areas and so on, or directly used as arable 
farmland. In fact, "[i]n England and Wales, nearly 6 million people live in flood 
plains, which cover some 1 0% of the land. The construction of roads and railways 
and commercial and domestic development is often done in floodplains because it 
is relatively easier and cheaper to build there. In some areas, the rate of 
development on flood plains has more than doubled in the past 50 years" 
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(Environment Agencyl). Parker (1995) shows that floodplains are substantially 
developed by the data from six urban locations in England and Wales. The 
development of floodplains is frequently attracted. However, it leads to the loss of 
capacity as a nutrient sink and a nutrient transformer, of habitats for many species, 
and of flood control functions. In other words, there is a trade-off between the 
direct and indirect use values of floodplains. In addition to the development, a 
bund, a levee, or a dike is built because people want to protect their properties and 
farmlands from flooding water. However, this activity mitigates the flood control 
function that natural floodplains have, and increases the risk of flood especially in 
the urban areas downstream. At the same time, agriculture in the farmlands 
outside of bunds depends on artificial chemical fertilizers because it cannot access 
the fertile soils that flooding water deposits. It leads to the deterioration of water 
quality in rivers. In many cases, the values of ecological and hydrological 
functions exceed the economic benefits of direct use. Under these complicated 
trade-offs, how should we use floodplains? What is the optimal management 
strategy of floodplains from the ecological, hydrological and economic point of 
view? 
Third, related to the second problem, we need to identify the institutions and 
incentives that are necessary to implement the optimal floodplain management 
strategy. The second problem is related to the problem of externality (no property 
rights) in the context of economics. Private land owners of floodplains have no 
incentives to take account of the public interests such as the values of ecological 
and flood mitigation functions that natural floodplains provide. The development 
and construction of bunds and dykes confer private benefits, but often have a 
negative effect on the public interest. This problem is attributable to the lack of 
well-defined property rights. In other words, although the rights to floodplains as 
lands are defined, rights to the ecological services are not. Natural floodplains are 
multi-functional resources, and the lack of well-defined rights causes market 
failure. Therefore, we need institutions and incentive mechanisms for the optimal 
management of floodplains. What are these necessary institutions and incentives? 
1· k www.envlTonment-agency.gov.u 
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What is the best fonn of property rights? 
1.2 Purpose of Research 
The thesis has three mam objectives. First, we develop a hydrological, 
ecological and economic model of the interdependence between natural and 
economic processes in floodplains. In a model, we can describe the essential 
characteristics of natural and socio-economic processes of floodplains, and 
understand these interdependences. Second, we estimate the values of the services 
provided by floodplains in the Ouse catchment under different management 
regimes and to evaluate the trade-offs between the values. Third, we simulate a 
measure of social welfare under different floodplain management regimes, test the 
sensitivity of the outcome to environmental variables such as precipitation and to 
economic variables such as land prices, and identify the institutions and incentives 
necessary to implement an optimal floodplains management strategy. 
The mam rationales for this thesis are the following. First, this thesis 
contributes to interdisciplinary research on environmental problems by providing 
an integrated ecological, hydrological and economic analysis. Second, it 
contributes to the economics of externality, property rights and market failure on 
ecological services. This can be applied to other environmental and ecological 
goods and services. Third, this thesis helps policy makers (a local government or 
governmental agencies) to optimally manage floodplains in the Ouse catchment. 
In particular, we attempt to provide a simulation model by which we can evaluate 
the real management options. 
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1.3 Scope of Research 
1. 3.1 Research Area 
This research project focuses on the Ouse catchment, which includes the 
watershed of River Ouse and the tributaries (see Figure 1-2). There are three 
reasons why we choose this catchment. First, the River Ouse is notorious for flood 
events. For example, a serious flood occurs in York (Ouse) in 2000 (See Figure 
1-3). Flood events seem to be related to floodplain development and averting 
behaviour. Second, it offers considerable scope for collaboration with user 
communities and the regional governmental agency (the Environment Agency). If 
possible, we would like to help the regional government and the regional 
Environment Agency to optimally manage floodplains of River Ouse. In particular, 
we provide a simulation model by which we can evaluate real management 
options. Third, the rivers are easily accessible and small enough that the research 
project is tractable. 
Fieure 1-2. Map afthe Ouse catchment 
Source: We create this map from OS Land-Form PANORAMA TM DTM [I :50,000] (EDINA Digimap) and 
OS Strategi® [I :250,000] (EDINA Digimap) by use ofArcGIS. 
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Figure 1-3. Flood Event in River Ouse (York, 2000) 
Source: York City Council. www.york.gov.uk 
1.3.2 Definition of Floodplain 
Floodplains are a fOlm of wetlands . Mitsch and Gosselink (2000b) discuss 
the definition of wetlands and conclude that there is no absolute defmition of 
wetlands, although legal defmitions have been becoming increasingly 
comprehensive. The deflDition of wetlands has been ambiguously treated through 
individual names such as swamp, fen, bog, marsh and so on. All reflect the fact 
that wetlands have many distinguishing features such as the presence of standing 
water, soil conditions, organisms, vegetations and so on (Mitsch and Gosselink, 
2000b) . According to Smith and Smith (2001), the following is a widely accepted 
defmition : "Wetlands are transitional between terrestrial and aquatic systems 
where the water table is usually at or near the surface or the land is covered by 
shallow water. . . . Wetlands must have one or more of the following three 
attributes : (1) at least periodically, the land supports predominantly hydrophytes 
[plants adapted to the wet conditions l (2) the substrate is predominantly 
undrained hydric soil [soils that fonned under conditions of saturation, flooding, 
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or ponding long enough during the growing season to develop anaerobic 
conditions in the upper part]; and (3) the substrate is nonsoil and is saturated with 
water or covered by shallow water at some time during the growing season of 
each year" (Cowardin, et aI., 1979). 2 We share Mitsch and Gosselink's view that 
the definition of wetlands depends on the objectives and the field of interest of 
users. 
Floodplains are often called riverine or riparian wetlands. Riverine wetlands 
are the wetlands that have developed along shallow and periodically flooded 
banks of rivers and streams (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b; Smith and Smith, 
2001). Floodplains are low lands adjoining a channel, river, stream and 
watercourse that have been or may be inundated by flood water (Bedient and 
Huber, 2002). It is ambiguous to what extent or how often they should be 
inundated by flood water, but we normally define this point by the notion of the 
flood frequency or the return period. We can statistically define the flood 
frequency or the return period. For example, the I ~O-year flood implies that they 
happen once per 100 years on an average (statistically). In other words, the 
1 ~O-year flood has a probability of 0.01 (1 %) of being equalled or exceeded in 
any single year. We can clearly define floodplains by this notion although it is still 
ambiguous what return period we should use. The IOO-year flood is often used. 
The Environment agency also adopts this and provides maps of floodplains based 
on this notion (see Figure 1_4).3 Thus, we adopt this notion in this research project. 
If low lands adjoining a channel, river, stream and watercourse have been or may 
be inundated by the 1 ~O-year flood water, they are floodplains. 4 
2 Cowardin, et al. (1979). p.l 03. 
3 "Special consideration is now given to flood plains in planning urban development, and to this 
end up-to-date and consistent maps of flood plains have been produced. The Environment Agency 
produces these maps for England and Wales and they are available on their website alongside other 
river-related environmental data" (Petts et al., 2002). 
4 In this thesis, we simply use the word 'floodplains' instead of 'river floodplains'. 
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Figure 1-4. Map of Floodplain 
Source: Environment Agency (downloaded on 15 Feb 2005) 
bttp:llmaps.environment-agency.gov.uklwiyby/mapController 
NB: Dark shaded areas could be flooded due to a flood that has a 1% (1 in 100) or greater chance 
of happening eacb year. 
Finally, it is of great impOltance that we should distinguish between natural 
and developed floodplains . Floodplains include both natural and developed 
floodplains . Natural floodplains provide a range of ecosystem services in addition 
to the absorption of floodwaters while developed floodplains do not. Developed 
floodplains provide us with a stream of economic direct-use benefits as resident 
areas, industrial areas, public infrastructures and so on. This research project 
focuses on the combination of natural and developed floodplains . 
Then, let us concisely define natural and developed floodplains in this thesis . 
Natural floodplains are composed of vatious types of land uses such as grass 
moors, mat"shes, shrub heaths, woodlands and so on. Hence, once we define 
developed floodplains as some specific types of land uses, natural floodplains are 
treated as tloodplains excluding developed floodplains . Developed floodplains are 
defined as the two types of land uses in the category of LCM (land cover map 
1990): (1) suburban, rural development and (2) urban development. Note that 
pastures, meadows and agricultural lands (tilled, arable crops) are categorized into 
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natural floodplains in this thesis because they function in a similar way to other 
types of natural floodplains in terms of flood mitigation service. s However, we 
distinguish different types of land uses even within natural floodplains by 
referring to different values (Manning's N) according to types of land uses. 
Manning's N shows the amount of flood mitigation service. We discuss this issue 
in Section 5.3.8 in Chapter 5 in detail. 
1.4 Approach 
There are three main stages in the development of the floodplain models used 
in this thesis: (1) Development of a hydrological, ecological and economic model 
for a normative analysis; (2) Calibration of parameters in an applied model; and 
(3) Quantitative policy simulations. 
In the first stage, we develop static and dynamic decision models, in which 
we attempt to maximise social utility and a stream of social utilities over time 
respectively. We use both static and dynamic optimisation techniques for a 
normative analysis (what it should be). 
In the second stage, we attempt to provide specific functional forms and 
calibrate the parameters for an applied model. In our problem, we need to 
calibrate many parameter values. We need to create the necessary data as well. 
The hydrological sub-model exploits the hydrological software programs 
'HEC-HMS', which uses several techniques for modelling water flows. We use 
GIS techniques in a GIS software program 'ArcGIS' for obtaining physical 
parameter values. Frequency analysis techniques are used for obtaining 
precipitation with a certain exceedance probability. We use relevant econometric 
techniques and benefit transfer methods for calibrating environmental and 
5 In general, it appears that they are closer to natural floodplains than to developed floodplains. 
The extent of similarity between types of land uses might depend on the types of ecosystem 
services which we focus on. 
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economic parameters. 
In the third stage, we attempt to execute policy simulations in which we 
simulate the effects of alternative floodplain management strategies on a measure 
of social welfare (sum of discounted social utilities over time). In so doing, we use 
a mathematical software program 'GAMS' for the numerical solution of dynamic 
optimisation problems. The simulations explore the hydrological, ecological and 
economic consequences of different policy options, and estimate the sensitivity of 
the model to changes of eitherlboth environmental or/and economic conditions. 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
In Chapter 2, we provide a literature review in order to clarify why our 
research is significant, to discuss what has been solved and to describe approaches 
or methodologies. In Chapter 3, we develop a static decision model for the 
normative analysis of floodplain management (what it should be). We set up two 
problems, the social optimisation problem and the private optimisation problem. 
In Chapter 4, we develop a dynamic decision model. We discuss a steady-state 
equilibrium and its local stability. In Chapter 5, we provide an applied model with 
concrete functional forms and calibrate parameters. We set up a hydrological 
sub-model for the expected cost function of flood risk by use of HEC software 
programs. In Chapter 6, we implement a number of policy simulations in order to 
evaluate outcomes under different policy scenarios and to evaluate the robustness 
of model projections to uncertainty about model parameters and structure. In 
Chapter 7, we provide conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Foundations of the Thesis: 
A Review of the Early Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature in order to establish three things: 
the nature and importance of the problem to be studied, the gaps in knowledge 
addressed in this research, and the approaches and methods used to address them. 
In Section 2.2, we discuss the market failures that are a common feature of 
environmental goods and services. We take up incomplete or missing markets, 
externalities, non-excludability and open access, public goods, non-convexities, 
and asymmetric information. In particular, we consider the externalities that affect 
the management of river floodplains. In Section 2.3, we discuss ecosystem 
services of wetlands. We attempt to make the ecosystem services that we should 
focus on obvious through the review. In addition, we discuss the relationships 
among biodiversity, physio-chemical environment, hydrology, and ecosystem 
functions and services. In Section 2.4, we discuss problems in the valuation of 
multiple ecosystem services. There are obviously limitations to existing valuation 
methods, about which we should be careful. In Section 2.5, we discuss ecological 
economic models including hydrological models and indicate the challenges 
involved in the integration of hydrological, ecological and economic models. 
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2.2 Market Failure 
We are confronted with a common problem when we consider the allocation 
of environmental and ecological resources: market failure. We cannot simply rely 
on the market mechanism without any remedial actions. Under such situations, we 
need to know what is the optimal situation (normative analysis) and how we 
should reach it (policy analysis plus empirical research). 
Floodplains are multi-functional resources. They provide us with various 
important ecosystem services. The services give several causes of market failure: 
(I) there is no market for them (missing market); (2) they are sources of 
environmental externalities; (3) they are often non-rival and/or non-exclusive; (4) 
they provide complex non-linear relationships between the amount and value of 
services, which are denoted by non-linear and non-convex functions 
(non-convexity); and (5) the information on the services is not perfect and the 
information is often asymmetric between individual landowners and policy 
makers (asymmetric information). The problem of market failure seems to have 
been established in theory, but we still need to identify the causes of market 
failure in real environmental problems and to find appropriate policy options for 
overcoming the problems in the practical context. The literature has recently been 
produced from the perspective. This thesis clarifies two types of environmental 
externalities related to ecosystem services of floodplains and evaluates a number 
of policy options to resolve the problem by computer simulations in the practical 
context of the Ouse catchment. 
2.2.1 Market Mechanism and Coase Theorem 
The pure market mechanism is, in principle, able to solve all allocation 
problems. In theory, the market is always efficient if several conditions are 
satisfied: (1) markets exist for all goods and services; (2) all markets are perfectly 
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competitive; (3) all economic agents have perfect information; (4) property rights 
are well-defined and fully assigned; (5) no externalities exist; (6) all goods and 
services are private goods that are rival and exclusive; and (7) long-run average 
costs are non-decreasing. These conditions are important in that a problem of 
resource allocation occurs unless they are satisfied. 
However, the market mechanism does not necessarily work well in practice. 
In particular, market failure is a rule in problems of environmental and ecological 
resources. In the words of Pearce and Barbier (2000), "the source of most 
environmental problems lies in the failure of the economic system to take account 
of the valuable services which natural environments provide for us". Hanley et aI. 
(1997) provide six main causes of market failure concisely, considering 
environmental and ecological resources: incomplete markets; externalities; 
non-exclusion and the commons; non-rivalry and public goods; non-convexities; 
and asymmetric information. These causes impair at least one of the conditions for 
market efficiency. Under such situations, we need some other ingenious 
organizational, institutional, or political systems instead of market mechanism for 
efficiently allocating environmental and ecological resources. 
The Coase theorem established that the optimal allocation, which minimises 
the social cost, is always possible through the market mechanism without regard 
to the initial assignment of property rights as long as the property rights are 
well-defined and allocated even if externalities exist (Coase, 1960). Nevertheless, 
we should notice that there are some crucial assumptions in the Coase theorem: 
perfect information; all economic agents are price-takers; a costless court system 
for enforcing agreements; all economic agents obey their maximisation rules; no 
income or wealth effects; no transaction costs (Kolstad, 2000). As is the case with 
the conditions for market efficiency, the validity of the Coase theorem depends on 
these conditions above. It is usually rare that real situations satisfy all the 
conditions above. In fact, Coase (1937, 1960, 1993) recognized that transaction 
costs are of great importance in the real economic world and argued that the 
existence of transaction costs explains why we need economic organizations such 
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as firms, although market mechanism can coordinate all the transactions 
theoretically (Coase, 1937 and 1993).1 Moreover, the assumptions in the Coase 
theorem are strong, especially in the context of environmental goods and services. 
It is better not to think that markets will normally solve the allocation problem of 
environmental and ecological resources. We usually need some organizational, 
institutional or political solutions such as tax, quota, regulation, law, direct 
intervention and so on to complement markets as Coase and Williamson have 
considered in a different context. 
2.2.2 Incomplete or Missing Markets 
We discuss each type of market failure for the time being, paying attention to 
environmental problems. Incomplete markets or missing markets are often 
observed. It is easy to give some examples: (clean) air; tropospheric ozone; 
freshwater in rivers; biodiversity; services provided by pollinators; natural pest 
control services; water quality improvement service by wetlands; flood mitigation 
service by floodplains; and so on. We have no markets for these goods and 
services, and it is difficult to create the markets because of difficulty in defining 
property rights under the current economic system, their indivisibility, non-
excludability, externalities and so forth. 
To address the problem we need at least information on values of such goods 
and services. In fact, we have to devise several methods in order to evaluate the 
values of the environment under incomplete or missing markets (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989; Freeman, 1993; Garrod and Willis, 1999; Haab and McConnell, 
2002). We can use direct hypothetical methods such as bidding games and 
willingness-to-pay questions, and indirect hypothetical methods such as 
contingent ranking, activity and referendum methods for evaluating the values of 
1 Based on the notion 'transaction costs', Williamson has discussed the choice among alternative 
modes of economic organizations including institutions (Williamson, 1975, 1980 and 1985). 
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the goods and services for which we have no market. In addition, we can use 
indirect observed behaviour methods such as travel cost, hedonic property values, 
avoidance expenditures and referendum voting for evaluating the values of the 
goods and services for which we have only incomplete markets. However, there 
are limitations on the methods. We have not solved the problems yet. Daily (1997) 
describes several challenges to the valuation of ecosystem services: the lack of 
information on (1) the role and value of biodiversity; (2) the marginal value of 
ecosystems; (3) the economic values of context-dependent ecosystem services; (4) 
quantifying ecosystem services such as stability; (5) interdependencies and 
indivisibility of ecosystem services. 
2.2.3 Externalities 
An externality happens when the activities of an agent affect those of other 
agents and this is not considered in direct or indirect market transactions between 
them. The reason why externalities are serous economic problems is that they 
violate Pareto efficiency, which implies the inability of market to allocate goods 
and services efficiently. According to the second theorem of welfare economics, 
we can always achieve any desired allocation by using market mechanism, but 
externalities preclude this. However, there is confusion about the notion 
'externality'. Baumol and Oats (1988) points out that it is important to distinguish 
between technological and pecuniary externalities (pseudo-externalities). 
Pecuniary externalities do not produce market inefficiency. Thus, we do not deal 
with this type of externalities. 
Externality is one of the most important problems in environmental goods 
and services. "From the innocent parable of the bees to the poisonous gas clouds 
of Bhopal, environmental external effects are evidence of the price system's 
inability to signal the true significance of the interdependence of human activities 
undertaken within a common environment" (Perrings, 1987). The problem of 
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environmental external effects is one of the most important issues in our research. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the external effects frequently occur in the private use 
of floodplains. The actions of landowners in floodplains upstream frequently 
increase the flood risk to people downstream. Private land owners of river 
floodplains have no incentives to take account of the impact of their behaviours 
on the ecological and hydrological services that natural river floodplains provide. 
While property rights to land in river floodplains as lands can be easily created 
and defined, it is difficult to create and define the property rights for each 
ecological or hydrological service of river floodplains. 
Externalities are not new problems in economics. 2 Marshall (1920) discusses 
external economies and diseconomies. Meade (1952) analyses two distinctive 
cases of external economies: one is internal to the individual industry; and the 
other is external to the individual industry. Certainly, Meade deals with examples 
of externalities, but Meade's problems seem to be on increasing returns to scale. 
We can see a similar discussion in Marshall (1920). In this respect, Baumol and 
Oats maintain that the analysis of increasing returns problem is quite different 
from that of more conventional externalities which constitute the primary threat to 
3 . h the environment (Baumol and Oats, 1988). We share the same perspectIve ere. 
In the sense that conventional technological externalities are analysed, Buchanan 
and Stubblebine (1962) provide a clear definition of externalities, which coincides 
with the above-mentioned definition. They distinguish between marginal 
(incremental) and infra-marginal (discrete) externalities; potentially relevant 
(motivated and possible to modify actions of the externality generator through any 
bargaining actions) and irrelevant (not motivated and possible to do that) 
externalities; and Pareto-relevant (possible to make one economic agent better off 
without hurting others in the modification) and Pareto-irrelevant (not possible to 
do that) externalities. They conclude that Pareto equilibrium cannot be attained in 
the case of marginal externalities without any remedial actions. 
The Pigouvian tax (or subsidy) is one of the most famous remedial actions 
2 Mishan (1971) provides a concise and good review on literature on externalities. 
3 Bator (1958) and Ellis and Fellner (1943) treat increasing returns in a similar way. 
Chapter 2. Foundation oj Thesis 39 
for externalities (Pigou, 1932). The decision determining whether we compensate 
the victims or not does not depend on whether the problem is a private goods 
(depletable) externality or a public goods (undepletable) externality, but whether 
the victims can costlessly control the amount of the damages or not (Freeman III, 
1984; Baumol and Oats, 1988). More concretely, compensating victims is difficult 
if the number of victims is large. Pigouvian tax brings about further inefficiency in 
the situation where Coasian bargaining is possible because of the small number of 
victims. In this respect, Turvey (1963) had long argued that a priori prescription 
of the tax is unwise especially when negotiations are possible between externality 
generators and victims. The basic policy prescription is the same for private and 
public externalities, which is a Pigouvian tax equal to marginal social damage 
levied on the producer of the externality (Baumol and Oats, 1988; Freeman III, 
1984). However, Papandreou (1998) concludes that we have to better recognise 
the role of institutions in removing externalities, evaluating the attempts to 
incorporate institutions into economic models endogenously. Likewise, Davis and 
Whinston (I967) provide simple models for discussing the provision of public 
goods and governmental public goods respectively, and conclude that both public 
goods can be provided in market by use of appropriate institutional arrangements. 
However, there are a number of policy options for overcoming the problem 
of externalities, which we should evaluate depending on real externalities. Let us 
give some recent discussions. Gustafsson (1998) mentions that the role of market 
mechanisms in solving problems of environmental externalities is overestimated 
because it is too simple to consider the complexity of environmental functions. He 
suggests that the choice of relevant environmental policy instrument should be 
conditioned by many considerations. Loehman and Randhir (1999) discuss several 
policy options for internalising two temporal externalities due to agriculture: soil 
erosion and related pollution. In terms of traditional welfare economics concepts, 
they come up with three efficient policy options such as a Pigouvian policy, a 
bargaining solution and 'government as co-producer of environmental goods' 
policy, but they require the government to play different roles. Owen (2006) 
estimates the external costs (environmental externality) of combustion of fossil 
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fuels in electric power generation and concludes that a number of renewable 
energy technologies will be competitive if the external costs are financially 
internalised by tariffs. Gottfried et al. (1996) provide a viewpoint of land use and 
land values in terms of the multiproduct nature of ecosystems. Interestingly, they 
discuss that markets do not work well even when traditional economic 
instruments to internalise externalities are applied. They mention that we need the 
institutions that enable us to overcome landscape-scale market failure, but it is not 
obvious what institutions are required. 
We need to clearly identify environmental externalities in the context of real 
environmental problems. For example, Parker and Munroe (2006) categorize the 
conflicts of farm incompatible productions between neighboring farms as 
"edge-effect externalities" and test the hypothesis that the externalities have 
influenced the location and production patterns of organic farms by the data on 
California Central Valley organic farmers. Ihalanfeldt and Taylor (2004) estimate 
the size of externality effect of hazardous waste sites on other land-uses such as 
commercial and industrial properties and show that it is substantial in a case study. 
The problems of externalities are related to property rights to a large extent. 
Property rights are the rights to use, control and exchange resources (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973; Bromley, 1991). The creation and protection of property rights are 
important parts of the internalisation of externality. "It is clear, then that property 
rights specify how persons may be benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who 
must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons .... A primary function of 
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
externalities" (Demsetz, 1967). The Coase theorem shows that an economic 
allocation will be efficient (Pareto efficient) providing that property rights are 
clearly defined (Coase, 1960). Disregarding the other assumptions needed for the 
result, the Coase theorem shows that property rights give the correct economic 
incentives for the optimal use of resources. However, there are many forms of 
property rights (See Table 2-1). Thus, we still need to consider which type of 
property rights is the most appropriate and effective for solving problems. The 
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answer may differ in different cases. 
Table 2-1 Types of property rights . 
Type Description 
Open.Access .Access for resource use is effectively unrestricted, in other 
(no propertyrights) words, it is free and open to all. 
The owner (individual, a group of individuals, coporations and 
Private Property so on) has the right to exclude others from use of the resource 
and to regulate its use. 
Resource ownership and management is in the hands of an 
Common Property identifiable communityof individuals, who can exclude others 
and regulate use of the resource. 
State Property Resource ownership is vested exclusively in the government, 
which determines and controls access, and regulates use. 
Source: Barbier et al. (1995), pp.77-78. 
Adger and Luttrell (2000) examine the relationship between property rights 
and wetland resources, giving two case studies. They mention that well-defined 
property rights are fundamental to sustainable resource use and that the situations 
are worsened by the lack of clear formal or informal rights interacting with 
historic under-valuation. However, their conclusions about the relationship 
between the resultant resource allocation and the type of property rights are 
ambiguous, although it seems that common property rights are more suitable to 
the resources where the nature of the habitat makes definition of boundaries 
difficult. Hodge and McNally (2000) state that collective action may be important 
for wetland restoration because the control of the wetness of private fields has 
externalities and the benefits of restoration can be achieved at a lager scale. 
Likewise, as river floodplains provide multiple ecosystem services, it is difficult 
and challenging to set up appropriate property rights on them. At this point, we 
need more case studies and analyses in order to develop management policies. 
There are cases that distribution of property rights is discussed in the 
intergenerational context. For example, Pasqual and Souto (2003) analyse the 
reasons why traditional solutions for externalities do not work in the 
intergenerational context and suggests that redistributing property rights between 
generations should be effective for achieving sustainability about environmental 
resources. 
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There is a considerable literature on externalities in the context of wetlands. 
Kohn (1994) develops an interesting two-sector model in which wetlands increase 
the productivity of fishing industry or alternatively are converted into agricultural 
lands. In the model, Kohn compares between a tax on converted wetlands and a 
subsidy on preserved wetlands, considering who has the property rights of 
wetland externalities. Interestingly, Kohn concludes that a tax is more important 
than a subsidy to the extent that wetland property owners possess the rights 
whereas a subsidy is more important than a tax to the extent that the public 
possess the rights. Ficklin et al. (1996) mention that forest ecosystem management 
system policies should consider total economic and social costs and benefits of 
forest cutting, paying a particular attention to an appropriate balance between 
many uses and values of forest ecosystems (non-commercial uses and values 
produce externalities). Niskanen (1998) analyses environmental external impacts 
of reforestation such as carbon sequestration, increased erosion control and so 
forth in Thailand. Niskanen argues that the free-rider problem is important in 
carbon sequestration, in which the costs are incurred locally but benefits accrue on 
the global level. Cataneo et aI. (2001) analyse an interesting situation in which 
livestock, rice recreational fisheries, tourism and possibly forestry are all 
dependent on the quality, the level and the extent of the wetland, and the quality, 
the level and the extent of the wetland is itself affected by certain 
activities-principally hydroelectric power generation and rice production. They 
argue that if some activity brings about ecological changes that cause the damage 
of other activities, it may threaten the sustainability of the provincial economy. 
Cacho (200 I) develops a dynamic economic model of agroforestry in the presence 
of the positive externality that is the enhancement of land productivity, where the 
conditions of optimal land-use allocation are derived, a measure of externality is 
identified, and policy analysis is undertaken in the form of subsidies to achieve 
the optimal allocation. Bhat and Bhatta (2004) find that the optimal land 
(including coastal floodplains) conversion depends not only on the economics of 
shrimp production but also on the renewable components of the ecosystems, 
applying existing literature to the problem of commercial aquaculture in India that 
cause negative agricultural and environmental impacts. 
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2.2.4 Non-exclusion and Open Access 
A second source of inefficiency is that the market mechanism fails to 
efficiently allocate resources when resources are non-exclusive, which implies 
that it is impossible or too costly to deny access to resources. If the resources are 
rival but non-exclusive, each economic agent has an incentive to take them as 
many and soon as possible. That leads to over-exploitation or over-consumption 
of resources. 
This happens in open access situations such as exist In many fisheries. 
Gordon (1954) developed an economic model for the overexploitation problem of 
the fishery, and Schaefer (1954) analysed the fundamental laws of population 
growth and the management of the oceanic fisheries. The key idea is that fishers 
continue to catch fish up to the point at which economic rents are fully exploited 
under the conditions of open-access common-property, and over-exploitation 
occurs as a result. 4 Gordon suggested that the "Overexploitation Problem" was 
applicable to all natural resources that were owned in common (were open-access) 
and exploited under individualistic competition. He drew two main implications: 
first we need the policies (agreement, regulation, tax and so on) that limit the 
fish-catch such that the fish population recovers and the catch-per-unit-effort 
increases; second, the problem about land animals is more severe because the 
biotic potential of land animals is much lower than that of fish. The second point 
is related to habitat provision service that floodplains provide. Furthermore, Clark 
(1973) shows the possibility of extinction in addition to over-exploitation, based 
on the Gordon-Schaefer model. 5 Bjorndal and Conrad (1987) provide an 
empirical application to the North Sea herring fishery, with special reference to 
the question of stock extinction under open access. In the same context, Brander 
and Taylor (I 998) provide an interesting insight into the rise and fall of the Easter 
4 Strictly speaking, we have to distinguish between open-access and common-property. In 
open-access, there is no property rights. In common-property, however, there is well-defined 
property rights that some collective body or a collective set of economic agents possess. In this 
sense, Gordon's 'common-property' implies open-access although Gordon implies individuals' 
free access to resources that they commonly possess. 
e.g. Clark (1990). 
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Island Civilization, using the same notion of open-access renewable resources. 
The point is that the negative effect of population growth on resources would be 
worse in the absence of established property rights (open-access). 
In a more general context, Hardin's seminal paper on the tragedy of the 
commons argues that the commons are justifiable only under conditions of 
low-population density if they are justifiable at all (Hardin, 1968).6 His arguments 
was as follows. First, each rational herdsman is forced to continue to increase his 
herd without limit because the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of 
the additional animal and the negative effects of overgrazing due to an additional 
increase in animal are shared by all the herdsmen. In this case, the additional 
benefit that accrues to each herdsman always exceeds the additional cost that 
accrues to him. 7 It results in the situation that "freedom in a commons brings ruin 
to all". Second, the tragedy of the commons holds true for the problems of 
pollution in a reverse way. The rational person understands that his share of the 
cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of 
purifying them by himself. Consequently, we are faced with a serious pollution 
problem. 
2.2.5 Public Goods 
A good is non-rival if a person's consumption of one more unit of the good 
does not decrease the consumption of other people. If goods and services are 
non-rival and non-exclusive, they are called public goods. In this case, market 
failure occurs because it implies that the marginal social cost of supplying goods 
6 Hardin argues the same point in 30 years after this seminal paper: "The more the population 
exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up" (Hardin, 
1998). 
7 Hardin provides ad hoc values of the additional benefit and cost to explain the tragedy of the 
commons in a pasture. However, real situations depend on the values of the additional benefit and 
cost. In addition, the additional cost that is shared by all the herdsmen seems to go up as the 
number of cattle increases. There is a threshold in which each herdsman has no incentive to 
increase his herd. 
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and services is zero. Then, their prices should be zero from the perspective of 
efficiency. The result is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium that is neither Pareto-efficient 
nor unique. 
Another problem with public goods is free-riding. Economic agents can 
enjoy benefits without paying for the costs of supplying public goods. As a result, 
the market provides public goods less than socially desired level. Many 
environmental and ecological resources are global or local public goods. For 
example, tropical forests provide local public goods that are their capacity of 
managing water flow, soil erosion and nutrient recycling and global ones that are 
benefits of biodiversity, ecosystem linkages and carbon sequestration (Hanley et 
aI., 1997). Likewise, River floodplains provide local (and global) public goods 
(services): flood mitigation service, habitat provision service, water quality 
improvement service, and so on. We are faced with the same problem of public 
goods. 
2.2.6 Non-convexities 
The convexity assumption is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium 
allocation in markets since the assumption of convex preference is used to assure 
that the demand function is well-defined (Varian, 1992). The second theorem of 
welfare economics is violated without the assumption. 
Comes and Sandler (1996) provide a simple example in which privately 
unprofitable courses of action may be socially profitable from the presence of 
non-convexities in agents' feasible sets or preferences. Furthermore, they imply 
that such non-convexities become a cause of a genuine externality even if 
property rights are well-defined. Non-convexities are an important ingredient of 
externalities models. In this context, Baumol and Bradford (1972) show that 
severe detrimental externalities induce non-convexity of social production 
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possibility set. Under this condition, we cannot rely on prices to give us the right 
signal, and tax instruments will be helpful for guiding the economy (Starrett, 
1972). 
In environmental problems, non-convexity IS more important because 
researches by ecosystem and population ecologists have shown that the processes 
in the environment and ecology are so often non-convex (Dasgupta and Maler, 
2003). Under non-convex systems, there are multiple basins of attraction (multiple 
equilibria) (Holling, 1973). Then, the system would flip from one basin to another 
if a condition exceeds a threshold, and the flip could be irreversible or could show 
hysteresis. Therefore, a mistake in environmental policy management might be 
more costly than we envisaged under convex systems. Dasgupta and Maler insist 
that economists should pay more attention to the properties of non-convex 
ecosystems, based on findings about ecosystems and population ecology. If 
environmental damages (damage function) are non-convex, we have two 
fundamental issues on economic policies: (1) there is the possibility that 
regulatory policy sometimes should pursue an all-or-nothing policy; and (2) there 
is the possibility that decentralized market incentives such as Pigouvian taxes 
might not lead to an efficient allocation of resources (Repetto, 1987). Tahvonen 
and Salo (1996) study a model where the decay function of pollution stock is 
increasing and concave for low stock levels but decreasing and convex for 
moderate stock levels (entirely non-convex) instead of a function with an 
increasing rate of decay (convex). It turns out that under the non-convex decay 
function multiple equilibria and multiple locally optimal solutions may exist. 
Brock and Starrett (2003) derive a similar implication from a model of the optimal 
management of dynamic ecological systems such as a shallow lake with 
non-convex positive feedback. They show that there may be multiple local optima 
and associated basins of attraction in which the optimal path may depend on 
initial conditions such as phosphorous stock. 
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2.2.7 Asymmetric Information 
The condition of perfect information is necessary for market mechanism to 
work efficiently. All relevant information should be concentrated on prices, and all 
economic agents in markets should access the information of prices. The existence 
of asymmetric information is a source of transaction costs such as costs of 
opportunistic behaviours and monitoring costs (Williamson, 1985). 
We have two types of asymmetric information problems: moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard is the ex-post problem of asymmetric information. 
Moral hazard happens when the behaviours of agents cannot be observed by their 
principals. Helpman and Laffont (1975) analyse the existence and efficiency 
properties of competitive equilibria under moral hazard situation in which 
probability distributions are functions of individual actions. They show that a 
competitive stationary equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-efficient. The most 
famous example of moral hazard is an insurance market. The accident-prevention 
effort tends to decrease under the protection of insurance because individual 
agents are risk-averse and it is costly to monitor the effort. Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1988) develop a basic model of insurance markets which shows that insurance 
indifference curves and feasibility sets are not convex, although they assume 
standard convex utility functions and technology. It implies that such markets do 
not function efficiently. 
Adverse selection is related to the problem of asymmetric information. 
Adverse selection happens when the characteristics or types of agents cannot be 
observed by principals. Akerlof (1970) provides a simple but clear model for 
explaining adverse selection in the lemons market: bad cars are sold at the same 
price of good ones since buyers cannot observe the quality of used cars. Bad cars 
drive out good ones, and only bad cars remain in the market, but no one can trade 
them at positive prices. Rothschild and Stiglitz (I976) show that a competitive 
equilibrium may not exist when the characteristics of goods transacted are not 
fully known to at least one of the economic agents in the transactions. More 
Chapter 2. Foundation of Thesis 48 
concretely, they argue that high-risk individuals drive out low-risk ones m 
insurance markets and the markets crash. 
The problems of asymmetric information are pervasive m the economy 
(Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988). The field 
of environmental and ecological economics is not an exception. In particular, 
perfect information is not possible about the environment and ecology. We always 
have to deal with uncertainties due to imperfect information. The famous example 
is asymmetric information between polluters and regulators (or pollutees). Cabe 
(I992) states that information availability and the cost of acquiring information 
playa crucial role in determining the best structure and parameters of a regulatory 
mechanism. Based on this idea, he develops a control mechanism that firms pay a 
tax depending on the ambient concentration of a pollutant about non-poi nt-source 
pollutants. Thomas (1995) points out a similar notion about the choice between 
Pigouvian tax and contract-based regulations. If a pollution tax is imperfect due to 
limited information on abatement to regulators, the role of contracts as pollution 
regulations is essential. 8 
2.3 Ecosystem Services of Wetlands 
2.3.1 Multiple Ecosystem Services 
River floodplains are important in that they provide us with important 
environmental, ecological and hydrological services. They are multi-functional 
wetlands (Turner, 1991). Natural river floodplains enhance biological productivity. 
They provide habitats for various species, which have both direct and indirect use 
values. "Wetland-dependent fish, shellfish, fur animals, waterfowl, and timber 
provide important and valuable harvests and millions of days of recreational 
8 e.g. Rollins and Briggs III (1996), Huber and Wid (1998), Gottinger (2001), Yates and Cronshaw 
(2001), Aggarwal and Lichtenberg (2004). 
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fishing and hunting" (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). In addition, the mix of 
various species determines what kind of ecological function or services it supplies, 
and it gives ecosystem resilience (stability) at the same time (Holling et aI., 1995). 
Hydrologically, natural river floodplains play an important role in mitigating 
floods because they can control water discharge volume. Furthermore, natural 
river floodplains improve water quality. They act as nutrient sinks for runoff from 
uplands but as nutrient transformers for upstream-downstream flow (Mitsch and 
Gosselink, 2000b). Because natural river floodplains contain fertile and nutrient 
soil, they can be directly used as arable and grazing lands. Finally, they can supply 
the lands that can be developed into residential areas, industrial areas, roads or so 
because floodplains are flat. Turner (1991) comprehensively enumerate 
functions/services of wetlands: flood storage, flood protection, important wildlife 
habitats, nutrient cycling/storage and related pollution control, landscape and 
amenity services, recreational services, non-use existence value benefits, 
agricultural output, other commercial output, shoreline protection and storm 
buffer zones, and extended food web control. 
Gren et al. (1995) estimate the values of multiple ecosystem services of 
Danube floodplains. These include: Values of (1) flood mitigation service; (2) 
water self-purification service; (3) groundwater regeneration service; (4) refuge 
provision service (for river-related organisms); (5) habitat provision service (for 
plant and animal species); (6) recreational sites provided; (7) service as nutrient 
sinks. Dister et al. (1990) discuss the impacts of hydrological engineering policies 
on multiple functions of river floodplains of the upper Rhine from the historical 
point of view. They discuss several ecosystem functions: reducing the effect of 
floods; contributing to the self-purification of water; regeneration of ground 
water; repopulation of the river; having richly structured habitats and refuges; 
offering highly productive sites; and having an enormous merit as recreational 
areas offering unique experience. Referring to ecosystem functions, they argue 
that the importance of intact Rhine floodplains has been underestimated for a long 
time and that development, industrialization and structural hydrological 
engineering have attenuated their functions historically. Crooks et al. (2001) 
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provide a good survey on the environmental problems of floodplains management 
in terms of the whole catchment or coast, focusing on policies. They indicate the 
importance of ecosystem services such as flood attenuation, drinking water 
storage, water quality amelioration, nutrient recycling, carbon storage and 
ecological support. They point out the same things as Dister et al. (1990). In 
addition, they argue the following point about policies. "However, managing 
floodplains is not just balancing development against biodiversity, it is about 
optimising a whole range of functions, many of which are not obvious but which 
nevertheless underpin environmental quality and flood vulnerability status. There 
is a need for a more overt water and wetlands policy based on a comprehensive 
assessment of floodplain functions" (Crooks et aI., 2001). It is the perspective that 
we take up in our research for understanding the hydrological, ecological and 
economic interactions in river floodplains. 
It seems difficult to treat all or many ecosystem services and economic 
development at the same time, but it is crucial to deal with complicated 
interactions among them. Barbier (1994) focuses on hydrological functions and 
habitats creation or maintenance functions. He mentions that the total economic 
value of wetland's ecological functions, its services and its resources may exceed 
the economic gains of converting the area to an alternative use if they are 
appropriately valued. Costanza et aI. (1989) mention "the economic value of 
ecosystems is connected to their physical, chemical, and biological role in the 
overall system, whether the public fully recognizes that role or not. ... This yields 
appropriate values only if the current public is fully informed (among a host of 
other provisions)". Barbier and Thompson (1996) focus on the value of water 
recharge function for irrigated agriculture in Hadejia-Jama' are floodplain in 
Northern Nigeria by using a combined hydrological and economic model. They 
conclude that the conservation of the floodplain is more valuable than building a 
dam for irrigated agriculture at the expense of the floodplain. Furthermore, they 
point out that the benefits of floodplains are ignored in many cases and that we 
should correctly evaluate the values of floodplains. Acharya (2000) values the 
Hadejia-Nguru wetlands in northern Nigeria by using the production function 
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approach. Acharya's case study focuses on the aquifer recharge function, which 
has an indirect use value. Barbier (1993) focuses on the groundwater recharge 
function of floodplain wetlands that may have indirect-use value through its 
replenishment of aquifer systems. The groundwater recharged by floodplain 
supplies water for domestic use and agriculture. Acharya and Barbier (2000) study 
the economic values of groundwater recharge functions from the viewpoint of 
agricultural irrigation by use of an economic model of production function 
approach. Cardoch et aI. (2000) focus on the wastewater treatment function and 
conclude that using wetlands for wastewater treatment is more efficient than using 
the traditional method in a case study of the treatment of the wastewater from a 
shrimp processor in Dulac, LA. 
Some papers have attempted to link the ecological services of wetlands to the 
economy more directly. Cattaneo et al. (2001) evaluate wetlands in Ibera 
(Argentine) using a production function approach. Cattaneo et aI.'s model 
includes the interdependence between wetlands-dependent industrial sectors 
through the wetlands, and contains the elements of interdependencies between 
natural and economic processes. Rosegrant et al. (2000) similarly develop a 
hydrologic-economic model for analysing water resource allocation among 
several sectors such as agriculture, industry, and municipal. Emerton et al. (1998) 
point out the significance of Nakivubo wetland (East Africa) for a range of 
small-scale income-generating activities. They refer to wetland resources and 
services as important inputs of the local economy. "Wetland resources: include the 
water, land, soils, plants and animals contained within wetlands, all of which 
provide goods which can be used to generate subsistence, income and 
employment. In Nakivubo, the use of wetland resources for crop cultivation, 
papyrus harvesting, brick-making and fish farming are of particular economic 
importance to surrounding communities ... because they act as a sink for wastes 
and residues and protect human and natural production systems. In Nakivubo, the 
most important wetland service is the purification and treatment of wastewaters. 
This provides economic benefits which accrue throughout Kampala [capital city 
of Uganda]" (Emerton et aI., 1998). They mention that the economic value of 
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wetland goods and services is poorly understood, which is a serious problem. 
2.3.2 Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functions/Services 
In this section, we discuss the interactions between biodiversity, the physio-
chemical environment, hydrology, and ecosystem functions and services. 
Natural floodplains enhance biological productivity. Floodplains have a high 
level of spatio-temporal heterogeneity. They are frequently ecotones (transition 
zones between adjacent patches) and sources of connectivity (the strength of 
interactions across ecotones) (Ward et al., 1999). The connectivity plays an 
important role in providing access to complementary habitats for species that 
require more than one habitat type during their life cycles (Amoros and Bornette, 
2002). In addition, differences in the nature and intensity of hydrological 
connectivity contribute to the spatial heterogeneity of floodplains, which results in 
high alpha, beta and gamma diversity (Amoros and Bornette, 2002). In general, 
they provide habitats or corridors (connections between habitats) for various 
species, which have both direct and indirect use values. 
There are five malO ecosystem functions of natural floodplains as we 
mentioned. They are produced by the interactions of three key factors of 
floodplains: biota (biodiversity), physiochemical environment and hydrology in 
natural floodplains (See Figure 2-1). Floodplain biota is the combination of 
vegetation, animals, insects and microbes. Physiochemical environment means the 
characteristics of sediments, soil chemistry, water chemistry and so on. Hydrology 
implies water level, flow, frequency and so on. 
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When natural floodplains are inundated, fertile soil is deposited on them by 
flood water, which depends on several hydrological elements such as precipitation 
and river flow dynamics. This is important for agriculture historically. In addition, 
it is important for habitats in natural floodplains. The hydrology also determines 
anaerobic or aerobic conditions, redox (reduction and oxidation) conditions and so 
on in soil (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). Floodplain biodiversity is determined 
by hydrology and the physiochemical environment in that it depends on nutrient 
availability and water accessibility, although it is important to note that the level 
of inundation and nutrient availability has both a positive and negative impact on 
biodiversity. Changes in flood pulse cause a change in community structure 
(vegetation composition) which has a dramatic impact on ecosystem functioning, 
and an eventual loss of biodiversity (Capon, 2003). "Species richness, at least in 
the vegetation community, increases as flow through increases. Flowing water can 
be thought of as a stimulus to diversity, probably caused by its ability to renew 
minerals and reduce anaerobic conditions" (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). 
Existing studies tell that species richness declines as various indicators of nutrient 
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availability increase beyond some threshold, but for many community types, the 
threshold beyond which richness declines has not been verified, and high or low 
diversity may occur below that threshold (Bedford et al., 1999). 
In the interactive processes, ecosystem servIces are produced. They are 
determined by the complicated interactions of the three key factors. In these, 
biodiversity plays a core role in providing ecosystem services although we cannot 
say which of the three key factors is the most important. Species (biodiversity) 
play at least two major roles in ecosystems. "First, they mediate energy and 
material flows, and so give ecosystems their functional properties. Second, they 
provide the system with the resilience to respond to events or surprises" (Perrings 
et al., 1995). Certainly, Schmid et al. (2002) mention "a general tendency toward 
increased ecosystem functioning - and the absence of contrasting evidence of 
reduced ecosystem functioning - with increasing plant diversity" based on the 
review of relevant research papers.9 "If each species perfonns well under a unique 
set of environmental conditions with little overlap among species and if 
environmental conditions also vary in space or time, then ecosystem productivity 
and stability should increase with species richness (McNaughton 1993)" (qtd. in 
Wright, 1996). 
Biodiversity plays a principal role in providing ecosystem services, 
depending on the interactions within the biota in itself and between biodiversity 
and the other two key factors of natural floodplains. 
First, species richness is due to the interactions with other key factors. 
Depending on the conditions of hydrology and physiochemical environment, 
some plants flourish, and they provide preconditions for growth of other species 
of vegetation and habitats of animals. Differences in the nature and intensity of 
hydrological connectivity in floodplains contribute to the spatial heterogeneity 
which brings about high alpha, beta and gamma diversity, and differences in 
9 According to their review, the results of many researches show that more diverse plant 
communities had greater resistance to pertmbation than less diverse communities. However, they 
have found that there is no clear pattern for the effects of plant diversity on resilience. 
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connectivity also provide complementary habitats for the parts of life cycles and 
life-cycles of some species (Amoros and Bornette, 2002). For example, riparian 
vegetation in western North America provides habitats for a locally diverse 
avifauna. It functions as the corridor for bird movements that facilitates faunal 
mixing on a broader scale, which influences regional diversity within landscapes 
(Knopf and Samson, 1994). Furthermore, the settlement of some species of 
animals might induce that of other species of animals via the food chain. 
Therefore, the conservation of natural floodplains directly implies the 
conservation of floodplain biodiversity and its growth, because we lose the 
corridors or habitats for species if we develop natural floodplains. 
Next, biodiversity influences the capacity of flood mitigation function. 
Riparian vegetation plays a crucial role in attenuating floods (Fischenich and 
Copeland, 2001). The capacity of flood mitigation function of natural floodplains 
is determined by the condition of vegetation as well as the characteristics of soil 
and hydrological conditions such as moisture. For example, as compared with 
bare floodplains, floodplains with vegetation have relatively bigger capacity to 
mitigate the fierceness of floods because the canopy of plants intercepts 
precipitation (interception) and vascular plants absorb moisture and exhale to the 
atmosphere (transpiration). "The area that vegetation presents to flow IS 
proportional to resistance (measured as Manning's n) and effectiveness at 
reducing flow velocity. This presented vegetational area of vegetation increases 
directly with increased stem size and density .... Plant species differ in their 
tolerance thresholds to flow above which they completely fail and are torn out of 
the ground. As with resistance, plant failure thresholds to flow are highly variable 
depending on the age and size of the plant" (Fischenich and Copeland, 2001). This 
might imply that flood mitigation service increases with more diverse vegetation 
because the effects of vegetation on the function differ in types of vegetation. 
Another example is that water quality improves due to nutrient uptake 
function of vegetation as well as percolation function of soil in floodplains. 
Riparian vegetation plays a vital role in the water quality improvement and 
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nutrient cycling functions of riverine systems (Fischenich and Copeland, 2001). 
For example, nitrogen can be removed through volatilisation as NH3, fixation as 
N2 and denitrification (drained into rivers) as N20 and N2 in soil chemistry. In 
addition, plants in floodplains can take up nitrogen in the form of N03 - after the 
process of nitrification and downward diffusion in soil. Similar processes of 
removal holds true about sulfur and phosphorous. It seems that the uptake 
capacity is enhanced if the flora becomes increasingly abundant, because of 
differences in rooting depth and seasonal activity among species. Ecosystem 
nitrogen retention increases with increasing functional group richness of 
vegetation (Hooper and Vitousek, 1998).10 
In addition, the diversity of vegetation plays a role in supplying carbon to 
downstream aquatic habitats (Brinson 1980). Carbon is assimilated from the 
atmosphere by plants and made available as food to other organisms in the basic 
form of sugars. Animals eat the plants or microbes decompose the litter, 
transferring the energy contained in the sugars up the food chain. Litter and 
leachates from riparian vegetation are flushed into downstream aquatic 
ecosystems by floodwater and groundwater, thereby supplying energy and 
supporting the organisms in those areas" (Fischenich and Copeland, 2001). This 
also supports that the diversity of vegetation in floodplains is a source of the 
diversity of animals, birds, etc. 
Finally, the diversity of vegetation contributes to stabilisation of morphology 
of rivers and floodplains, which also stabilises ecosystem functions of floodplains. 
"Riparian vegetation affects hydraulic and hydrologic functions of streams and 
rivers in several ways. Maintenance of stream morphology is improved by the 
bank stabilization afforded by riparian vegetation" (Fischenich and Copeland, 
2001). In other words, erosion and deposition are both prevented by the diversity 
of vegetation (less erosion means less deposition). As a result, floodplains are kept 
physically stable, which implies that ecosystem functions are also stable. 
10 However. nitrogen-leaching losses do not necessarily decrease with increasing functional group 
richness (Hooper and Vitousek, 1998). 
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2.4 Valuation Methods for Ecosystem Services 
As we mention in the last section, river floodplains are multiple resources 
that provide several ecosystem services. In order to evaluate multiple resources in 
the monetary terms, we need appropriate methods for evaluating multiple 
ecosystem services respectively (de Groot, 1994). Moreover, as these ecosystem 
services are global or local public goods, we cannot use market prices in order to 
value them. Furthermore, the valuation of ecosystem services has not necessarily 
been established and remains a challenging topic. 
2.4.1 Willingness- To-Pay (WTP) Approach 
In general, the values of ecosystem services are divided into three main 
categories: direct-use, indirect-use and non-use value (including option value) 
(Aylward and Barbier, 1992; Barbier, 1993; Freeman, 1993; MaIer et al., 1994). 
Aylward and Barbier (1992) provide a useful table that shows the comparison 
between ecological and economic concepts (See Table 2-2). Based on the concepts, 
they indicate the relationship between the characteristics (concepts) of ecosystem 
and types of values (direct-use, indirect-use and non-use) in the example of 
mUltiple uses of wetlands. Their way of capturing the relationship between them is 
applicable to river floodplains. 
Table 2-2. Ecological and economic concepts 
System Ecosystem concepts Ecological variables Economic concepts 
concepts 
Stocks Structural components Matter, space Goods 
Flows Environmental functions Time, energy Services 
Organization Biological and cultural Diversity Attributes 
diversity 
Source: Aylward and Barbier (1992). Table 1. 
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Figure 2-2. Types ofvalues and methods 
l Total economic value 1 
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Source: Barbier (1993). Fig. 1. 
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The relation between types of values and methods of valuing them is often 
provided (Freeman, 1991; Aylward and Barbier, 1992; Barbier, 1993; Goulder and 
Kennedy, 1997) (See Figure 2-2). We should note that we could not necessarily 
utilise these methods for the purpose of evaluating values of ecosystem services. 
Aylward and Barbier (1992) mention that WTP may be directly estimated through 
contingent valuation methods, hedonic prices and so forth, but that these 
techniques might be less applicable to most tropical wetlands in developing 
countries. Moreover, we do not believe that we can completely calculate total 
economic value by using all the methods available in the figure. On the theoretical 
side, acquisition of reliable and complete information is always possible, but 
observing NOAA guidelines strictly makes contingent valuation methods 
expensive and time consuming on the practical side (Portney 1994). It is often 
pointed out that the contingent valuation method focuses on preferences of 
particular people but does not necessarily reflect the ecological importance of 
ecosystem goods and services (Costanza and Farber, 1984; Gatto and de Leo, 
2000). Peoples' preferences are changeable, but economists have no theoretical 
basis for analysing how preferences change. However, even if the valuation is not 
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complete, it is much better than no valuation. Chavas (2000) remarks that 
rejecting valuation would severely limit our ability to assess environmental 
decisions. 
de Groot (1994) provides an ambitious overview of the relationship between 
ecosystem functions and valuation methods from the perspective that it is difficult 
to solve current environmental problems unless the information on ecosystem 
functions is structurally integrated into the planning and decision-making 
processes. We should note that de Groot focuses on ecosystem 'functions' rather 
than ecosystem' services'. de Groot defines ecosystem functions as the capacity of 
natural processes and components to provide goods and services that satisfy 
human needs directly and/or indirectly. He distinguishes four categories of 
ecosystem functions: (1) "Regulation functions: this group of functions relate to 
the capacity of natural and semi-natural ecosystems to regulate essential 
ecological processes and life support systems which, in turn, contributes to the 
maintenance of a healthy environment by providing clean air, water, and soil"; (2) 
"Carrier functions: natural and semi-natural ecosystems provide space and a 
suitable substrate or medium for many human activities such as habitation, 
cultivation and recreation"; (3) "Production functions: nature provides many 
resources, ranging from food and raw materials for industrial use to energy 
resources and genetic material"; and (4) "Information functions: natural 
ecosystems contribute to the maintenance of mental health by providing 
opportunities for reflection, spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, and 
aesthetic experience" (de Groot, 1994). 
Furthermore, de Groot provides a table that indicates the relation between 
types of socio-economic values and valuation methods (see Table 2-3). According 
to the table, the relation seems to be clear, but it is complicated. de Groot 
mentions that it is impossible to add the seven values in order to obtain one total 
monetary value because the seven values are not comparable and that we should 
use each value independently in the decision-making process. 
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Table 2-3 Types of socio economic values and v It' th d . - a ua lOn me o s 
Types of 
socia-















Source: de Groot (1994). Figure 9.4. 
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#: The existence value could be quantified by these techniques, but it is argued that it is principally wrong to 
put a monetary price on this value. 
*: Is usually derived from a surrogate market price. 
It is often observed that WTP approaches convert all the values of ecosystem 
functions or services into one monetary value. Since some environmental goods 
and services are too difficult to convert the monetary value, they are not 
sufficiently considered in cost-benefit analyses (Gatto and de Leo, 2000). Gatto 
and de Leo insist that multi-criteria analysis is much better than cost-benefit 
analysis because multi-criteria analysis can treat the value of non-market goods 
and services without converting the value to the monetary value. However, the 
valuation in multi-criteria analysis also depends on preferences. If so, we have to 
measure or stipulate the shape of indifference curve practically and theoretically 
for using the method. In addition, the trade-off relationships are still ambiguous if 
we cannot compare the values between market and non-market goods on the 
practical side. Therefore, multi-criteria analysis is not necessarily better than 
cost-benefit analysis and contingent valuation. 
There is another way of dividing total economic value: primary and 
secondary values (Gren et aI., 1994; Turner et al. 1995; Crooks et aI., 2001). 
Primary value refers to the development and maintenance of ecosystems or their 
self-organizing capacity. Secondary values are defined as the outputs, life-support 
Chapter 2. Foundation of Thesis 61 
functions and services, generated by wetlands. Then, referring to the two values, 
Gren et al. (I994) provide three case studies and conclude that only part of the 
total wetland value can be captured in monetary terms. Based on Crooks et al. 
(2001), primary value is treated as total systems value, which is not a component 
of total economic value. The total value of ecosystem is composed of total 
economic value and total systems value. The notion of primary value is interesting, 
but it is ambiguous in terms of valuation especially in a practical context. In 
particular, it is vague how we should distinguish between primary and secondary 
values practically. We also worry about the problem of double-counting. How 
should we evaluate primary value separately? Furthennore, it is not obvious why 
the classification between primary and secondary values is advantageous for 
valuing ecosystems. 
The relation between valuation and social goals is of importance (Costanza 
and Falke, 1997; Costanza, 2000) (see Table 2-4). The point is that valuation of 
ecosystems should be based on the following three goals: (1) ecological 
sustainability, (2) social fairness, and (3) economic efficiency. Costanza and Folke 
(1997) discuss a conceptual model that incorporates the three criteria as goals of 
policies and mention that we cannot give a value without choosing the goal. 
Table 2-4. Social goals and valuation 
Level of Level of Goal or Preference Scientific Specific 
Value Basis Who Votes Basis Discussion Input Methods Required Required 
Current Willingness 
Efficiency Homo individual Low Low 
economicus preferences to pay 
Homo Community ~dium Veil of Fairness 
communicus preferences High ignorance 
Homo 
Whole 
fllbdeling with Susta ina bility 
naturalis system M!dium High precaution preferences 
Source: Costanza and Folke (1997). Table 4.1., and Costanza (2000). Table 1. 
Let us discuss the production function approach. Ellis and Fisher (1987) 
show the processes of using a production function approach, in which 
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environmental goods are treated as an input of the production of marketed or 
marketable goods. They mention that the approach is firmly rooted in the welfare 
theory accepted by most economists and that this approach has the advantage of 
relying primarily on production or cost data. However, there is disadvantage on 
this approach. On the practical side, we need a demand function of marketed 
goods. We are required to estimate a compensated demand function in order to get 
rid of income effects, but we cannot directly estimate a compensated demand 
function because we cannot directly observe utility functions (Willig, 1976). 
Maler et al. (1994) provide production function approach to put monetary value 
on multifunctional ecosystems. They enumerate four advantages of production 
function approach: "[1] [The production function is more stable than the utility 
function.] Even if preferences for different goods change over time because of 
various exogenous factors, it is less likely that the production function will change, 
except for changes in the technical knowledge. [2J Furthermore, one could 
reasonably assume that the production function is constant across different 
individuals, while preferences are not. [3] Next, information on the production 
function may be obtained through observing technologies which in general will be 
simpler than by observing preferences. [4] Finally, all established approaches to 
value resources through observations on market behavior - artificial markets, 
travel cost methods, hedonic methods, etc. - can be characterized through a 
priori assumptions on the production function". Barbier (2000) gives a concise 
summary about two types of production approaches (static and dynamic 
approaches). He explains the general approach in the following. "The general 
approach consists of a two-step procedure. First, the physical effects of changes in 
a biological resource or ecological function on an economic activity are 
determined. Second, the impact of these environmental changes is valued in tenus 
of the corresponding activity. In other words, the biological resource or ecological 
function is treated as an 'input' into the economic activity, and like any other input, 
its value can be equated with its impact on the productivity of any marketed 
output" (Barbier, 2000). 
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2.4.2 Energy-based Approach 
We have an energy-based (EA) approach that is an alternative to WTP 
approaches. WTP approaches are based on human demand while EA approaches 
are based on natural system supply (Costanza and Farber, 1984). 
Costanza and Farber (1984) provide a good survey of energy-based 
approaches as compared with WTP approaches. There are three major 
assumptions on energy-based approach: (1) Sunlight is only a primary input to the 
system; (2) Energy-accounting is possible based on the primary input; and (3) 
More importantly, the energy embodied in both natural and human products 
would correlate with their economic value if all market imperfections were 
removed. Biological productivity or gross photosynthesis of the whole ecosystem 
has been used as an index of its embodied energy, which assumes independence of 
ecosystems. However, the assumption is so often invalid, and we need the 
complete description of ecosystem interconnections to calculate the energy costs 
(Costanza and Farber, 1984). Not to mention, it is (nearly) impossible to get 
complete, quantitative information on ecosystem interactions. The most critical 
weakness of energy-based approach lies in the hypothesis that energy embodied in 
both natural and human products would correlate with their economic value. In 
addition, it is difficult to find the exact correlation between them. More concretely, 
we have little information on what variable we should choose as an energy 
measure and a converter into economic value. 
Folke (I 991) indicates the usefulness of energy-based approach as a 
complementary method. "An energy analysis is one approach for comparing the 
work of "nature" with the work of "the economy", and which makes it possible to 
consider environmental functions which seldom have a market and on which the 
general public seldom have perfect information .... The approach is useful as a 
complement to economic analysis ... " (Folke, 1991). 
Farber and Costanza (1987) apply both energy-based and WTP approaches to 
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the valuation of wetlands. They find that WTP approach underestimates the value 
while energy-based approach overestimates them. 
Odum and Odum (2000) insist that we should value the economy on the 
same basis as the work of the environment although many economists try to 
measure the value of the environment in the economic terms. Then, they provide 
an interesting idea: "emergy (not energy)". Emergy expresses all numbers in one 
kind of energy (for example, solar energy) required to produce designated goods 
and services. They provide EMDOLLAR as an example. "EMDOLLARS, the 
economic equivalent of emergy, is defined as the GNP equivalent to emergy 
contributions (conversion: 1.16 trillion solar emjouls per 1997 US dollar). A 
recent calculation by Brown and Ulgiati (1999) found two-thirds of the global 
wealth produced each year to come from emergy of fuel use and one-third from 
the emergy of renewable energy of nature" (Odum and Odum, 2000). However, 
we cannot clearly capture how much value they are by using the unit emergy. In 
addition, it is ambiguous why emergy is better than WTP methods. 
2.4. 3 Marginal Value vs. Total Value 
How much value do ecosystems provide us globally? Costanza et al. (1997) 
famously tried to calculate the total economic value of ecosystem services on the 
earth by using the results of over 100 existing studies. They concluded that the 
value was in the range of US$ 16-54 trillion per year, with an average of US$ 33 
trillion per year. This is controversial as well as sensational, and provoked several 
criticisms. 
First, several researchers have stressed the importance of the infrastructure of 
the ecosystem itself as a contributor to its total value. Costanza et al (1997) 
themselves mention that this component of the value is not included in their 
analysis. This value is called 'primary value' in some papers (Gren et al., 1994; 
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Turner et al., 1995). However, the reason why the distinction between primary and 
secondary values is important is ambiguous because we cannot estimate primary 
value of ecosystems directly and separately. The classification is not practical but 
conceptual. 
Second, there is a problem on consumer surplus of ecosystem services. "Here, 
the demand [marginal willingness-to-pay] approaches infinity as the quantity 
available approaches zero (or some minimum necessary level of services), and the 
consumer surplus (as well as the total economic value) approaches infinity. 
Demand curves for ecosystem services are very difficult, if not impossible, to 
estimate in practice" (Costanza et aI., 1997). If so, the shape of the demand curve 
means that it is of no use to estimate the value of ecosystem services because it 
assumes that the value of ecosystem services is infinite and that the value is 
always larger than that of other goods and services. In addition, "It may well be 
true that the 'consumer surplus' of ecosystem services is far more than all other 
economic goods and services put together. However, paradoxically, this cannot be 
true of the PQP [price-quantity product] proxy. In an evolutionary equilibrium the 
shadow price of most ecological services, supplied at optimum levels, would be 
zero. For practical purposes, the cost of control and maintenance of environmental 
capital is the best proxy for the value of the service flows derived therefrom" 
(Ayres, 1998). Furthermore, Hueting et al. (1998) insist that supply and demand 
curves in Costanza et aI's paper are both irrelevant. The supply curve that is 
perpendicular to abscissa means that "the services of the function can be supplied 
without costs up to the perpendicular". However, this is contradictory to economic 
theory and empirical fact on the environment. Supply curve must reflect on 
opportunity costs because provision of ecosystem functions incurs costs of 
restoring or maintaining at least. 
Third, more importantly, the total value of ecosystems in itself does not make 
sense (Goulder and Kennedy 1997; Opschoor, 1998; Serafy, 1998; Dasgupta et al., 
2000; Heal, 2000). Costanza et aI. (1997) themselves mention that it is instructive 
and meaningful to estimate the 'incremental' or 'marginal' value of ecosystem 
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services. Considering life-supporting ecosystem services, human beings cannot 
exist without them. Their total (absolute) value must be infinite. Thus, the total 
value is non-sense. We should consider how and how much the change in quantity 
or quality of ecosystem services influences on the economic welfare. Dasgupta et 
aI. (2000) provide critical comments. "However, the latter estimate [Costanza et 
aI., 1997J should cause us to balk because if crucial environmental services were 
to cease, life would not exist. However, who would be there to receive $33 trillion 
of annual benefits if humanity were to exchange its very existence for them? 
Almost paradoxically, perhaps, the total value of the world's ecosystem services 
has no meaning and, therefore, is of no use, even though the value of incremental 
changes to those ecosystems not only has meaning - it also has use" (Dasgupta 
et aI., 2000). Heal (2000) insists that economic valuation should focus on only the 
marginal value of ecosystem service and it cannot evaluate the total value of 
ecosystem service although we know how to do it. Heal provides another reason 
that market-based prices tell us only the value to society of a small amount more 
or less of a service based on its scarcity and do not indicate the overall 
contribution of the service. Heal also mentions that economic valuation is more 
concerned with prices than with values or importance by using the paradox of 
water and diamonds. II Then, Heal mentions that it is much more important to 
provide incentives to conserve ecosystems than to carry out economic valuations. 
We understand and agree on the point that incentives are critical for conservation. 
We need economic valuation in order to provide appropriate incentives to 
conserve ecosystems. Some economic activities that have a negative effect on the 
environment are also necessary for our economic welfare. That is why we should 
balance our economic activities and conservation. For the purpose, we need to 
know the marginal value of ecosystem services. 
11 c.r. Smith (1993). 
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2.4.4 Valuation of Wetlands 
In this section, let us review several papers on valuation of wetlands. Farber 
and Costanza (1987) estimate the social value of a wetland system in Louisiana 
coastal zone. They use the WTP measurement methods such as CVM and travel 
cost method, and furthermore use energy analysis method for comparison. WTP 
measurement tends to underestimate the value because some values such as flood 
protection value, option value and existence value are not evaluated. On the 
contrary, energy analysis tends to overestimate value because it includes things 
that are of little use to the society or the economy. 
Costanza et al. (1989) have tried to evaluate multi-functional values of 
wetlands, but the point of 'multi-functional resource' is ambiguous. The 
difficulties of valuation of wetlands, especially as compared with other ecological 
goods and services, lie in the multi-functionality. Externalities and tradeoffs are 
the source of the difficulties. 
F olke (1991) analyses the societal value of a Swedish wetland system with 
respect to the various economic functions by using two valuation methods: 
replacement costs approach and GPP (gross primary production) approach. He 
acknowledges that both valuation techniques consider only a part of values of 
life-supporting functions. He concludes that we need more development of 
valuation methods that especially can catch the values of life-supporting 
functions. 
About tropical wetlands, Barbier (1993) emphasizes the importance of 
indirect-use value derived from supporting economic activities that have directly 
measurable values. 
de Groot (1994) provides meaningful implication for wetland functions, 
which is useful for our research on river floodplains. "The most important wetland 
functions for which a monetary value can be calculated are (1) flood prevention, 
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(2) storage and recycling of human waste, (3) nursery value, (4) aquaculture and 
recreation, (5) food production and (6) education and science uses" (de Groot, 
1994). 
Barbier (1994) uses the production function approach for the total valuation 
of tropical wetlands. He tries to value various regulatory ecological functions of 
tropical wetlands that have important indirect use values such as the groundwater 
recharge function. 
Turner et aI. (1995) present three case studies on the valuation of wetlands 
functions. The first focuses on the support function value of a Swedish wetland. 
The second is an application of the contingent valuation method to the Broadland 
wetlands in the UK. The third focuses on the biophysical and economic measures 
of the island of Gotland in Sweden. 
Gren et aI. (1995) try to estimate the values of multiple ecosystem services of 
Danube floodplains. However, they have faced the serious problems of data 
availability and model availability. Then, they try to estimate them by using 
relevant results of other researches. An important finding is that the value of the 
land as a nutrient sink accounts for about one-half of the total value. 
Mitsch and Gosselink (2000a) consider some hypotheses about the 
relationship between the value of wetlands and the importance of scale and 
landscape settings. In so doing, they maintain that we should capture the values of 
wetlands at three levels of ecological hierarchy: population, ecosystem and 
biosphere (See Table 2-5). They conclude that a wetland with moderate economic 
development will have the largest value because the healthy functions of wetlands 
and human population can co-exist in balance. 
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Table 2-5. Values of wetlands 
Ecological Scale Value 
Animal harvested for pelts 
Waterfowl and other birds 
Population Fish and shellfish 




Ecosystem .tIquifer recharge 




Biosphere Sulfur cycle Carbon cycle 
Phosphorus cycle 
Source: Mitsch and Gosselink (2000a). Table 1, 
2.4.5 Some Problems of Valuing Multiple Resources 
We have some common problems of valuing multiple resources. To begin 
with, we should be careful about two major difficulties when we evaluate multiple 
resources in particular in the case of applying the production function approach: 
double-counting and trade-offs (Aylward and Barbier, 1992; Barbier, 1994; 
Barbier, 2000). 
Aylward and Barbier (1992) provide an example of coastal wetlands' nutrient 
retention function to explain the problem of double-counting. Their nutrient 
retention service supports shrimp production within the wetland area. Thus, if the 
full value of the shrimp production is already accounted for as a direct-use value 
of the wetland's resources, adding the share of the value of the nutrient retention 
service as an indirect-use value and aggregating to obtain total economic value 
will double count this indirect-use value. The point is that the values of multiple 
uses that are counted should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustible. 
They also give an example of forest ecosystems to explain the problem of 
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trade-offs. The forest provides direct-use and indirect-use values that consist of 
timber, non-timber products and off-site watershed protection seIVice. If the fuII 
value of timber benefits can only be obtained through clean-cutting the forest land, 
simply adding other values of non-timber products and off-site watershed 
protection seIVice to the value of timber to obtain the total economic value will 
over-estimate the value of forest ecosystem. The reason is that getting all the 
timber products implies the loss of values from non-timber products and 
watershed protection service. There is a trade-off between them. The essence is 
that we should precisely focus on the marginal benefits and costs related to 
economic decisions or activities. 
Aylward and Barbier (I992) point out other problems on valuing ecosystem 
seIVices. They mention that the most effective second-best method of determining 
the value of protective environmental functions is to estimate the damage costs 
that are currently being avoided. However, they point out the defect that we are 
required to do substantial fieldwork, data analysis and modelling for estimating 
the costs. In addition, they argue that we should use replacement costs and related 
methods with scepticism. The problem lies in the implicit assumption of the 
methods. The assumption is that the benefits of the replacement exceed the costs 
of providing these benefits. However, this assumption is contradictory to the fact 
that the benefit-cost ratio for the replacement can be neither equal to nor greater 
than one because the replacement incurs costs to reproduce the benefits that are 
freely provided by ecosystems. 
We have another problem related to uncertainty and irreversibility. Chavas 
(2000) mentions that the valuation of ecosystems might produce wrong 
conclusions about the choice of an optimal policy if we ignore uncertainty and 
irreversibility that are related to the incompleteness of valuation. We need to 
identify circumstances leading to irreversible states that have significant adverse 
effects on human welfare in the long run and implement appropriate policies to 
avoid such irreversible situations. Moreover, we are often not fully aware of our 
indirect uses of ecosystems due to lack of information, true uncertainty, ecological 
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knowledge and data (Gren et aI., 1994). 
2.5 Ecological Economic Modelling 
2.5.1 Ecological Economic Models 
"The environmental resource base upon which all economic actIvIty 
ultimately depends includes ecological systems that produce a wide variety of 
services" (Arrow et aI., 1995). Arrow et ai. (2000) mention that the management 
of ecological systems is not beyond the reach of economic analysis, but they insist 
that we should develop new dimensions of economic theories and we should make 
much of the interconnection between economics and ecology. On the other hand, 
they indicate that the simplification of models is important for understanding the 
interdependencies among economic and natural factors because ecosystems are 
highly complex. Based on this perspective, we develop a hydrological, ecological, 
economic model in our research. Bockstael et aI. (1995) try to explain the 
direction of the project of building an ecological economic model including 
ecology, economics and spatial analysis. They pose a number of questions that 
should be solved in the proj ect: how ecosystems function; how they are affected 
by human activity; what determines human uses and human intervention into 
ecosystems; and how this is affected, among other things, by the ecosystem's 
characteristics and regulatory paradigms. In this thesis, we develop an 
interdisciplinary integrated model to clarify hydrological, ecological and 
economic interactions in floodplains and identify relevant policy options from the 
viewpoint. 
Braat and van Lierop (1986 and 1987) provide an interesting review of 
economic-ecological models by using questionnaires and interviews, which cover 
more than 100 models. They discuss the technical structures of the 
economic-ecological models, the characteristics of environmental and resource 
Chapter 2. Foundation of Thesis 72 
problems, technical problems and institutional problems of the modelling, and the 
ways of dealing with them. They derive three points from the survey: (1) the 
majority of models in the survey are complex, integrated ecological-economic 
models; (2) in the class of complex models completely dynamic models dominate 
(63%); and (3) for ecological policy issues simulation modelling occurs most 
frequently while for economic issues optimisation techniques are mostly used. 
Likewise, we use both of them for normative and policy analyses in this research. 
Recently, the possibility of computer simulation in ecological economic modelling 
has attracted researchers' attentions due to its flexibility and the advancement of 
computer technology. In our research, we rely on computer simulations. 
Let us review recent integrated models. Based on the Gordon-Schaefer 
model (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1954), Clark (I 990) provides a sophisticated and 
thorough ecological-economic models, in which economic choices take account of 
biological growth functions in the dynamic context. Rosegrant et al. (2000) 
provide a hydrologic-economic model for analysing the water resource among 
several sectors such as agriculture, industry, and municipal. The model focuses on 
how we should allocate the water resources to various uses. The interesting point 
is that both water quantity and water quality in terms of salinity are included in 
the simulation model in which the salt concentration in the return flow from , 
irrigated areas is explicitly calculated. That allows the endogenous consideration 
of the externality between upstream and downstream irrigation districts. Barbier 
(1994) provides an ecological-economic dynamic optimisation model as a form of 
production function that considers ecological services of tropical wetlands. 
Barbier and Strand (1997) provide a similar model, and mention that a mangrove 
is an important and essential input into the shrimp fishery in the Campeche, 
Mexico. Krysanova and Kaganovich (I994) develop a model for a watershed's 
ecological and economic systems analysis, which determines how to manage 
water and land resources for ecologically sustainable development. They insist 
that systems analysis and computer simulation are the best tools for understanding 
the functions and management of integrated ecological economic systems. Eppink 
et aI. (2004) provide a scenario simulation analysis on the relationship between 
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biodiversity and land use on a non-optimisation hybrid model. van den Bergh et al. 
(2004) provide a model that heuristically integrates a water quantity model, a 
water quality model and an ecological model. Using the integrated model, they 
evaluate three scenarios of land-use: the intensification of agriculture, the nature 
scenario (converting agricultural lands into nature areas) and the recreation 
scenario (converting lands into nature areas and designing them for recreation). 
Interestingly, they give three indicators for evaluating and ranking the scenarios: 
NPY, spatial equity and environmental quality. They conclude that the recreation 
scenario is the most-preferred one and that Nature scenario becomes the most 
preferred one only if the weight assigned to NPV is substantially reduced. Deal 
and Schunk (2004) develop an integrated large-scale computer model to assess the 
economic impacts of urban land use transformation. Chopra and Adhikari (2004) 
provide a dynamic simulation model to investigate the linkage between ecological 
relationships and economic value in the context of a wetland in Northern India. 
They show that the economic value substantially depends on ecological health 
indices. 
2.5.2 Optimisation 
In our research, we set up a static model and a dynamic model, and then we 
mathematically optimise them respectively. Techniques for static optimisation are 
familiar in economics. Thus, we do not discuss them here. 12 However, dynamic 
optimisation is not necessarily familiar although it has been established especially 
in financial economics, development economics and resource economics. 
Most relevant here are contributions by Clark (1973 and 1990) and Conrad 
and Clark (1987), which show the application of the optimal control theory to 
renewable and non-renewable resources (mainly, the fishery model). Ehui et al. 
(1990) provide a two-sector dynamic model that treats the problem of the 
12 c.f. Chiang (1984); Lambert (1985); Dixit (1990); Leonard and Long (1992); Hoy et al. (2001). 
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trade-off between current and future interests, taking account of the interactions 
between deforestation and agricultural productivity. We provide a similar dynamic 
model in the context of river floodplains. 
2.5.3 Hydrological Models 
Over the last three decades, hydrologic simulation models have advanced 
with the help of the development of computer hardware and software. 
Hydrological simulation models have the advantage that "many alternative 
schemes for development or flood control can be quickly tested and compared 
with simulation models" (Bedient and Huber, 2000). In addition, "[hJydrologic 
models allow for parameter variations in space and time through the use of 
well-known numerical methods. Complex rainfall patterns and heterogeneous 
basins can be simulated with relative ease if watershed and hydrologic data are 
sufficient, and various design and control schemes can be tested with the models" 
(Bedient and Huber, 2000). Bedient and Huber (2000) survey both hydrological 
simulation models and GIS based models. They identify six major categories of 
watershed analysis models: Jumped parameter vs. distributed parameter, event vs. 
continuous, and stochastic vs. deterministic. Lumped parameter models are black 
box models that transfonn actual rainfall input data into runoff output data. An 
example of the lumped parameter model is Snyder or Clark UH (unit hydrograph). 
Distributed parameter models describe physical processes and mechanism in 
space. They have been recently connected to the more advanced GIS and digital 
elevation models. An example of this model is the Kinematic wave model. Event 
models are simulation models of rainfall-runoff from single storm events. The 
examples are HEC-I Flood Hydrograph Package, HEC-HMS, SWMM, SCS 
TR-20 and so on. HEC-l and HEC-HMS have been used for most floodplain 
computations in the United States. The newest version of HEC-RAS can treat the 
unsteady flow model (one-dimensional). Bedient and Huber (2000) summarise the 
family of hydrological simulation models (See Table 2-6 and 2-7). 
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Spatial data are significant for hydrological models. Therefore, hydrological 
models should be GIS-based if possible. In particular, digital elevation models 
(DEM) are important. Thus, some models mentioned above are directly connected 
with some GIS models or software. HEC-GeoHMS and HEC-GeoRAS are 
well-known examples, which are useful for analysing river floodplains. 
"HEC-GeoRAS was used to develop digital floodplains that were analyzed in 
ArcView for the purpose of comparing various flood control options and 
displaying these results directly onto Digital Orthophoto Quadrangles (DOQs)" 
(Bedient and Huber, 2000). In addition, they can be connected with Arc/Info, the 
oldest and still one of the most powerful GIS software applications. In our 
research, we do not use the hydrologic software program integrated with GIS, but 
we use HEC-HMS and GIS data with ArcGIS. 13 
Table 2-6. Model type and example 
Model Type Exam pie of Mode I 
Lumped parameter Snyder or Clark UH 
Distributed Kinematic wave 
Event HEC-1, HEC-HMS, SWrvtv1, SCS TR-20 
Continuous Stanford model, SWMM, HSPF, STORM 
Physically based HEC-1, HEC-HMS, SWMM, HSPF 
Stochastic Synthetic streamflows 
Numerical Kinematic or dynamic wave models 
Anal~ical Rational Method, Nash IUH 
Source: Bedient and Huber (2000), p.315 
Table 2-7. Selected simulation models in hydrology 
Model Author Date Description 
Stanford Model Crawford and Linsley 1966 Stanford Watershed Model 
HEC-1 HEC 1973,1981,1990 Flood h~rograph package 
HEC-2 HEC 1976,1982,1990 Water surface profiles 
HEC-HMS HEC 1998,2001 H~rologic modeling system (replace HEC-1) 
HEC-RAS HEC 1995,2000 River Analysis system (replace HEC-2) 
SCS-TR20 USDASCS 1984 H~rologic simulation model 
HSPF Johanson et al. 1984 H~rological Simulation Program - FORTRAN 
SWWM Huber and Dickinson 1971,1988 Storm Water Management Model 
DWOPER NWS, Fread 1978 NWS operational dynam ic wave model 
UNET Barkau 1992 One-dimensional dynamic wave 
Source: Bedient and Huber (2000), p. 318 
13 ArcGIS is the newest GIS software program, which integrates ArcView and Arc/Info. 
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We review some papers on hydrological models related to our research. 
Ogawa and Male (1986) provide an important analysis for our research. They 
evaluate the capacity of flood mitigation function of upstream wetlands and 
downstream wetlands by using existing computer simulation models (HEC-l and 
HEC-2). They provide an interesting conclusion that the flood mitigation function 
of wetlands is important for downstream flood protected area, but that 
downstream main-stem wetlands are more effective in reducing downstream 
flooding than upstream wetlands. In brief, the extent of flood mitigation function 
depends on the size of wetland, the location of wetland and the relative location of 
wetland to protected areas (Ogawa and Male, 1986). Ford and Oto (1989) provide 
the logic and procedures of a branch-and-bound enumeration approach for 
choosing an optimal (economically the most efficient l4 ) management option. 
They use the HEC software such as HEC-l, HEC-2, SID and HEC-DSS, and the 
inputs into the programs are the discharge CDF, elevation-discharge, and 
elevation-damage functions for the location of interest. Kuchment et al. (1996) 
apply a physically based distributed rainfall-runoff model to the basin of River 
Ouse (our research area). They create a model for the Ouse basin and evaluate the 
accuracy of prediction and the possibility of using as a simulating model. They 
find that the model can simulate catchment outflows satisfactorily with 
hydrologically meaningful estimates of internal variables given. Olsen et al. 
(2000) provide a dynamic model for choosing an optimal mix of floodplain 
management options. The model is formulated as a Markov decision process. The 
model can evaluate multiple objectives at the same time by use of weighting 
factors. The uniqueness of the model lies in the point that the model can take 
account of non-stationary trends such as hydrological conditions and economic 
development for sequential decision-making although the traditional cost-benefit 
approach assumes those factors are constant for the life of the project. Lund 
(2002) provides a model for choosing the optimal mix of floodplain management 
options within a probabilistic framework. The objective is to choose the options in 
order to minimize expected annual damages and flood management expenses. 
14 The word "efficient" here is different from that in economics (allocative efficiency). This word 
here means "the most cost-saving" or "the cheapest", which is similar to technical efficiency in 
economics. 
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Lund attempts to provide an answer to the following two questions. "Given a 
probability distribution of inundation flows or stages for a floodplain, what 
nonstructural floodplain management options should be undertaken? And, what is 
the economic value of a changed set of probabilistic inundation levels, as might 
arise from the operation of a system of levees, reservoirs, and channel 
improvements?" (Lund, 2002). AI-Sabhan et al. (2003) review the current status 
of spatial hydrological models, and then mention that we should develop the 
real-time Web-based flood prediction system linked with GIS and other 
hydrological models in stead of relying on the stand-alone hydrological models 
because the stand-alone models are complex, non-u ser-fri endly and 
time-consuming. White and Howe (2002) discuss policies against floods in 
England. They have contended that the recent planning policies of development 
lead to the increasing risks of flooding because they do not adequately take all the 
factors into consideration. Flooding has occurred due to the interactions among 
natural, social, economic, political, ecological factors. 
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that treats 
the problem of floodplain management in an integrated way from the hydrological, 
ecological and economic point of view. This is our research target although it is 
challenging. 
2.6 Conclusion of Chapter 2 
Based on the literature review, we have to solve the following three problems 
in this thesis. First, we have to clarify the real problem of floodplain management 
and to show how we should consider it. The theory of market failure has been 
established, but it is still ambiguous what is the essential problem in individual 
environmental problems practically. We clarify two types of environmental 
externalities related to ecosystem services of floodplains and derive the optimal 
conditions by developing a model. 
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Second, we have to provide an interdisciplinary integrated model that 
enables us to identify appropriate policy options in the practical context of 
floodplain management. In each field of ecology, biology and hydrology, our 
knowledge on ecosystem functions has been accumulating. On the other hand, the 
researches on valuation of ecosystem services have been carried out, although 
valuation of ecosystem services is still a challenging topic. However, even if we 
can understand that ecosystem services are important, we cannot optimally 
manage environmental and ecological resources in the social and economic 
contexts without relevant integrated models. In order to solve real environmental 
problems, we need to understand environmental and economic interactions. 
Indeed, there are such attempts, but they are not sufficient and studies on 
individual environmental problems remain to be done. In this respect, this thesis 
provides a hydrological, ecological and economic model that enables us to 
implement policy simulations for the optimal floodplain management. 
Third, we have to evaluate potential policy options under some real situations 
and identify appropriate policies for the optimal floodplain management in the 
practical context. In theory, several market based policies and command-and-
control approaches are equivalently effective as long as they fully internalise 
externalities. However, the real conditions are different from those in theory in 
individual environmental problems. In fact, the evaluation of potential policy 
options has been discussed in various cases, but we have not achieved a definite 
conclusion about them. Therefore, in this thesis we test a number of policy options 
for the optimal floodplain management by computer simulations in the concrete 
context of the Ouse catchment. 
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Chapter 3 
Static Decision Model of River 
Floodplains 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a static decision model of 
hydrological, ecological and economic interactions in river floodplains. We need a 
static model to clarify the essential problems in real situations of floodplain 
development and relevant policies. The problems are: (a) what types of 
externalities should we manage? (specification and estimation of externalities); 
(b) what policies are workable under what situations? (uncertainties about 
measurement and structure, and the effectiveness of alternative policy 
instruments) 
We derive the socially optimal conditions, and clarify the problem of 
externalities by comparing them with private optimal conditions. The socially 
optimal conditions become an essential benchmark. The model includes the values 
of ecosystem services of river floodplains, although the latter are simplified into 
an aggregate function. Moreover, we focus on flood mitigation service in order to 
simplify the model and to shed light on the particular problem of the 
unidirectional spatial externality related to flood mitigation service. 
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3.2 Model Settings 
We have to set several conditions and limitations as presuppositions of the 
model in advance in order to simplify the model. They are crucial in that they 
detennine whether we can handle the model (tractability) and that they detennine 
the range that the model can explain (limitations of the model). 
• There are two control variables. One is the size of the developed floodplains 
(development of floodplains). The other is the scale of averting behaviour 
such as building dykes, banks, bunds, floodwalls and so on. 
• We can set some other variables as control variables. For example, land use 
patterns outside floodplains have an impact on flood risk through a change in 
imperviousness of land. However, we assume them as exogenous variables 
for the time being in order to focus on floodplain management. 
• The total size of floodplain is fixed, and is defined by the 100-year floodplain 
(1 % chance of flooding each year). Strictly speaking, the size of floodplains 
will change over time in the long tenn even if it is defined by the same notion, 
but we assume that it is constant in the model. 
• The type of floodplain development has different effects on ecosystem 
functions that natural floodplains have. For example, the development into 
industrial areas reduces the capacity of mitigating floods more than that into 
agricultural areas. However, we do not distinguish among various types of 
development in the model. We distinguish just between natural and developed 
floodplains. We assume that the aggregate value of ecosystem services and 
the capacity of flood mitigation (or the flood risk) depend on the size of 
development (the size of remaining natural floodplains). 1 
• The cost of floodplain development is not the same as that of floodplain 
restoration. Therefore, the solution of an optimisation problem depends on 
initial conditions with respect to the size of developed floodplains and natural 
1 In the process of calibrating parameters of an applied model, we consider different types of 
development although we adhere to the dichotomy. At least, we must categorize real situations of 
floodplains into natural or developed floodplains. 
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floodplains. However, we assume the initial condition that all the floodplains 
are natural in the static model, in which we can ignore the cost of floodplain 
restoration. This assumption tells us to what extent we should develop 
floodplains from the original situation. Nevertheless, initial conditions are 
significant for solving practical problems. Thus, we are going to consider 
initial conditions and the cost of floodplain restoration in the dynamic context 
in the next chapter. 
• We assume that the society is risk-neutral. Individuals are risk-averse while 
organizations including governments and societies are risk-neutral. 
3.3 Mathematical Notation 
The following notation is used in the model. 
i : the zone number. We divide a catchment into several zones (subbasins). The 
zone numbers are given to each zone from upstream to downstream in 
ascending order (see figure 3-1). 
Fieure 3-1. Concept a/zone (subbasin) number 
upstream 
downstream 
m : the total number of zones. 
X' : the size of developed floodplains (the size of development in floodplains). 
EF : the size of floodplains which include natural and developed floodplains. It 
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is assumed constant. 
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d : the area potentially protected by averting behaviour. The area is detennined 
by the scale of averting behaviour. 2 See figure 3-2. The area potentially 
protected should be given by a function of height and length of averting 
behaviour (e.g. floodwalls, banks, bunds or so). In fact, we directly control 
the scale of averting behaviour, and indirectly control the area potentially 
2 The reason why we indicate, "potentially protected" is that the area protected by averting 
behaviour is thought of as the area covered by height and length of the averting behaviour. 
Therefore, the area is potentially protected, but it is not necessarily protected in reality. That is 
detennined by the combination of averting behaviour and other factors such as meteorological 
variables, patterns ofland use etc. 
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protected through the scale of averting behaviour. Then, we refer to the area 
potentially protected by averting behaviour as a proxy of the scale of averting 
behaviour because it is easy and simple to treat only one variable than two or 
more variables in a theoretical model. 
Finally, all the vectors are denoted by bold letters. For example, q, x and a. 
3.4 Functions and Assumptions 
In this section, we provide the functions in the model and their assumptions. 
To begin with, all functions are continuous and twice differentiable with respect to 
relevant arguments as long as we do not take a special caveat. 
U(JZ'{)) is the social utility function in which utility is cardinal rather than 
ordinal. 3 Based on the preceding assumption that society is risk-neutral, the utility 
level of expected value is equivalent to the expected utility level of each value. 4 
.n{) is the aggregate net benefit function. It is evaluated in monetary terms. It is 
composed of several functions of benefits and costs related to the control 
variables. 
dU d 2U U =->0, U_ =--2 <0. 
Tr d" "" d" 
The marginal utility with respect to the aggregate net benefit 7r is positive. The 
marginal utility is diminishing with respect to the aggregate net benefit. 
B(EF - Xi) is the benefit function of ecosystem services of natural 
floodplains, excluding flood mitigation service. The benefit of ecosystem services 
is given by an aggregate term of relevant ecosystem services. It is a function of 
the size of natural floodplains (the size of floodplains minus that of developed 
3 We take the utilitarian approach. 
4 The aggregate net benefit function includes the expected damage cost of floods, but we do not 
need to pay a deliberate attention to this point due to the assumption. 
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floodplains). It is evaluated in monetary tenns. 5 
The marginal benefit of ecosystem services with respect to floodplain 
development is negative. The negative marginal benefit (the marginal opportunity 
cost) is decreasing with respect to the size of developed floodplains. 
f{x') is the direct net benefit function of floodplain development. It 
includes only the direct benefits and costs of development. The function reflects 
the difference between unit land price as a developed land and unit cost of 
floodplain development. It is evaluated in monetary tenns. 
df d 2f Ix = dx > 0, fcr = d;2 ::; O. 
The marginal direct net benefit with respect to floodplain development is positive. 
The marginal direct net benefit is decreasing with respect to the size of developed 
floodplains. 
g(d) is the cost function of averting behaviour. It is a function of the 
potentially protected area. It is evaluated in monetary tenns. 
dg d~g 
g =->0 g =-~O. 
a fla 'aa ., 
UI da-
The marginal cost of averting behaviour is positive. The marginal cost is 
increasing with respect to the potentially protected area which reflects the scale of 
averting behaviour. 
C1 ~I ,d , q (.r' ,a i )} (i"* j) is the expected cost function of flood risk in 
zone i, in which q{Xi, aJ ) is the function of flood risk that upstream zones j 
impose on zone i. We call this flood risk q(x.l ,a.l) "external flood risk". The 
5 We implicitly assume the same functions for all zones. This assumption is set for other functions 
in the model except for the expected cost function of flood risk. 
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external flood risk is given by a function of the size of developed floodplains and 
the area potentially protected by averting behaviour in zone j. We assume that the 
value of this function is nonnegative. In addition, 
q = dq > 0 (I, = dq ~ O. 
x dx.1 - • ~ da ' 
This implies that the external flood risk increases as we develop more floodplains 
and/or we enlarge the area potentially protected by increasing the scale of averting 
behaviour. However, they have no impact on the external flood risk over a certain 
threshold value. This is shown by the equality sign. 
Then, the expected cost of flood risk in zone i is given a function of the size 
of developed floodplains in its own zone i, the degree of averting behaviour in its 
own zone i, and the external flood risk that upstream zones j impose on zone i. It 
is evaluated in monetary terms. An essential assumption on the location of zones 
is related to the problem of unidirectional spatial externality. If i < j, then 
q(Xl ,a1)= O. It implies that the choice of control variables in the downstream 
zones j has no effect on the flood risk in zone i. 
dC' . dC' C =-~O. C =-~O. 
X dx' (/ da' 
The expected cost of flood risk increases as we develop more floodplains in its 
own zone i. On the contrary, the expected cost decreases as we increase the area 
protected by averting behaviour in its own zone i. In other words, averting 
behaviour in its own zone i is a substitute for the flood mitigation service of 
natural floodplains in its own zone i. However, we should note that floodplain 
development and averting behaviour have no effect on the expected cost over a 
certain threshold value respectively. This point is shown by the equality sign in 
the equations. In addition, 
dC' Cq = -- > 0 when i > j (otherwise Cq = 0). dq 
This means that the expected cost of flood risk goes up as the external flood risk 
increases. We need to take the caveat that the external flood risk has no impact (it 
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is assumed to be zero) in the direction from downstream to upstream. We assume 
that the expected cost function is convex in all the control variables jointly.6 In 
addition, we implicitly assume that there is no externaI flood risk within each zone 
I. 
3.5 Social Optimisation Problem 
The social optimisation problem may be summarised as follows: 
x,a 
w = U {lZ"(x,a)} max 
where 
subject to 
0 < I < 11 (" II 
- x _ -F lor a i) 
o ~ d (for all i). 
The social (global) optimum provides a benchmark. The social optimisation 
problem is to choose the values of all the control variables in order to maximise 
social weI fare. Social welfare is composed of the social utility of the aggregate net 
benefits. In addition, the problem is subject to two constraints on the control 
variables. The development of floodplains is limited by the size of floodplains, 
and both control variables are nonnegative. 
6 Sec Appendix A-I. 
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3.6 Analytical Solutions 
In this section, we get the analytical solutions of the social optimisation 
problem First, we derive the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Second, we 
categorize them into the cases of interior solution and comer solution. Third, we 
provide economic interpretations of them 
In the beginning, we set the Lagrange function for solving the problem. 
z = U {;r{x,a)} + I/r(DF - Xl). 
1=1 
We differentiate the Lagrange function with respect to relevant variables and set 
the appropriate conditions to derive the first-order conditions in the following. 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are the following. 
Xl ~ 0 and Xl az = 0 (for alI i). 
aXI 
(3-1) 
az =l} {_ dg _ aCI _ LaC) ~}~O, 
ad f( dd ad ]>1 aq ad 
d~OanddaZ=O (for all i). 
ad 
(3-2) 
az = Dc _ Xl ~ 0, 
aA: I" 
l ~ 0 and A: vZ = 0 (for all i). 
VA 
(3-3) 
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3.6.1 Interior Solution 
We focus on the case where there is an interior solution. Assuming that we 
have an interior solution, we focus on the ranges 0 < x' < DF and d > 0 for 
all i. Within these ranges, we can derive the conditions for the optimal solution 
from the first-order conditions (3-1), (3-2) and (3-3). 
az =u {dB + df _ ac' _ I aC) 3!L}-A' =0 (for all i). 
ax' 1r dx' de ax' », aq ax' 
(3-4) 
az =u {_ dg _ ac' _ I ac) ~}=o (for all i). 
aa' tr da' ad ]>' aq ad 
(3-5) 
A = 0 (for all i) 
(3-6) 
From (3-4), (4-5), (3-6) and U 1r > 0, the optimal choice of control variables 
(X'· , a,e ) must satisfy the following: 
df dB ac' aC) aq 
- - - + + " - (for all i). 
dx' - dxl ax' ~ aq ax' 
»1 
(3-7) 
ac' dg Lac) aq (ti 11) 
-----+ ---- ora i. 
ad - dd aq ad 
»1 
(3-8) 
To begin with, let us consider the meaning of the Lagrange multiplier (A'). 
The optimal value of Lagrange multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal utility 
of the size of floodplains. 7 The Lagrange multiplier implies the imputed value or 
shadow price of developed floodplains. It is the value of one more unit of 
floodplains developed. When we have an interior solution, the imputed value 
(shadow price) of developed floodplains is zero. This means that there is no 
7 See Appendix A-2. 
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incentive to develop natural floodplains in the equilibrium. 
Next, we consider the first condition (3-7). The tenn on the left hand side is 
the marginal direct net benefit of floodplain development. The first tenn on the 
right hand side is the marginal cost of losing ecosystem services due to floodplain 
development The second tenn on the right hand side is the marginal cost of flood 
risk due to floodplain development. The third term on the right hand side is the 
marginal cost of extemal flood risk that floodplain development in zone i inflicts 
on the zones downstream. The third term is significant because it measures the 
marginal external costs (unidirectional spatial externality). In total, the condition 
(3-7) implies that the marginal benefit of floodplain development must be equal to 
the marginal cost of floodplain development plus the marginal external cost of 
floodplain development. 
Finally, we consider the second condition (3-8). The term on the left hand 
side is the marginal benefit of averting behaviour, which means the marginal cost 
of flood risk that we can save by averting behaviour. The first term on the right 
hand side is the marginal direct cost of averting behaviour. The second term on the 
right hand side is the marginal cost of external flood risk that averting behaviour 
In zone i inflicts on the zones downstream This term implies the marginal 
external cost (unidirectional spatial externality). Finally, the condition (3-8) 
implies that the marginal benefit of averting behaviour should equal the sum of 
the marginal direct cost of averting behaviour plus the marginal external cost of 
averting behaviour. 
The upshot is that we must take both the marginal cost of losing ecosystem 
services (externality between private and public people) and the marginal external 
cost (unidirectional spatial externality) into consideration in order to choose the 
values of control variables for the social optimisation. The condition is simple, but 
significant because these costs are normally ignored in our market economy. As a 
result, floodplains tend to be over-developed, and averting behaviour tends to be 
overused. 
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3.6.2 Corner Solution 
Next, we focus on the case of corner solution. There are three comer 
solutions. 
The first case is Xl = O. It implies that all the natural floodplains remain 
undeveloped. From the first-order condition (3-1), 
Utr{d~ + df _ 8C I _ I 8C} Oq}_l < O. 
dt cit I oxl »1 oq oxl 
(3-9) 
From the first-order condition (3-3), 
oZ 11 I I 
ol = Jj-" - X = Lj-" > 0 (': Xl = 0). 
Then, l = 0 oZ (',' l-=O). 
ol 
Based on the condition l = 0, we transform (3-9) into 
df dB ael oC} oq 
< + + " (': Uw > 0). dx l - dx l axl ~ oq oxl " 
(3-10) 
Hence, Xl = 0 happens when the condition (3-10) is true. The condition 
(3- J 0) implies that the marginal direct net benefit of floodplain development is 
smaller than the marginal cost of floodplain development. In this case, there is no 
incentive to develop natural floodplains from scratch because floodplain 
development brings about a net loss to the society. All natural floodplains should 
be conserved Furthermore, considering the Lagrange multiplier, the imputed 
value (shadow price) of developed floodplain is zero. 
The second case is Xl = L~. It implies that all the floodplains are fully 
developed. From the first-order condition (3-3), 
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oZ -1' _ ,_ 0A - ~F X - o. 
Then, A > 0 oZ (': l-=O). 
ol 
(3-1 I) 
Therefore, x' = L'F occurs when condition (3-11) holds. Thus, the shadow 
price (imputed value) of developed floodplains is positive in this comer 
equilibrium. As long as the shadow price of the developed floodplains is positive, 
there is an incentive to continue to develop them. 
The third case is a' = O. It implies that no area is potentially protected by 
averting behaviour (no averting behaviour). From the first-order condition (3-2), 
dg >_OC' -ICC) ~ 
do' 00' ]>1 oq ad 
oZ (': 0' - = 0 and Utr > 0). 00' 
(3-12) 
Thus, a' = 0 happens when condition (3-12) is true. Condition (3-12) 
implies that the marginal cost of averting behaviour is larger than the marginal 
benefit of mitigating the flood risk in all the relevant zones. In this case, there is 
no incentive to cany out averting behaviour at all. 
3.7 Sufficiency Conditions 
In the previous section, we derive the conditions for the social optimisation 
based on the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions which are just necessary 
conditions. It is still unknown whether they are not only necessary but also 
sufficient for the optimality. Thus, we have to verify that they satisfy the 
sufficiency conditions for the optimality. For this purpose, we have two options 
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for them: the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem and the Arrow-Enthoven 
sufficiency theorem. The Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem is stricter than the 
Arrow-Enthoven one, and we use that. 
Chiang (1984) has provided a conCIse summary of the Kuhn-Tucker 
sufficiency theorem. The problem given as a nonlinear program is to maximise 
IT = j{x) subject to gl (x) S T; (i = 1,2, ... , m) and x ~ O. In this case, the three 
conditions must be satisfied in order that the first-order conditions are not only 
necessary but also sufficient for deriving a global maximum. First, the objective 
function is differentiable and concave in the nonnegative orthant. Second, every 
constraint function is differentiable and convex in the nonnegative orthant. Third, 
the choice of the values of control variables x* satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker 
first-order necessary conditions. 
Now, we check the three conditions about the social optimisation problem 
that we set in the previous section. The key things are the concavity of the 
objective function and the convexity of the constraint functions. Based on the 
assumptions of functions in section 3.4, all the sub-functions that are components 
of the objective function are concave. x If al1 the functions are concave, the sum of 
the functions is also concave. Hence, the objective function is concave. 9 All the 
constraint functions are linear. Linear functions are convex as well as concave. As 
a result, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions that we derive satisfy 
the conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem. In addition, if at least one 
function included in the objective function is strictly concave, the optimal solution 
derived from the first-order conditions should be unique. 10 
~ Some functions are assumed convex. However, ifj{x) is a convex function, then -f(x) is a concave 
function. Hence. all the component functions are concave if we consider minus signs. 
9 Strictly speak.ing. the objective function is the social utility function that is a function of the 
aggregate net benefit. It is assumed concave, and the aggregate benefit is composed ofconcave 
functions of relevant control variables In general. if a function is a concave function of a concave 
function in relevant variables. it is a concave function in them. See Appendix A-3. 
If) We assume that at least one function in the objective function is strictly concave here. 
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3.8 Problem of Externality 
The purpose of this section is to clarify the problem of externalities by 
considering two types of local optimisation problems. In the social optimisation 
problem, an economic agent aims to maximise the total social welfare including 
the benefits of ecosystem services in the whole catchment. The agent might be a 
regional government or governmental agencies. On the other hand, in the private 
and local optimisation. individual landowners do not consider costs of losing 
ecosystem services and external costs that they impose on people downstream. 
From the viewpoint of individual landowners, we set the local optimisation 
problem. Landowners attempt to maximise their net benefits by adjusting their 
control variables. The local optimisation problem is defined in each zone i by the 
following. II 
x' ,at 
WI = [! {n-I (Xl, a' )} max 
where 
,,1(.)= f(XI)- g(o')- C'~' ,a' ,q(x.l ,aJ )} (i * j) 
subject to 
0 < Xl < /1. 
- - ~l-
O~o' 
(for all i). 
The problem is that landowners aim to maximise their utility (welfare) which 
depends on their private net benefits. The important thing is that landowners never 
consider the benefits of ecosystem services and the external flood risk that they 
11 We implicitly sct some assumptions. (i) The market for developed lands including developed 
floodplains is competitive in each zone. (ii) There is no external flood risk from upstream to 
downstream within each zone. (iii) We set the problem in the unit of zone, based on the 
competitive market and profit (benefit) maximising private landowners. Thus, this seems to be a 
problem of a representative zone i. Alternatively, we can assume the representative private 
landowner who possesses all the floodplains in zone i. In this case, we assume that the private 
landowner has no monopoly power. 
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inflict on the zones downstream. 12 
Let us derive the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions from the relevant 
Lagrange function F with a Lagrange multiplier p. 
F = U ~I (. )}+ p(L'F - x' ) 
of = U {df _ dC I } _ < 0 ox' Ir dx' dx' p - , 
aF 
x' ~ 0 and x' - = 0 
ax' 
(for all i). 
-=(1 ---- <0 of {dg del} 
aa' Ir da' da' - , 
a' ~ 0 and a' aF = 0 
00' 
of /1 I op = ~F -x ~O, 
of p~O and p-=O 
0,1 
(for all i). 




Assuming that we have an interior solution, we can derive the following 
conditions from conditions (3-13), (3-14) and (3-15). 
df dC ' 
-=--
d'(' d'(' (for all i). 
(3-16) 
12 Individual landowners also enjoy the benefit of ecosystem services that natural floodplains 
provide. However. they do not recognize the benefit as the value in monetary temlS. The benefit is 
trivial to each private landowner although it is enormous to the public in total. 
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dC I dg 
---=-- (for all i). 
do' do' 
(3-17) 
These conditions imply that the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost 
with respect to both the control variables although the benefit and cost are related 
to only individual landowners' interests. As a result, landowners underestimate the 
marginal cost, and then they tend to over-develop floodplains and over-invest in 
averting behaviour. Table 3- I and Figure 3-3 provide the summary about the 
analysis of overdevelopment and over-investment due to ignoring externalities. 
Table 3-1. Summary: problems of externalities 
Social Optimisation Local Optimisation 
Viewpoint whole catchment zone (private lands) 
Condition rvI3=rv1C+fvEC M3= M:: 
Development Xs '• < l<[.' 
Averting Behaviour a I. < al' 5 
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3.9 Policy Implications from Static Model 
In this section, we discuss possible policies for the optimal management of 
floodplains, based on the static model. Now, let us focus on floodplain 
development rather than averting behaviour. The political target is to realize the 
optimal amount of floodplain development (developed floodplains) derived from 
the social optimisation. Thus, we consider possible policies that enable the state to 
reach the optimal amount of floodplain development (X~*) by internalising the 
. dB "aC} aq 
margmal external costs (--+ .i...J----). We can come up with four 
dxl ]>1 aq axl 
possible policies in general: (I) Pigouvian tax; (2) marketable permits; (3) 
subsidy; and (4) command and control. 13 
3.9.1 P;gouv;an Tax 
Policies of economic incentives such as Pigouvian tax, marketable permits 
and subsidies aim to accomplish the optimal target at the least costs as long as 
several conditions are satisfied. Several conditions include information availability, 
administrative capacity, existence of competitive markets, policy feasibility and so 
on. In this section, we will focus on uncertainty (infonnation availability) related 
to effectiveness. In the beginning, we focus on Pigouvian tax. We set a tax rate 
that coincides with the marginal external costs on the unit of floodplain 
development. Consider the following problem. t is a tax rate. 
x' .a' 
WI = U Vrl (Xl ,d )} max 
where 
13 Command and control policy is a quantity rationing policy. It is similar to marketable permits 
except that requirements are not tradable under command and control policies. Thus, we do not 
treat command and control policies in this chapter. We explicitly analyse them in Chapter 6 (Policy 
Simulation ). 
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(i;ej) 
subject to 
(for all i). 
We can derive the optimal condition for floodplain development, assuming that 
we have an interior solution. 
df 0(" 
-=--+1 
dx' ox' (for all i). 
(3-18) 
Then, comparing condition (3-18) with condition (3-7) of the social optimisation, 
the optimal tax rate (Pigouvian tax rate) is determined by the following. 
(for all i). 
(3-19) 





As a result, we can attain the optimal floodplain development in each zone if 
we set the optimal tax rate on floodplain development. Figure 3-4 shows the tax 
rate t. Landowners are faced with the new marginal cost curve including the tax 
rate (MeL + 1). They choose the amount of development by the intersection of the 
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new marginal cost curve and the marginal benefit curve (point F). It results in the 
optimal amount of developed floodplains from the social point of view. 
However, we should notice that the optimal tax rate differs among zones 
because the marginal costs are different among zones. The floodplain 
development upstream has more impact on the external flood risk than that 
downstream. Therefore, we should set higher tax rates on zones upstream as 
compared with zones downstream. 
3.9.2 Marketable Permits 
Alternatively, we can achieve the same result by marketable permits. 
Policy-makers issue the amount of marketable permits for developing floodplains 
that is equivalent to the optimal amount of floodplain development (x~* in Figure 
3-3). The marketable permits are the rights to develop a fixed amount of 
floodplains. Then, if the markets are competitive and the economic agents 
(individual landowners) to transact the permits are minimising costs and keeping 
to the amount of floodplain development regulated by the permits, the optimal 
amount of developed floodplains is attained at the least costs as well. Like the 
case of Pigouvian tax, we should set different amounts of the marketable permits 
among zones for the same reason. Each zone should be so large that the market 
for permits can be efficient. It wiII be costly as the number of zones increases. 
3.9.3 Pigouvian Tax vs. Marketable Permits 
In theory, the Pigouvian tax and marketable permits are equivalent. However, 
in reality there is uncertainty about the relevant marginal benefits, marginal costs 
and marginal external costs, but it is not possible to get the precise information. 
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Here, we compare the two instruments under uncertainty (problems on the 
infonnation availability) about the marginal benefit curve and the marginal cost 
curve. 14 
Figure 3-5. A modified diagram on ME and Me 
MaMe 
, . 
x =mp LF' 
Me 
= social rmrginal 
external costs 
MB 
= private net marginal benefit 
, 
x 
For the analysis, let us change the figure. Rearranging equation (3-7), 
df oC' dB" ae l aq 
----=--+ ~----
dx' ox' dx']>, oq ox' (for all i) 
(3-20) 
The left hand side of equation (3-20) is the marginal net private benefit. We 
simply call it the marginal benefit (MB curve in figure 3-5). The right hand side is 
the marginal external costs. We simply call them the marginal cost (Me curve in 
figure 3-5). Then, we set the appropriate tax rate (t) or the relevant amount of 
marketable penn its (mp) by the intersection of the marginal benefit curve and the 
marginal cost curve. 
14 The discussion is based on Weitzman (1974); Baumol and Oats ( 1988); and Hanley et al. (1997). 
However. these focus on the problem of pollutions. It is not necessarily possible to directly apply 
the fundamental theorem into the arguments on floodplain management. 
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Figure 3-6. Uncertainty ahoul the marginal external costs 
MB.MC 
=mp 
Using this type of diagram, let us analyse under uncertainties on the marginal 
cost. That is, we consider the situation that we have precise information on the 
marginal benefit while the marginal cost function (curve) is just an expected one. 
In this case, the Pigouvian tax and marketable permits yield the same result, 
which implies both approaches produce the same social dead-weight loss. Figure 
3-6 shows this. IS MCE curve is an expected marginal cost curve. We set a tax rate 
or the amount of marketable pennits by the intersection of the expected marginal 
cost curve (MCE) and the marginal benefit curve (MB). The tax rate is t, and the 
amount of marketable permits is mp. In the case that the true marginal cost curve 
is higher than the expected one, the optimal point is truly at EH. The optimal 
amount of floodplain development is x;. However, the resultant amount of 
floodplain development due to marketable permits is x~, which is larger than the 
optimal one. Thus, the shaded area A is the social dead-weight loss. Likewise, the 
tax rate 1 makes private landowners choose the amount of floodplain development 
x~ .. This yields the same social dead-weight loss as the marketable pennits do. In 
the case that the true marginal cost curve is lower than the expected one, both 
political measures result in the same social dead-weight loss that is a shaded area 
15 The figure depicts the linear marginal cost and benefit curves, but the results hold true about 
non-linear curves. 
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B. 







Next, we compare them under uncertainties on the marginal benefit. We 
assume that the marginal cost and benefit curves are both linear. The relative 
slopes of the marginal cost and benefit curves provide guidance on the choice of 
policy. To begin with, we analyse the case that the absolute values of slopes of the 
two curves are the same. In this case, the social dead-weight losses are the same. 
We show this by Figure 3-7, which analyses the case that the true marginal benefit 
is higher than the expected one. Based on the marginal cost curve (MC) and the 
expected marginal benefit curve (MBd, policy-makers can set the tax rate (t) or 
issue the amount of marketable permits (mp). However, the true marginal benefit 
(MBII) is higher than the expected one. The optimal amount of floodplain 
development is x'·. In the case of the tax, landowners determine the total amount 
of floodplain development by the point which equates the tax rate with the true 
marginal benefit. Then, the resultant amount of floodplain development is XI' 
This brings about the social dead-weight loss that is equivalent to the shaded area 
B. On the other hand, marketable permits cause the social dead-weight loss that is 
equivalent to the shaded area A. In this case, the two social dead-weight losses are 
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equal. 16 
Next, let us consider the case that the absolute value of the slope of the 
marginal benefit curve is larger than that of the marginal cost curve. The situation 
is the same as the analysis in Figure 3-7. See Figure 3-8. Likewise, the shaded 
area A is the social-weight loss in the case of marketable pennits, and the shaded 
area B is the social-weight loss in the case of the Pigouvian tax. The social 
dead-weight loss caused by marketable pennits is larger than the Pigouvian tax. If 
the marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefit curve, the results are 
just the opposite. 










We can get the same results when the true marginal benefit is lower than the 
expected one. However, we should notice that the order of the amount of 
floodplain development is opposite. In this case, the resultant amount of 
floodplain development under the Pigouvian tax is smaller than the optimal one 
while that under marketable petmits is larger than the optimal one (see Figure 
3-9). 
16 In this respect, a fonnal mathematical proof is given in Weitzman (1974), Adar and Gritfm 
(1976), and Baumol and Oats (1988). We can easily apply it to the context of floodplains. 
MB,MC 
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Figure 3-9. Overestimation of MB 
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The results tell us that we are faced with the same risk under the two policies 
if we do not have appropriate information on the marginal cost and benefit curves. 
We cannot conclude which is better based on the analysis without relevant 
information. 
Furthermore, as IS often the case with environmental problems of 
development, the problem of overdevelopment is more serious than that of 
under-development especially under irreversibility. In real situations, it is often 
difficult and costly or sometimes impossible to restore floodplains (Mitsch and 
Gosselink, 2000b).17 Thus, we should consider the risk of overdevelopment. First, 
it is problematical to underestimate the marginal cost (the marginal external costs). 
If we underestimate the marginal cost, both the approaches result in 
overdevelopment (see Figure 3-6). In this case, it is helpful to take the perspective 
of the precautionary principle or the safe minimum standards. Perrings (199]) 
mentions with a formal model that it is rational for policy makers to make current 
decisions to safeguard against the potentially catastrophic future effects of current 
activity. The safe minimum standards are essential, given the uncertainty related 
J 
7 The difficulties lie in the establishment of appropriate natural hydrological conditions that are 
supported by appropriate vegetation communities (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000b). 
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to the future environmental impacts of current economic activities, the ecological 
or environmental threshold (discontinuity of environmental costs) and 
irreversibility of environmental or ecological goods and services (Perrings, Folke 
and Maler, 1992; Perrings and Pearce, 1994). In the context here, it turns out to be 
reasonable for policy makers to take a precautionary margin between the tax rate 
set and the tax rate calculated from the estimated benefits and costs. 
Second, the Pigouvian tax brings about overdevelopment if the marginal 
benefit is underestimated (see Figure 3-7). On the contrary, marketable permits 
cause overdevelopment if the marginal benefit is overestimated (see Figure 3-9). 
Thus, we should consider which risk is higher, the risk of overestimating or 
underestimating the marginal benefit. This depends on real situations. However, 
the problem of overdevelopment is unavoidable if the information on the marginal 
net private benefit is asymmetric between landowners and policy makers. Let us 
consider the case that only landowners have the precise information on it that 
policy makers cannot obtain. Thus, policy makers must rely on the information 
landowners provide. Under the Pigouvian tax, landowners have the incentive to 
tell lower net benefit than the real one because they can make the tax rate lower. 
As a result, the marginal benefit is underestimated, and the Pigouvian tax causes 
overdevelopment. Under marketable permits, landowners have the incentive to 
tell higher net benefit than the real one because they can make the amount of 
marketable permits larger. As a result, the marginal benefit is overestimated, and 
marketable permits cause overdevelopment. The bottom line is that the problem of 
overdevelopment cannot be avoided under such asymmetric information. 
Finally, the target on the amount of floodplain development fluctuates under 
the tax system while it is fixed under marketable permits. If we keep to the 
precautionary principles, marketable permits might be preferable because the 
target is clear and fixed. However, it is often pointed out that it is difficult to 
establish the competitive market for the permits. In reality, feasibility might be 
problematical. 
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3.9.4 Subsidy 
We set the problem in the following with the rate of subsidy s and a 
standard of floodplain development X. 
where 
subject to 
o ~ x' ~ [;F 
O~a' 
(for all i). 
Then, we derive the optimal conditions on floodplain development, assuming 
that we have an interior solution. 
df ae' 
-. ---. =s 
dx' ax' (for all i). 
(3-21 ) 
Condition (3-21) is the same as condition (3-18). Thus, we set the same rate as the 
Pigouvian tax. 
(3-22) 
Based on condition (3-22), we can attain the social optimum by the subsidy. 
As the condition is common between the tax and the subsidy, basic characteristics 
of the subsidy coincide with those of the tax. However, there are several points 
that we should point out. 
To begin with, it is difficult but necessary to detennine the standard of 
subsidy Xi. Assuming that the marginal (net private) benefit function is linear, 
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the following condition must be satisfied (the mathematical notations coincide 
with those in Figure 3-10). 
. 1 ( . ) Xl >_ X l* +Xi 2 s p 
(3-23) 





i· i lfi 
X 
-
X S x xp 
Unless the condition is satisfied, landowners have no incentive to choose the 
optimal amount of floodplain development because they can earn positive benefits 
by developing floodplains up to x~. The gain from the subsidy is the rectangle 
EFXx;*, and the benefit from floodplain development is the triangle Ex~x~*. 
Thus, comparing the shaded areas A and B, the subsidy works if the shaded area A 
is larger than B. In the case of non-linear functions, it is more difficult to set the 
standard. In both cases, we need precise information on the marginal benefit curve 
in order to set a relevant standard. When we have no precise information, we need 
to set a sufficiently large standard such that condition (3-23) can be satisfied. It is, 
however, costly. Policy-makers need a lot of money for providing subsidies. 
Obviously, it is the best to choose the minimum value for the standard that 
satisfies condition (3-23). 
Furthermore, if we overestimate the marginal (net private) benefit, we need 
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more financial resources for the subsidy than we expected. See Figure 3-11. We 
set the rate of subsidy s and the standard of the subsidy x. Then, we expect 
that the total amount of subsidy is the rectangle area FGxx~. However, 
landowners choose the amount of floodplain development x~, based on the true 
lower marginal benefit curve. As a result, we need to provide them with the total 
subsidy that is equivalent to the rectangle EGxx:. 
Figure 3-11. Subsidy: overestimation ofMB 
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Subsidies completely fail if we underestimate the marginal benefit and 
choose the 'minimum' standard for the subsidy that satisfies condition (3-23). See 
Figure 3-12. Likewise, we set the rate of subsidy s and the standard for the 
subsidy. However, landowners' behaviour depends on the true higher marginal 
benefit curve. Based on the true marginal benefit curve, the standard cannot 
satisfy condition (3-23). Therefore, they choose x~. Subsidies do not function 
well. 
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Finally, the subsidy increases the amount of floodplain development in the 
competitive market in the long run. This is often referred to as a serious problem 
on the subsidy system. 18 This is analysed in a polluting industry, in which 
emissions are proportional to the output. Thus, the context which we analyse is 
different from it, but the same thing still can be applied. Assume that there are 
large number of landowners in each zone, which satisfies the assumption of the 
competitive market. They are initially endowed with floodplains as private lands, 
and they decide whether to develop floodplains. The amount of floodplain 
development in each landowner is just determined by the rule P (price) = Me, and 
the price comes from the competitive market in which no private landowner can 
earn positive economic profits. Thus, they choose x;* without the subsidy (see 
Figure 3-13a). 19 The subsidy shifts the marginal cost curve upward like Pigouvian 
tax, but shifts the average cost curve downward and to the left. As a result, each 
landowner chooses the smaller amount of floodplain development, but the total 
amount of developed floodplain in zone i increases because more landowners 
decide to develop floodplains due to the subsidy which makes the price go down 
(see Figure 3_13b).20 Subsidies make the situation worse. 
18 For example, Kohn (1985), Baumol and Oats (1988), and Hanley et al. (1997). 
19 Figure 3-13a shows the marginal cost curves and the average cost curves in the representative 
landowner in zone i. This is different from the previous figures that we have used. The SUbscript s 
shows the case of subsidy, and t shows the case of tax. 
20 D' is a demand function. 
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Considering the problems we discussed above, subsidies seem to be more 
difficult to choose than the Pigouvian tax and marketable pennits although it 
depends on real conditions including problems of feasibility and equity. 
3.10 Conclusion of Chapter 3 
In this chapter, we develop a static decision model of hydrological, 
ecological and economic interactions on floodplains. The social optimal 
conditions tell that we should choose the values of control variables such that the 
marginal benefits are equal to the marginal costs plus the marginal external costs. 
There are two external costs: the opportunity costs of lost ecosystem services that 
landowners inflict on the public at large; and the unidirectional spatial external 
costs of flood risk that floodplain development and/or enhancement of averting 
behaviour in upstream zones impose on downstream zones. The bottom line is that 
it is crucial to take the externalities into consideration and to internalise the 
external costs for avoiding the overdevelopment of floodplains. 
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The general policy problem, considered in more detail in later chapters, is 
how to internalise the external costs. This chapter analyses the Pigouvian tax, 
marketable pennits and subsidies in the context of a simple static model. We 
cannot conclude which instrument is the best although subsidies are generally 
problematic. The choice of policies depends on real conditions. We will analyse 
this respect by policy simulations in a dynamic context in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4. Dynamic Model III 
Chapter 4 
Dynamic Decision Model of River 
Floodplains 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a dynamic decision model, based on 
the static model in Chapter 3. To begin with, we discuss the significance of 
extending a model into the dynamic context. There are several reasons why we 
need a dynamic decision model. 
First, we can analyse the time paths of variables in a dynamic model. In the 
case of convergence, we can observe the time paths of variables through which 
they converge to certain values such as equilibria or static optimal conditions. On 
the contrary, in the case of divergence, we can understand how they diverge by 
observing the time paths. The analysis of time paths is important especially when 
static optimal conditions are impaired or not necessarily stable. 
Second, our decisions are in reality made in the dynamic and continuous 
context rather than the static and discrete context. Then, it is natural that we 
consider the economic phenomena in the dynamic context from this point of view. 
Third, as we mentioned in Chapter 3, initial conditions are of importance for 
the optimal strategy of floodplain management because there is normally 
difference between the costs offloodplain development and floodplain restoration. 
In other words, the outcomes are path-dependent. In the static decision model, we 
implicitly assume that all floodplains are natural as an initial condition and then 
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choose the size of development in floodplain. Although we might be able to treat 
different initial conditions even in a static model, we can treat them more easily, 
clearly and systematically in the dynamic context because we can explicitly 
introduce the initial conditions into the model. In addition, we can analyse the 
irreversibility related to floodplain development more obviously. 
Fourth, related to the second reason, we can treat the process of adjustment 
in a dynamic decision model in the case that we are faced with stricter constraints 
on control variables. In fact, we can neither develop all the remained natural 
floodplains nor restore all the existing developed floodplains to natural ones at a 
moment in time. It takes time to do these. We cannot immediately choose the 
optimal values of control variables by any policies. The adjustment processes 
affect our welfare over time. It is possible to analyse the adjustment processes and 
their consequences in a dynamic model. 1 
Fifth, in a dynamic model we can cope with natural self-organizing processes. 
For example, natural floodplains are being naturally recovered depending on their 
conditions, and the functions of natural floodplains are being strengthened or 
weakened depending on their own conditions. We can denote such self-organizing 
processes by functions in the equations of motion of state variables. The most 
famous example related to this point is the logistic growth function in the equation 
of motion of the biomass in the fishery model. 2 Here, we do not consider such 
self-organizing processes because such a process is not necessarily clear for the 
moment although each ecosystem function might have such a process in view of 
biogeochemistry. Nevertheless, this point will be important when we enrich the 
model in the future. 
Finally, there are two kinds of costs on averting behaviour, fixed and variable 
costs. Fixed costs imply the initial investments and variable costs imply on-going 
maintenance costs. We should notice that the variable costs do not depend on 
economic outputs but on the size of averting behaviour and time in this context. In 
1 We set this point in Chapter 5 and analyse it by policy simulations in Chapter 6. 
2 e.g. Schaefer (1954), Clark (1973), Clark (1990), Conrad and Clark (1987). 
Chapter 4. Dynamic Model 113 
this respect, the notion of variable costs here is different from those in the usual 
terms of economics. In the real economic world, these kinds of costs are of much 
importance because the time-dependent variable costs perpetuate once we invest 
in averting behaviour in order to compensate for the lost flood mitigation service 
of natural floodplains. In other words, such costs imply a part of the values of 
ecosystem services that natural floodplains provide. It is, however, complicated 
and difficult to treat such variable costs in the static context because the costs 
depend on the size of averting behaviour (kind of accumulated investment) and 
they perpetuate over time. That is why we need to extend a static model to a 
dynamic one. 
In this chapter, we develop a dynamic decision model from the hydrological, 
ecological and economic points of view. A dynamic decision model is a basis for 
an applied model used in policy simulations. 
4.2 Model Settings 
We set several conditions as presuppositions of the model in advance. They 
are important in that they determine whether the model can yield analytical 
solutions (tractability) and that they determine the range that the model can 
explain (limitations of the model). When we enrich the model, these will become 
significant. The following conditions are similar to those of the static model in 
Chapter 3 since the dynamic model is an extension of the static model. 3 We, 
however, repeat assumptions of the static model in the following in order to make 
the settings of a dynamic model clear. We want to avoid providing any 
misunderstandings because they are similar but different in essence. 
• There are two kinds of control variables. One is a change in the size of 
developed floodplains in time t. We can control it by developing or restoring 
3 c.r. Section 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
• 
• 
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floodplains. The other is a change in the scale of averting behaviour in time 
1.4 Likewise, we can control it by enlarging or reducing the scale of averting 
behaviour. 
There are two kinds of state variables. One is the Slze of developed 
floodplains. The other is the scale of averting behaviour. 
Land use patterns outside floodplains have an impact on flood risk through a 
change in imperviousness of land. However, we assume them to be 
exogenous for the time being. In the stage of simulations, we treat the 
exogenous variables as control variables in a hydrological software program. 
• The total size of floodplain is fixed, and is defined by the 100-year floodplain 
(1 % chance of flooding each year). Strictly speaking, the size of floodplains 
will change over time in the long term even if it is defined by the same notion, 
but we assume that it is constant over time here. 
• The type of floodplain development has different effects on floodplains' 
capacity of mitigating floods and other ecosystem functions. For example, the 
development into industrial areas presumably alleviates the capacity more 
than that into agricultural areas. However, we distinguish only between 
natural and developed floodplains for simplification of the model in this 
chapter. Then, we assume that the capacity or the flood risk depends just on 
the size of development (the size of remaining natural floodplains). When we 
apply a model to simulations, we have to take different land use patterns into 
consideration in a hydrological software program. 
• We assume that the society is risk-neutral. Individuals are risk-averse while 
organizations including governments and societies are risk-neutral. 
4 In the model, the scale of averting behaviour is treated as the area potentially protected by 
averting behaviour like in the static model. 
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4.3 Mathematical Notation 
We continue to use the same mathematical notations as in the static model. 5 
However, we have to distinguish between control and state variables in the 
dynamic context. 
y: or i (t ): Change in the size of developed floodplains in time t. 
a; or d (t): Change in the scale of averting behaviour in time t. 
X: or X' (t) : Size of developed floodplains in time t. 
A: or A' (t): Scale of averting behaviour in time t. This is the same as d 10 
the static model. 6 
8 : Discount rate. We assume a positive discount rate (8) 0). 
4.4 Functions and Assumptions 
We are using the same functions and assumptions as those in the static 
model. 7 However, we should note that all are functions oftime t although they are 
autonomous. 8 We add explanations of new functions and their assumptions. In the 
beginning, we assume that all functions are continuous and twice differentiable 
with respect to relevant arguments as long as we do not indicate a specific 
assumption explicitly. 
F{X;) is the benefit function of developed floodplains. This function is 
5 C. f. Section 3.3 in Chapter 3. 
6 We use the area potentially protected by averting behaviour as a proxy of this variable. However, 
we abstractly treat this state variable as the scale of averting behaviour in a dynamic decision 
model. 
7 c.f. Section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
8 For example, the utility function is We) or U(nt} rather than U(e) and U(nt, t). 
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similar to f(x 1 ) in the static model. However, we should note one difference. 
This fun~tion is inside the net benefit function at time t. Thus, this function cannot 
be treated as a unit land price. Land prices are determined by the sum of 
discounted rent that we earn from the land if the market is complete and efficient. 
Here, this function is referred to as the rent per land that we earn from the 
developed land in time t. 9 The assumptions on the benefit function of developed 
floodplains are the same as those of f{x i ). 
D{y;) is the direct cost function of floodplain development and restoration. 
It implies the costs that we incur when we develop or restore floodplains in time t. 
It is evaluated in monetary terms. We assume the cost function is strictly convex 
for the relevant range. The following three assumptions imply that we incur the 
direct cost when we both develop and restore floodplains. When / is negative, it 
implies floodplain restoration because developed floodplains are reduced. In this 
case, the direct costs increase as / gets smaller (the absolute value of / gets 
larger). The final condition means the convexities in both of the ranges of control 
variable i > 0 and i < O. The marginal cost increases as we develop or 
restore more floodplains at time t. Figure 4-1 shows the shape of the cost function 
as an example (see the next page). The shape of the function may be different 
between the ranges i > 0 and i < 0, which reflects the difference between 
the costs of development and restoration. 
dD D =-~O if i ~O. 
Y dy 
Dy = dD < 0 if i < 0 . 
dy 
D(O)=O when i =0. 
d 2D D =-->0 when i '* O . 
.Y.Y dy2 
9 If we eam the rent from natural floodplains, this function implies the net value between the rent 
from natural floodplains and that from developed lands. 
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Figure 4-1. Shape of the costfunction (an example) 
D(iJ 
o 
C(a;) is the cost function of averting behaviour. It implies the direct costs 
that we incur when we enhance or alleviate the scale of averting behaviour in time 
t. It is evaluated in monetary terms. This function is similar to g(d) in the static 
model. We assume the cost function is strictly convex for the relevant range. The 
following three conditions imply that we incur costs when we both enhance and 
reduce the scale of averting behaviour. When d is negative, it implies the 
reduction of averting behaviour. In this case, costs increase as d gets smaller (the 
absolute value of d gets larger). The final condition implies the convexity of the 
cost function in both of the ranges of control variable d > 0 and a' < 0 . 
Marginal cost increases as we enhance or alleviate the degree of averting 
behaviour more in time t. The shape of this function is the same as the function 
D(Y;) (c.f. Figure 4-1.) 
dG Ga =-~O if d ~o. da 
dG . 
Ga =-<0 if d <0. da 
G(O) = 0 when a' = o. 
d 2G G = -- > 0 when d '# 0 . 
aa da 2 
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M(A;) is the cost function of operation and maintenance, which is assumed 
to be a function of the scale of averting behaviour. The larger the scale is, the 
larger the costs of operation and maintenance are. The costs are incurred at time t, 
and are evaluated in monetary terms. We assume the cost function is strictly 





h{X J ,A J) is the function of external flood risk that the upstream zones j 
impose on zone i. This function is the same as q{Xf, af ) in the static model 
except that we distinguish between control and state variables. We set the same 
assumptions. This implies "external flood risk". 
C {xi, AI ,h(X i, Ai)} (i '# j ) is the expected cost function of flood risk in 
zone i. This function is the same as CI {xi ,d ,q(Xf ,af )} in the static model 
except that we distinguish between control and state variables. Then, we set the 
same assumptions. 
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4.5 Social Optimisation Problem 
The social optimisation problem has the following form: 
<Xl 
Af,,~x W = f e-biU {Jr(Yf' ap X" AJ}dt 
o 
where 
Jr()= fB(L~ - x;)+ fF(X;)- ID(y;)- fG(a;) 
1=1 1=1 i=1 i=1 
subject to 
X'I I t =Yt 
.4;. = a; 
- IM(A/)- IC'{x/,A;,h(X/,A/)} 
i=1 i=1 
for all i 10 
for all i 
_Xi <yl < ri _Xi 
t - t -LF t for all i 
for all i 
o ~ XI (0) = X ~ ~ EF for all i 
A'(O)= ~ 20 for alii 
The social optimisation problem is to choose the paths of control variables, 
subject to equations of motion, constraints on control variables and initial 
conditions, in order to maximize social welfare over time. Social welfare is 
composed of the sum of discounted social utilities over time. This is a problem in 
optimal control theory. 
10 The notation of the dot above variables implies the derivative of the variable with respect to time 
t. For example, X' I __ dX: 
t dt 
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4.6 The Maximum Principle 
In the beginning, we need to derive the conditions of the Maximum Principle 
for this problem. We set the current value Hamiltonian function. A and ~ are 
costate variables. 
_ m m 
H = U{Jr/)} + L~Y; + LJl;a; 
,~1 ,~1 
Then, we augment the current value Hamiltonian function into the current 
value Lagrangian function in order to consider the constraints on control variables. 
91 92 and 93 are the Lagrange multipliers. 11 
m m 
L = U {Jr/)} + LA;y; + LJl;a: 
1=1 1=1 
+ IOI',t(Y; + X:)+ !O~)L~ -X; - Y;)+ fO~)a; +.4;) 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
We can derive the conditions of the Maximum Principle from the Lagrangian 
function. The conditions are the first-order necessary conditions for optimal 
outcomes. 
(for all i) 
(4-1) 
(for all i) 
(4-2) 
(for all i) 
(4-3) 
11 Refer to Chiang (1992) chapter 10 about the current value Lagrangian function. 
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ji - 8 I = _~ = -u {_ M _ BC I _ "BC} ~} _ I 
t l)il aA; 1r A aA; 7;: Bh BA; e3,t (for all i) 
(4-4) 
XI = aL = yi (for all i) 
I aA: I 
I 
(4-5) 
A' = aL =d .L~ a I I 
PI 
(for all i) 
(4-6) 
BL I X' . LJi BL = 0 ae' = Yt + 1 ~ 0, el' I ~ 0 and vI,1 aEl (for all i) 
1,1 1,1 
(4-7) 
aL Li Xl I f}1 0 f}1 BL. = 0 
--. = F - I - YI > 0 2 I ~ and 2 Be' - , Bf}' 
2,1 2 
(for all i) 
(4-8) 




A I ( 0) = Ad ~ 0 (for all i) 
(4-11) 
lim A: (t) = 0 (for all i) 
I...".'" 
( 4-12) 
lim pi (t) = 0 (for all i) 
I...".", 
(4-13) 
To begin with, we interpret the economic meaning of these first-order 
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necessary conditions, assuming that we have an interior solution. 12 Based on the 
assumption, the constraints on control variables are not binding. Therefore, we 





The equation (4-14) implies that the marginal cost of floodplain development (or 
restoration) is equal to the imputed value (or shadow price) of developed 
floodplains (or natural floodplains in the case of restoration) in time t. Equation 
(4-15) implies that the marginal cost of averting behaviour is equal to the imputed 
value (or shadow price) of the area potentially protected by averting behaviour 
(the scale of averting behaviour) in time 1. 
From (4-3) and (4-14), 
i. == U {8D _ B + ae' + ~. ae f ah _ F } 
t 1f Y X aXI ~ ah aXI x 
t J>l I 
(4-16) 
The first term in braces is the interest received if floodplains are not developed 
(we do not incur the direct cost). This is an opportunity cost. It implies that we 
would earn the interest if we invested the resource that we could save. The second 
term in braces implies the marginal cost of losing ecosystem services due to 
floodplain development. The third term is the marginal cost of increased flood risk 
due to floodplain development. The fourth term implies the marginal cost of the 
external flood risk that floodplain development in zone i inflicts on other zones 
downstream. The fifth term is the marginal direct benefit of floodplain 
J 2 We focus on the case of floodplain development for the explanation of the economic meanings. 
Based on it, it is easy to interpret them in the case of floodplain restoration. 
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development. We have to compare the marginal cost (the sum of the first four 
terms) with the marginal benefit (the fifth term) in order to interpret this condition. 
If the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit, the right hand side of equation 
(4-16) is positive. Thus, A.; > O. It implies that the imputed value (shadow price) 
of developed floodplains must increase in order to compensate for the loss due to 
floodplain development. Vice versa. 13 
From (4-4) and (4-15), 
j.J = lAJ + + ----+-'/ U {~ M I ac} 8h. 8C.i } 
t 1r a A pi 8h 8.4; 8A; 
(4-17) 
Likewise, we can interpret the economic meaning of equation (4-17). The first 
term in braces implies the interest received if we do not enhance the scale of 
averting behaviour (we do not incur the cost). This is an opportunity cost. It 
implies that we would earn the interest if we invested the resource that we could 
save. The second tenn is the marginal maintenance and operation cost of averting 
behaviour. The third term is the marginal cost of the external flood risk that 
enhancing the scale of averting behaviour in zone i imposes on other zones 
downstream. The fourth term implies the marginal cost that we can avoid by 
enhancing the scale of averting behaviour. It is the marginal benefit of averting 
behaviour. We compare the marginal cost (the sum of the first three tenns) with 
the marginal benefit (the fourth term). If the marginal cost exceeds the marginal 
benefit, the right hand side of equation (4-17) is positive. Thus, /1; > O. This 
implies that the imputed value (shadow price) of the area potentially protected by 
averting behaviour (the scale of averting behaviour) must increase in order to 
compensate for the loss due to enhancing the scale of averting behaviour. Vice 
versa. 
Conditions (4-5) and (4-6) are equivalent to equations of motion given in the 
optimisation problem. Conditions (4-lO) and (4-] 1) are initial conditions given. 
13 In the case offloodpJain restoration, the similar interpretation is possible. 
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Conditions (4-12) and (4-13) are transversality conditions. In this problem, the 
values of the state variables at the end point are free. Thus, we need the conditions 
(4-12) and (4-13) in order to get the optimal solution. 14 They imply that the 
imputed value (shadow price) approaches zero if time goes to infinity. From 
economic point of view, we have to continue to develop or restore floodplains 
perpetually if condition (4-12) is violated. Likewise, we have to continue to 
enhance or reduce averting behaviour perpetually if condition (4-13) is violated. 
The situation cannot be optimal. 
4.7 Steady-state Solution 
In this section, we derive the steady-state solution in order to analyse its 
stability later. We continue to focus on an interior solution. 
In the beginning, we leave out the costate variables A: and Ii from the 
equations by use of the conditions (4-14), (4-15), (4-16) and (4-17). Then, we 
derive the differential equations without the costate variables. Differentiate 
equation (4-14) with respect to time t, and arrange them by use of the condition 
(4-5). 
(4-18) 
Likewise, differentiate equation (4-15) with respect to time t, and arrange them by 
use of the condition (4-6). 
14 Chiang (1992) provides a mathematical explanation (proof) in this respect (chapter 9). 
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(4-19) 
Substitute equations (4-18) into the condition (4-16). 
(for all i) 
(4-20) 
Substitute equations (4-19) into the condition (4-17). 
=U OG -G Ii +M +-+ ----. { 
. OCi OCj~} 
Tr a aa t A 8A; ~ 8h 8A; (for all i) 
(4-21) 
The number of equations in (4-20) and (4-21) is 2m and the number of 
control variables is 2m. Then, we can solve the equations for each control variable 
conceptually. In other words, we can get the following differential equations for 
each control variable from (4-20) and (4-21) conceptually. 
y; = /' (y, a, X, A) (for all i) 
a; = gi (y, a, X, A) (for all i) 
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Adding conditions (4-5) and (4-6) to the differential equations above, we 
obtain the relevant system of simultaneous differential equations of the problem. 
Using the system of simultaneous differential equations, we can derive analytical 
solutions and analyse the steady-state solution and its local stability. Here, we try 
to derive the steady-state solution. In the steady-state, all the control and state 
variables do not change. Then, 
" 0 YI = (for all i) 
" 0 a = I (for all i) 
x; = Y; = 0 (for all i) 
A; = a; = 0 (for all i) 
We can derive the steady-state solution by substituting these conditions into 
equation (4-20) and (4-21). 
{ aci ac
1 ah} U -B,-F,+-+'--. =0 
1f ,\ .\ ax' L..J ah ax' 
I J>' I 
U {M +aCi+,aCl~}=o 
1f A aA; f;1 ah aA; 
According to the assumption, U 1f > O. Thus, 
aCi ac.i ah F = -B , + - + ,----. (for all i) 
x .\ ax' L..J ah ax' 
I J>' I 
(4-22) 
ac' ac J ah 
- - M +' - (for all i) aLi' - A L..J ah aLi' ~ J>' ~Jy 
(4-23) 
Therefore, the steady-state solution must satisfy equations (4-22) and (4-23). 
Equations (4-22) and (4-23) provide the steady-state conditions, which have 
an important economic meaning. The essential point is that the marginal benefit 
must be equal to the marginal cost plus the marginal external cost about floodplain 
development and averting behaviour respectively. We interpret equations (4-22) 
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and (4-23) in more detail. 
Equation (4-22) is on floodplain development. The term on the left hand side 
implies the marginal direct benefit of floodplain development. The first term on 
the right hand side implies the marginal cost of losing ecosystem services due to 
floodplain development. The second term on the right hand side implies the 
marginal cost of increased flood risk due to floodplain development. These first 
three tenns on the right hand side are totally the marginal cost of floodplain 
development. The third term on the right hand side implies the marginal cost of 
the external flood risk that floodplain development in zone i inflicts on other 
zones downstream. It is the marginal external cost of floodplain development. 
Hence, the condition (4-22) implies that the marginal benefit of floodplain 
development must be equal to the marginal cost plus the marginal external cost of 
floodplain development. 
Equation (4-23) is on averting behaviour. We can acquire a similar economic 
interpretation. The tenn on the left hand side implies the marginal cost that we can 
avoid by enhancing the scale of averting behaviour. This is the marginal benefit of 
averting behaviour. The first term on the right hand side implies the marginal 
operation and maintenance cost due to the increase in the scale of averting 
behaviour. The second term on the right hand side implies the marginal cost of the 
external flood risk that enhancing the scale of averting behaviour in zone i 
imposes on other zones downstream. This is the marginal external cost of averting 
behaviour. Therefore, equation (4-23) implies that the marginal benefit of averting 
behaviour must be equal to the marginal cost plus the marginal external cost of 
averting behaviour. 
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4.8 Analytical Solution 
In this section, we obtain an analytical solution in the dynamic optimisation 
problem. To begin with, we obtain a general form of analytical solution, in which 
there are m zones. However, this merely complicates matters. In order to discuss 
the essence of the model, it is better to make the model simpler and more tractable. 
This does not undermine the generality of the model. Thus, we assume that there 
are two zones. Furthennore, we focus on development of floodplains by omitting 
the variables related to averting behaviour. This enables us to get more concrete 
results. 
4.8.1 General Form of Analytical Solution 
In the beginning, we show the general form of analytical solution. We derive 
a system of simultaneous differential equations relating all the control and state 
variables from equations (4-20) and (4-21). 
y; = Ji(y"a"X"AJ 
a; = gi (y" a" Xl' AJ 
X; = k' (ypap XpAJ= y; (for all i) 
A: = q'(YI'3p X"AJ = a; 
( 4-24) 
If an initial condition is given, we observe the optimal trajectories of control, 
state and costate variables by using this system. 15 This system satisfies the 
first-order necessary conditions (the maximum principle). On the theoretical side, 
we can obtain the differential equations in the system. Nevertheless, on the 
practical side, we cannot explicitly show them without providing concrete specific 
I S We need equations (4-14) and (4-15) in order to obtain the optimal trajectories of costate 
variables. 
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functional forms in the optimisation problem because of its complicacy. 
4.8.2 Model o/Two Zones with Two Control Variables 
We confine the general form to a two-zones case (an example), say m = 2. 
We still treat two control variables and two state variables in this case. Thus, the 
system of differential equations contains eight differential equations. Based on 
(4-20) and (4-21), we can obtain four equations. We can solve the system of these 
four equations for the four time derivatives of control variables, and we add up the 
four equations of motion to get the system of differential equations. 
y;=1 = fl (y;=1 ,y;=2 ,a;=1 ,a;=2 ,X:=I ,X:=2, A;=I ,A;=2 ) 
Y'i=2 = f2( 1=1 1=2 i=1 i=2 Xi=1 X I=2 Ai=1 Ai=2) , Yt 'Yt ,at ,a, , , , , , .. ~ ,~ 
al=1 = 1 (i=1 1=2 i=1 1=2 XI=I X i=2 A 1=1 A i=2) 
t g Yt 'Yt ,at ' at ' t , t ' < 't ," 't 
a l=2 = g2( 1=1 i=2 1=1 i=2 Xi=1 X I=2 .11=1 .1/=2) t Yt 'Yt ,at ,at ' t ' , ,~ '<'1 
XI=I = kl( 1=1 1=2 1=1 1=2 X I =1 X t=2 .11=1 .1 /=2)= yl=1 t y, , y, , at , at , t , , , .. 't , < 't t 
XI=2 = k2 (/=1 1=2 1=1 1=2 Xi=1 Xi=2 Ai=1 .11=2)= y l=2 t Yt ,Yt ,at ,at , t , t ,< 't , ~ t 
,11=1 = I( 1=1 1=2 1=1 1=2 XI=I X i=2 Ai=1 Ai=2)= ai=1 
.. 'r q Yt , Yt ,at ' at ' , , t ,~ , ~ t 
~1=2 = q2(y;=I, y;=2 ,a;=1 ,a;=2, X;=I, X:=2 ,..4;=1 ,..4;=2 )= a;=2 
(4-25) 16 
This system of differential equations provides the analytical solution of the 
dynamic optimisation problem. The optimal paths of four control and four state 
variables are derived by the system of differential equations. However, they are 
too complicated to treat abstractly. If we give specific functional forms to the 
model with relevant parameter values, we can easily derive optimal paths from 
initial conditions given with the help of a computer software program such as 
GAMS. 
16 The first four differential equations are given by complicated functions. See Appendix 8-1. 
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4.8.3 Model of Two Zones with One Control Variable 
The model above is complex. One of the causes of the complexity is the 
number of control and state variables. Hence, we consider a reduced model with 
no option of averting behaviour here. Referring to equations (4-1), (4-2), (4-3) and 
(4-4) in the first-order necessary conditions (the maximum principle) or equations 
(4-22) and (4-23) in the steady-state optimal solution, it is possible that we 
initially ignore the option of averting behaviour in the model because of the 
symmetric relationship between floodplain development and averting behaviour. 
Averting behaviour in zones upstream has the same external effects on zones 
downstream as floodplain development in zones upstream. Averting behaviour is 
an alternative to floodplain conservation or restoration in terms of flood 
mitigation of its own zones. Therefore, we can still maintain the essential points 
even if we focus on floodplain development with no option of averting 
behaviour. 17 To begin with, we set up a social optimisation problem in a reduced 










(i = 1,2) 
_Xi <yi <Li -X' 
t - t - F t (i= 1, 2) 
i I 
Mathematical notation and assumptions are the same as before (except that 
averting behaviour is omitted). We should, however, notice that we omit the 
function of flood risk (h) because it is a function of only the size of developed 
floodplains. 
17 We should note that averting behaviour is still important as a matter of fact. 
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We derive the first-order necessary conditions for the dynamic social 
optimisation problem in the reduced model in the same procedure as section 4.6. 
The first order necessary conditions yield: 18 
+ dF 1Tl =2 _ dD . i=1 _ dD . i=2 _ aC1=1 X i=1 _ ac,=2 X'=2 
dX ,=2 d 1=) YI d i=2 Yt aX1=1 t aX1=2 t 
I OIl Yt t I 
aC1=2 . H} dD {dB dF aCi=1 aC1=2} 
- x- -8U --=-u + - ---
aX1=1 I tr d 1=) tr dXi=1 dX
'
=) axi=l aX1=1 
I YI I I I I 
(4-26) 
d d dV aci=l aci=2 'F ·i=2_~'i=) ___ 'i=2 ___ ._1'i=l_ . 1'i=2 
+ dXi=2 XI d i=1 Yt d i=2 Yt aX1=1 I aX1=2 t 
t YI 011 t t 
(4-27) 
X:=1 = y;=1 and X:=2 = y:=2 
(4-28) 
From (4-26), (4-27) and (4-28), we can derive the system of differential 
equations. 
18 Equations (4-26) and (4-27) are equivalent to equations (4-20) and (4-21). 
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y=1 = fl(yl=1 i=2 Xi=1 X i=2)= NRI 
t t 'Yt , t , t DN 
y=2 = f2(i=1 1=2 X,=I Xi=2)= NR2 
t 1 'Yt , t 'I DN 
X'=I = kl( 1=1 1=2 X'=I X'=2)- 1=1 
1 Yt , YI , 1 , t - YI 
X,=2 = k 2( 1=1 1=2 X,=I X'=2)- 1=2 
t Y1 , YI , t , 1 - YI 
(4-29) 
where 
NRI =U - -. +0-.-+ . +--d
2D {dF dB dD OC'=I OC I=2} 
1T d(y;=2 r dX;=l dX;=1 dy;=1 Ox; =1 OX;=1 
+ U Y - -.- - - + +--{ 
i-If dD d2 D J( dF dB OC'=1 OC I=2J 
1T1T 1 dy;=1 d(y;=2 r dX;=1 dX;=1 OX;=I oX; =1 
i=2[ dD d 2 D J( dF dB OC'=2 J 
+ Yt dy;=1 d(y;=2 r -dX;=2 - dX;=2 + OX;=2 
dD dD (dF dB OCi=2] +-.---.- - . - . + . dlr l dlr2 dX ,=2 dX ,=2 OX,=2 
Jt Jt 1 t t 
( 
dD J2( dF dB OC'=l aC i=2J} 
+ dy;=2 dX;=1 + dX;=1 - ax;=1 - ax;=1 
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dD dD (dF dB aCi=1 aCi=2J 
+----- - . - + +--dyl=1 dyl=2 dX1=1 dXi=1 axi=1 axi=1 
t t t t t t 
dD dF dB aCi=2 ( J2( J} + dy;=1 dX;=2 + dX;=2 - ax;=2 
The system of differential equations (4-28) is the analytical solution of the 
reduced dynamic optimisation problem. The optimal paths of two control and two 
state variables are provided by the system of differential equations. If an initial 
condition is given, we can obtain an optimal trajectory of each control, state and 
costate variable according to the differential equations. 
4.9 Sufficiency Conditions 
Our discussion has been based on the first-order necessary conditions 
(maximum principle) up to now. However, we need to check the sufficient 
conditions in order to verify that the situations derived from the first-order 
necessary conditions are optimal. We have two options: the Mangasarian 
sufficiency theorem and the Arrow sufficiency theorem. The Arrow sufficiency 
theorem uses a weaker condition than Mangasarian's theorem, but we check the 
sufficient conditions, based on the Mangasarian sufficiency theorem. 
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Chiang (I 992) has provided a concise summary of the theorem in the case of 
ro 
an infinite horizon problem. The problem is to maximise V =: f F(t, y, u}it 
o 
subject to y =: /(t,y,u) and y(O) = Yo (given).19 In this case, the two 
conditions must be satisfied in order that the first-order conditions are not only 
necessary but also sufficient for deriving an optimal path. The first condition is 
that Hamiltonian function H == F(t,y,u)+ ,If(t, y, u) is concave in (y,u) 
for all t E [0, T]. The second condition is: lim A(t ){;{t)- y*(t )}~ O. 
I~ro 
Now, we check the two conditions in our model. The first key is the 
concavity of Hamiltonian function. Based on the assumptions in Section 4.4, the 
integrand function is concave, and the equations of motion are linear in all the 
control and state variables. The second key is that the limit above should be equal 
or larger than zero. In our model, there is a positive discounting factor. It always 
converges to zero as time t goes to infinity. As a result, the first-order necessary 
conditions (the maximum principle) satisfy the conditions of the Mangasarian 
sufficiency theorem. 
4.10 Stability Analysis 
In this section, we check the local stability of steady-state equilibrium by 
using the method of linearization of higher-dimensional non-linear systems. In the 
beginning, we show the general form of Jacobian matrix in the method of 
linearization. Then, based on the general form, we analyse the local stability of 
steady-state equilibrium in the reduced model that we provided in the previous 
section. 
19 U is a control variable andy is a state variable. 
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4.10.1 Stability Analysis in the General Form 
Based on (4-24), we depict the system of differential equations in the 
following. 
Y; = fl(ypal'XI'AJ 
a; =gi(ypat'Xt'AJ 
x; = kl(Yl'a"X"AJ= y; 
A; = qi(ypa"XpAJ= a; 
(for all i) 
Differentiate the right hand side of these equations with respect to the relevant 
arguments, and set them as a factor of the Jacobian matrix. We evaluate the 
Jacobian matrix in the steady-state equilibrium in the following. (y, a, X, A) is 
the set of values in the optimal steady-state solution. 
1= 
[:] [!] [!] [~] 
[Z] [~] [~] [~~l 
[:] [:] [:;] [:] 




, and the same applied to the rest. 
(4-30) 
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Then, the judgement on the feature of local stability obeys the following 
theorem (Polking et ai., 2002).20 (1) If the real part of every eigenvalue of the 
Jacobian matrix is negative, the steady-state equilibrium is an asymptotically 
stable equilibrium point. (2) If the Jacobian matrix has at least one eigenvalue 
with positive real part, the steady-state equilibrium is an unstable equilibrium 
point. 
4.10.2 Stability in the Model of Two Zones with One Control 
Variable 
Based on the general form above, we analyse the local stability of the 
optimal steady-state solution in the reduced model that we discussed in the 
previous section. In the first place, we check the optimal steady-state solution. In 
the steady-state equilibrium, all the control and state variables remain unchanged. 
Thus, we put the condition, X;=1 = X;=2 = y;=1 = y;=2 = 0, into the first-order 
necessary conditions (4-26), (4-27) and (4-28). Then, we obtain the followings. 
The optimal steady-state solution (57;=1,57;=2, X;=I, X;=2) must satisfy these. 
dB dF ac i=1 ac i=2 dD 
--+ -. - . -8--=0 dX i =1 dX ,=1 ax,=1 ax,=1 d ;=1 
t t t t Yt 
(4-31) 
dB dF ac,=2 dD 
--+ . - . -8-.-=0 dX i =2 dX,=2 ax,=2 dy'=2 
t t t t 
(4-32) 
X· 1=1 -;=1 0 -y -t - -
(4-33) 
X· i=2 -i=2 0 -y -t - -
(4-34) 
20 In the case of 2 x2 Jacobian matrix, we have more categories (c.f. Brock and Malliaris (1989), pp. 
77-84). 
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Based on the general form (4-30), we can provide the 4x4 Jacobian matrix 
that is evaluated in the optimal steady-state equilibrium. 
all all all afl 
a 1=1 Yt a 1=2 Yt ax,=1 t axi=2 t 
a/2 a/2 a/2 a/2 
a /=1 a 1=2 axi=1 axi=2 J= Yt Yt t t 
akl akl akl akl 
--a /=1 Yt a 1=2 Yt ax,=1 t ax,=2 t 
ak2 ak2 ak2 ak2 
a /=1 a ;=2 ax,=1 ax,=2 y:~l=i~l=O y:~2=yi~2=O Yt Yt t t xtl=Xi~l 
x:-2 =.\,i-2 
Then, we can calculate each factor of the Jacobian matrix by using equations 
(4-29) with the steady-state conditions (4-31), (4-32), (4-33) and (4_34).21 
a 0 f3 r 
0 a £ ¢ J= 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
where 
21 See Appendix B-2 about the process of mathematical derivation of the Jacobian matrix. 
ric=2 a2c=2 
22 The inequality sign of this ten» depends on the ten» . 1 . 2 = . 0 . 1 . However, ax/~ ax'= ax'=-ax/~ t t t t 
this does not affect the result of the local stability analysis. 
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(4-35) 
Based on the Jacobian matrix, we can obtain the following four eigenvalues 
(r). 
a ~a2 + 2/3 + 2¢ + 2~ /32 - 2/3¢ + ¢2 + 4y& 
" , '2' '3,'4 = - ± and 2 2 
a J a 2 + 2fJ + 2¢ - 2~ fJ2 - 2/3¢ + ¢2 + 4y& 
- + ...!...--------.-.:.-------~ 2 - 2 
(4-36) 
Based on the eigenvalues (4-36), we can check whether the optimal 
steady-state equilibrium is stable or not. If the second term of the eigenvalues is 
an imaginary number, the real part of the eigenvalues is obviously positive 
because a > 0 . If the second term is a real number, at least two eigenvalues are 
2 
positive because the second term is common in each pair of the eigenvalues. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the steady-state equilibrium is unstable, based on 
the judgement rule we mentioned. Notice that we cannot judge whether it is a 
saddle point in three or more dimensional models (here, four dimensions). If it is a 
saddle, it is possible to control it. 
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4.11 Policy Implications 
As we have discussed, the system of floodplain management that is derived 
in this chapter is complex in that all the control and state variables in zones of the 
catchment interact one another. In addition, the system is unstable, based on the 
result of local stability analysis derived from the reduced model of two zones with 
one control variable. 23 In this case, the state can never attain the steady-state 
equilibrium unless the initial point is on an optimal steady-state equilibrium. It is, 
however, unknown where initial states go, based on the result of the local stability. 
If several initial states diverged into extreme situations in which all the 
floodplains are developed or natural, they would be non-optimal for the infinite 
optimisation problem because they are not sustainable. 24 
Under such an unstable situation, we have difficulties setting relevant 
policies because we have to force the current situation to directly move to a 
steady-state equilibrium with pinpoint accuracy. In addition, we do not know 
whether it is optimal to do so. On the contrary, in the case of stable equilibria, any 
initial states approach a steady-state equilibrium without any policies as long as 
each zone obeys the optimal management strategy although the adjustment 
process might be long. 25 In the case of saddle equilibria, we can take a feedback 
or closed-loop control policy (Conrad and Clark, 1987). If we can calculate 
separatrix curves (or saddle paths), we can reach the optimal paths that lead to a 
steady-state equilibrium along these curves. 
To deal with the difficulties posed by the instability of the reduced model, 
and to explore the implications for policy, the next step is to develop an applied 
model based on the theoretical model in Chapter 5 and carry out policy 
23 Our discussion is limited to the reduced model hereafter for a while. 
24 In the mathematical terms, such states do not satisfy transversality conditions derived from the 
social optimisation problem. Intuitively speaking, no ecosystem services and full economic 
activities or no economic activities and full ecosystem services are both non-optimal for our 
society. 
25 Even if the equilibria are stable, we need a policy for considering the externalities we 
mentioned. 
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simulations concretely in Chapter 6. 
4.12 Conclusion of Chapter 4 
In this chapter, we develop a theoretical continuous dynamic model for 
considering an optimal floodplain management. Unlike the static model, the 
dynamic model can provide optimal trajectories as a system of differential 
equations. The dynamic model is the basis of the applied models used in policy 
simulations. 
The steady-state solutions imply that the marginal benefit should be equal to 
the sum of the marginal cost and the marginal external cost in tenns of floodplain 
development and the scale of averting behaviour respectively. Interestingly, the 
conditions are the same as the optimal conditions derived from the static model in 
Chapter 3. In a reduced model, however, the steady-state equilibrium is locally 
unstable. Therefore, any initial states cannot achieve the steady-state equilibrium. 
That is, the optimal conditions derived from the static model cannot be satisfied in 
the dynamic context. There is interestingly a gap between static and dynamic 
models based on the same assumptions. Notice, however, that the results of the 
local stability analysis depend on the assumptions of functions on concavity and 
convexity. If the assumptions are not satisfied in real situations, the results may 
change. In any case, it is difficult to provide clear guidance for policies except that 
externalities should be internalised, based on the analysis of the theoretical 
dynamic model. Thus, we wiII develop an applied model, calibrate parameters and 
conduct policy simulations in the concrete context of the Ouse catchment in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Applied Simulation Model and 
Calibration: Hydrological Modelling on 
HEC-HMS 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an applied model in discrete time 
based on the theoretical continuous model we developed in Chapter 4, to 
detennine functional forms and a hydrological sub-model (related to HEC-HMS) 
and to calibrate parameter values. The applied model with relevant calibrated 
parameter values is used for policy simulation in the next chapter. 
The models are calibrated using several types of data such as economlC, 
physical, GIS, and hydrological data. Some data derive from other researches in 
order to obtain a concrete function of benefits of ecosystem services. Furthermore, 
related to the hydrological sub-model, we often create data in order to calibrate 
parameters. For example, we create required data from GIS digital elevation 
models in order to obtain physical data on subbasins and rivers for the hydraulic 
model. We try to associate them with observed data as much as possible. However, 
we acknowledge that we set some assumptions on parameters and sub-models 
because of limited availability of necessary data. Needless to say, we make the 
assumptions clear in relevant parts. 
In Section 5.2, we develop an applied simulation model in discrete time. We 
need the model in discrete time steps for policy simulation. In Section 5.3, we 
develop a hydrological sub-model (related to HEC-HMS) for the expected cost 
function of flood risk. This determines the impact of the land-use in floodplains as 
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control variables in terms of hydrology. To begin with, we select an appropriate 
model for the Ouse catchment. Then, we specify measured parameters and fitted 
parameters based on data generated using the optimisation (calibration) tool of 
HEC-HMS. In addition, we specify the functional relationships between required 
variables, using a frequency analysis technique. The hydrological sub-model 
requires many parameters to be specified and large amounts of data for carrying 
out simulations. In Section 5.4, we specify the forms and parameter values of the 
functions included in the model by use of a value transfer method and relevant 
data. We set constraints on control variables as well. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2 Simulation Model in Discrete Time 
In Chapter 4, we developed a theoretical model in continuous time in order to 
analyse the optimal conditions and derive some policy implications. Now, we 
develop an applied model in discrete time. This is a reduced model with one 
control variable, floodplain development. That is, we omit the factor of averting 
behaviour as a control variable. 
There are several reasons why we focus on a reduced model. First, even in 
discrete time, the model of multiple zones with two control variables is intractable. 
We prefer a simpler model in order to derive essential implications for policy 
making, as long as we adhere to our main research questions. Our main questions 
focus on floodplain management, not averting behaviour. Furthermore, essential 
points will not be lost even if our model does not include averting behaviour 
explicitly for the following reason. Second, the enhancement of averting 
behaviour in zone i has the same effect on the expected cost of flood risk in the 
zone i as the conservation of natural floodplains in zone i. In this respect, averting 
behaviour is a substitute for natural floodplains. Averting behaviour and 
floodplain development are complementary. In fact, floodplain development is 
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often accompanied by averting behaviour. In addition, the enhancement of 
averting behaviour in zone i has the same effect on the expected cost of flood risk 
in zones), downstream as the development of floodplains in zone i, which implies 
unidirectional spatial externality. Thus, only if we check the characteristics of 
floodplain development in the model, we can understand policy implications. 
Third, it is too difficult to indicate averting behaviour in a hydrological sub-model 
because of a limitation of the model and data availability. The types of averting 
behaviour are various: embankment, dykes, floodwalls, pumping system, and so 
on. We can control the height of banks in a hydrological sub-model, but we cannot 
directly address other types of averting behaviour. 1 Nor do we have data on other 
forms of averting behaviour. Furthermore, the range of averting behaviour is often 
limited to a particular area in a zone (subbasin). In this case, we have to divide the 
target watershed (catchment) into so many zones (subbasins) for considering 
averting behaviour, which is complicated and may not help policy analysis. 
Averting behaviour (flood protection) is treated as one of the initial 
conditions (as an exogenous variable). As we mention in Section 5.3.13, we focus 
on precipitation volume with 2%, I % and lower exceedance probability in 
simulations, given that the current flood protection water level is close to the 1% 
flood water level in York and Selby urban areas. 2 
The optimisation problem is the following. The interpretation of the problem 
is the same as in Chapter 4. However, it is a finite discrete time problem. We 
suppose that decision makers or policy makers attempt to make their decisions in 
a fixed duration such as 30, 50 and 100 years. 
where 
1 There is a possibility for expanding a model in order to include averting behaviour as far as the 
embankment is concerned. 
2 This might be a strong assumption for the whole catchment. As the assumption is applied to the 
whole catchment, we choose precipitation volume with 2%, 1% and lower exceedance probability. 
Chapter 5. Applied Model and Calihration 144 
1 
p = 1 + J (P is the discount factor, and (5 is the periodic discount rate.) 
V(.) denotes a final function that indicates the value of the state variable at 
terminal time T. 
subject to 
Xi Xi I 
1+1- 1 =YI (for all i) 
-X; ~Y: ~L~ -X; (for all i) 
X~ = XI (0) given (for all i) 
Let us derive the first-order necessary conditions as we did in Chapter 4. We 
use the Hamiltonian. To begin with, we set the current value Hamiltonian function 
H with the costate variable ;.. 
The first-order conditions include: 
aH dD i 
-I = -U 1r -i + PA:1+1 = 0 (for all i) 8yt dYl 
(5-1) 
l -l =_ aH =-{u [dB + dF _ ac i _ "aC l ]} (for all i) 
p 1+1 tax; 1r dX; dX; ax; f: ax: 
(5-2) 
XI _XI _ aH _yi (for all i) 
1+1 1 - a( l J - 1 P 1+1 
(5-3) 
11 = av and XOi = Xi(O) (for all i) 
'''7 aX I 
T 
(5-4) 
Arranging conditions (5-1), (5-2), (5-3) and (5-4), 
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l' -u dD 
Pn't+l - 1r ~ (for all i) 
Yt 
(5-5) 
A: = U (dB + dF _ ae' _ ~ ae f J + A: 
1 1r dX' dX' ax' L..J ax' P 1+1 1 t 1 J>I t 
(for all i) 
(5-6) 
x' X' , 1+1- 1 =Yt (for all i) 
(5-7) 
1i -- a~:'. ..( ) ''7 'A and X~ = X' 0 
T 
(for all i) 
(5-8) 
The system of difference equations is given by conditions (5-5), (5-6), (5-7) and 
(5_8).3 
In addition, we want to consider the steady-state in which y, X and A. are 
unchanging. In the steady-state, the following conditions hold: 
A: = A; = A;+I (for all i) 
X' = X; = X:+I (for all i) 
, I 0 dD Y = YI = (~-. = 0) (for all i) di 
Then, 
=:> dF = _ dB + ac' + L Be} (for all i) 
dX: dX: oX: }>, ax; 
The conditions are the same as the steady-state conditions derived in Chapter 
4. This implies that the marginal benefit of floodplain development must be equal 
3 We try to numerically solve this dynamic optimisation problem by GAMS software program in 
the next chapter. 
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to the marginal cost plus the marginal external cost of floodplain development. 
Finally, we should note that the unit of the value is ] 990 UK £ and the unit of 
area is a hectare (ha). In addition, we need to set a specific functional form of the 
utility function for simulations. A utility that satisfies the assumptions in Chapter 
3 is 4 
1 U(Jr) = 2(Jr + c)'2 
(U'(Jr)=(Jr+cr~ >0, U"(Jr)=_2.(Jr+ct% <0) 
2 
where c is a constant that is sufficiently large in order that the term (n+c) is 
always positive. 5 
5.3 Hydrological Sub-model 
We give the expected cost of flood risk from a hydrological sub-model 
(hydrological simulation model). Then, based on a hydrological sub-model, we 
derive a concrete functional form for the expected cost function of flood risk in 
Section 5.4.1. To begin with, we define a hydrological model on HEC-HMS 
(Hydrologic Modeling System) and calibrate relevant parameters. This gives the 
relationship between control variable (floodplain development) and discharge 
volume (peak flow). Next, we implement frequency analysis on precipitation in 
order to acquire the relationship between precipitation and its exceedance 
probability. Then, we set the function that shows the relation between discharge 
volume and estimated flood costs in each subbasin. Finally, we calculate the 
expected cost of flood risk linked with a value of control variable. 
4 We can choose any functional fonus as long as they satisfy the assumptions. 
5 The utility function is ordinal. We are not interested in the absolute value but the relative value. 
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5.3.1 HEC-HMS 
HEC-HMS is a GUI (Graphical User Interface) software program of 
hydrologic modelling simulation. HEC-HMS is freely provided by the US Army 
Corps of Engineers, Hydrologic Engineering Center. 6 The US Army Corps of 
Engineers continuously upgrade the software program. 7 These are advantages to 
using HEC-HMS. This point is related to reproducibility of research work. 8 
HEC-HMS provides mathematical simulations of the precipitation-runoff 
processes of dendritic watershed systems, based on several theoretical or 
empirical and hydrological or hydraulic models. It is applicable in a wide range of 
geographic areas for solving the widest possible range of problems including 
floodplain regulation (USACE, 2001). Simulation models on HEC-HMS are 
composed of three sub-models: a basin model, a meteorologic model and a control 
specification model. The basin model stipulates river system connectivity and 
physical data describing a watershed. The meteorologic model stores the data on 
precipitation which is used in simulations. The meteorologic model also deals 
with virtual or hypothetical precipitation for simulations. The control specification 
model determines the time duration and time interval in which we execute 
simulations. 
There are, however, some limitations of HEC-HMS (USACE, 2000 and 
2001). First, HEC-HMS cannot deal with backwater effects except through 
Modified PuIs which can partly treat them. Tidal fluctuations, significant tributary 
inflows, dams, bridges, culverts, and channel constructions may cause backwater 
effects. We focus on the upstream area in the total watershed of River Ouse that is 
not close to Humber estuary. Thus, we do not need to worry about tidal 
fluctuations. However, we are not sure about other possible causes. If backwater 
effects were serious, we should switch to other hydrological modelling programs. 
Second, some of the routing models in HEC-HMS cannot take flood mitigation 
6 The software program, HEC-HMS, is downloadable from the website. www.hec.usace.army.mil 
7 We use HEC-HMS version 2.2.2. (28 May 2003). 
8 We provide a review on hydrological software programs in Chapter 2. 
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function of floodplains into consideration. If flood flows exceed the channel's 
carrying capacity, water flows into floodplains. Depending on the characteristics 
of the floodplains, the flows in floodplains can be slowed greatly because of their 
flood mitigation function. This can be significant in terms of the translation and 
attenuation of a flood wave. It is what we want to analyse. In this case, we can use 
a two-dimensional flow model in order to simulate the physical processes. Based 
on USACE (2000), the Modified PuIs model and Muskingum Cunge 8-point 
model are used for the problem. Third, some of the routing models in HEC-HMS 
are not suitable if the channel slopes are small. For example, the Kinematic Wave 
model is not appropriate if the channel slope is less than 0.002. However, 
Muskingum Cunge model can be used for relatively flat slopes of channels. We 
can avoid this problem because we choose Muskingum Cunge 8-point model. 
Fourth, if the shifts between subcritical and supercritical flows are frequent and 
unpredictable, none of the routing models in HEC-HMS is suitable. 9 In this 
respect, we cannot judge what is happening in reality because of only limited 
availability of data. If this problem was serious, we should use other hydrological 
software programs. Finally, the models in HEC-HMS cannot treat snowfall and 
snowmelt. 10 Fortunately, as we have only little snow in our target River Ouse 
catchment, this problem does not seem to be serious. 
5.3.2 Modelling on HEC-HMS 
We have to set the three sub-models in order to implement simulations on 
HEC-HMS. The basin model is a core of modelling on HEC-HMS. River system 
connectivity is given by a schematic map that is composed of several elements: 
subbasin, reach (river), reservoir and so on. Each element should be provided by a 
model for calculating runoff or discharge volumes. There are several options of 
9 The sub critical flow is the flow of water at a velocity less than critical or tranquil flow while the 
supercritical flow is the flow of water at a velocity greater than critical or rapid flow (Bedient and 
Huber, 2002). 
10 HEC-HMS wiII be able to treat snowfall and snowmelt in the future according to USACE. 
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the model on each element on HEC-HMS. Thus, we do the following procedures 
to create a basin model. 
1. We set a schematic map as a representative abstract model based on , 
the geographical map. 
2. We choose relevant models (called methods in HEC-HMS) for each 
element. 
3. We specify necessary parameter values by GIS, physical and 
observed data. 
Figure 5-1. Geographical map of River Ouse catchment 
Source: This geographical map is created from GIS data of EDINA Digimap (OS Strategi and Land-Form 
Panorama [DEM)). 
To begin with, let us set a schematic map. We need a geographic map of 
rivers and gauging stations. It is obtained from National River Flow Archive or 
CEH (2003). 11 However, we set a geographical map of River Duse catchment 
(watershed) from GIS data by using ArcGIS. 12 Figure 5-1 shows this. The points 
and numbers indicate the gauging stations. The boundaries show subbasins 
11 National River Flow Archive: www.nerc-wallingford.ac.uk/ihlnwaJindex.htm 
12 We explain how to obtain this map in the following sections. 
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defined by gauging stations. 13 These subbasins are treated as zones In the 
theoretical and applied model. Table 5-1 is the list of gauging stations. 
Table 5-1. List oj gauging stations 
Number Place River 
27001 Hunsingore Weir Nidd 
27002 Flint Mill Weir Wharfe 
27005 Gouthwaite Reserwir Nidd 
27007 Westwick Lock Ure 
27009 Skelton Ouse 
27034 Kilgram Bridge Ure 
27043 Addingham Wharfe 
27053 Birstwith Nidd 
27069 Kirby Wiske Wiske 
27071 Crakehill Swale 
27075 Leeming Bedale Beck 
27083 Huntington Foss 
27085 Dalton Bridge Cod Beck 
27089 Tadcaster Wharfe 
27090 Catterick Bridge Swa/e 
Based on the geographical map, we can set a schematic map considering the 
availability of relevant data and the tractability of our applied simulation model. 
Figure 5-2 shows the schematic map in HEC-HMS. It goes without saying that we 
simplify the real river physical connectivity and subbasins in the process of 
creating the schematic map on HEC-HMS. Thus, we implicitly set some 
assumptions by simplification. Crucially, we set one subbasin element and one 
reach (river) element as a representative on each subbasin based on a gauging 
station. Related to this, we assume that the characteristics of subbasins and rivers 
are similar in each subbasin although they are locally variable in reality. We do 
not think that the assumption is problematical, but the assumption does affect the 
degree of precision of the results of simulations, the tractability of simulation 
model, several difficult points related to calibration of parameters, and so on. In 
this respect, the simplification of the model has both advantages and 
disadvantages. 14 
13 We distinguish subbasins based on the gauging stations. Thus, we name the subbasins by the 
same number of gauging stations. 
14 The issue of this model simplification is ascribed to the problem: how many zones we should 
separate the watershed into when considering policies? However, it depends ~n the number of 
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Figure 5-2. Schematic map of River Ouse catchment on HEC-HMS 
We need to select relevant models for the elements in the schematic map. 
Two elements are used: subbasins and reaches (rivers). We have to choose 
relevant models for the loss rate, transform and baseflow of subbasins. We need to 
pick out a relevant model for reaches (rivers). However, it is difficult to select 
appropriate models for the elements. A very wide variety of models are generally 
available to any rainfall-runoff modelling application without any clear basis for 
their choice (Beven, 2002). Beven (2002) provides practical criteria for choosing 
models: 
• Is a model readily available, or could it made available if the 
investment of time (and money!) appeared to be worthwhile? 
• Does the model predict the variables required by the aims of a 
particular project? 
• Are the assumptions made by the model likely to be limiting in tenus 
of what you know about the response of the catchment you are 
gauging stations when we carty out simulations based on observed data. Furthermore, "the 
ungauged catchment problem is, as yet, not properly resolved due to the fact that it is very difficult 
to generalize about the nature of catchment responses in any quantitative way" (Beven, 2()02). 
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interested in? 
• Can all the inputs required by the model, for specification of the low 
domain, for the specification of the boundary and initial conditions 
and for the specification of the parameters values, be provided within 
the time and cost constraints of a project? 
Here, we have no a priori information on hydrological and hydraulic processes in 
River Ouse catchment. We use the following criteria, considering Beven's 
practical ones. 
I. We choose a model out of the models that HEC-HMS provides. 
2. We choose a simple model with only a few parameters that need to 
be calibrated by observed data, because the calibration (called 
"optimization" in HEC-HMS) algorithm is not so powerful to adjust 
multiple variables in order to make the fit of the model optimal. 15 
3. In tenns of data availability, we choose lumped models. We need to 
choose models, considering data availability. If we cannot specify 
parameter values, it will be meaningless. 
4. We fundamental1y avoid models that need physical parameters and 
data on chemical and biological processes because the data on 
physical parameter values are limited. Thus, we prefer empirical 
(system theoretic) models to conceptual models. 
5. More importantly, we must select the model in which we deal with 
control variables (floodplain development). 
Let us discuss which model we choose for the loss rate, the transfonn and the 
baseflow of subbasins, and the reaches (rivers) in order, considering the criteria 
above. First, we discuss models for loss rate of subbasins. HEC-HMS calculates 
the volume of water that is intercepted, infiltrated, stored, evaporated, or 
transpired as losses in order to compute runoff volume. Thus, we need a model for 
loss rate of subbasins. Table 5-2 shows the list of models. First, we avoid setting 
Green and Ampt, Gridded SCS Curve No and Gridded SMA because they are 
distributed models. Second, SCS Curve No is not suitable to our catchment 
15 In this respect, "[i]n many ways, hydrologic modeling is more an art than a science, and it is 
likely to remain so (Loague and Freeze, 1985)" (qtd. in US ACE, 2000). The issue of choosing 
models is subtle. Ultimately, the problem lies in the extent to which the chosen models with 
calibrated parameters can reproduce real hydrologic situations. 
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because it is developed with data from small agricultural watersheds in mid US. 
Third, we cannot select SMA in terms of data availability. Finally, Initial/Constant 
rate and Deficit/Constant rate can be good candidates in our applied model 
although they might be too simple. We choose Initial/Constant rate as the first 
option for loss rate of subbasins because the number of parameters in it is less 
than that in Deficit/Constant rate. If we are faced with serious problems in the 
process of calibration, we will test Deficit/Constant rate as the second option. In 
addition, one of the important things to note is that the parameter of impervious 
(%) denotes the area of developed lands in each subbasin. This indicates 
development of lands in subbasin. 
Table 5-2. Models for loss rate of subbasins 
Model Type of Model Parameter (unit) Characteristics Choos.? 
-Initial loss (mm) Distributed model. Distributed - Conductivity (mmlhr) Not widely used, so less mature. Gre.n and Ampt Empirical - Vol. moisture deficit Less parsimonious than simple No Fitted parameter -Impervious (%) 
empirical models. 
- Wet. front suct. (mm) 
InitiaUCons tent Lumped -Initial loss (mm) May be too simple to predict 
Empirical - Constant rate (mmlhr) losses within eve nt even if it Yes (1) rate 
Fitted parameter -Impervious (%) predict total losses well. 
Developed wit data from small 
Lumped -Initial loss (mm) agricultural watersheds in mid 
5CS Curve No. Empirical - SCS curve No. US, so applicability elsewhere is No 
Fitted parameter - Impervious (%) uncertain. 
Rainfall intensity not considered. 
Lumped -Initial deficit (mm) Deficit/Cons tant 
- Loss rate (mm/hr) Sim ilar to initial/constant rate. Yes (2) 
rat. Empirical 
- Max. deficit (mm) Fitted parameter 
-Impervious (%) 
- SMA unit Parameters required are SMA Lumped 
- Initial storage (%) complicated. No (Soil Moisture Empirical 
- Storage capacity (mm) Difficult in terms of data Accounting) Fitted parameter 
- Impervious (%) availability. 
GrlddedSCS Distributed - Initial abstraction ratio Distributed model. No Curve No. Empirical - Potential retention scale Fitted parameter 
Distributed 
- Initial storage (%) Grldded SMA Empirical Distributed model. No 
Fitted parameter [5 ground levels] 
Source: Arranged trom USACE (2000, 2001), and HEC-HMS Help. 
Next we discuss models for transform of subbasins. We need a model for , 
simulating the process of direct runoff of excess precipitation on the watershed. 
We may be able to use the empirical parameter prediction equations to specify 
parameter values of transform models, but the optimal source of the parameters is 
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calibration (US ACE, 2000). Furthermore, we often need several measured 
physical parameter values for using the equations, but they are not available in our 
target. Table 5-3 shows the list of models for transform of subbasins. First, we 
cannot choose ModClark because it is a distributed model. Second, we do not 
choose Kinematic Wave and Snyder's UH because they require physical 
parameter values that it is difficult to obtain in the Ouse catchment. Finally, SCS 
VH and Clark's VB can be good candidates in that their parameters can be 
calibrated. We prefer SCS UH to Clark's UR. We should notice that SCS UH 
assumes only one peak flow on event level. However, we have no observed data 
on events although we have daily data. Thus, we cannot check this point. This is 
an implicit assumption in this applied work. 
Table 5-3. Models/or transform of subbasins 
Model Type of Model Parameter (unit) Characteristics Choose? 
Clark's UH Lumped It is a quasi-conceptual 
- Time of concentration (hr) model, but parameters can (Unit Empirical 
- Storage coefficient (hr) be calibrated by obserwd Yes (2) Hydrograph) Fitted parameter precipitation and flow data. 
- Choice of channel It is a conceptual model. 
Lumped routing method Required parameters are Kinematic 
- Detailed information measurable or observable No Wave Conceptual on planes watershed properties. Measured parameter 
- Detailed inform ation Data requirement is 
on channels enormous. 
Distributed 
- Time of concentration (hr) It is a quasi-conceptual ModClark Empirical No 
- Storage coefficient (hr) distributed model. Fitted parameter 
Sn~er standard lag can be 
Lumped - Sn~er standard lag (hr) calculated by em pirical 
Snyder's UH Empirical - Sn~er peaking equations, but they need No 
Fitted parameter coefficient physical param eters that 
are difficult to obtain. 
Lumped Can be calibrated. 
SCS UH Empirical - SCS Lag (min or min) Pssume only one peak on Yes(1) 
Fitted parameter ewnt lew!. 
Source: Arranged from USACE (2000, 2001), and HEC-HMS Help. 
Next we discuss models for baseflow of subbasins. Baseflow is the sustained , 
flow in rivers due to soil moisture, ground water or prior precipitation that was 
stored temporarily in the watershed (Bedient and Huber, 2002; USACE, 2000). 
The parameters in baseflow models cannot be specified in the process of 
calibration. We definitely need appropriate data to derive parameter values of base 
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flow models. Table 5-4 shows the list of models for baseflow of subbasins. First, 
we cannot use Linear Reservoir because this model is suitable only with SMA 
Loss and Gridded SMA Loss models. Second, we do not use Recession and 
Bounded Recession because it seems to be difficult to get the data for specifying 
their parameter values due to data availability. Finally, we choose Constant 
Monthly in that we can specify the constant monthly baseflow by use of Base 
Flow Index provided by CEH (Gustard et aI., 1992). Alternatively, we can 
calculate them from the data of gauged daily flow. 
Table 5-4. Models for basejlow of subbasins 
Model Type of Model Parameter (unit) Characteristics Choose? 
Lumped -Initial Q (cms) Difficult to estimate recession 
Recession Empirical 
- Recession constant constant and o1her parameters No 
Fitted parameter - Threshold Q (cms) in terms of data availability. 
Lumped Can use 1he data ofBFI (Base Constant 
Empirical - Constantbaseflow Flow Index). Yes Monthly 
Fitted parameter (cms) [each mon1h] Can derive parameters from gauged daily flow data. 
Linear Lumped 
- Storage coefficient (hr) Compatible only with SMAloss Empirical me1hod and gridded SMA loss No Reservoir 
Fitted parameter - Number of reservoir me1hod. 
- Initial baseflow 
Bounded Lumped (cms or cm/sq km) Difficult to estimate recession 
Empirical - Recession ratio ratio and other parameters in No Recession 
Fitted parameter - Max. baseflow (cms) terms of data availability. 
[each mon1hJ 
Source: Arranged from USACE (2000, 2001), and HEC-HMS Help. 
Finally, we discuss models for reaches (rivers). We need a hydrologic or 
hydraulic routing model to compute the volume of water that flows through rivers. 
Fundamentally, routing models solve Saint Venant equations which are composed 
of the momentum and continuity equations. More importantly, we must deal with 
control variables such as floodplain development and averting behaviour although 
we here focus on floodplain development. Table 5-5 shows the list of models for 
reaches (rivers). This condition should be definitely satisfied although we are 
faced with some difficult situations for specifying parameter values. In terms of 
this, we need to choose Muskingum Cunge 8 Point model for rivers. In addition, 
this model is suitable to the situation that flood wave goes out of bank and into 
floodplains (USACE, 2000). In fact, we will use knowledge on Muskingum 
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Cunge Standard model for specifying parameter values because of limited data 
availability and model simplification. 
Table 5-5. Models for reaches (river~~ 
Model Type of Model Parameter (unit) Characteristics Choose? 
Lumped Cannot deal with control 
Lag Empirical - Lag (min or hr) variables. No 
Fitted parameter 
Lumped - Muskingum K (hr) Cannot deal with control 
Musklngum Empirical - Muskingum X variables. 
no 
Fitted parameter - Number of subreaches 
Modified 
Lumped - Number of subreaches Cannot deal with control 
Puis 
Empirical - Initial conditions variables. 
No 
Fitted parameter _ Storage-outflow (cms) 
- Cross section shape 
- Reach length (m) 
Musklngum Lumped _ Energyslope (m/m) Cannot deal with control 
Cunge Quasi-conceptual - Bottom width or 
No 
variables. 
Standard Measured parameter diameter (m) 
- Side slope (xH:1 V) 
- Manning's N 
_ Reach length (m) Can deal with control 
- Energyslope (m/m) variables although we 
Musklngum Lumped 
- Manning's N have to set some Yes 
Cunge Quasi-conceptual [overbank and channel) assumptions to specify 
8 Point Measured parameter 
- Cross section several parameter 
coordinates values. 
_ Cross section shape 
_ Reach length (m) 
_ Energyslope (m/m) 
Lumped _ Bottom of width or Cannot deal with control 
Kinematic No 
Wave 
Conceptual diameter (m) variables. 
Measured parameter - Side slope (xH:1V) 
- Manning's N 




- Lag (hr) Cannot deal with control No 
Stagger 
Empirical 
_ Straddle duration (hr) variables. 
Fitted parameter 
Source: Arranged from USACE (2000, 2001), and HEC-HMS Help. 
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5.3.3 Parameters 
We have chosen the models for each element. Let us specify parameter 
values in the models. We have two types of parameters: measured and fitted 
parameters. Measured parameters are estimated from relevant data while fitted 
parameters are calibrated by comparing simulated discharge flow data with 
observed discharge flow data. We can calibrate fitted parameters by using the 
optimisation tool of HEC-HMS. The procedures for specifying parameter values 
are: 
I. We specify the values of measured parameters by using relevant data 
such as GIS, hydrological and physical data. 
2. We input the values of all the measured parameters into HEC-HMS, 
and we input observed precipitation and discharge flow data into 
HEC-HMS. 
3. We calibrate the values of fitted parameters by using the optimisation 
tool in HEC-HMS. 
Table 5-6 shows the summary of parameters. In the next section, we specify the 
parameter values. 
Table 5-6. Parameters 
Type of parameter Bement Model Parameter 
SubbasinlLoss rate Initial/Constance Impervious 
Constant 
Subbasinl8aseflow Constant Monthly 8aseflow 
[each month] 
Reach length 
Measured parameter Energy slope 




SubbasinlLoss rate Initial/Constance Initial loss Rtted parameter Constant rate 
Sub bas infTrans form SCSUH SCS lag 
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5.3.4 Derivation of Constant Monthly Baseflow 
We need data on constant monthly baseflow for the subbasin element in the 
model on HEC-HMS. In order to derive the values of monthly constant baseflow 
in each subbasin, we obtain a Base Flow Index (BFI) in each subbasin. Gustard et 
al. (1992) give the BFI values in gauging stations. The data cover several years 
before 1992, but the data are missing in some target gauging stations and in any 
case are old. CEH (2003) also gives data on BFI, but the duration of data on 
which the calculation is based is not necessarily clear. We obtained gauged daily 
flow data from National Water Flow archives (CEH [Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology D. Thus, we calculate the values of BFI based on the data we have, but 
it is a good idea to use the definition of the BFI and the method of calculating the 
BFI that Gustard et al. (1992) provide because we can compare our calculated BFI 
values with their BFI values. 16 17 Based on Gustard et al. (1992), the BFI is 
referred to as the proportion of the river's runoff that is derived from stored 
sources, and the values of BFI can be calculated as the ratio of the flow under the 
separated hydrograph (baseflow) to the flow under the total hydrograph (recorded 
flow) by a smoothing and separation rule. Figure 5-3 shows the relationship 
between the recorded hydrograph (VT) and the baseflow line (VB). The 
mathematical expression is given by the following. 
VB BFI =-<1 
VT 
16 In general, there is no certain correct method of deriving baseflow or BFI although the abstract 
notion of baseflow is well defined. 
17 The values of BFI are relatively stable because they mainly depend on the soil type. Thus, the 
comparison is meaningful. 
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Figure 5-3. Relation between recorded hydrograph and baseflow line 
Gauging Station 27009 
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NB. This graph shows the results of the actual calculation in gauging station 27009 (Ouse at Skelton). 
More concretely, the procedures for calculating the BFI values are the 
following: 18 
1. We have the data on gauged daily flow (GDF) (m3/s or ems), 01, 
02, .. , Oi, .. , On. We divide this data into non-overlapping blocks 
(m) offive days, and derive the minima for each block, Mij, ... , Mim. 
Mij is a vector. 'i' in Mij is given by discontinuous integer numbers. 
2. Consider the block (Mil, Mi2, Mi3), (Mi2, Mi3, Mi4), ... , (Mij-I, Mij, 
Mi,j+I), ... , (Mi,m-2, Mi,m-I, Mim). In each case, if 0.9 x the central 
value is less than outer values, we pick out the central value as an 
ordinate for the baseflow line, Bij. Bij is a vector. We should note that 
both 'i' and 'j' in Bij are given by discontinuous integer numbers. 
3. We estimate each daily value of Bi (i == 1, ... , n) by linear 
interpolation between Bij. 
4. IfBi > Oi, we replace the value ofBi with Qi. 
5. We calculate the total volume of base flow below the baseflow line. 
n 
VB = I.B, 
,=1 
IR The procedures of calculation seem to be easy, but it is not so simple. Thus, we code some programs by 
Visual Basic on Microsoft Excel for the calculation. The codes are provided in Appendix Col. . 
Chapter 5. Applied Model and Calibration 160 
6. Likewise, we calculate the total volume of recorded daily flow 
under the recorded hydrograph. 
7. Then, we can calculate the BFI value by BFJ = VB 
VT' 
Table 5-7. Calculated BFJ 
Our Calculation GJstard et al. Gauging 
















BA Year BA 
Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 0.471 1991-2002 -
Wlarfe at Flint Mill Weir 0.386 1991-2003 0.376 
Nidd at Gouthwaite Reserwir 0.506 1991-2002'1 
-
Ure atWestwick Lock 0.400 1991-2002 0.395 
Ouse at Skelton 0.461 1991-2002'2 0.425 
Ure at Kilgram Bridge 0.325 1991-2004 0.321 
lMlarfe at Addingham 0.340 1991-2002 0.325 
Nidd at Birstwith 0.448 1991-2002 -
Wiske at KirbyWiske 0.146 1991-2002'3 0.170 
Swale at Crakehill 0.439 1991-2002 0.504 
Bedale Beck at Leeming 0.383 1991-2002'4 0.428 
Foss at Huntington 0.445 1991-1995'5, 1997 -2002 
0.449 
Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 0.487 1991-2002'6 -
Wharfe at Tadcaster 0.410 1991-2002'7 -
Swale at Catterick Bridge 0.377 1992-2004'8 -
*1: The data of Mar in 1999 are missing in ODF. 
*2: The data of Jul- Dec in 1991 are missing in ODF. 
*3: The data of29 and 30 Dec in 2002 are missing in ODF. 
*4: The data of25 Feb - 15 Mar in 1999 are missing in ODF. 





































*6: The data of 2 Aug - 31 Oct in 1992 and 16 - 17 A ug in 2002 are missing in ODF. 
*7: The data of 1 Jan - 26 Jun in 1991 are missing in ODF. 
*8: The data of 1 Jan - 16 Dec in 1992 are missing in ODF. 
Table 5-7 shows the result of the calculation of BFI values in the gauging 
stations together with the data in Gustard et a1. (1992) and CEH (2003). It turns 
out that there is no big difference between the calculated BFI values and those in 
Gustard et al. (I992) and CEH (2003). The calculated BFI values seem to be 
valid. 
Finally, USIng the calculated BFI and the data on gauged monthly flow 
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(GMF) (m 3/s or cms) that is provided by National Water Flow archives (CEH 
[Centre for Ecology and Hydrology]), we can calculate constant monthly 
baseflow in each subbasin (gauging station). The procedures are: (1) calculate the 
average of gauged monthly flow in each month during 1991 - the most recent year 
that is available; and (2) multiply the average by the BFI we have obtained in 
order to derive constant monthly baseflow. Table 5-8 shows the results, which are 
inputs to constant monthly model of baseflow in subbasins in HEC-HMS. 
















Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 
6.60 6.58 4.57 3.68 1.93 2.07 1.12 
10.93 10.62 8.06 5.72 3.67 3.09 1.97 
2.46 2.64 1.68 1.30 0.76 0.76 0.39 
16.07 17.10 11.32 8.16 4.96 4.79 2.45 
43.10 43.21 29.97 23.44 12.56 12.83 6.32 
9.70 10.03 6.62 4.32 2.70 2.51 1.26 
7.68 7.85 5.73 3.93 2.43 2.28 1.46 
3.88 3.89 2.54 1.96 1.00 1.10 0.52 
1.35 1.45 0.60 0.66 0.18 0.33 0.10 
17.39 17.93 11.49 9.74 5.21 5.53 2.65 
1.89 2.41 1.03 0.86 0.52 0.62 0.23 
0.76 0.60 0.43 0.44 0.14 0.17 0.07 
1.45 1.27 0.93 1.10 0.42 0.41 0.21 
11.46 11.83 B.77 6.50 3.98 3.76 2.27 
B.84 B.56 5.24 3.92 2.86 2.51 1.35 
NB. The duration of the data is the same as Table 5-7. 
*1: The data of Nov in 1995 are missing in GMF. 
*2: The data orAug - Oct in 1992 are missing in GMF. 

















*4: The data orJan 1991 - Nov 1992 are missing in GMF. 

































The percentage of impervious land in each subbasin is a measured parameter, 
which reflects development of lands (land-use). This plays an important role in 
controlling the volume of runoff. The excessive development of lands tends to 
bring about flood events. The impervious (%) is defined as the percentage of the 
developed area in each subbasin. National River Flow Archive (NWA) provides 
Chapter 5. Applied Model and Calibration 162 
spatial information on each subbasin, by which we can obtain the information on 
the percentage of the developed area. However, it includes some missing data, and 
a GIS formatted file of subbasins in River Ouse catchment is unavailable. Thus, 
we need a GIS map of subbasins and a GIS map of land-use. In addition, we 
definitely need the GIS map of subbasins for specifying other measured parameter 
values. 
Therefore, let us derive a GIS map of subbasins by using ArcGIS. 19 We can 
derive a GIS map of subbasins in the River Ouse catchment from OEM (digital 
elevation model). One restriction is that we use a depressionless OEM to avoid the 
problem of pits or sinks. The summarised procedures are (see Figure 5-4): 
1. Obtain OEM in the River Ouse catchment. 
2. Calculate flow direction. 
3. Check the existence of pits or sinks. 
4. Fill pits or sinks if we detect the existence of pits or sinks, and obtain 
the depressionless OEM. 
5. Detect water flows, and then identify stream networks. 
6. Adjust the location of gauging stations in order that they are on 
stream lines in the depressionless OEM. 
7. Specify each subbasin. 
Let us explain each step in the procedures. First, we derive the depressionless 
OEM. To begin with, we can obtain OEM (digital elevation model) in the River 
Ouse catchment from OS Land-Form PROFILE™ DTM [1:10,000] or OS 
Land-Form PANORAMA TM DTM [1 :50,000] (EDINA Digimap). The former 
gives OEM as 20m raster data while the latter gives OEM as 80m raster data. 20m 
raster data is more accurate than 80m raster data, but 80m raster data is 
sufficiently good here. Thus, we choose the latter data. The second step is to 
determine what cells flow into which cells, say the flow direction. In the third step, 
we have to check whether there are pits on DEM in the target area or not because 
we cannot derive correct water flows if there are. In more detail, if there are some 
19 We use ESRI® ArcMapTM 9.1. 
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cells that are lower than all the surrounding cells, all water travelling into the cell 
will not travel out (ArcGIS Desktop Help). Having found pits in the target area we 
complete a fourth step by which we fill pits in order to obtain the depressionless 
DEM. Once we obtain the depressionless DEM, we can derive stream flow 
networks without the problem of pits. Then, based on the depressionless DEM, we 
re-calculate the flow direction. 







Identify stream networks 
(MAP ALGEBRA) 
WATERSHED 
Map of subbasins 
FILL 
In a fifth step, we calculate accumulated flow, using the depressionless OEM. 
"The output from the Flow Accumulation function would then represent the 
amount of rain that would flow into each cell, assuming that all rain became 
runoff and there was no interceptions, evapotranspiration, or loss to groundwater" 
(ArcGIS Desktop Help). This provides cells of concentrated flow (a high 
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accumulated flow) with large numbers. Therefore, Cells with a high-accumulated 
flow are used to identify stream flow networks. Using the output GIS map of flow 
accumulation, we can identify stream networks (Step 6). We can delineate stream 
networks by giving a threshold value to the output of flow accumulation. If we 
give a small value as a threshold, we can detect complicated rivers including small 
rivers and channels. On the contrary, if we give a larger value as a threshold, we 
can detect main rivers (see Figure 5-5). 
Figure 5-5. Identifying stream flow networks 
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NOTE: These maps are the same part of River Ouse catchment. The map on the left is given by a small 
threshold value (= 1000) while the one on the right is given by a large threshold value (=5000). 
Source: We create these maps trom os Land-Form PANORAMA ™ DTM [1:50,000J (EDINA Digimap) by 
use of ArcGIS. 
In the final two steps, we adjust the locations of gauging stations in order that 
they are on the nearest stream lines, and then specify subbasins linked with 
gauging stations as a GIS map. The information on the locations of gauging 
stations is given by the OS grid, but the unit is km. The locations are not so precise. 
In addition, we are using 80m raster DEM data. Thus, the gauging stations are not 
necessarily on stream lines. We need to adjust the locations of gauging stations 
manualJy. Based on the map of the adjusted locations of gauging stations and the 
map (output) of flow direction on the depressionless DEM, we can specify each 
subbasin on the GIS map. Figure 5-6 shows the output. The point features indicate 
the locations of gauging stations. 
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Figure 5-6. Map of Subbasins 
Source: We create this map from OS Land-Form PANORAMA™ DIM [1:50,000] (EDINA Digimap) by use 
of Arc GIS. 
We can use the Land Cover Map of Great Britain 1990 (LCM 1990) in order 
to obtain the information on land-use. 2o The LCM 1990 is 25m raster data, and 
shows land-use patterns by 25-cIass system. Using the LCM 1990 and the GIS 
map of subbasins derived, we can calculate the impervious area in each subbasin 
by following the procedures: 
1. Convert the raster data of subbasins into the feature (vector/polygon) 
data. Calculate the area of each subbasin. 
2. Abstract developed areas from LCM 1990. Developed areas are 
given by the two categories: SuburbanlRural Development (category 
number: 20) and Continuous Urban (category number: 21). 
3. Clip the developed areas in each subbasin, and convert the raster data 
into feature (vector/polygon) data. Calculate the area of developed 
lands in each subbasin. 
4. Divide the area of developed lands by the area of subbasin in each 
subbasin to get the impervious area. Table 5-9 shows the results. The 
20 Land Cover Map of GB 1990 is provided by Centre for Ecology and Hydrology in the fonn of 
an academic license. 
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data are inputs to Initial/Constant rate model of loss rate in subbasins 
inHEC-HMS. 
Table 5-9. Impervious in each subbasin 
Subbasin Name of Stations % impervious 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 11.722 
27002 WhaTfe at Flint Mill Weir 6.028 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 0.720 
27007 Ure atWestwick Lock 4.043 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 6.813 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 1.042 
27043 Wharfe at Addingham 1.043 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 1.421 
27069 INiske at KirbyWiske 8.162 
27071 Swale atCrakehili 9.019 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 5.684 
27083 Foss at Huntington 6.681 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 6.094 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 12.148 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 3.070 
5.3.6 Calculation of River Length 
The river length of each subbasin is a measured parameter, which is an input 
to Muskingum Cunge 8 point model of reach in HEC-HMS. There are no 
appropriate data on river lengths in that river lines are not distinguished by 
subbasins we derive. Then, we have to calculate them. 
There is a dendritic river network in each subbasin, but we model a main 
river as a reach in each subbasin for simplification. To begin with, we have to 
define a main river in each subbasin. For this purpose, we use the map of stream 
flow networks derived in the previous section and a vector data of rivers from OS 
Strategi@ [1:250,000J (EDINA Digimap). In the case that primary or only one 
secondary river flows through a subbasin, we clip the river lines in the subbasin. 
However, it is difficult to choose the river lines if two or more secondary rivers or 
only small rivers flow on a subbasin. In this case, we compare the river lines from 
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the vector data with the map of stream flow networks derived from a high 
threshold value in order to determine a main river line in each subbasin. In so 
doing, we define and obtain the lines of main rivers in subbasins. Figure 5-7 
shows the map. 
Figure 5-7. River networks in subbasins in the model 
Source: We create this map trom OS Land-Form PANORAMA ™ DIM [1:50,000J (EDINA Digimap) and 
OS Strategi® [I :250,000J (EDINA Digimap) by use of ArcGIS. 
Then, we can calculate the river length in each subbasin by following the 
procedures: 
1. Clip the river lines in each subbasin, and convert the feature (vector) 
data into coverage data. This conversion is necessary because the 
infonnation on reach length on the river lines that passes over the 
boundaries of subbasins is not correct (the information reflects the 
old data). 
2. Open the attribute table of river lines, and sum the river lengths in 
each subbasin. We can obtain the data on river lengths in each 
subbasin. Table 5- I a shows the results. 
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Table 5-10. River length in each subbasin 
Subbasin Name of Stations River Length (m) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 31820.15 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 44410.14 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 12376.29 
27007 Ure at Westvvick Lock 37385.34 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 31788.14 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 54699.36 
27043 \Nharfe at Addingham 48433.24 
27053 Nidd at Birstvvith 14840.30 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 42431.67 
27071 Swale at Crakehili 49224.49 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 25263.05 
27083 Foss at Huntington 29379.04 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 22605.91 
27089 \Nharfe at Tadcaster 9226.85 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 41877.08 
5.3.7 Calculation of Energy Slope 
The energy slope of a river is a measured parameter that is needed for the 
Muskingum Cunge 8 point reach model in HEC-HMS. However, the data on it are 
not available. Thus, we have to calculate them by using GIS data such as the map 
of river lines and the DEM. The acquired data on energy slope might be rough 
because we are using 80m raster data, but the precision is enough good for our 
model analysis. The procedures are: 
1. Using the determined river lines, specify the two grid cells of OEM 
on both edges of the river line in each subbasin. 
2. Read the information on their heights. 
3. Calculate the energy slope by using the information together with the 
data on river length we have derived. The results are shown by Table 
5-11. 
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Table 5-11. Energy slope afriver in each subbasin 
Subbasin Name of Stations Energy Slope (m/m) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 0.00153990 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 0.00137356 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reserwir 0.01115035 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 0.00192589 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 0.00028312 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 0.00998184 
27043 Wharfe atAddingham 0.00538886 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 0.00417781 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 0.00143761 
27071 Swale atCrakehili 0.00093449 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 0.00823337 
27083 Foss at Huntington 0.00405051 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 0.00225605 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 0.00151731 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 0.00487140 
5.3.8 Derivation of Manning's N 
Manning's N (roughness coefficient) is a measured parameter that plays an 
important role in reflecting floodplain management in the model. Manning's N 
represents the resistance to water flows in rivers (channels) and overbank areas 
(floodplains) (Barnes, 1967; Arcement and Schneider, 2000; Bedient and Huber, 
2002). Manning's N for channels is determined by morphological conditions, 
vegetation and soil conditions of the bottom of rivers. 21 Manning's N for 
overbank areas is determined mainly by land-use (vegetation).22 Therefore, 
land-use patterns on floodplains should be concentrated on the Manning's N for 
overbank areas. The change in the control variable of floodplain development 
influences the expected cost of flood risk through the Manning's N value. Thus, 
this parameter value is significant. However, it is difficult to calculate and 
21 Based on Arcement and Schneider (2000) and Coon (1998), the base Manning's N value for 
channels should be modified by cross-section irregularities, channel variation, obstruction, 
vegetation and degree of meandering. However, Manning's N for channels is often given by types 
of channel shown by Tables 5-12, 5-13 and 5-14. 
22 Based on Arcement and Schneider (2000), Manning's N for overbank areas should be additively 
calculated by surface irregularities, obstruction and vegetation (land-use). However, Manning's N 
for overbank areas is often given by categories of land-use (vegetation) as we show in Tables 5-16, 
5-17 and 5-18. 
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determine the Manning's N partly because there are ranges on the value even in 
the same category of physical characteristics, partly because the linkage of 25 
classes of land-use categories with the categories given with Manning's N is 
ambiguous and partly because the information on physical characteristics of rivers 
and floodplains is limited. Hence, using available data, we need some assumptions 
to derive the Manning's N values in subbasins. 
To begin with, we discuss the specification of Manning's N for channels in 
our hydrological model. In order to derive the exact roughness coefficients for 
rivers (channels) in the model, we need precise information on cross-section 
irregularities, channel variation, obstruction, vegetation and degree of meandering. 
Unfortunately, we have no such information on them. Then, we have to assume 
plausible values of Manning's roughness coefficients based on several tables on 
Manning's roughness coefficients that are often used for channels. Fortunately, the 
value for channels lies in a small range. Thus, even if we roughly assume the 
values, they are not so different from real ones. For example, Barnes (1967) 
shows that the range of Manning's roughness coefficient for channels is between 
0.024 and 0.075. Let us check some tables on it. Table 5-12, 5-13 and 5-14 show 
Manning's N based on types of streams from various sources. Table 5-12 provides 
simple data, Table 5-13 provides more detailed data, and Table 5-14 provides 
complicated data. However, there seems to be no big difference between the tables. 
If we have sufficient information on the targeted rivers, we can use the detailed 
data. As we mention, we have no relevant data on rivers, but we can estimate the 
width of rivers by GIS data. By obtaining the information on the width of rivers, 
we can refer to the part of the data in Table 5-14 in order to assume plausible 
values of Manning's N for channels. 
Table 5-12. Manning s N jar channels (J) 
Type of Stream Manning's N 
Natural Streams 
Clean and straight 0.030 
Major rivers 0.035 
Sluggish with deep pools 0.040 
Source: LMNO Engineering, Research, and Software, Ltd. (www.lmnoeng.com/manningn.htm) 
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Table 5-13. Mannings N for channels (2) 
Type. of Channel Minimum Normal Maximum 
Natural Streams 
Clean, straight, full stage 0,025 0.030 0.033 
Clean, winding, some pools and shoals 0.033 0.040 0.045 
Sluggish reaches, weedy, deep pools 0.050 0.070 0.080 
Mountain stream steepbanks; gravel and cobbles 0.030 0.040 0.050 
Mountain stream steepbanks: cobbles with large boulders 0.040 0.050 0.070 
Source: Bedient and Huber (2002), Table 7.1, p. 460. 
Table 5-14. Manning's Nfor channels (3) 
Type of Channel and Description Minimum Normal Maximum 
A. Minor Stream (top width at flood stage less than 100 ttl 
1. Streams on plain: 
a. Clean, straight, full stage, no rifts or deep pools 0.025 0.030 0.033 
b. Same as above, but more stones and weeds 0.030 0.035 0.040 
c. Clean, winding, some pools and shoals 0.033 0.040 0.045 
d. Same as above, but some weeds and stones 0.035 0.045 0.050 
e. Same as above, lower stages more ineffective 0.040 0.048 0.055 
slopes and sections 
f. Same as type d, but more stones 0.045 0.050 0.060 
g. Sluggish reaches, weedy, deep pools 0.050 0.070 0.080 
h. Very weedy reaches, deep pools orfloodways with 0.075 0.100 0.150 
heavy stand of timber and underbrush 
2. Mountain streams, no vegetation in channel, banks 
usually steep, trees and brush along banks submerged 
at high stages: 
a. Bottom: gravels, cobbles, and few boulders 0.030 0.040 0.050 
b. Bottom: cobbles and large boulders 0.040 0.050 0.070 
B. Major streams (top width at flood stage greater than 
100 ttl. The n value Is less than that for minor streams of 
similar description because banks offer less effective 
resistance 
1. Regular section with no boulders or brush 0.025 - 0.050 
2. Irregular and rough section 0.035 - 0.100 
Source: Coon (1998), Table 2, p. 17. 
We can use the vector data of as Land-Line.Plus® [urban 1:1,250, rural 
1 :2,500 and moorland 1: 10,000] (EDINA Digimap) for estimating the width of 
rivers. As we will discuss cross sections of rivers in the next section, the width of 
river is variable even locally. It is very difficult and subtle to determine the width 
as a representative in each subbasin. Then, we try to measure the width of river at 
the middle point of the river line in each subbasin on the GIS map by using a 
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measuring tool of ArcGIS. 23 The measured values are treated as the 
representatives in subbasins. Based on the measured width, we divide two 
categories by following Table 5-14. Basically, the Manning's N value for large 
rivers is less than that for small rivers because banks of large rivers offer less 
effective resistance (Coon, 1998). We assume the value 0.035 as Manning's N for 
channel if the width is larger than 100/eet (30.48 m). We assume 0.04 if the width 
is smaller than 100/eet (30.48 m). Table 5-15 shows the results. 
Table 5-15. Manning s N for river in each subbasin 
Subbasin Name of Stations Width of Manning's N River (m) for Channel 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 21.41 0.040 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 28.69 0.040 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 12.63 0.040 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 39.15 0.035 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 41.91 0.035 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 18.59 0.040 
27043 \tvtlarfe at.Addingham 23.25 0.040 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 22.93 0.040 
27069 INis ke at Kirby INis ke 4.30 0.040 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 22.01 0.040 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 6.06 0.040 
27083 Foss at Huntington 4.40 0.040 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 9.11 0.040 
27089 \tvtlarfe at Tadcaster 32.06 0.035 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 24.99 0.040 
Next, let us calculate Manning's N for overbank areas in each subbasin, 
following the procedures: 
I. Calculate the areas and percentages of each land-use category on 
floodplains in each subbasin by using relevant GIS data and ArcGIS. 
2. Link the categories of land-use provided by tables of Manning's N 
with the 25 categories ofLCM 1990. 
3. Calculate Manning's N values in each subbasin. 
In the first step, we need a GIS map of floodplains, the map of subbasins we 
have derived and LCM 1990. We can use Indicative Floodplain Map 2001 
23 The locations of the measurement sites are given in Appendix C-2. 
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[1: 10,000] (© Environment Agency).24 The GIS map provides the location of] % 
floodplains as mentioned in the definition of floodplains in Chapter I. Figure 5-8 
shows floodplains in River Ouse catchment. 
Figure 5-8. Floodplain Map 
Source: Map created from OS Land-Fonn PANORAMA™ DTM [1:50,000J (EDINA Digimap) and 
Indicative Floodplain Map 2001 [1:10,000] (© Environment Agency) by use of Arc GIS. 
To begin with, we clip the raster data map of LCM ] 990 in the area of 
floodplains of each subbasin. We convert the raster data into the feature 
(vector/polygon) data, then calculate each area of the 25 categories to obtain their 
percentages. 25 There is an important assumption that we should notice. Although 
we define a main river line in each subbasin, we calculate the areas of categories 
on the basis of the whole floodplains along all the streams in each subbasin. The 
reason is that it is too difficult to separate the floodplains along the defined main 
river. Thus, we assume that land-use patterns are even within the floodplains in 
each subbasin. Related to this, we have another important thing to notice. We 
distinguish between developed and undeveloped (natural) floodplains, but we do 
not distinguish between different types of undeveloped floodplains although we 
24 The GIS data is provided by Environment Agency, thanks to the staffs' (York and Leeds offices) 
~ecial consideration. 
The results of calculated areas from GIS are given in Appendix C-3. 
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consider them in the process of calculation of Manning's N. In reality, what type 
of natural floodplains (e.g. forests, turf area, bare ground. etc.) affects the flood 
mitigation function of floodplains. However, if we were to distinguish between 
them, we would have to consider different incentive mechanism for each area. 
Thus, for tractability, we abstract from differences in the type of natural 
floodplains. 
Next, we check the table of Manning's N for overbank areas in order to link 
the categories of LCM 1990 with those of the Manning's N table. Table 5-16, 5-17 
and 5-18 show Manning's N values in the categories of ground cover (land-use). 
These three tables seem to be consistent, although some small differences are 
observed. Thus, there is no serious problem about which table we should refer to, 
but Table 5-18 is much more elaborate than the others. We mainly refer to Table 
5-18. It is difficult to link the categories between LCM 1990 and Manning's N 
table, but we need to do that. 
Table 5-16. Manning's Nfor overhankareas (1) 
Ground Cover Manning's N 
Smooth asphalt 0.012 
As phalt of concrete paving 0.014 
Packed clay 0.030 
lightturf 0.200 
Dense turf 0.350 
Dense shrubbery and forest litter OAOO 
Source: Bedient and Huber (2002), p. 277, Table 4-2. [Original source: Crawford and Linsley (1966)] 
Table 5-17. Manning's N for overbank areas (2) 
Ground Cover Manning's N Range 
Concrete or asphalt 0.011 0.01-0.013 
Bare sand 0.01 0.01-0.016 
Graveled surface 0.02 0.012-0.03 
Bare clay-loam (eroded) 0.02 0.012-0.033 
Range (natural) 0.13 0.01-0.32 
Bluegrass sod 0.45 0.39-0.63 
Short-grass prairie 0.15 0.10-0.20 
Bermuda grass 0.41 0.30-0.48 
Source: Bedient and Huber (2002), p. 277, Table 4-2. [Original source: Engman (1986)] 
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Table 5-18. Manning:{) N for overbank areas (3) 
Cover and Treatment Residue Rate Value (ton/acre) recommended Range 
Concrete or asphalt 0.011 0.01 - 0.013 
Bare sand 0.010 0.01 - 0.016 
Graveled surface 0.020 0.012 - 0.03 
Bare clay-loam (eroded) 0.020 0.012-0.033 
Fallow - no residue 0.050 0.006-0.16 
Chisel plow 1/4 0.070 0.006 - 0.17 
1/4 - 1 0.180 0.07 - 0.34 
1 - 0.300 0.19-0.47 
3 0.400 0.34 - 0.46 
Disklharrow 1/4 0.080 0.008-0.41 
1/4 - 1 0.160 0.1 - 0.41 
1-3 0.250 0.14 - 0.53 
3 0.300 -
No - till 1/4 0.040 0.03 - 0.07 
1/4 - 1 0.070 0.01-0.13 
1 - 3 0.300 0.16-0.47 
rvloldboard Plow (Fall) 0.060 0.02 - 0.1 
Coulter 0.100 0.05 - 0.13 
Range (natural) 0.130 0.01-0.32 
Range (clipped) 0.100 0.02 - 0.24 
Grass (bluegrass sod) 0.450 0.39 - 0.63 
Short grass prairie 0.150 0.1 - 0.2 
Dense grass 0.240 0.17 - 0.3 
Bermuda grass 0.410 0.3 - 0.48 
Woods-Light underbrush 0.400 -
Woods-Dense underbrush 0.800 -
Source: Thomas (1986), Table 1, p. 6. 
Table 5- 19 indicates the linkage of land-use categories between the tables. 
LCM 1990 provides 17 land cover categories related to the 25 target classes. If we 
cannot find the same or similar category in the 25 target classes, we put the same 
Manning's N value within the same category in the 17 land cover categories. In 
addition, we assume the value of Manning's N for a few categories of land use 
that are not included in the tables of Manning's N. For example, we put the 
Manning's N value of deep grass for the category of bracken. 
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Table 5-19. Linkages of land-use categories hetween tahles 
Category of LCM 1990 N Bedient and 
Huber (2000) Thomas (1986 
Rough Pasture, 5 Grass Heath 0.15 o Short-grass Short Grass 
Dune Grass, Prairie Prairie 
Grass Moor 9 Moorland Grass 0.15 o Short-grass Short Grass 
Prairie Prairie 
Pasture, 6 Mown, 0.20 o Light Turf 
Meadow, Grazed Turf 
Amenity Grass 7 Meadow, Verge, 0.20 o Light Turf Semi-natural 
19 RuderalWeed 0.400 
Marsh, 23 Felled Forest 0.400 Dense Shurbbery 
Rough Grass and Forest Litter 
8 Rough, Marsh 0.400 Bermuda Grass Bermuda Grass Grass Bluegrass Sod Bluegrass Sod 
25 Open Shrub 0.350 Grass Shrub Heath Heath 
10 Open Shrub Moor 0.350 Dense Turf Dense Grass 
13 Dense Shrub 0.400 Dense Shurbbery 
Shrub Heath Heath and Forest Litter 
11 Dense Shrub 0.400 Moor 
Bracken 12 Bracken 0.400 
Deciduous, 14 Scrub, Orchard 0.400 Woods-Light 
Mixed Wood 15 Deciduous 0.600 Woods-Dense Woodland 
Coniferous, 
16 Coniferous 0.600 Woods-Dense Evergreen Woodland Woodland 
Bog (Herbaceous) 24 Lowland Bog 0.800 
17 Upland Bog 0.800 
Tilled (Hable Crops) 18 Tilled Land 0.250 Chisel Plow 
Suburban, Suburban, Rural 0.011 Concrete or Concrete or Rural Development 20 Development Asphalt asphalt 
Urban Development Continuous 0.011 Concrete or Concrete or 21 Urban Asphalt asphalt 
Bare Sand Bare Sand Inland Bare Ground 22 I nland Bare 0.020 Graveled Surface Ground Bare Clay-loam Bare Clay-loam 
Finally, we can calculate Manning's N values for overbank areas in each 
subbasin, multiplying the Manning's N allocated to the categories by percentages 
of areas of land-cover categories. 26 Table 5-20 shows the results. These values are 
treated as initial values in the model, which are also the basis for calibrating fitted 
parameter values. We again should note that Manning's N values change with the 
26 In HEC-HMS, Muskingum Cunge 8 point model can distinguish between the right and left 
overbank areas, in which we can put different values into the Manning's N values of the right and 
left ovetbank areas. However, we do not distinguish between them. We provide those of the right 
and left overbank areas with the same value. 
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change in control variables over time. 
Table 5-20. Manning s N (initial condition) 
Subbasin Name of Stations N 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 0.234 
27002 lIVharie at Flint Mill Weir 0.249 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 0.248 
27007 Ure atWestwick Lock 0.263 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 0.231 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 0.253 
27043 Wharie at Addingham 0.241 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 0.250 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 0.217 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 0.228 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 0.227 
27083 Foss at Huntington 0.213 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 0.239 
27089 lIVharie at Tadcaster 0.259 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 0.244 
5.3.9 Setting o/Cross Section Coordinates 
Cross section coordinates are necessary for Muskingum Cunge 8 point model 
of each river in subbasins. They are used for calculating water volume of flows in 
the hydraulic model. In the model, we need to indicate a cross sectional form of 
river as 8-point-coordinates. 
However, obtaining the data of cross section coordinates is not 
straightforward. First, the cross-sectional form is variable even locally. The 
cross-sectional form of natural channels (rivers) is characteristically irregular in 
outline and locally variable, and width and depth do not uniquely define 
cross-sectional shapes (Knighton, 1998). Thus, hydrologists choose several points 
to measure cross-sections of rivers including width, depth and side slopes by 
dividing a target river into short river lines. Even if we divide a target river into 
short river lines, the problem remains although the severity of the problem might 
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be alleviated. 27 Nonetheless, we have another problem in this case. The model 
will become overcomplicated, which may be inappropriate for policy analyses. 
Thus, we maintain the number of rivers in the model, and choose the appropriate 
(the best one out of possible choices) data as a representative. Second, we have no 
data on cross sections of rivers except for a part of River Ouse. Hence, we try to 
estimate cross section coordinates by using available data including GIS data, 
together with empirical and theoretical models of cross-sectional forms, and some 
assumptions. Since we cannot know the relevant shape of cross section, we 
determine a symmetrical cross sectional form as in the Muskingum Cunge 
standard model. 
Therefore, we set some assumptions for estimating cross section coordinates 
of rivers. First, we assume a symmetrical trapezoidal shape as in the Muskingum 
Cunge standard model on the ground that the figures of cross sections of a part of 
River Ouse (78 sites between Skelton gauging station and Bishopthorpe Bridge) 
show various 'trapezoidal' shapes. 28 Generally, cross sections should cover the 
entire floodplain and should be perpendicular to the main flow line (Bedient and 
Huber, 2002). Figure 5-9 denotes 8-point cross section coordinates with an 
abstract air view of the river. The station points 3 and 6 are treated as left and right 
bank stations respectively. The station points 2 and 7 cannot be measured because 
the degree of precision of OEM (even 20m raster) is not enough high to measure 
locally. 
27 Apart from the severity of the problem, hydrologists choose data on cross-sections as a 
representative for a river (channel) in a hydrological model. Fundamentally, we do the same thing. 
28 The data of cross sections is provided by Environment Agency (2003). 
Chapter 5. Applied Model and Calihration 179 







(overbank area) witdth of river 
.. ... .... 












Second, we have to assume the angle of the slopes of both river banks in 
order to complete 8-point cross section coordinates. However, we have not found 
an appropriate theoretical or empirical basis for this. Base on data on 
cross-sections of a part of River Ouse (Environment Agency, 2003), we define the 
angle of the river banks at one site as (EL+ a2 Jf in Figure 5-10. We can 
bl b2 
calculate the values from the data of cross sections of a part of River Ouse. Figure 
5-11 shows the results as a histogram. The number of data is 78. We set seven 
classes of intervals in the histogram. 29 Thus, we use the average, 0.418, as the 
value of angle, considering the shape of the histogram. 
Figure 5-10. Angle a/river banks 'slopes 
29 Panofsky and Brier (1968) suggest that we can use k = 5log]o n (k: number of classes; n: 
number of data) for determining the number of class intervals (qtd. in Bedient and Huber, 2002). It 
provides k = 9.46. An alternative index (Sturges, H.A.) is k = 1 + 3.32Iog]O n (Miyakawa, 
1991). It provides k = 7.28 . However, these are not the ultimate rule and are not necessarily 
based on scientific grounds. 
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Figure 5-11. Angles of river banks in the case of a part of River Ouse 
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Source: We calculate and arrange from the data of Environment Agency (2003). 
Third, we need to estimate the depth of the rivers in order to complete the 
8-point cross section coordinates. We estimate the depth based on the measured 
width of rivers from GIS data, using a model of cross sectional form of natural 
open rivers. We use the technique of hydraulic geometry, which assumes that 
discharge (here, bankfull discharge) is the dominant independent variable and that 
dependent variables are related to it in the form of simple power functions 
(Knighton, 1998). 
w = aQa, d = cQfJ, V == eQY, S == gQo, n == hQIi, .ff == kQ8, Q",sp = mQ.J. 
where Q = discharge volume; w = width of river; d = mean depth of river; v = 
mean velocity; s = slope; n = Manning's N (resistance);ff= Darcy-Weisbach 
iT (resistance); QIUSP = suspended sediment load; and a, c, e, g, h, k, m, a, fI, y, 
b, t:, () and A are parameters. 
We should note some assumptions of the model above. First, the empirical 
estimates are equilibrium values. In other words, they are based on the situation in 
which cross sectional form is maintained by a local balance between erosion and 
deposition (Knighton, 1998). We consider the problem in the model within 
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instantaneous time « 10-1 years) for calibration and within short timescale 
(10 1_102 years) for policy analyses. We do not need to consider the change in the 
structure of cross sectional forms. Second, the empirical estimates are valid for 
natural open channels, streams or rivers. In this respect, there is no big problem in 
the River Ouse catchment. Third, the choice of an appropriate discharge volume is 
a crucial issue because exponential values that are empirically calibrated are not 
independent of the selected discharge (Knighton, 1998). "Bankfull discharge (Qb) 
is an obvious candidate but it cannot always be defined and is not necessarily of 
constant frequency (Williams, 1978)" (qtd. in Knighton, 1998). At this point, we 
use the results of Hey and Thorne (1986), assuming that bankfull discharge is well 
defined and constantly frequent in the River Ouse and tributaries. 30 Hey and 
Thorne (1986) have done an empirical analysis of the hydraulic geometry for 
gravel-bed rivers (62 sites) in the UK. The resultant calibrated parameter values in 
the hydraulic geometry equations are: 
w = 3.67Q~45 
d = 0.33Q~ 35 
v = 0.83Q~20 




We can calculate the depth of rivers in the subbasins from the equations above and 
the measured width of rivers. The calculated depth of rivers is shown in Table 
5-21. 
Finally, we measure the difference in height at station points 1, 3, 6 and 8 by 
use of OS Land-Form PROFILE™ DTM [1: 10,000] (EDINA Digimap) which 
provides DEM as 20m raster data) to determine the elevation and station of the 
points 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. We use the average value of the right and left overbank 
areas (floodplains) for specifying these coordinates. Even in the 20m raster data, 
we are faced with the problem of the data precision. Thus, we calculate the station 
and elevation proportionally based on the data on the station points. In addition, 
we measure the width of floodplains in the same way as we measure the width of 
30 In the process of calculation here, we do not need to distinguish among various types of 
discharge indexes. 
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rivers.31 32 33 
Table 5-21. Depth oj rivers 
Subbasin Name of Stations Depth of Width of River (m) River (m) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 1.30 21.41 
27002 VVharfe at Flint Mill Weir 1.63 28.69 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 0.86 12.63 
27007 Ure atWestwick Lock 2.08 39.15 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 2.19 41.91 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 1.16 18.59 
27043 Wharfe atAddingham 1.38 23.25 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 1.37 22.93 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 0.37 4.30 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 1.33 22.01 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 0.49 6.06 
27083 Foss at Huntington 0.38 4.40 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 0.67 9.11 
27089 VVharfe at Tadcaster 1.78 32.06 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 1.47 24.99 
We can calculate and determine the 8-point cross section coordinates in the 
rivers in the subbasins respectively, using the data derived above. The results of 
the 8-point cross section coordinates are indicated in Figure 5-12. In addition, we 
also calculate the cross section coordinates at the points of York and Selby urban 
area respectively. These areas are not included in the subbasins that we have 
determined based on the hydrological gauging stations. They are not used in the 
hydrological model because we have no hydrological data (no gauging stations) in 
these areas, but they will be used in the calculation of the expected cost of flood 
risk later. Both urban areas are crucial for evaluating the expected cost of flood 
risk. 
31 As we mentioned, we tJy to measure the width of river at the middle point of the river line in 
each subbasin. To be more precise, we try to choose the measurement site around the middle line 
in each subbasin in order to avoid eX1remely narrow and wide floodplains. 
32 We use OS Land-Line.Plus® [urban 1: 1,250, rural 1 :2,500 and moorland I: 10,000] (EDINA 
Digimap) and Indicative Floodplain Map 2001 [1:10,000] (© Environment Agency). 
33 The data measured in this respect is shown in Appendix C-4. 
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Figure 5-12. 8-point cross section coordinates of rivers 
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5.3.10 Calibration of Parameters 
The three fitted parameter values (initial loss, constant rate and SCS lag) are 
calibrated by using observed data such as precipitation and discharge flow. Using 
the optimisation (calibration) tool in HEC-HMS, we can calibrate the fitted 
parameter values in order that the data of discharge flows that the model in 
HEC-HMS produces based on the input data of precipitation can be fitted with the 
observed data of discharge flows as much as possible. 
To begin with, let us describe the observed data used for the calibration. The 
shorter the time interval of the observed data is, the better the precision of the 
calibration is. If we could obtain the results of frequency analysis of precipitation 
on an event basis, hourly data should be ideal for analyses. However, they are not 
available. We can obtain daily gauged (discharge) flow data and monthly 
catchment rainfall (precipitation) data on the gauging stations during 1990 - the 
most recent available year from National Water Archive (NWA) (or National 
River Flow Archive) administrated by CEH. 34 According to NWA, daily gauged 
flows are calculated by the conversion of the record of stage, or water level, using 
a stage-discharge relation, in which stage is measured and recorded over time by 
instruments usually actuated by a float in a stilling well. The precipitation data is 
derived from a one kilometre square grid of rainfall values generated from all 
34 The infonnation on the availability of the observed data is given in Appendix C-5. 
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available daily and monthly rainfall data, which are provided by individual rain 
gauging stations administrated by the Met Office. 35 
About the observed data, there are a few problems. First, there are some 
missing data as is often the case. Since we need a complete data set for calibration, 
this excludes time periods that contain missing data. This is one of the constraints. 
Second, the time interval is set to daily because it is the minimum within the 
available data. However, we have only monthly data on precipitation in the unit of 
catchment. We need to convert the monthly data into daily data. For the 
conversion of data, we can use Met Office - UK Land Surface Stations data 
(1900-present) that is obtainable from the British Atmospheric Data Centre 
(BADC). The data provides daily data on precipitation based on rain gauging 
stations. The problem with this is that data are missing. The locations of 
hydrological gauging stations do not coincide with that of rain gauging stations. 
Therefore, we cany out the conversion of data by the following procedures: 
1. Find the rain gauging station that is the nearest to the hydrological 
gauging station, and check the data availability (the existence of 
missing data). 
2. Choose the best daily data of the rain gauging station on a monthly 
basis as consistently for the whole duration of the data as possible. 36 
3. Convert the monthly precipitation data into the daily data on the pro 
rata basis, based on the daily precipitation data of the rain gauging 
station. 
Third, we need the observed data for a continuous duration of time in common 
with every subbasin (hydrological gauging station). During 1990 - 2004, the 
condition holds true only in 1993, 1994 and 1997. Thus, we use 1993 data for the 
calibration and 1994 data for the verification. 
We use the optimisation tool in HEC-HMS for the calibration. Let us explain 
35 The detailed infonnation on the data is available on the site ofNWA: 
www.nerc-walJingford.ac.uklihinwa/index.htm 
36 We show the table of linkage between min and hydrological gauging stations and its data 
availability in Appendix C-6. 
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the procedures. The fundamental purpose is to fit simulated discharge flow data 
with the observed discharge flow based on the precipitation data as an input. Thus, 
we need an index of goodness-of-fit as the objective function that we try to 
optimise (minimise). The optimisation tool provides several goodness-of-fit 
indices: sum of absolute errors; sum of squared residuals; percent error in peak; 
and peak-weighted root mean square error (see Table 5-22). In our research, we 
focus on the expected cost of flood risk. Therefore, we want to consider the 
goodness-of-fit on peak flows more than that on other ordinates. That is why we 
choose the peak-weighted root mean square error objective function as the 
objective function that we try to optimise (minimise). 




Sum of Ilqo(i)- q. (i~ Difference in the absolute errors ordinates, weighting 
each equally. 
Sum of squared I [qo(i)-qs(i)Y Squared differences, residuals weighting each equal!l 
Percent error in qs(prak )-qo(peak) Compare only between peak 100 simulated and observed 
qo(Peak) peak flows. 
Peak-weighted 1 Squared differences, 
root mean [_I ( L ( (;)_(i))2( q,(i)+dmean)JJJ weighting each in square error proportion with the 
objective N qo q, 2qo(mean) magnitude of the 
function ordinate. 
Source: Arranged from USACE (2000, 2001). 
In the optimisation tool of HEC-HMS, there are two algorithms as a 
searching method that tries to minimise the value of the chosen objective 
function. 37 One is the univariate gradient method that evaluates and adjusts one 
parameter at a time keeping other parameters constant in order. This process 
continues until the point that an additional adjustment cannot decrease the value 
of the objective function by at least 1 %. Another is the NeIder and Mead method 
that uses a downhill simplex to evaluate all the parameters at the same time and 
determine which parameter to adjust. We use both methods. However, the 
univariate gradient method rarely provided good results in our case. Hence, the 
37 See USACE (2000) for further details of the two searching methods. 
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results of the calibration are mainly derived from the Neider and Mead method. 
In the process of calibrating parameters for each subbasin, we cany out 
several trials with initial values changed, because the results are occasionally 
sensitive to initial values. Fundamentally, we try to search the parameter values 
that give the smallest value of objective function. In so doing, we check several 
results for choosing the parameter values: parameter sensitivity to the value of 
objective function; difference in total discharge volume; difference in peak flow; 
flow comparison graph; scatter graph; residual graph; and objective function 
graph. Importantly, we do not necessarily adopt the parameter values that give the 
smallest value of the objective function although the value of the objective 
function is one of the most important factors. If we get values of objective 
function that are similar among several trials, we should compare percentage 
difference in volume and peak flow among the results of the trials. The differences 
in volume and peak flow are important because our interest should be in the 
expected cost of flood risk. Considering our main purpose of the analysis, we 
want to avoid underestimating the volume and the peak flow in the process of 
calibration. Table 5-23 shows the results of the calibration (optimisation). 38 
Table 5-23. Results of calibration 
Initial loss SCS lag Value of %diff in %diff in Subbasin Constant loss objective Method (mm) (mm) (hr) function volume peak flow 
27001 6.5000 0.0672 0.8 11.266 53 -4.15 Neider Mead 
27002 1.5000 1.6000 1.600 26.922 64 7.43 Neider Mead 
27005 0.4069 0.5641 0.4 7.397 -9 56.35 Neider Mead 
27007 2.4000 3.5190 0.83 32.145 28 0.05 Neider Mead 
27009 1.5000 1.4240 0.63 79.791 105 14.80 Neider Mead 
27034 2.2600 0.1020 2.9 33.741 26 -10.38 Neider Mead 
27043 0.3570 0.0630 0.567 22.099 53 -0.03 Neider Mead 
27053 1.5000 2.4000 1.5 8.251 -6 -0.82 Neider Mead 
27069 6.1327 0.0010 0.1 14.774 20 1.20 Univariant 
27071 0.8000 1.8000 1.26 47.483 92 43.97 Neider Mead 
27075 1.1000 0.0157 1.6 9.465 64 -36.64 Neider Mead 
27083 0.4069 0.5641 0.4 1.115 -26 -52.36 Neider Mead 
27085 0.3022 0.5641 0.51 3.991 -12 98.72 NelderMead 
27089 0.9700 0.7210 1.5 31.008 118 0.09 Neider Mead 
27090 0.9400 0.0300 1.8 29.321 60 
-20.69 Neider Mead 
38 Appendix C-7 shows the flow comparison graphs in the subbasins in 1993. 
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Finally, we use data in 1994 to validate the parameter values calibrated on 
data in 1993. We cany out two procedures for the verification. First, we check the 
goodness-of-fit in 1994 on the visual basis. Appendix C-7 shows the flow 
comparison graphs in the subbasins in 1994. This is not quantitative, but they 
seem to be reasonable. Second, we check the value of objective function in 1994 
about the same calibrated parameter values and then compare the value in 1994 
with that in 1993.39 If the value in 1994 is much larger than that in 1993, the 
goodness-of-fit is dubious. Table 5-24 shows the results. There are only two cases 
that the value in 1994 is larger than that in 1993 (Subbasin 27069 and 27083). 
Moreover, there is no big difference in the value in these two cases. Therefore, the 
calibrated parameter values are judged to be valid, based on the verification 
analysis. 
Table 5-24. Comparison of the value of objective function 
Subbasin Value of objective Value of objective 1994 < 1993 function in 1994 function in 1993 
27001 8.2 11.3 Yes 
27002 19.8 26.9 Yes 
27005 3.2 7.4 Yes 
27007 25.8 32.1 Yes 
27009 70.9 79.8 Yes 
27034 27.1 33.7 Yes 
27043 19.4 22.1 Yes 
27053 5.7 8.3 Yes 
27069 16.1 14.8 No 
27071 40.3 47.5 Yes 
27075 6.5 9.5 Yes 
27083 1.9 1.1 No 
27085 3.1 4.0 Yes 
27089 25.5 31.0 Yes 
27090 23.3 29.3 Yes 
Note: The values are calculated by use of the optimisation tool in HEC-HMS. 
39 This value shows the goodness-of-fit. The smaller the better. The number of days in 1994 is the 
same as that in 1993. Thus, we can compare the values between them. 
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5.3.11 Relation Between Discharge and Elevation 
We can derive the relationship between discharge flow and elevation in each 
subbasin from the cross section coordinates we have derived and an equation of 
the hydraulic geometry (5-9), although the relationship is dependent on the 
assumptions of them. To begin with, let us calculate mean velocity of discharge 
flow in each subbasin (see Table 5-25). 
We calculate the area of cross section from the cross section coordinates, and 
derive the relationship between area and elevation. Then, we obtain the 
relationship between discharge volume (cms) and elevation (m). In so doing, we 
can show the discharge-elevation curve in each subbasin in Figure 5-13. As we 
mentioned before, we also derive the curves for York and Selby urban areas 
respectively here. 
Table 5-25. Calculated mean velocity 
Subbasin Name of Stations Velocity (m/s) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 1.818 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 2.070 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 1.438 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 2.377 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 2.450 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 1.707 
27043 Wharfe atAddingham 1.886 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 1.874 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 0.891 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 1.840 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 1.037 
27083 Foss at Huntington 0.900 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 1.244 
27089 VVharfe at Tadcaster 2.175 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 1.947 
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5.3.12 Relation Between Elevation and Damage 
We have to estimate the relationship between the elevation and the predicted 
damage value in order to calculate the annual expected cost of flood risk. It is 
difficult to derive the precise predicted damage values in the target areas because 
of both the data requirements and the number of other factors involved. 
Let us discuss the difficulties. First, we cannot obtain a precise map of 
flooded areas in each flood event in simulations partly because the digital 
elevation model provides only rough data, partly because the hydrological model 
of river routings is also rough and set simply with relevant assumptions and manly 
because we cannot obtain the precise and thorough data on cross-sections of rivers 
and floodplains as we mentioned. Second, developed lands are mainly composed 
of residential and non-residential areas. In the case of residential areas, we have to 
consider house types, house age, social class, inventory items, fabric items and so 
on. Likewise, in the case of non-residential areas, we should consider types of 
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properties, types of shops, moveable equipments included in them, fixtures and 
fittings included in them, stocks included in them and so on. Furthennore, we 
should take account of the secondary damage such as sales losses. Such data in 
the research target area (the Ouse catchment) are not available, and it is too costly 
to collect them. Third, we have to take other flood losses such as roads, railways 
and emergency costs into consideration in each flood event. However, it is also 
too difficult to estimate the values in each flood event in simulations. Fourth, 
agricultural lands are also damaged by flood events although it depends on 
farming methods and seasons. If land is fallow, there is little damage. Furthennore, 
if the farmers do not rely on chemical fertilizers, flood events will be welcome 
because the flood water supplies fertile soils. This is not a damage but a benefit. 
We have to distinguish between farming methods. In addition, we have to 
consider the values of crops (both types of crops and their market prices) that are 
damaged or lost due to floods. It is also difficult to do so locally depending on 
changeable flooded areas. 
Nevertheless, we need the relationship between the elevation and the 
predicted damage value for carrying out policy simulations although it is a rough 
sketch. Taking a similar perspective, Penning-Rowsell et al. (2003, 2005a, 2005b) 
provide standard data on the relationship between flood depth and damages. They 
do not recommend the use of detailed surveys for the cost-benefit analysis of 
flood risk management. Rather, they recommend the use of the standard data that 
they provide based on the data of flood damages in the UK. We use the data 
provided by Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a, 200Sb) to set the predicted damage 
values per hectare in our model. 40 The data include flood damage values as 
standard data. In addition, they have tried to cover all the relevant sectors of the 
economy including residential property, non-residential property, agriculture, 
communications, emergency services and other costs. Furthermore, they consider 
economic damage values and not financial damage values. That is, they consider 
40 The CD-ROM of the detailed data is attached to Penning-Rowsell et al. (2003), but it is not 
available for us. It seems to be difficult to obtain it now. However, Penning-Rowsell et aI. (2005a, 
2005b) give the CD-ROM of the modified version of detailed data. These document have been in 
general available from Middlesex University Press since February 2006. 
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opportunity costs and take the standpoint of the nation as a whole. 41 
Hence, we set the unit damage values in developed lands and agricultural 
lands respectively based on the data of Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a, 2005b). 
Then, we calculate the predicted damage values according to the elevation on a 
pro rata basis (a rough calculation). The concrete procedures are the followings: 
1. We set flood damage values of developed lands and agricultural 
lands per hectare respectively based on the available data. 
2. Based on the relationship between discharge volumes and elevations, 
we calculate the percentage of flooded area in each subbasin in each 
flood event in simulations. 
3. U sing the percentage of flooded area, we calculate the areas (hectare) 
of flooded developed lands and flooded agricultural lands 
respectively on the 'pro rata' basis.42 43 
4. Using the flood damage values per hectare, we can calculate the 
predicted damage values in subbasins in each flood event in 
simulations. 
Thus, we have to set the flood damage values of developed lands and 
agricultural lands per hectare in the rest of this section. To begin with, 
Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a, 2005b) provide the data on standard depth-damage 
relationship in residential areas (residential sector average) (see Figure 5_14)4445 
41 The standpoint of the nation as a whole implies that the value will be offset if one person's loss 
can be another person's gain. 
42 If developed lands are concentrated on the areas close to a river, we will tend to underestimate 
the damage value. However, we cannot consider this point because the model is simplified mainly 
because the data are not sufficiently available. 
43 For York and Selby utban areas, we can calculate the flooded developed areas on the same pro 
rata basis by using the urban areas in floodplains that are calculated by ArcGIS from the sama GIS 
data (we mentioned before). 
44 The elevation in Figure 5-14 is measured from the location p3 or p6 (overbank) in Figure 5-9. 
45 We use the data of short duration because we will evaluate the expected cost of flood risk by 
peak stages. They do not tend to last over 12 hours. 
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Source: Penning-Rowsell et aJ. (200Sa, 200Sb),Apfendix 4.1 in the attached CD-ROM. 
Note: We converted the unit from 200S£ per minto 1990£ per ha, using RPI data from UK. 
National Statistics. In the calculation, we assume that the ratio of building area to the total 
developed area is 40%. 
Figure 5-15. Elevation-damage relationship in non-residential areas (UK) 
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Source: Penning-Rowsell et aJ. (200Sa, 200Sb),Apfendix S.6 in the attached CD-ROM. 
Note: We converted the unit from 200S£ per minto 1990£ per ha, using RPI data from UK 
National Statistics. In the calculation, we assume that the ratio of building area to the total 
developed area is 40%. 
Next, Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a, 2005b) provide a standard 
depth-damage curve as weighted mean values in each small category of 
non-residential area type in the case of a basic scenario (river flood, no warning 
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and duration less than 12 hours).46 In addition, they provide the one as weighted 
mean value in non-residential areas. We refer to this data. Figure 5-15 shows the 
graph. 47 
Table 5-26. Emergency costs of Autumn 2000 Floods in North Yorkshire 
Total York Selby Harrogate Richmondshire Others 
Care Related 
104,447 Services - 101,790 0 0 2,657 
Nursing home 
104,447 101,790 0 evacuation - 0 2,657 
Rood Alleviation 1,033,209 
- 499,451 227,508 55,389 250,861 
Sandbagging 713,566 
- 471,379 53,508 35,045 153,634 
Emergency 
319,643 28,072 174,000 20,344 97,227 costs -
Highways and 
572,161 7,686 174,142 39,591 350,742 Bridges -
Emergency 
401,090 1,877 111,381 18,434 269,398 
repairs-roads -
Emergency 
171,071 5,809 62,761 21,157 81,344 
repairs-bridges -
Emergency 
0 0 12,700 0 0 12,700 Planning 
Evacuation 0 0 12,700 0 0 12,700 
Education 
0 0 10,015 0 0 10,015 
related 
Evacuation-
Sherbum 0 0 10,015 0 0 10,015 
School 
Rre Services 414,074 108,268 143,128 34,019 15,601 113,058 
North Yorkshire 681,398 216,403 328,102 1,788 978 134,127 Police 
Total 2,805,289 324,671 1,102,872 437,457 111,559 874,160 
Source: Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a), Table 6.14, p. 132. 
In addition, we obtain the data on emergency costs associated with Autumn 
2000 floods from Penning-Rowsell et al. (2003, 2005a) (see Table 5-26). Likewise, 
we cannot use the data in general in each flood event in simulations although we 
know that we definitely incur such emergency costs. They include fixed costs in 
proportion to the size of flood events, but they are still related to the size of flood 
events. They are probably related in an discontinuous function. 
46 The categories of non-residential area types are: shop/store, vehicle services, retail services, 
office, distribution/logistics. In the categories of leisure, public building, and industry, the 
weighted mean values are not provided because no reasonable data are available. 
41 The elevation in Figure 5-15 is measured from the location p3 or p6 (overbank) in Figure 5-9. 
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Therefore, we set the predicted flood damage values per hectare in developed 
lands according to their elevation based on Figure 5-14 and 5-15, although there is 
possibility that we underestimate the damage value. In the calculation, we give 
even weight to residential and non-residential areas. 48 This gives the results 
reported in Figure 5_16. 49 
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Let us check the data of flood damage values in agricultural lands. 
Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005) provide the data on financial and economic output 
and gross margins, fixed costs and net margins for selected crops and livestock 
enterprises. Let us assume that the crops are completely destroyed after all the 
inputs are used. 50 Then, we abstract the output data from Penning-Rowsell et al. 
(2005) and apply the calculated average value in Table 5-27 assuming that the 
annual probability of the damage is 50% where agricultural lands lie fallow in 
48 Based on the land-use data (LCM 1990), we cannot tell residential areas from non-residential 
ones. Presumably, residential areas are larger than non-residential ones. Thus, the even weight 
tends to overestimate the value, but the tendency of overestimation may be offset by the tendency 
of the underestimation that we mentioned (we do not consider other costs such as emergency 
costs). 
49 The elevation in Figure 5-16 is measured from the location p3 or p6 (overbank) in Figure 5-9. 
50 In addition, we implicitly assume that all the fixed costs are sunk costs, which implies that all 
the inputs are irretrievable or depletable. 
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winter. 
Table 5-27. Output of selected crops and livestock enterprises (UK) 
Output (1990£ per ha) 
Crops 
Winter wheat 391 
Oil seed rape 257 
Peas 246 
Beans 246 
Sugar beet 1,156 
Potatoes 2,660 
Average (crops) a 826 
Livestock Enterprise 
Dairy cows 1,511 
Beef cows 279 
Beef cattle 473 
Sheep fat lambs 347 
Average (livestock) b 652 
Average (a & b) 739 
Source: Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005a), Table 9.4 and 9.5, pp. 194-195. 
Note: We converted the unit from 2005 UK£ per ha into 1990 UK£ per ha, using RPI data 
from UK National Statistics. 
5.3.13 Relation Between Flood Risk and Precipitation 
Virtual rainfall (hypothetical frequency of precipitation) with an annual 
probability (1%,2%,4%, 10% and 20% 51) is an important input for calculating 
the expected cost of flood risk in simulations on HEC-HMS. It derives from 
precipitation frequency analysis. This section conducts a precipitation frequency 
analysis in order to obtain the relation between precipitation and the probability of 
flood damage. We use the data on daily precipitation in subbasins, analysing 
I . .., i." d 52 53 cumu atIve precIpItatIOn amounts lor two ays. . 
51 These probabilities are 'annual' probabilities (probabilities based on the unit of year). For 
example, I % annual probability implies that the return period is 100 years. In this section, we are 
dealing with daily data (2-day rainfalls). Thus, we have to convert the probability based on the unit 
of 2 days into the one based on the unit of year later. Finally, we obtain the 5-year, lO-year, 25-year, 
50-year and I DO-year return period 2-day rainfalls respectively. 
52 "In order to predict 50-year or 1 ~O-year events, we need the data for 50 or 100 years 
respectively" (Gordon et aI., 20(4). It implies that the more accurate the prediction becomes the 
more data we have. However, the data is limitedly available as we mentioned. The analysis is 
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We have to find a probability distribution function that fits the observed data 
of 2-day rainfalls. In so doing, we have three methods available to us: graphical 
method; method of moments; and method of maximum likelihood. The method of 
maximum likelihood is superior to the method of moments by some statistical 
measures, but it is computationally much more complicated because it requires an 
iterative procedure (Bedient and Huber, 2002; Gordon et aI., 2004). In addition, an 
efficient estimate by the method of maximum likelihood is not necessarily found 
(Gordon et a1., 2004), Thus, we use the graphical method and the method of 
moments. The graphical method enables us to find a candidate probability 
distribution. We then obtain the location, scale and shape of the distribution from 
the observed data series by the method of moments. 
We put the observed data into a probability diagram by use of a plotting 
position formula such as Wei bull, GEV and Cunnane. We use Cunnane's plotting 
position formula here because it is the most sophisticated and flexible about 
probability distribution functions. The probability diagram is designed to produce 
a straight-line plot when the observed data is completely fitted with the chosen 
theoretical probability distribution. Then, we judge the goodness-of-fit of the 
chosen probability distribution (to what extent the drawn line is straight) by eye, 
or apply the chi-square statistic and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for assessing the 
goodness-of-fit. Since the latter are seldom helpful in distinguishing among 
different distributions because their confidence intervals are so large that the 
hypothesis that the distribution is fitted with the data tends to be usually accepted 
(Bedient and Huber, 2002). Furthermore, they are insensitive in the tails of 
distributions: the areas are normally important for evaluating extreme events 
(Gordon et a1., 2004). Hence, we use the graphical method for judging the 
based on the data for 10 years in 1990s (see Appendix C-5 and C-6). Thus, we do not treat the 
flood events beyond 100-year return period. 
53 "Cumulative 'precipitation amounts for specified durations are commonly analyzed. mostly for 
durations of less than 3 or 4 days" (USACE, 1993). Considering that HEC-HMS gives 1,2 or 4 
days as the options for the duration of a frequency storm, we choose 2 days duration for the 
analysis. 
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goodness-of-fit here. 54 
In the precipitation frequency analysis, we follow the following procedures: 
1. We obtain the 2-day precipitation data from the observed daily 
precipitation data in subbasins by adding the data of precipitation on 
the previous day to the one on the current day, say 
D;,2-day = Di,l-day + D;-l,l-day . 
2. There are many zero values included in the data. Thus, we set a 
mixed frequency distribution that is composed of a discrete 
probability mass (the data value is zero) and a continuous probability 
density function (in the rest of the range). p(X=O)+p(X>O)=l 
(for all X ~ 0). If there are several zero values in the data, the total 
area of the continuous probability density function provides the value 
that is smaller than one. 
3. We exclude the zero values, and focus on the rest of data to find a 
candidate continuous probability density function. We draw a 
histogram by using the function k = 510g1o n (k: number of classes; 
n: number of observations).55 Based on the shape of the histogram, 
we find candidate probability distribution functions. 
4. We rank the data values from 1 to N (the total number of 
observations). The largest value should be given a rank of 1, the 
second largest one a rank of 2, and so on until the smallest one is 
given a rank of N. 
5. We determine the plotting positions of the data values by using the 
Cunnane's plotting position formula, (m)a where m is a 
N+l -2a 
rank, a. is a constant that is specific to probability distributions and N 
is the total number of data. The formula gives the probability of 
exceedance based on the data values. 
54 "In the end, the decision is often subjective and based on a preference for the underlying 
mechanism of one distribution versus another." (Bedient and Huber, 2002, p. 218). 
55 It is helpful for determining the number of class intervals (Bedient and Huber, 2002). 
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6, We plot the observed data values on the probability diagram, in 
which we can compare the observed data with the one derived from 
the chosen candidate cumulative probability distribution,56 In so 
doing, we use the method of moments in order to specify the 
measures for the distribution,57 If the observed data coincide with 
those, they provide a straight line in the diagram, 
7, Finally, we obtain the precipitation volume with an 'annual' 
exceedance probability such as 1%, 2%, 4%, 10% and 20% from the 
chosen cumulative probability distribution in each subbasin, These 
data are outputs here, 
We carried out the procedures above in fifteen subbasins, We concretely 
show the procedures here,58 Take subbasin 27053 as an example, Table 5-28 
shows the fundamental statistics on 2-day precipitation data, The number of zero 
values is 863, which implies that the probability is 0.2839 (= 863/3040), Then, the 
total area of a continuous probability density function should be 0,7161 (= 1 -
0,2839). 
Table 5-28, Statistics on 2-day precipitation data (27053) 
Data 
N 3,040 
Year a 8,33 
Zeros 
Numer of zeros 863 
P(O) 0,2839 
Data excluding zeros 
mean 8,111 
st.d 9,358 
Source: Derived from monthly catchment rainfall (precipitation) data (NWA, CEH) and Met Otlice - UK 
Land Surface Stations data (BADC), 
Note: a, The range (availability) of the data is shown in Appendix CoS. 
56 There is a problem on the plotting position fonnula that we should note, "There can be a great 
amount of uncertainty in the plotting positions assigned to the largest events, The extreme events 
may plot as 'outliers', far off the line defined by the more frequent events" (Gordon et aI, 2004), 
57 Several authors have indicated the bias related to the methods of moments due to uncertainties 
in the estimation of the flood frequency relationship from limited data, but there are possibilities of 
both overestimation and underestimation (Amell, 1989), 
58 We show histograms and probability diagrams about the other subbasins in Appendix C-8, 
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Class of Intervals 
We construct a histogram of the data series excluding zeros. Figure 5-17 
shows the histogram. From the shape of the histogram, the exponential 
distribution appears to be suitable because it is obviously skewed to the right. 
Normal, log-normal, log-Pearson, gamma and extreme value distributions seem to 
be unsuitable. In addition, the exponential distribution has the property that its 
mean is equal to its standard deviation. Looking at Table 5-28, there is no big 
difference between them. Thus, we expect that we can fit the exponential 
distribution with the observed data. 
We then check the goodness-of-fit in the probability diagram. The 
cumulative distribution function of the exponential distribution is denoted: 
x 
F(X)= f Ae-AXdX = 1- e-M' 
o 
whil e the exceedance probability is: G( X) = 1-F (X) . 
It follows that G(X) = e-M'. 
-lnG(X) 
Rearranging, X = . 
A 
Thus, if the left hand side represents the vertical axis and the right hand side 
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represents the horizontal axis in the probability diagram, the plot of the points 
derived from the distribution function produces a straight line. Hence, we 
compare the positions of the observed data determined by the plotting position 
formula with the straight line. Figure 5-18 shows the diagram. As we mentioned, 
we observe a discrepancy in the range of large values. However, the fit is not bad 
in this type of analysis. Taking this discrepancy into consideration, we use the 
distribution function 2 with the value of A that is estimated by the sample standard 
deviation for reducing the discrepancy. 
Figure 5-18. Probability diagram (27053) (exponential distribution) I "'''.'lio" F"'ol;,. 1 -"'tr.~b" F'"ol;o" 2 
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index of exceedance probability 
NOTE: The distribution function 1 is the exponential distribution with the value of')... that is estimated by the 
standard deviation. The distribution function 2 is the one with the value of')... that is estimated by the 
mean. 
Table 5-29. 2-day precipitation and annual exceedance probability (27053) 
Annual Precipitation Exceedance 






Based on the chosen exponential distribution with A = 0.1333, we derive the 
relationship between 2-day precipitation volumes and an 'annual' exceedance 
probability. However, we cannot directly derive the' annual' probabilities from the 
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ones the distribution function provides. We should note that we have to convert 
the probability based on the unit of 2 days into one based on a year. Let us 
illustrate this point by an example. If the probability on the yearly basis is 0.01, it 
implies that the return period is 100 years (1/(100 years) = 0.01). Consider the 
case that the probability on the 2-day basis is 0.01. This implies that the return 
period is 200 days (0.01 = 1/(100 2-days». It is equivalent to only 0.548 year. For 
example, the annual exceedance probability 0.1 (I 0%, 10-year return period) is 
equivalent to the exceedance probability 0.00055 (0.0055%) on the basis of the 
2-day unit. The probabilities are quite different if the units are different. Here, let 
us derive the relationship between 2-day precipitation volumes and the' annual' 
exceedance probability, considering the discrete probability mass of zeros. Table 
5-29 shows the results. 
Table 5-30. Results o!precipitationjrequency analysis 
Subbasin Annual Exceedance Probability PDF Measures 
20% 10% 4% 2% 1% 
27001 47.577 52.776 59.647 64.845 70.043 Exponential A = 0.133 
27002 50.420 55.858 63.048 68.486 73.924 Exponential A = 0.127 
27005 75.743 83.706 94.232 102.195 110.157 Exponential A = 0.087 
27007 51.874 57.538 65.025 70.689 76.352 Exponential A =0.122 
27009 39.282 43.588 49.281 53.587 57.894 Exponential A = 0.161 
27034 82.692 91.493 103.127 111.928 120.728 Exponential A =0.079 
27043 71.201 78.870 89.007 96.676 104.344 Exponential A = 0.090 
27053 60.660 67.147 75.721 82.207 88.694 Exponential A = 0.107 
27069 38.744 43.024 48.682 52.962 57.242 Exponential A - 0.162 
27071 40.742 45.171 51.026 55.456 59.885 Exponential A=0.156 
27075 42.418 46.932 52.899 57.413 61.928 Exponential "=0.154 
27083 39.508 43.839 49.564 53.895 58.226 Exponential A = 0.160 
27085 42.581 47.285 53.503 58.206 62.910 Exponential A = 0.147 
27089 48.060 53.248 60.106 65.294 70.482 Exponential A = 0.134 
27090 71.493 79.122 89.206 96.835 104.463 Exponential A = 0.091 
Likewise, we do the same analysis in each subbasin. Then, we obtain the 
results shown in Table 5-30. "The two-day, five-year return period rainfall 
exceeds 150 mm in parts of the north and west of Britain and is less than 50 mm 
in parts of the south and east (Natural Environment Research Council, 1975)" (qtd. 
in GOntner et a1., 2001). This information is old, but the results in Table 5-30 seem 
to be valid because the Ouse catchment is located in the north (close to middle) 
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and east of Britain. The data in Table 5-30 can be used as the inputs for frequency 
precipitation in the meteorologic model of HEC-HMS. 59 Finally, there are three 
things that we should note about the treatment of the precipitation data in 
simulations. First, we assume that we have rainfall with equal probability in all 
subbasins at one time. If the probability functions of precipitation in the subbasins 
were independent, we would evaluate the probability of precipitation events in the 
Ouse catchment based on the joint distribution of probability density functions of 
the subbasins. However, we do not think that precipitation events in the subbasins 
are completely independent one another. Rather, they are dependent or related one 
another. The Ouse catchment is not so large (about 4,250 km2). Observing the 
daily precipitation data in subbasins, the weather seems to be quite similar in the 
catchment. Therefore, the assumption might be acceptable. 60 Second, there is a 
seasonal change that is shown by the volumes of monthly baseflow although they 
are not drastically different. For simulations, we choose October because the 
volume of baseflow in October is close to the average (see Section 5.3 .4). Third, 
we use 2-day precipitation volumes with 2%, 1% and lower exceedance 
probability in simulations. We do not consider averting behaviour as a control 
variable, but we need to include the scale of the current averting behaviour as part 
of the initial conditions (i.e. as an exogenous variable). The Environment Agency 
(2003) provides information on the scale of averting behaviour in part of lower 
River Ouse (from Skelton gauging station in York to Selby). According to this, the 
existing flood defence level is close to the estimated 1 % annual probability water 
level. Considering this, we assume that the current scale of averting behaviour 
protects against the precipitation with 2% and higher exceedance probability. 61 
59 Strictly speaking, we should evaluate the intensity of minfalls as well. There are methods for 
deriving temporal patterns of design minfalls (pilgrim, 1969; Giintner et aI., 2001), but we still 
need the base data of rainfalls for shorter dumtions. Therefore, we assume unifonn hypothetical 
rainfalls in our simulations, and conduct a sensitivity analysis in temlS of the intensity of rainfalls 
in the next chapter. 
60 On the other hand, there is a risk that we overestimate the volume of rainfalls. 
61 This might be a strong assumption for the whole catchment. Therefore, we will have to carefully 
consider the results of simulations in the next chapter. 
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5.3.14 Calculation of Expected Cost of Flood Risk 
This section explains the process of calculating the expected cost of flood 
risk. Figure 5-19 shows the summary of procedures for calculating the expected 
cost of flood risk. To begin with, we input the data of hypothetical frequency 
storms into the meteorologic model of HEC-HMS, and we set relevant values of 
control variables in HEC-HMS. Next, we derive peak discharge volumes of 
subbasins from the simulation on HEC-HMS. Using the discharge-elevation and 
elevation-damage relationships, we obtain the value of predicted damage. Finally, 
we can calculate the annual expected cost of flood risk from the value of predicted 
damage and the probability of hypothetical frequency storms. 
Figure 5-19. Process of calculating the expected cost offload risk 
Model on HEC-HMS 
Set control variables 
············•·• •• ••· •• ~!I~·· 
Proba bility 
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5.4 Derivation of Specific Functional Forms 
5.4.1 Expected Cost Function of Flood Risk 
We can now obtain the expected cost of flood risk in subbasins and two city 
areas from the simulation on the hydrological sub-model (HEC-HMS). Hence, we 
can analyse some important aspects of the relationships between the expected cost 
of flood risk and floodplain development. In Section 6.2 (Chapter 6), we try to 
analyse the impact of some patterns of floodplain development on the expected 
cost of flood risk in the Ouse catchment. 
However, we need specific functional forms for the expected cost function of 
flood risk in subbasins. This is both because we have to numerically solve the 
dynamic optimisation problem and because we wish to simulate several scenarios 
(policies) on the basis of the dynamic optimisation. In addition, we need to know 
the marginal values in order to find the optimal steady state equilibrium. Since the 
simulations on the hydrological sub-model cannot provide the 'marginal' expected 
cost of flood risk, we need to adopt specific functional forms in subbasins. For 
deriving a specific functional form, we need the data on the relationship between 
areas of developed floodplains and the expected cost of flood risk, but the historic 
data on the relationship are not available. Fortunately, the simulations on the 
hydrological sub-model can produce data on the relationships between the 
expected cost of flood risk and areas of developed floodplains in subbasins. Thus, 
using the outputs from the simulations, let us estimate specific functional forms. 
To begin with, we have to obtain the data on the relationship between areas 
of developed floodplains in subbasins (state variables) and the expected cost of 
flood risk from simulation in the hydrological sub-model. If we set the values of 
state variables, we can obtain the expected cost of flood risk from the simulation. 
By this procedure, we obtain 60 observations about the combination of the values 
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of state variables and the expected cost. 62 
Considering the structure of the hydrological sub-model, there are some 
points that functional forms must satisfy. First, there are unidirectional spatial 
externalities. The function should include the areas of developed floodplains in its 
own zone and upstream zones as long as the external impacts are not trivial. 
Second, the increase in the area of developed floodplains in its own zone and/or 
upstream zones increases the expected cost of flood risk. 
ac'(xi XJ) aCi(xi Xl) 
----'--'--'- > 0 '> 0 
ax' 'axl 
where zones j are upstream ones relative to the zone i. 
Third, the settings of the model structure are common among the subbasins. Only 
the calibrated parameter values and geographical locations are different. Thus, the 
functional forms adopted should also be the same. Fourth, we can derive another 
clue for functional forms from the structure of the hydrological sub-model. The 
expected cost of flood risk is influenced by peak stages and the area of developed 
lands that are susceptible to floods in the subbasin. Peak stages are determined by 
control variables in the reference zone and in upstream zones (Xi,Xi). The area 
of developed lands is the area of developed floodplains in the reference zone X'. 
Thus, the impact of Xi is larger than that of Xl. Functional forms should 
reflect this point. 
The criteria for choosing functional forms is: (1) The conditions that we 
discussed above are satisfied. (2) Adjusted R-squared (coefficient of 
determination) is sufficiently high. (3) Independent variables are statistically 
significant (at least at 10% significance level) based on t-test and F-test. (4) 
Functional forms that satisfy the sufficiency conditions are preferable. (5) They 
satisfy RESET (regression specification error test) or the Davidson-MacKinnon 
test if necessary. 63 
62 Generally speaking, we need at least 30 observations in order to conduct a regression analysis 
(Wooldridge, 2000). 60 observations seem to be sufficient. 
63 There are some problems on RESET: (l) There is no optimal choice of the number of 
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Fortunately, we can find a functional form that satisfies the conditions 
mentioned above: 
Zones) are upstream zones on the same river (tributary). If two or more tributaries 
flow into a zone, the functional form includes two or more second terms 
(Subbasin 27009 is an example). In addition, there is no term X for the two urban 
areas (York and Selby) because, as we explained, these areas do not contain a 
gauging station and therefore we cannot use the HEC-HMS model to simulate the 
link between developed area and flood risk within these zones. Thus, the 
functional form differs somewhat between subbasins. The equations are estimated 
by OLS, as follows (see Appendix C-9 for details): 
27001 C i =27001 = 27. 17415(Xi)2 + 23654.05790 I Xi} = 27005 and 27053 
i 
27002 C=27002 =3.22602(XiY +3562.36893IXi }=27043 
i 
27005 C=27005 = 137.27578(Xi)2 
27007 C i=27007 =6.43880(XiY +3138.36812LXi }=27034 
i 
27009 C=27009 = 4.61088(X1 )2 +6578.54122L Xi +7049.52755L xk 64 
J k 
} = 27007 and 27034, k = 27069, 27071, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
27034 C=27034 = 15.50372(Xi )2 
27043 C=27043 = 28. 96503(Xi Y 
27053 C=27053 =1.08513(X i j +123.99826IXi j=27005 
i 
27069 C=27069 = 24.53457(Xi r 
27071 C=27071 =4.41719{X1 )2 +4069.88547IXi 
j = 27069, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
polynomials (we choose two); (2) The power may be low; and (3) There is no guidance about how 
to re-specify the model (Wooldridge, 2(00). About the Davidson-MacKinnon test, there is a 
~roblem that the result of the test is not decisive (Wooldridge, 2000). 
Three tributaries (River Nidd, River Ure and River Swale) flow into Subbasin 27009. The 
function of 27009 should have three tenns onX', but a term related to River Nidd is obviously 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, we omit the term. See Appendix C-9 in detail. . 
27075 C=27075 = 37.52708(Xi l 
27083 C=27083 = 5.28397(Xi )2 
27085 C=27085 = 7.80344(Xi l 
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27089 C=27089 = 20.35564(X'} + 342.83757.L: X f j = 27002 and 27043 
i 
27090 C=27090 = 29.55 I 94(Xi l 
Selby coSe/by = 899343.7842+ 48.69045.L:XJ j=Al115subbasins 
J 
York c=York = 8477662.330+ 290.425942: X j j = 27001,27005,27007, 
j 
27009, 27034, 27053, 27069, 27071, 27075, 27083, 27085 and 27090 
5.4.2 Benefit Function of Ecosystem Services 
As we mentioned before, natural floodplains provide us with several 
ecosystem services. This point is crucial, and this has been widely recognized 
recently. Thus, the research on the valuation of wetlands which include 
floodplains have been accumulating. To the best of our knowledge, however, there 
has been no valuation of floodplains in the Ouse catchment up to now. In addition, 
there are few other studies that value river floodplains, although some inland 
wetlands are implicitly included in floodplains. 65 In the absence of research on the 
valuation of floodplains in the Ouse catchment, we value ecosystem services of 
floodplains in the Ouse catchment by the method of benefits transfer. 66 
Fortunately, research on the valuation of wetlands, in general, have 
accumulated (Woodward and Wui, 2001). Hence, a meta-analysis for value 
transfer is now possible. Heimlich et al. (I998) provide a good review of 33 
studies from the literature on wetland valuation over the last 26 years in order to 
65 e.g. Gren et al. (1995); and Hickman et al. (2001). For example, Gren et al. (1995) try to 
calculate the total value of ecosystem services that Danube floodplains provide by a method of 
transferring benefits from the results of other researches that focuses on one or more ecosystem 
services. . 
66 This can become one of the big researches, and it is beyond our target. 
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derive a range of the values per acre of wetlands. The values derived are 
standardized using a 6-percent discount rate and a 50-year accounting period, and 
are indicated in 1992 constant US dollar terms. The review covers the values of 
marketed goods, non-marketed goods and non-marketed ecosystem services that 
wetlands provide. Heimlich et aI. (1998) have given a summary table (Table 5-31). 
We want to convert the values of Table 5-31 into the values per year per hectare in 
1990 constant GBP (£). Table 5-32 shows the converted data. This is used to 
provide indicative benefits of ecosystem services. 
Table 5-31. Economic values ofwetlandfunctions (per acre, 1992 US dollar) 
Wetland function valued Number of studies Median Mean Range of means 
Marketed goods: 
Fish and shellfish support 8 702 6,132 7 - 43,928 
Fur-bearing animals 2 na 137 12 - 261 
Nonmarketed goods: 
General-users 12 32,903 83,159 115-347,548 
General-nonusers 6 623 2,512 105 - 9,859 
Fis h ing-us ers 7 362 6,571 95 - 28,845 
Hunting-users 11 1,031 1,019 18-3,101 
Recreation-users 8 244 1,139 91 - 4,287 
Ecological functions: 17 2,428 32,149 1 - 200,994 
Amenity and cultural 4 448 2,722 83-9,910 
Source: Heimlich et aI. (1998), Table 1, p. 15. . . 
Note: It shows the values that are standardized by a 6-percent discount rate and a 50-year accounting pcnod. 
Table 5-32. Economic values ofwetlandfonctions (per ha per year, 1990 GBP £') 
Wetland function valued Median Mean Range of means 
Marketed goods: 
Fish and shellfish support 55 478 0.5 - 3,424 
Fur-bearing animals na 11 0.9 - 20 
Nonmarketed goods: 
General-users 2,564 6,482 9.0 - 27,088 
General-nonusers 49 196 8.2 - 768 
Fis hing-us ers 28 512 7.4 - 2,248 
Hunting-users 80 79 1.4 - 242 
Recreation-users 19 89 7.1 - 334 
Ecological functions: 189 2,506 0.1 - 15,666 
Amenityand cultural 35 212 6.5 - 772 
Total - - 34.6 - 49,791 
Source: Converted and arranged from Heimlich et al. (1998), Table 1, p. 15. GDP detlator is calculatcd from 
the data on nominal and real GDP (Source: US Department of Commerce). The exchange rate is £ = 
1.7864 US$ in 1990, based on the annual average of spot exchange rale (Source: Bank of England). 
Note: The total value is deri ved by summing the values in the items above. There might be a problem of 
double-counting (Aylward and Barbier, 1992; Barbier, 1994). Thus, it is a provisional value. 
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Concretely, we try to use the results of meta-analysis of wetland valuation for 
setting the function of benefits of ecosystem services. Woodward and Wui (200 I) 
have derived a function that explains the value of wetland by a meta-analysis, 
using the results of 46 existing researches of wetlands valuation (39 wetlands). 
They assume that "there exists an unobserved valuation function that determines a 
wetland's value given its physical, economic and geographic characteristics" 
(Woodward and Wui, 200 I). Based on this, they show two types of results: a 
simple bivariate meta-analysis with graphical presentation; and a multivariate 
econometric meta-analysis. 67 We use them to fit results in order to set the benefit 
function of ecosystem services. 
Fundamentally, we need to derive the relationship between the value (or the 
unit value) of wetland and its area. The model provided by Woodward and Wui 
(2001) includes many of the system's ecological characteristics and its 
socio-economic environments as dummy variables. Woodward and Wui (2001) 
assume the following function: 
In{V)= a + Pa In{xJ+ Psxs + Pmxm + Poxo 
where 
v = value per year per acre (1990 US$) 
a = constant term 
/la' P., Pm' Po = coefficient of independent variables 
Xa = area of the wetland in acres 
x. = a function of the services provided [dummy variable (0 or 1)] 
xm = a methodology [dummy variable (0 or 1)] 
Xo = other variables (year, location and so on) [dummy variable] 
(5-15) 
The results are shown by Table 5-33. They test the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in the model, and reject the null hypothesis. Thus, they use 
67 "From our analysis it is clear that the prediction of a wetland's value based on previous studies 
is, at best, an imprecise science. The need for site-specific studies remains" (Woodward and Wui, 
2001). 
Chapter 5. Applied Madel and Calibration 213 
White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 68 Considering the results 
and our interests we focus on, we use the option A. 
Table 5-33. Estimated models of the wetland valuationjunction 
Variable Mean Option A Option B OptionC 
Intercept 
- 7.945b(1.07) 6.641 b(1.31) 7.872b(1.74) 
Year 14.908 -0.052 (0.03) -0.004 (0.04) 0.016 (0.04) 
Ln acres 9.281 -0.168 (0.10) 
-0.286b (0.11) 
Coastal 0.431 -0.523 (0.71 ) 
-0.117 (0.68) 
Flood 0.138 -0.358 (1.03) 0.678 (0.77) 
Quality 0.2 1.494c (0.78) 0.737 (0.75) 
Quantity 0.062 0.514(1.60) -0.452 (1.54) 
Recreation Fish 0.354 0.395 (0.55) 0.582 (0.56) 
Com m odity Fis h 0.277 0.669 (0.79) 1.360 (1.01) 
Birdhunt 0.4 -1.311 b(0.49) -1.055b(0.52) 
Birdwatch 0.277 1.704b(0.52) 1.804b(0.59) 
Amenity 0.154 -3.352b(0.92) -4.303b (0.95) 
Habitat 0.308 0.577 (0.56) 0.427 (0.59) 
Storm 0.031 0.310 (2.37) 0.173 (1.66) 
Publish or not 0.769 -0.669 (0.72) -0.154 (0.71) 
DataO [questionable = 1] 0.246 0.302 (0.56) 0.000 (0.60) 
TheoryO [questionable = 1] 0.215 -1.020 (0.84) -1.045 (0.84) 
MetricO [questionable = 1] 0.123 -4.030b(1.21 ) -3.186b(1.22) 
Producer's surplus or not 0.277 -2.416b (0.83) -2.034b(0.72) -3.140b(0.86) 
Hedonic pricing method 0.031 0.441 (1.02) 5.043b(1.12) 
Net factor income method 0.246 -0.724 (0.82) 0.273 (0.90) 
Replacement cost method 0.277 1.376 (0.86) 2.232b(0.89) 
Travel cost method 0.108 -1.196c (0.64) -0.341 (1.05) 
n 65 65 65 65 
R2 
-
0.373 0.364 0.582 
Source: Woodward and Wui (2001), Table 2. 
a. Standard errors were calculated using White's (1980) correction lor heteroskedasticity. All results were 
obtained using Shazam version 8.0 (White, 1997). 
b. Signiticantly dilferent from zero at the 5% level. 
c. Signiticantly ditferent from zero at the 10% level. 
The area of wetland should depend on the control variable in our model. 
Except for this, all other variables are dummy variables. The problem is to 
interpret the statistical test for each explanatory variable; say whether each 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 or 10% level. Here, we 
should distinguish between "statistically significant" and "economically 
significant" (McCloskey, 1985; Goldberger, 1991; McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996). 
"In many research reports, the author's conclusions emphasize the 
68 Refer to Wooldridge (2000) in this respect. 
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statistical significance, rather than the economic significance, of the 
coefficient estimates. Yet, a coefficient estimate may be "very significantly 
different from unity" (by the t-test), while that difference is economically 
trivial. Or the difference may be "not significantly different from unity" b~t 
have an economically substantial magnitude. . . . It may be a good idea to 
reserve the tenn "significance" for the statistical concept, adopting 
"substantial" for the economic concept" (Goldberger, 1991, p.240). 
Statistical significance is important, but it is not the whole story. Some 
explanatory variables are sometimes significant economically although they are 
not significant statistically. 
Hence, we try to use all the explanatory variables except for year, and put 
zero into 'coastal', 'flood', 'storm' and 'PS' and one into the others because we 
focus on fluvial floodplains and all the possible ecosystem services except flood 
mitigation service in the terms of net benefit function. 69 Then, we obtain the 
following function: 
In(V) = 8.635 - 0.168 ·In{xJ 
The unit of area in this equation is an acre. We convert the unit into hectare in 
order that we can use the function in our model. Substituting the factor of 
conversion into the function, 
In{V) = 8.635 - 0.168 ·In(2.471· (LF - X)) 
where 
xQ = 2.471· (LF - X) 
LF - X is a notation used in our model whose unit is hectare. Arranging the 
function above, 
In(V)= 8.48302 - 0.168 .1n(LF - X) 
Solving the equation for V, 
V = e8.48302-0.168'ln(Lp-X) 
The value of this function is still per year per hectare in 1990 "US dollar" terms. 
We need to convert the unit to per year per hectare in 1990 "GBP (£)" terms for 
69 Even if we put zero into the tenn of "flood" and "storm", there is a possibility that we 
double-count the value of flood mitigation service in our model. However, the function has not 
been a decisive model yet, and our knowledge of ecosystem services is still developing. Hence, 
there is also a possibility that we underestimate the value of ecosystem services at the same time. 
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our model. 70 
~a,£ = 0.55978· e8.48302-0.168.ln(Lp-X) (5-16) 
Finally, we convert function (5-16) into the one that is fitted with our model. 
B(L~ - X i )= O.55978(L~ - X i }8.48302-0.168.ln(L'rXi ) (5-17) 
We use the function (5- I 7) for simulations in the next chapter. 
To calculate the marginal benefit of ecosystem services from the function 
(5-17), differentiate the function with respect to the control variable, 
dB (' ') 
--, = -0.46573. e8.48302-0.168.ln L'p-X' < 0 
dX 1 
d(:.' = -0.07824· (EF - X' t . e8.48302-0.168.\,(v,-X') < 0 
The marginal value is always negative. Likewise, the second derivative of the 
function with respect to the control variable is also negative. This function is 
strictly concave. These conditions satisfy the assumptions we set in the model. In 
terms of the functional form, we should note the following. As we discussed in 
Chapter 2, the connectivity of floodplains in terms of location seems to play an 
important role in enhancing the extent of ecosystem services. Considering the 
connectivity, there should be a range in which the marginal value is increasing. 
However, we cannot consider such an effect of connectivity because we cannot 
distinguish the location beyond the demarcation of subbasins (zones) that we have 
divided in our model. 
Using function (5-16), let us check the unit value (per year per hectare) based 
on the possible maximum area of natural floodplains in each subbasin of the Duse 
catchment as compared with Table 5-32. Table 5-34 shows the unit values and the 
areas.
71 The unit value will be maximised when the term L~ - Xi approaches 
70 The exchange rate is £ = 1.7864 US$ in 1990, based on the annual average of spot exchange rate 
(Source: Bank of England). 
7! The area of floodplains in each subbasin implies the maximum area of natuml floodplains. 
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zero. We cannot define zero in the function. Thus, we put the value 0.0001 ha (1 
m
2
) to reflect the case of full exploitation. In the end, the range of unit values in 
the Ouse catchment in our model is 1,544 - 40,551 GBP (1990 £) per year per 
hectare, which is consistent with Table 5-32. 
Table 5-34. Unit value of ecosystem services in subbasins 
Area of Unit value Gauging Name of natural 
Stations Stations floodplains of floodplains 
(ha) (1990 £ y-1 ha-
1) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 1,359.7 805 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 2,629.7 720 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 373.4 1,000 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 2,498.0 727 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 6,646.2 617 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 2,476.9 728 
27043 Wharfe atAddingham 1,402.5 801 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 348.0 1,012 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 1,338.2 807 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 3,621.6 683 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 1,029.1 843 
27083 Foss at Huntington 1,119.7 832 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 1,152.2 828 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 443.8 971 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 1,632.8 781 
Total 28,071.8 484 
Case of fully exploitation 0.0001 12,710 
5.4.3 Benefit Function of Developed Floodplains 
Economic benefits will be brought about if we develop floodplains to be used 
for economic activities. Economic rents will be generated by economic activities 
on developed lands. The benefits are variable, depending on economic activities. 
However, if we assume that all economic agents are rational and always try to 
maximise their profits, current economic activities are efficient in the absence of 
externalities. The values that they produce are maximal. We use the data on prices 
of residential lands. If the market for land is complete and efficient, the price of 
residential land coincides with the present value of the sum of the rents that the 
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land owner can earn in the future (theoretically). This is based on a market 
equilibrium in which there is no arbitrage that can make any transactions more 
profitable. In addition, prices are in reality determined by current market 
conditions which include speculation. However, we want to use the notion as an 
assumption because we have no relevant data for considering the point. Assuming 
fixed economic rent from the land, we can show the land price by the following: 
LP= f ER =ER 
1=1 (1 + r) r (5-18) 
where 
LP = land price 
ER = economic rent 
r = discount rate (real interest rate) 
This estimates economic benefits from developed areas and ignores 
externalities, the agglomeration effect of developed areas and the limitation of 
development. 72 The agglomeration effect is that the unit value (benefit) of 
developed lands will increase if the total area of developed lands increases and the 
developed lands are connected with each other in close proximity. This enhances 
the value of an additional unit of developed land. The agglomeration effect is 
composed of scale economies (increasing returns to scale) and a location effect 
(connectivity of economic activities in concentrated areas) that is related to 
transportation costs and the movement of productive factor (Fujita et aI., 1999). 
On the other hand, there is a possibility that the problem of congestion occurs, 
which offsets the agglomeration effect. Furthennore, the value of development in 
peripheral areas wil1 decrease due to the burden of expensive transportation cost 
and the limitation of population. Therefore, as long as the total area of developed 
lands is small enough, the marginal value of development may increase, but it 
may decrease once the total area of developed lands exceeds a certain threshold. 
Considering the initial conditions, we should assume a decreasing function or a 
72 Geographical aspects had been ignored in neoclassical economics. Not to mention, the 
perspective is critical in envirorunental and ecological economics. About geographical aspects in 
economics, refer to Henderson (1974); Segal (1976); Krugman (l991a, 1991b, 1995); Morl 
(1998); and Fujita et al. (1999). 
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linear function. However, we cannot consider the agglomeration effect and the 
limitation for estimating the benefits here because we have no relevant data.?3 
Hence, we assume a linear function for the benefit function of developed 
floodplains. 
F(X)=aX 
We estimate the value of a by calculating the economic rent from the data on 
land prices, using equation (5- 18). 
The data on market land prices of residential areas is available from ODPM 
(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister). We can calculate a real interest rate from a 
nominal interest rate and an inflation rate. We use the data on annual average UK 
banks' base rates as the nominal interest rate. In order to calculate the inflation 
rate, we use RPI. Based on the land prices and the calculated real interest rate, we 
can derive the economic rent per year. Finally, we convert the value into 1990 UK 
£ price. Table 5-35 shows the results. We adopt the average value for the first five 
years in 1990s for the parameter value. We obtain the following function. 
F(X i )= 14030.80048X i 
Table 5-35. Economic rent o/residentialland in Yorkshire and the Humber 
Economic rent 
Land price 1 Real 
Nominal Inflation year at 1990 price interest interest 
rate 3 ('Yo) (£ per hal (£ per ha) rate (0/0) rate 2 ('Yo) 
1990 18,844 355,000 5.31 14.77 9.46 
1991 17,833 324,859 5.81 11.68 5.87 
1992 15,977 301,786 5.81 9.56 3.75 
1993 9,970 251,596 4.42 6.01 1.59 
1994 7,530 282,723 3.04 5.46 2.42 
1995 9,492 348,517 3.22 6.69 3.47 
1996 10,769 367,802 3.55 5.96 2.41 
1997 9,191 335,000 3.43 6.57 3.14 
1998 10,769 365,000 3.81 7.24 3.43 
1999 11,314 390,000 3.81 5.34 1.53 
Note 
J. Simple average price. Source: Inland Revenue Valuation Omce, "Table 561. Housing market: land prices 
pri vate sector, by region". 
2. Source: Bank ofEngJand, "Annual average of4 UK banks' base rates". 
3. RPI: All items retail prices index (January 1987=100). Source: UK National Statistics. 
73 This is beyond our scope. It can be one research topic. 
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5.4.4 Direct Cost Function of Floodplain Development and 
Restoration 
We need the direct cost function of floodplain development and restoration 
with relevant parameter values in our model. However, there is no appropriate 
data on costs of floodplain development. The reason might be that this depends on 
the various site-specific and engineer-specific characteristics. Moreover, in terms 
of economics, we are always interested in opportunity costs of floodplain 
development such as costs of lost ecosystem services. 
There are some data on wetland restoration, much of it from ecological point 
of view, but there are only a few pieces of literature that contain relevant data on 
costs of restoration. The reason may be that we have not sufficiently studied the 
mechanism of ecological restoration, and that we cannot precisely estimate the 
costs of restoration without the knowledge of the process of ecological restoration. 
Furthennore, the costs of restoration depend on the site-specific factors as well. 
Thus, good and appropriate data on costs of floodplain (wetland) restoration are 
unavailable about the Duse catchment. In addition, it seems to be difficult to 
obtain and choose this type of data because the costs depend on the types of 
methods for restoration, the types of end uses, the level of restoration (to what 
extent we can recover biological productivity etc.) and so on. Moreover, data on 
costs of restoration span a wide range of values. We thus do not aim at deriving a 
precise and definite function with parameter values here. Instead, setting different 
parameter values, we analyse some scenarios in this respect for simulations in the 
next chapter. 
I. We assume that the functional form is linear which satisfies the 
sufficiency conditions in the static and dynamic models in Chapter 4. 
2. We assume that the coefficients are different between development 
and restoration. Since restoration is more difficult than development 
(Edwards and Abivardi, 1997; Mitsch and GosseJink, 2000b), we 
assume that the coefficient of restoration is ten times as large as that 
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of development. 74 
D(i)= ai if i ~ O. [development] 
D(i)= IOai if i < O. [restoration] 
3. The value of coefficient of the function for floodplain restoration is 
obtained from the wider literature on wetland restoration .. 
Table 5-36. Restoration costs (1995 US $1,000 per haf 
Area Restoration Reference Site Type of land cost (ha) [original] Original Unit (1990 UK£) 
Los Angeles, USA Wetland 120.0 18,264,959 b Edwards&Abivardi(1997) 1995 US $ [NRC(1992») 
San Diego, USA Riparian Wetland 3.0 1,038,208 Edwards&Abivardi(1997) 1995 US $ [Guinon(1989)) 
UK Wetland (peatland) 50.0 3,298 Edwards&Abivardi(1997) 1995 US $ (Wleeler&Shaw(1995») 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 0.6 39,657 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 0.6 354,266 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 1.9 271,434 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 6.9 475,880 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 5.4 274,953 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 4.2 126,901 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 7.3 37,013 Gutrich& H itztlusen (2004) 2000 US $ 
Ohio and Colorado, USA Wetland (marsh) 25.5 411,761 Gutrich&Hitztlusen(2004) 2000US$ 
Kissimmee Riller 
Kissimmee Riller, USA Aoodplain 10360.0 198,175,658 Restoration Project 1997 US $ 
(www.sfwmd.gov) 
Note: 
a. The unit is converted into 1990 UK £ by use of US GDP deflator (Source: US Department of Commerce) 
and the annual average of spot exchange rate (Source: Bank of England). 
b. The original data is provided by the range of 6,087,328 - 30,442,591 (1990 UK f). 
Table 5-36 shows the data that we can obtain on the relationship between 
areas and restoration costs. Using the data, we can calibrate the parameter values 
of the linear function above by a simple regression (OLS). We should note that it 
is difficult to derive statistically significant results because of the small number of 
observations. 
D(i)= 19146.37353/ if i < O. (5-19) 
(R2 = O. 993, t-value == 41.024, p-value == 0.0000) 
74 Edwards and Abivardi (1997) compare the wetland restoration cost with the potential value of 
the restored land, and indicate that the fonner is at least around 100 times as large as the latter. 
Considering this, this assumption might be within reliable prediction even though we take account 
of direct cost of floodplain development. Fundamentally, it seems to be expensive to restore 
natural floodplains from urban developed areas as compared with the development. 
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D(i)=1914.63735i if i ~O. (5-20) 
We use functions (5-19) and (5-20) for the direct cost of floodplain 
restoration and development respectively as a base case in simulations in the next 
chapter. 
5.4.5 Constraints on Control Variables 
We set the direct cost functions of floodplain development and restoration in 
the previous section. Note, however, that functions 5-19 and 5-20 do not take the 
timing of costs into account. Since wetland restoration takes time, this is an 
important consideration for floodplain restoration. In this respect, Gutrich and 
Hitzhusen (2004) mention that it is critical to estimate and consider the economic 
restoration lag costs that are incurred while achieving natural functional 
equivalency. In fact, society is currently incurring significant lag costs although 
the lag costs have not been considered historically (Gutrich and Hitzhusen, 2004). 
To capture this in the model, we apply capacity constraints on the control 
variables in simulations. That is, there is a limit to the area that it is possible to 
restore in anyone time period. It is mathematically denoted by the following. 
_Xi <y-i <yi <y-l <Li _Xi 
r- r- t- d- F t (for all i) 
To detennine the values of Ji~ and y~, we assume that the time of restoration is 
ten times as long as that of development and then test the sensitivity of this 
assumption in the scenarios developed in the next chapter. We introduce the 
following as a base case in Section 6.6 in the next chapter. 
y; = 10 (for all i) [restorati on] 
Then, y~ = 100 (for all i) [development] 
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5.5 Conclusion of Chapter 5 
To begin with, we set the discrete dynamic simulation model based on the 
continuous dynamic theoretical model developed in Chapter 4. Then, we set a 
hydrological sub-model for the expected cost function of flood risk and specify 
the other functions in the model. We calibrate the parameter values and specify the 
functional forms adopted in the sub-model. Thus, we set several assumptions in 
the process of specification and calibration, which are necessary but might be a 
source of bias. Our main purpose is not to precisely evaluate the current real 
situation but to evaluate and identify optimal policies in simulations. In the next 
chapter, we carry out policy simulations, using the discrete dynamic simulation 
model. 




For the last 30 years, flood events have become more frequent and more 
serious in the Ouse catchment. The purpose of this chapter is to implement 
simulations in order to evaluate (a) outcomes under different management regimes 
and (b) the robustness of model projections to uncertainty about model parameters 
and structure. We use the applied simulation model specified and calibrated in 
Chapter 5. In Section 6.2, we show to what extent the change in the area of 
developed floodplains has an impact on the expected cost of flood risk. In Section 
6.3, we use simulations to identify the optimal management strategy, making the 
problem of externalities clear. In Section 6.4, we discuss the problem of 
discounting. Discounting often has a large impact on our decisions. We test the 
sensitivity of the outcomes to the choice of discount rates. In Section 6.5, we 
attempt to identify the optimal policy, and discuss the outcomes of several 
potential polices. In Section 6.6, we discuss the problem of irreversibility. In 
Section 6.7, we test the sensitivity of the outcomes to economic parameters such 
as the value of ecosystem services and the value of developed lands, and to an 
environmental variable such as precipitation. In Section 6.8, we conclude the 
chapter. 
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6.2 Importance of Floodplain Management 
In this section, we analyse the impact of changes in control variables 
(floodplain development) on the expected cost of flood risk. To be more precise, 
we clarity to what extent floodplain management influences the expected cost of 
flood risk (probability of flood occurrence) in simulations. It is often said that the 
number of floods has increased for the last 30-50 years (we will check the data 
later). However, there is no agreement about the main causes of this. One of the 
hypotheses is that the changes in land use including floodplain development have 
had an impact. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test or verity this hypothesis 
because the land use data are not available historically (as time series data). Thus, 
an analysis based on simulations can be treated as an 'indirect' test of this 
hypothesis. 
6.2.1 Historical Data on Flood Events 
To begin with, let us observe the historical data on flood events and describe 
the trends. We take York as a sample. Figure 6-1 shows the trend of monthly 
rainfall for the long period 1911- I 999. However, there are no data based on the 
same MET rainfall gauging station covering the whole duration. Figure 6-1 (a) 
shows the trend of monthly rainfall at the station "York" for the period 19] 1-1964. 
Figure 6-1(b) shows it at the station "York Acomb Landing TR.WKS" for the 
period 1961-1999. They are away from each other by 2 km. We do not think that 
there is a big difference between them, but we should recognize that the data come 
from the different stations. Looking at them, it seems that there is neither a big 
change nor a clear trend. l 
I However, we cannot observe the intensity of rainfalls for a short duration from it. 
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Note: (a) York: The data in 1933 and 1951-53 are missing. (b) York Acomb Landing TR.WKS: The missing 
data are: Jul-Dec 1988, lui-Dec 1992, Jan and June 1993, Feb 1996, and Nov-Dec 1999. 
Interestingly, however, there seems to be a clear increasing trend about flood 
events. Figure 6-2 shows the flood record for Viking in the City of York. The 
number of peaks over a threshold value (S.058m) is shown for the long period 
1881-2000. An obvious change is observed around 1950. Rather than a trend , 
flood risk suddenly became high around 1950 and the high flood risk has 
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continued. What has changed? 
We hypothesise that floodplain development (changes in land use) plays a 
crucial role in controlling flood risk. That is, land use changes have altered both 
run-off and the damage cost of flooding. The evidence suggests that land-use 
changes in the post-war years marked a threshold. 
Fieure 6-2. Flood record for Viking in the City of York 
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Chapter 6. Policy Simulation 227 
6.2.2 Impact of Floodplain Development on Expected Cost of 
Flood Risk 
Let us analyse the impact of changes in the size of developed floodplains on 
the expected cost of flood risk in simulations, which indirectly tests the hypothesis. 
Table 6- I shows the scheme for simulations. First, we set seven initial conditions 
on floodplain development. They show the percentage of the area of developed 
floodplain in floodplains, 5, 25, 50, 75 and 95%. In addition, we set the different 
percentages on upstream and downstream zones as other two initial conditions. In 
so doing, we define subbasins 27005, 27007,27034,27043,27053,27069,2707], 
27075, 27085, and 27090 as the upstream zones, and subbasins 27001, 27002, 
27009, 27083 and 27089 as the downstream zones (See Figure 6-3). Second, we 
analyse three scenarios: increase the area of developed floodplains by one ha per 
subbasin in all zones, in only upstream zones, and in only downstream zones. We 
analyse 21 cases in simulations in total. 
Table 6-1. Schemefor simulations 
Initial condition: 
Roodplain Roodplain Roodplain 
"Ioof developed 
development development development floodplains 
in all areas in upstream areas in downstream areas in floodplains 
5% Case 1 Case2 Case 3 
25% Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
50% Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 
75% Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
95% Case 13 Case 14 Case 15 
Upstream: 25% Case 16 Case 17 Case 18 Downstream: 75% 
Upstream: 75% Case 19 Case 20 Case 21 Downstream: 25% 
Then, we calculate the following OPT) as the measure of the impact of the 
change in control variables on the expected cost of flood risk. 
IPT= C(X +h)-C(X) 
h 
(6-1 ) 
where C is the expected cost function of flood risk in the catchment, X is the 
initial area of developed floodplains, and h denotes the change in the area of 
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developed floodplains (1 ha per subbasin in this simulation). 
Figure 6-3. Definition of upstream and downstream zones 
Source: We create this map from OS Land-Form PANORAMA ™ DTM [I: 50,000] (EDINA Digimap) by use 
ofArcGIS. 
Note: The shaded areas denote upstream areas. 
Table 6-2 shows the results. Table 6-2 coincides with Table 6-]. There are a 
few interesting findings. First, the impact of floodplain development (change in 
control variables) on the expected cost of flood risk is substantial. 2 Comparing the 
values obtained (the range is 9,017 - ] 1,053 1990 UK £) with the economic rents 
on developed lands (the average is 12,168 1990 UK f), they tum out to be large. 
This shows the importance of floodplain management for alleviating flood risk. 
Second, there are unidirectional spatial externalities of floodplain development. 
Comparing the values in each row of the table, the following relationship holds 
true. 
[Development in downstream zones] < (Development in all zones] 
< [Development in upstream zones] 
The impact of floodplain development in upstream zones is the largest because it 
has an external effect on the expected cost of flood risk in downstream zones. The 
2 See Table 5-35 in Chapter 5. 
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upstream effect, however, is completely unchanged. 
Table 6-2. Impact offload development on expected cost offlood risk 
Initial condition: 
Aoodplain Aoodplain %01 developed Aoodplain 
floodplains development development development 
in floodplains in all areas in upstream areas in downstream areas 
5% 10,374 11,053 9,017 
25% 10,425 11,053 9,169 
50% 10,473 11,053 9,314 
75% 10,526 11,053 9,472 
95% 10,526 11,053 9,472 
Upstream: 25% 10,444 11,053 9,227 
Downstream: 75% 
Upstream: 75% 10,481 11,053 9,338 Downstream: 25% 
Note: The unit is 1990 UK £. The values show the increase in the expected cost of flood risk per I-hectare 
increase in the area of developed t1oodplains. See function (6-1). 
6.3 Optimisation 
In this section, we find the optimal steady-state equilibrium from the 
conditions obtained in theoretical models in previous chapters, and derive the 
optimal path from the initial conditions. Then, we simulate a measure of social 
welfare in some scenarios. 
6.3.1 Optimal Steady-state Equilibrium 
Let us derive the optimal steady-state equilibrium by use of the steady-state 
conditions derived in previous chapters. In the steady-state equilibrium, the 
following conditions must be satisfied in all the subbasins. 
(for all i) (6-2) 
Chapter 6. Policy Simulation 230 
If we can solve the equations for all X, we can obtain the optimal size of 
developed floodplains in all the subbasins in the equilibrium. 3 Notice that these 
conditions are the same as the optimal conditions in the static decision model in 
Chapter 3. 
Table 6-3. Optimal steady-state equilibrium 
Size of developed Initial size 
floodplains of developed Size of Subbasin in equilibrium floodplains floodplains 
(hal (ha) (hal 
27001 239.19083 99.39369 1356.91346 
27002 1987.28207 217.13234 2402.75427 
27005 0[-39.99124] 14.38793 204.67004 
27007 503.39352 155.26437 2447.00171 
27009 1426.77342 308.46632 6639.46521 
27034 108.47819 51.12944 2451.61496 
27043 161.96300 27.69161 1257.75186 
27053 0[-4836.83615] 7.97054 347.13385 
27069 38.67005 101.62420 1338.21609 
27071 685.14809 306.14877 3595.16936 
27075 24.88389 63.81431 1029.10755 
27083 1116.83288 106.27285 1119.66767 
27085 119.85753 6006330 1149.58292 
27089 318.88009 35.18348 443.79102 
27090 32.49644 67.09430 1632.33813 
Note: The values in the bracket show the calculated values, based on the conditions obtained from theoretical 
models. 
Table 6-3 shows the results. We obtain interior solutions in all but two 
subbasins. In the case of comer solutions, no floodplain development is optimal 
because of the negative values in the table. Based on these results, 
overdevelopment of floodplains occurs in 5 subbasins, 27005, 27053, 27069, 
27075 and 27090. Interestingly, these five subbasins are upstream zones in the 
Ouse catchment. While this indicates the importance of managing unidirectional 
spatial externalities, we cannot draw any definite conclusions. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, we have to carefully interpret the results because of the assumptions 
made in the process of setting functional forms and calibrating parameter values 
for the applied model. It is better to think that the model identifies the 
characteristics of the problem and implications for policy-making rather than the 
3 We obtain the solutions by help of Maple 8.0 (mathematical software program). 
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'precise' evaluation of the current situation. Of course, if we could fully access the 
appropriate and exact data, we could evaluate the current situation by the model. 
Table 6-4. Optimal steady-state equilibrium under different assumptions 
Base 4%and smaller 1 O%and smaller Initial 
2%and smaller Conditions 
27001 239.190 121.260>47.4.54 99.393 
27002 1987.282 1056.718 456.111 217.132 
27005i< ······{)<F39jl~1 • .. ··0[;{l6Ag1I«LO{~7IMF~ 14.387 
27007 503.393 >:·<3h84P>])h114:S1S 155.264 
27009 1426.773 708.483~\!?a.44~ 308.466 
27034 1 08.4 78>QF~:{)~i1' .. 0H$~;~8~ 51.129 
27043 161.963 54.561QFtoA~a 27.691 
27053 .' •..•.•. PF4a~~,$)aJLUQF14~~Om~ . Ii.'.' •• Q[-4~257.t~~ 7.970 
27069 r.·.· ....... < .·}~.§7Q .... ·./OI~'()??7~J ·· .. ·.<y.{)+?1~;HE? 1 01.624 
27071 685.148 ·..·9[~5.$~?QI~Z.1,~5~ 306.148 
27075 .'< •. Z4,&ea<)Or~~:&~9J> ... /. ·PF146.2$f! 63.814 
27083 1116.832 594.245 279.655 106.272 
27085 119.857 »P{,;~~t.~441··PHe3J)84;4 60.063 
27089 318.880 174.985 82.382 35.183 
27090 •· ••• ····<J32)4!:l(}/>O[-$6.~14J ·OF1&7,~.56 67.094 
Note: The shaded cells imply the overdevelopment. The values in the bracket show the calculated values, 
ba..~ed on the conditions obtained from theoretical models. 
In particular, the assumption about the scale of averting behaviour is crucial. 
We assume that the current level of flood protection (flood averting behaviour) 
can protect against floods with 2% and larger annual exceedance probability, but 
not floods with 2% and smaller annual exceedance probability.4 As the theoretical 
models show, we have to choose the scale of averting behaviour as well, 
comparing the expected cost of flood risk with the investment costs and 
maintenance costs of averting behaviour. However, we do not analyse the scale of 
averting behaviour here. Thus, we cannot offer a definite conclusion on whether 
floodplains have been overdeveloped unless we analyse the scale of averting 
behaviour. There is no reason to believe the current scale of averting behaviour is 
correctly chosen. If this changes, the situation will dramatically change. Then, let 
us check the same equilibrium under the other assumptions. Table 6-4 shows the 
results. 5 The evaluation of the current situation changes a lot. For example, if we 
4 We assume that the probability distribution function is continuous. 
5 The parameter values in the expected cost function of flood risk change according to the 
assumptions. They are provided in Appendix D-l 
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assume that the current scale of averting behaviour protect against floods with 
10% and larger exceedance probability, floodplains are currently overdeveloped in 
all but three subbasins. Thus, this assumption is critical for evaluating the current 
situation of floodplains. 
In addition, the upstream zones tend to show overdevelopment, based on 
these results. This is because the development of floodplains in the upstream 
zones causes unidirectional spatial externalities. It coincides with the fact that 
many cities are located in downstream zones. The more upstream zones are 
developed, the greater the need to protect cities in the downstream zones against 
floods. 
6.3.2 Optimal Path 
Let us derive the optimal path from the initial conditions in tel111s of the 
maximisation of social welfare. 6 The essence of the social optimisation problem 
in the applied model in Chapter 5 is the same as the theoretical model in Chapter 4. 
Based on the applied model, we numerically solve the dynamic optimisation 
problem by using GAMS IDE version 21.3 (a software program for solving large 
mathematical programming problems).7 We use GAMS in simulations in the 
following sections in this chapter. 
We set the time duration T = 30 (years). There are three reasons. First, a 
planning horizon that is shorter than 30 years might be insufficient for policies to 
be effective. Second, the parameter values in the functions may change due to 
several shocks for much longer planning horizons. Third, given the rate by which 
public investments are discounted, a period of thirty years captures the bulk of 
6 We obtain the initial conditions from the GIS land cover map in Chapter 5. 
7 GAMS IDE demo version is downloadable from the web site (www.gams.com). Demo version 
restricts the number of variables that we can deal with. 
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Table 6-5. Optimal path 
Control Variable [ y ] (ha) 
Time (t ) 
1 2 3 
0.117 0 0 
1.306 0 0 
0.000 0 0 
1.054 0 0 
1.820 0 0 
0.427 0 0 
0.147 0 0 
0.000 0 0 
-1.666 0 0 
1.104 0 0 
-1.075 0 0 
0.102 0 0 
0.699 0 0 
0.159 0 0 
-1.392 0 0 
State Variable [X 1 (ha) 
Time (t ) 
1 2 3 
236.753 236.870 236.870 
1967.379 1968.685 1968.685 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
492.542 493.596 493.596 
1411.211 1413.031 1413.031 
103.971 104.398 104.398 
159.640 159.787 159.787 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
66.036 64.370 64.370 
669.753 670.857 670.857 
42.763 41.688 41.688 
1115.472 1115.574 1115.574 
111.097 111.796 111.796 
315.715 315.874 315.874 

































We can obtain the optimal path from the original initial point by use of 
GAMS IDE. 9 Table 6-5 shows the optimal path. Given the form of the problem, 
the state converges to equilibrium from the initial point. The optimal path derives 
& The final point is related to discounting. 
9 The periodic discount rate is assumed 0.05 as a base case. We show the GAMS code in Appendix 
0-2. 
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from the social optimisation problem, in which we consider all the benefits and 
costs including externalities. Thus, this becomes the criterion for optimum. 
There are three interesting findings about the optimal path. First, it is not the 
most rapid approach path, but the initial state rapidly converges towards a solution. 
This implies that we should control to a large extent in early stages. However, 
considering floodplain development and restoration in reality, we cannot control 
the size of developed floodplains in such a large scale immediately because it 
normally takes time to develop and restore them. In this respect, we discuss in 
Section 6.6.1. Second, the equilibrium numerically obtained along the optimal 
path is different from that theoretically obtained in the previous section. Based on 
the analysis of the theoretical models, the optimal steady-state equilibrium is 
unstable. Thus, even though an initial state approaches the optimal steady-state 
equilibrium, it never converges to the optimal steady-state equilibrium. On the 
other hand, the initial state will not diverge to corner solutions but converge to the 
equilibrium that is different from the optimal steady-state equilibrium 
theoretically obtained. We cannot predict this in the analysis of local stability 
based on the theoretical model in Chapter 4. We can know only about the local 
sphere on the equilibrium point. In such a high dimensional system, we cannot 
know the definite characteristics of the direction of changes unlike 
two-dimensional models. We have no way to verify the followings, but we can 
imagine two possibilities. It seems that 'slow' adjustments occur in the sphere 
near to the equilibrium but the state will 'finally' start to diverge in the far future. 
Alternatively, it appears that the state will quickly move to the orbit of a vortex 
near to the equilibrium around which 'slow' adjustments will occur forever 
thereafter. Third, the optimal path achieves comer solutions (no developed 
floodplains) in the two subbasins (27005 and 27053) just as the previous section 
indicates. 
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6.3.3 Externalities 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, there are two kinds of externalities in our 
problem. First, there is an externality between private and public use. In other 
words, private landowners of floodplains have no incentive to take account of the 
public interests such as the values of ecosystem services that natural floodplains 
provide. In our model, private landowners underestimate the value of the benefit 
function of ecosystem services. Second, there is a unidirectional spatial externality 
related to flood mitigation service that natural floodplains provide. In our model, 
decision makers in upstream zones underestimate the external costs of flood risk 
that people in the downstream zones incur. About both kinds of externalities, 
floodplains tend to be overdeveloped. In this section, let us analyse how 
externalities affect the optimal path from the initial conditions. 
Let us derive the path from the initial conditions in the same way when the 
externalities are not considered (private or local optimisation). Table 6-6 shows 
the path. The initial state converges to equilibrium. The areas of developed 
floodplains in the equilibrium are much larger than those in equilibrium in the 
case of the optimal path (See Table 6-7). Thus, the value of social welfare with 
externalities ignored is lower than that of the optimal path (See Table 6-8). 
Therefore, it is required to take account of externalities by appropriate policies. In 
the next section, we come up with possible policy scenarios. 
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Table 6-6. Path when externalities are not considered 
Control Variable [ y J (ha} 
Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 155.632 0.811 0 0 0 a 27002 1930.379 7.548 0 0 0 0 27005 36.084 0.171 0 a 0 0 27007 920.992 3.465 0 0 0 a 27009 1192.880 6.406 0 0 0 0 27034 395.848 1.438 0 0 0 0 27043 211.556 0.774 0 0 0 0 
27053 339.163 0.000 0 0 0 0 
27069 180.827 0.911 0 0 0 a 
27071 1262.713 5.041 0 0 0 0 
27075 120.845 0.597 0 0 0 0 
27083 1013.395 0.000 0 0 0 0 
27085 827.985 2.863 0 0 0 0 
27089 305.254 1.088 0 0 0 0 
27090 167.407 0.751 0 0 0 0 
State Variable [X 1 (ha) 
Time ( t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 255.026 255.837 255.837 255.837 255.837 
27002 217.132 2147.511 2155.059 2155.059 2155.059 2155.059 
27005 14.388 50.472 50.643 50.643 50.643 50.643 
27007 155.264 1076.256 1079.721 1079.721 1079.721 1079.721 
27009 308.466 1501.346 1507.752 1507.752 1507.752 1507.752 
27034 51.129 446.977 448.415 448.415 448.415 448.415 
27043 27.692 239.248 240.022 240.022 240.022 240.022 
27053 7.971 347.133 347.133 347.133 347.133 347.133 
27069 101.624 282.451 283.362 283.362 283.362 283.362 
27071 306.149 1568.862 1573.903 1573.903 1573.903 1573.903 
27075 63.814 184.659 185.256 185.256 185.256 185.256 
27083 106.273 1119.667 1119.667 1119.667 1119.667 1119.667 
27085 60.063 888.048 890.911 890.911 890.911 890.911 
27089 35.183 340.437 341.525 341.525 341.525 341.525 
27090 67.094 234.501 235.252 235.252 235.252 235.252 
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Table 6-7. Areas of developed floodpla ins in equilihrium (ha) 
Subbasin Externalities are 
not considered. Optimal Path 
27001 255.837 > 236.870 
27002 2155.059 > 1968.685 
27005 50.643 > 0 
27007 1079.721 > 493.596 
27009 1507.752 > 1413.031 
27034 448.415 > 104.398 
27043 240.022 > 159.787 
27053 347.133 > 0 
27069 283.362 > 64.370 
27071 1573.903 > 670.857 
27075 185.256 > 41.688 
27083 1119.667 > 1115.574 
27085 890.911 > 111.796 
27089 341.525 > 315.874 
27090 235.252 > 53.846 
Table 6-8. Values of social welfare 
Social Welfare 
Optimal path 1,059,544 
Path when externalities are not considered 1,049,394 
6.4 Discounting 
In this section, we simulate the paths of social and local optimisations 
according to several discount rates. Discounting in principle implies how much 
we should consider social welfare of future generations as compared with that of 
the current generation. Therefore, this influences our decisions on the choice of 
the values of control variables over time. We are here interested in how 
discounting affects them in the problem of floodplain management. 
Discounting is one of the critical decision variables for policies. In this 
respect, there are two extreme ethical notions. Let us cite the followings from 
Dasgupta (2001). 
"A. Low rates of consumption by generations sufficiently far into the 
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future would not be seen to be a bad thing by the current generation if 
future well-beings were discounted at a positive rate. This suggests we 
should follow Ramsey in not discounting future well-beings. 
B. As there are to be a lot of futurc generations in a world with an 
indefmite future, not to discount future well-beings could mean that thc 
present generation would be required to do too much for the future; that 
is, they would have to save at too high a rate. This suggests we should 
abandon Ramsey and discount future well-beings at a positive rate" 
(Dasgupta, 2001). 
Dasgupta (2001) mentions that it is necessary to discount the future because the 
world will not exist forever although we do not know when it will cease to exist. 
Thus, as long as the world will not exist forever, we have to discount the future by 
even a tiny discount rate. There are many rationales for discounting such as 
inflation, physical change over time and so on (Price, 1993). In addition, there are 
two major approaches to determine the appropriate discount rate: the nonnative or 
ethical perspective (the prescriptive approach) and the positive perspective (the 
descriptive approach) (Arrow et al., 1996). In our analysis, we simulate the model 
for several discount rates including the zero rates, and discuss the results. 
















Table 6-9. Optimal paths for several discount rates 
Control Variable [ v 1 (ha) 
Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 
138.602 0 0 0 0 
1760.548 0 0 0 0 
-14.388 0 0 0 0 
343.098 0 0 0 0 
1111.264 0 0 0 0 
55.254 0 0 0 0 
133.150 0 0 0 0 
-7.971 0 0 0 0 
-49.718 0 0 0 0 
371.662 0 0 0 0 
-30.275 0 0 0 0 
1009.972 0 0 0 0 
55.656 0 0 0 0 
282.150 0 0 0 0 

















Chapter 6. Policy Simulation 239 
0-0.01 Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 138.405 0 0 0 0 0 27002 1759.025 0 0 0 0 0 27005 
-14.388 0 0 0 0 0 
27007 342.252 0 0 0 0 0 
27009 1110.054 0 0 0 0 0 
27034 54.901 0 0 0 0 0 
27043 132.963 0 0 0 0 0 27053 
-7.971 0 0 0 0 0 
27069 
-47.545 0 0 0 0 0 
27071 370.431 0 0 0 0 0 
27075 
-28.852 0 0 0 0 0 
27083 1009.863 0 0 0 0 0 
27085 54.960 0 0 0 0 0 
27089 281.907 0 0 0 0 0 
27090 
-21.794 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.03 Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 137.901 0.063 a 0 a 0 
27002 1753.413 1.904 0 0 0 0 
27005 
-14.388 0 0 0 a 0 
27007 340.392 0.042 0 0 0 0 
27009 1107.472 0.051 0 0 0 0 
27034 54.127 0.015 0 0 0 0 
27043 132.430 0.122 0 0 0 0 
27053 -7.971 0 0 0 a 0 
27069 
-42.608 -0.075 0 0 0 0 
27071 367.715 0.046 0 a a 0 
27075 -25.626 -0.048 0 0 0 0 
27083 1009.605 0 0 0 0 0 
27085 53.429 0.028 0 0 0 0 
27089 281.318 0.011 0 0 0 0 
27090 -17.697 
-0.060 0 0 0 0 
0-0.07 Time (t ) 
a 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 136.683 0.248 0 0 0 0 
27002 1745.216 1.853 0 0 0 0 
27005 -14.388 0 0 0 0 0 
27007 335.443 0.604 0 0 0 0 
27009 1100.805 0.576 0 0 0 0 
27034 52.044 0.273 0 0 0 0 
27043 131.361 0.237 0 0 0 0 
27053 -7.971 0 0 0 0 0 
27069 -28.472 -2.711 0 0 0 0 
27071 360.506 0.880 0 0 0 0 
27075 -16.387 -1.768 0 0 0 0 
27083 1008.759 0.181 0 0 0 0 
27085 49.341 0.516 0 0 0 0 
27089 279.674 0.293 0 0 0 0 
27090 -5.955 -2.250 0 0 0 a 
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Let us derive the optimal paths (social optimisation) for several discount 
rates. Table 6-9 shows the optimal paths. As discount rates become higher, the 
amounts of development and restoration both decrease. Higher discount rates 
provide the incentives to develop or restore them less. In the zones where the 
optimal level of developed floodplains is larger than the initial level, the amounts 
of developed floodplains in equilibrium decrease as discount rates go higher. In 
the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial level, the amounts of 
developed floodplains in equilibrium increase (the amounts of restoration 
decreases) as discount rates go higher. Why? 
Time 
t + 1 & 
future 
Figure 6-4. Influence of discounting on decisions 
Direct cost of floodplain 
development or restoration. 















The increase in total net benefit in time t+ 1 and beyond is caused by 
floodplain development or restoration in time t. When we determine how much 
we develop or restore floodplains in time t, we compare the direct cost of 
floodplain development or restoration in time t with the increase in total net 
benefit in time t+ 1 and future (see Figure 6-4). Assuming that we stand in time t, 
the increase in total net benefit in time t+ 1 and future is discounted. Therefore, if 
the discount rate goes higher, the value of the increase in total net benefit in time 
t+ 1 will be smaller. The incentive to develop or restore floodplains in time twill 
be alleviated. 
Hence, interestingly, the risk of overdevelopment becomes smaller as 
discount rates rise in the zones where the optimal level is larger than the initial 
level. On the other hand, the incentive to restore floodplains becomes weaker as 
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we assume higher discount rates in the zones where the optimal level is smaller 
than the initial level. Therefore, from the normative point of view, the optimal 
discount rate depends on the evaluation of the current situation. Which is more 
important, the avoidance of the risk of overdevelopment or the promotion of 
restoration? 
6.5 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Certainty 
In this section, we simulate the effects of a number of different policy options 
and the paths (adjustment processes) associated with them. 10 We simulate a 
measure of social welfare under policy scenarios, and discuss the choice of policy 
scenarios. We suppose that the policy-makers should be (local) governments or 
governmental agencies. 
We take up the Pigouvian tax, subsidies, the mix of tax and subsidy, two 
types of marketable permits and two direct controls as possible policy scenarios. 
We will discuss the characteristics of the policy scenarios respectively at first. 
Then, we will compare the values of social welfare and discuss the choice of them 
under certainty. 
6.5.1 Pigouvian Tax 
The Pigouvian tax is one of the famous policies for providing an appropriate 
economic incentive to consider externalities. As we mentioned in Chapter 3, we 
impose the unit tax rate on developed floodplains (per ha per year), which is equal 
to the marginal external costs. The unit tax rate is different among zones because 
the marginal external costs are different among them. Table 6-10 shows the 
10 GAMS codes for the policy analysis are given in Appendix D-2. 
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calculated unit tax rates in zones (subbasins). Let us simulate the path under the 
tax policy. Table 6- I I shows the path from the initial conditions. As externalities 
are considered through the tax appropriately imposed on developed floodplains, 
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Table 6-11. Path under tax 
Control Variable [ v ] (ha) 
Time (t ) 
1 2 3 
0.300 0 0 
2.027 0 0 
0.000 0 0 
1.293 0 0 
1.672 0 0 
0.543 0 0 
0.291 0 0 
0.000 0 0 
-3.281 0 0 
1.779 0 0 
-2.111 0 a 
1.607 0 0 
0.906 0 a 
0.402 0 0 
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State Variable r X 1 (ha) 
Time (t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 236.574 236.874 236.874 236.874 236.874 
27002 217.132 1966.635 1968.662 1968.662 1968.662 1968.662 
27005 14.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27007 155.264 492.380 493.673 493.673 493.673 493.673 
27009 308.466 1411.414 1413.086 1413.086 1413.086 1413.086 
27034 51.129 103.877 104.420 104.420 104.420 104.420 
27043 27.692 159.498 159.789 159.789 159.789 159.789 
27053 7.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27069 101.624 67.604 64.323 64.323 64.323 64.323 
27071 306.149 669.119 670.898 670.898 670.898 670.898 
27075 63.814 43.773 41.662 41.662 41.662 41.662 
27083 106.273 1113.951 1115.558 1115.558 1115.558 1115.558 
27085 60.063 110.928 111.834 111.834 111.834 111.834 
27089 35.183 315.477 315.879 315.879 315.879 315.879 
27090 67.094 56.543 53.808 53.B08 53.808 53.808 
6.5.2 Subsidy 
In principle, the function of subsidies is the same as that of Pigouvian tax, 
but their monetary flows are opposite. As we showed in Chapter 3, we provide 
individual landowners with the unit subsidy on natural floodplains (per ha per 
year), which is equal to the marginal external costs. Landowners have the 
incentive to keep or restore floodplains more because of subsidies. The unit 
subsidy rates are the same as the unit tax rates (see Table 6-10). Let us simulate 
the path under the subsidy policy. Table 6-12 shows the derived path from the 
same initial conditions. As externalities are considered through the subsidy 
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Table 6-12. Path under subsidy 
Control Variable r v 1 (hal 
Time (t ) 
1 2 3 ... 
0.061 0 0 0 
0.538 0 a a 
0.000 0 0 0 
0.271 0 0 0 
0.361 0 0 0 
0.095 0 0 0 
0.045 0 0 0 
0.000 0 0 0 
-0.511 0 0 0 
0.338 0 0 0 
-0.364 a 0 0 
0.281 0 0 0 
0.186 0 0 0 
0.073 0 0 0 
-0.445 0 0 0 
State Variable [ X] (ha) 
Time (t ) 
1 2 3 ... 
236.819 236.880 236.880 236.880 
1968.049 1968.587 1968.587 1968.587 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
493.382 493.653 493.653 493.653 
1412.727 1413.088 1413.088 1413.088 
104.312 104.407 104.407 104.407 
159.736 159.781 159.781 159.781 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
64.905 64.394 64.394 64.394 
670.563 670.901 670.901 670.901 





























1115.302 1115.583 1115.583 1115.583 1115.583 
111.628 111.814 111.814 111.814 111.814 
315.801 315.874 315.874 315.874 315.874 
54.310 53.865 53.865 53.865 53.865 
6.5.3 Mix of Tax and Subsidy 
We can use the mix of the Pigouvian tax and subsidies for the same purpose. 
In essence, we should make individual landowners consider the marginal external 
costs when they change areas of developed floodplains. We can impose the unit 
tax (per ha per year) on the amounts of developed floodplains that exceed a 
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reference value and set the unit subsidy (per ha per year) on the amounts of 
natural floodplains that exceed the same reference value instead of setting the tax 
(subsidy) on all the developed floodplains (natural floodplains). In this case, the 
unit tax and subsidy rates are the same as before (see Table 6-] 0). 
We have several options for choosing the reference value. The choice of the 
reference value does not matter in tetms of the effectiveness of policies (social 
welfare). We can achieve the same result even if we set different reference values. 
Here, we choose the initial conditions as the reference values. This is one of the 
possible choices in reality. Private landowners can earn the subsidy (per ha per 
year) if they restore natural floodplains and they have to pay the tax (per ha per 
year) if they develop floodplains from the initial conditions. 
Let us simulate the path under the mix policy of tax and subsidy. Table 6-13 
shows the derived path. Likewise, the local optimisation is appropriately corrected 
by the mix policy. The path is close to the optimal path. 
Table 6-13. Path under the mix policy of tax and subsidy 
Control Variable [ y ] (ha) 
Time (t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 136.794 0.000 0.648 0 0 0 
27002 1747.989 3.530 0 0 a 0 
27005 
-14.388 0.000 0 0 a a 
27007 336.408 1.696 0.111 0 0 0 
27009 1101.992 0.000 2.438 0 0 0 
27034 51.888 1.397 0 0 0 0 
27043 131.837 0.263 0 0 0 0 
27053 
-7.971 0.000 0 0 0 0 
27069 
-33.167 -4.115 0 0 0 0 
27071 362.031 2.686 0 0 0 0 
27075 -19.435 -2.707 0 0 0 0 
27083 1006.901 0.000 1.97 0.019 0 0 
27085 50.495 1.272 0 0 0 0 
27089 280.067 0.560 0 0 0 0 
27090 
-9.807 -3.463 0 0 0 0 
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State Variable [X 1 (ha) 
Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 236.188 236.188 236.836 236.836 236.836 
27002 217.132 1965.121 1968.651 1968.651 1968.651 1968.651 
27005 14.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27007 155.264 491.672 493.368 493.479 493.479 493.479 
27009 308.466 1410.458 1410.458 1412.896 1412.896 1412.896 
27034 51.129 103.017 104.414 104.414 104.414 104.414 
27043 27.692 159.529 159.792 159.792 159.792 159.792 
27053 7.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27069 101.624 68.457 64.342 64.342 64.342 64.342 
27071 306.149 668.180 670.866 670.866 670.866 670.866 
27075 63.814 44.379 41.672 41.672 41.672 41.672 
27083 106.273 1113.174 1113.174 1115.144 1115.163 1115.163 
27085 60.063 110.558 111.830 111.830 111.830 111.830 
27089 35.183 315.250 315.810 315.810 315.810 315.810 
27090 67.094 57.287 53.824 53.824 53.824 53.824 
6.5. 4 Marketable Permits 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, we can set marketable pennits as an 
alternative policy for price rationing policies such as taxes, subsidies and the mix 
policy. This policy rations quantities. The strengths of this policy are (I) to 
directly control the target level as long as individual owners abide by the rules, 
and (2) to achieve the target level at the least costs because individual landowners 
can transact the penn its in the market in each zone. 
We have two options for marketable pennits. To begin with, we set 
marketable pennits for development of floodplains (control variables). In the 
zones where the optimal level of developed floodplains is larger than the initial 
level, we can issue the amount of marketable pennits that is equivalent to the 
difference between the optimal and initial levels. Through the pennits, we can 
limit the development up to the optimal level. In this type of marketable pennits, 
we cannot issue any pennits in the zones where the initial quantity is larger than 
the optimal one. It implies that floodplain development is forbidden in such zones. 
However, we cannot provide the incentive to restore floodplains there. Table 6-14 
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shows the amount of marketable permits in zones. Let us simulate the path under 
the marketable permits, assuming that individual landowners observe the rules. 
Table 6-15 shows the path derived from the initial conditions. Controlling the 
quantity of development, the path is close to the optimal path only in the zones 
where pennits are issued. 
Table 6-14. Quantity of marketable permits for development 
















Table 6-15. Path under marketable permits for development 
Control Variable [ v ] (ha) 
Time(t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 137.473 0 0 0 0 0 
27002 1751.550 0 0 0 0 0 
27005 0.000 0 0 a a 0 
27007 338.329 a a a 0 0 
27009 1104.562 a 0 a a 0 
27034 53.266 0 0 a 0 0 
27043 132.092 0 0 0 a 0 
27053 0.000 0 0 a 0 0 
27069 0.000 0 0 a 0 0 
27071 364.705 0 0 a 0 0 
27075 0.000 0 0 a 0 0 
27083 1009.298 0 0 0 a 0 
27085 51.730 0 0 0 a 0 
27089 280.688 0 0 0 a 0 
27090 0.000 a 0 0 a a 
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State Variable [ Xl (ha) 
Time (t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 236.867 236.867 236.867 236.867 236.867 
27002 217.132 1968.682 1968.682 1968.682 1968.682 1968.682 
27005 14.388 14.388 14.388 14.388 14.388 14.388 
27007 155.264 493.593 493.593 493.593 493.593 493.593 
27009 308.466 1413.028 1413.028 1413.028 1413.028 1413.028 
27034 51.129 104.395 104.395 104.395 104.395 104.395 
27043 27.692 159.784 159.784 159.784 159.784 159.784 
27053 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 
27069 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 
27071 306.149 670.854 670.854 670.854 670.854 670.854 
27075 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 
27083 106.273 1115.571 1115.571 1115.571 1115.571 1115.571 
27085 60.063 111.793 111.793 111.793 111.793 111.793 
27089 35.183 315.871 315.871 315.871 315.871 315.871 
27090 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 
Table 6-16. Quantity of marketable permits for developed floodplains 
Permits for 

















We can also set marketable permits for developed floodplains that 
landowners can possess (state variables). In this case, unlike the fonner case, we 
can force landowners to restore natural floodplains appropriately. If the amount of 
pennits is smaller than the initial level of developed floodplains, landowners have 
to buy pennits in the market in the same zone or to restore natural floodplains. In 
the zones where the total amount of permits is smaller than the initial total area of 
developed floodplains, landowners have to restore floodplains in total. Notice that 
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we need a rule that landowners should obey the permits from time t = 1 because 
they have no incentive to restore floodplains in early stages without any 
regulations. If marketable permits are set in an appropriate way, the optimal level 
can be achieved at the lowest costs because less efficient landowners can buy 
permits from more efficient ones in the market in each zone. Table 6-16 shows the 
amounts of marketable permits. Likewise, let us simulate the path under this 
marketable permits policy, assuming that landowners abide by the rules. Table 
6-17 shows the derived path. As we directly ration the quantities of developed 
floodplains, the path is close to the optimal path. This type of marketable permits 
is better than the previous type in that it can give the right incentive to restore 
floodplains. 
Table 6-17. Path under marketable permits for developed floodplains 
Control Variable r v J (ha) 
Time ( t ) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 137.476 0 0 0 0 0 
27002 1751.553 0 0 0 0 0 
27005 
-14.388 0 0 0 0 0 
27007 338.332 0 0 0 0 0 
27009 1104.565 0 0 0 0 0 
27034 53.269 0 0 0 0 0 
27043 132.095 0 0 0 0 0 
27053 
-7.971 0 0 0 0 0 
27069 
-37.254 0 0 0 0 0 
27071 364.708 0 0 0 0 0 
27075 
-22.126 0 0 0 0 0 
27083 1009.301 0 0 0 0 0 
27085 51.733 0 0 0 0 0 
27089 280.691 0 0 0 0 0 
27090 
-13.248 0 0 0 0 0 
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State Variable [X] (ha) 
Time (t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 236.870 236.870 236.870 236.870 236.870 
27002 217.132 1968.685 1968.685 1968.685 1968.685 1968.685 
27005 14.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27007 155.264 493.596 493.596 493.596 493.596 493.596 
27009 308.466 1413.031 1413.031 1413.031 1413.031 1413.031 
27034 51.129 104.398 104.398 104.398 104.398 104.398 
27043 27.692 159.787 159.787 159.787 159.787 159.787 
27053 7.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27069 101.624 64.370 64.370 64.370 64.370 64.370 
27071 306.149 670.857 670.857 670.857 670.857 670.857 
27075 63.814 41.688 41.688 41.688 41.688 41.688 
27083 106.273 1115.574 1115.574 1115.574 1115.574 1115.574 
27085 60.063 111.796 111.796 111.796 111.796 111.796 
27089 35.183 315.874 315.874 315.874 315.874 315.874 
27090 67.094 53.846 53.846 53.846 53.846 53.846 
6.5.5 Direct Controls 
We can directly control the level of developed floodplains by coerCIve 
regulations. Let us consider two options. First, like marketable permits for 
development, we impose quota (constraints) on development in the zones where 
the optimal level is larger than the initial level. However, landowners cannot 
transact them because they are not provided marketable permits but compulsory 
regulations. On the other hand, we force landowners to restore floodplains by a 
coercive regulation in the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial 
level. Assuming that landowners follow such regulations, we can obtain the same 
path as marketable pennits for developed floodplains. Under this type of direct 
control, however, it is dubious that it can be achieved at the lowest costs. The 
policy of marketable pennits is preferable to this regulation policy in this respect 
if the path is the same in reality. 
Second, policy makers can centrally control the level of developed 
floodplains in the catchment. In the beginning, policy makers buyout all natural 
floodplains in the zones where the optimal level is larger than the initial level, and 
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buyout the areas of developed floodplains that should be converted into the 
natural ones in the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial level. 
Then, policy makers can control floodplain development, and restore floodplains. 
In this case, policy makers can realize the optimal path. This policy is here called 
'buyout and central control'. 
6.5.6 Evaluation of Policy Scenarios 
We derived the paths under policy scenanos above. In this section, we 
discuss the choice of policy scenarios in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity. II 
To begin with, we discuss the effectiveness of policies under certainty. We 
basically focus on the effectiveness in our analysis. The effectiveness implies to 
what extent policies achieve the policy-maker's objective. That is to what extent 
they maximise social welfare over time. Thus, let us simulate and compare the 
values of social welfare among the policy scenarios. Table 6-18 shows the values 
of social welfare respectively. Under certainty, the policy scenarios except for 
marketable pennits for development are equivalent. As we mentioned, the policy 
of marketable penn its for development does not provide the right incentive to 
restore floodplains in the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial 
level. However, it is stilI better than no policies (local optimisation when 
externalities are not considered). 
II We will analyse and discuss the flexibility of policies in the context of irreversibility and 
uncertainty in Sections 6.6 and 6.7. 
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Table 6-18. Social welfare under certainty 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,059,544 1 
Buyout and 
1,059,544 
central control 1 
Marketable permits for 
1,059,544 1 developed floodplains 
Regulation 1,059,544 1 
Tax 1,059,544 1 
Subsidy 1,059,544 1 
Mix of tax and subsidy 1,059,544 1 
Marketable permits 1,059,401 8 
for development 
Next, we discuss the efficiency of policies briefly. The efficiency of policies 
implies that the policy-maker's objective (maximisation of social welfare) can be 
attained 'at the lowest possible costs'. This depends on real situations, but we 
make some comments on this. The 'buyout and central control' policy seems to 
be costly because we need funds for buying out floodplains and it incurs 
management costs to control the development and restoration in the centralized 
system over time. Furthermore, we may need a legal coercive regulation to buy 
the needed amounts of floodplains at a reasonable price. As this is related to 
individual property rights, it seems to be politically difficult. Hence, considering 
the feasibility of this policy in reality, this policy looks too difficult to be carried 
out although it can realize the optimal path on the theoretical side. As for 
marketable permits, we need to design the efficient markets for them in each zone. 
In order to consider unidirectional spatial externalities, we need to divide the 
catchment into zones. The degree of taking account of externalities increases as 
the number of zones increases. However, if the areas of zones are not large 
enough to create efficient markets, the policy of marketable permits will be 
ineffective. We also need a legal foundation to define the property rights to 
transact permits and to ensure that the rights are enforceable. In addition, 
monitoring and penalties are critical for making landowners abide by permits. 
However, marketable permits enable landowners to achieve the optimal level at 
the least costs by the transactions of permits in the markets. Unlike marketable 
permits, this kind of cost-saving cannot be achieved in the regulation policy of 
quota on development and restoration. In addition, monitoring and providing 
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appropriate penalties are also crucial in regulations. On the other hand, the 
policies of tax and subsidy depend on decentralized system. The costs of 
implementing policies seem to be lower than marketable peImits and regulations. 
However, notice that we have to set different unit tax (subsidy) rates among zones 
in the catchment (zonal taxes). 
Finally, let us discuss the equity of policies shortly. The equity of policies 
implies that the policy-makers' objective (maximisation of social welfare) can be 
achieved without aggravating income distribution among members of society. 
There are a few comments. First, landowners should compensate for the external 
costs due to floodplain development. In this respect, the policies of tax, 
marketable permits and regulations function well because they impose costs on 
landowners. Second, however, landowners are compensated for opportunity costs 
of avoiding development under the policy of subsidy. In addition, landowners do 
not pay under the 'buyout and central control' policy. Third, it will be preferable 
if rich groups directly or indirectly incur the external costs. Landowners are not 
poor groups in that they possess lands. It is desirable that they should pay for the 
external costs. The policy of subsidy may be unacceptable at this point. 
6.6 Irreversibility and Constraints on Control 
Variables 
In this section we discuss constraints on control variables in general and , 
irreversibility of floodplain development. The irreversibility is shown by 
constraints on control variables, but it is shown by prohibitively high direct costs 
of floodplain restoration as well. We re-evaluate the policy scenarios under the 
constraints and irreversibility. 
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6.6.1 Constraints on Control Variables 
As we mentioned in Chapter 5, it takes time to develop and restore 
floodplains, which is referred to as the costs of time lag. We introduce the 
constraints assumed in Chapter 5 into the model. The constraints are: 
)7: =lO(ha)~y: ~y~ =lOO(ha) (for all i) 
To begin with, let us derive the optimal path (social optimisation) under the 
constraints. Figure 6-5 shows the path. Due to the constraints, it takes more time 
steps to converge to equilibrium. The level of the equilibrium is slightly different 
from that under no constraints, because the adjustment processes (paths) are 
different. The time lag costs change the optimal path. Comparing the values of 
social welfare, it turns out that the constraints are costs. Table 6-19 shows them. 
Obviously, the value of social welfare under no constraints is lager than that under 
the constraints. 
Figure 6-5. Optimal path under constraints on control variables 
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Table 6-19. Values of social welfare under constraints 
Social Welfare 
Optimal path under no constraints (base case) 1,059,544 
Optimal path under the constraints 1,057,121 
6.6.2 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Constraints 
We discuss and evaluate the policy scenarios under the constraints. In so 
doing, we distinguish two cases. The first case is that policy-makers do not 
(exactly) know the constraints. The second case is that policy-makers exactly 
know the constraints. We qualitatively discuss policy scenarios respectively at 
first, and compare them in terms of social welfare. 
To begin with, we consider the tax policy. If policy-makers do not (exactly) 
know the constraints, they impose the same tax rates (see Table 6-10). Therefore, 
the tax rates are not optimal under such a situation. If they exactly know the 
constraints, they set correct new tax rates. Likewise, under the policies of subsidy 
and the mix of tax and subsidy, policy-makers set the same rates, which are not 
appropriate, if they do not exactly know the constraints. 
Let us discuss policies of marketable pennits. In the beginning, we discuss 
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the policy of marketable permits for development (quantity of control variables). 
If policy-makers do not know the constraints, they cannot issue correct amounts 
of permits. If they exactly know the constraints, they set the relevant quantity of 
permits. Next, we discuss the policy of marketable permits for developed 
floodplains (quantity of state variables). The problem is more complicated if 
policy-makers do not know the constraints. The problem that policy-makers 
cannot set the appropriate amounts of permits is the same. In addition, 
policy-makers immediately give penalties to landowners in the zones where the 
optimal level of developed floodplains is smaller than the initial level because 
landowners cannot immediately satisfy the requirements of permits due to the 
constraints. If landowners accept this marketable permits policy, the pressure of 
penalties make them restore floodplains as fast as possible. This process is close 
to the optimal path under the constraints. However, landowners try to refuse such 
a policy, and they have no incentive to tell policy-makers the correct value of 
constraints, because they can earn private net benefits if they tell the value of 
constraints that are smaller than the true ones. Hence, marketable permits for 
developed floodplains without relevant information might be politically infeasible. 
If policy-makers precisely know the constraints, they can set the appropriate 
deadlines for satisfying the requirements of permits. However, as the deadlines 
can be set only discretely in the unit of year, landowners still can earn private net 
benefits by decreasing the amounts of restoration in the early stages (first year) as 
long as they abide by the deadlines. Thus, social welfare is not maximised under 
this policy even if policy-makers have relevant information on the constraints. 
Let us discuss policy scenarios of direct controls. First, we discuss the 
regulation of quota on development and restoration. This policy has the same 
problems as marketable permits for developed floodplains if policy-makers do not 
know the constraints. Second, we discuss the 'buyout and central control' policy. 
Under this policy, it does not matter whether policy-makers know the constraints 
in advance or not. Eventually, they get the information on them after they buyout 
floodplains. If the policy is in reality feasible, it can realize the optimal path. 
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FinalIy, let us compare the values of social welfare among the policy 
scenarios in the two cases. Table 6-20 shows the values of social welfare when 
policy-makers do not know the constraints. Like the results of the analysis under 
certainty, the 'buyout and central control' policy is the best. The policies of tax, 
subsidy and the mix of them provide almost the same value as the social optimum 
although the rates are not exactly correct. 12 These policies are robust to the 
constraints (existence of time lag costs). The policy of marketable pennits for 
development provides the lowest value of social welfare, but it is stilI better than 
the local optimisation (not considering externalities at all). 
Table 6-20. Socia! welfare when policy-makers do not know constraints 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 




Tax 1,057,121 1 
Subsidy 1,057,121 1 
Mix of tax and subsidy 1,057,121 1 
Marketable permits 
1,056,978 6 for development 
Marketable permits for politically infeasible -developed floodplains 
Regulation politically infeas ible -
Table 6-21. Socia! welfare when policy-makers know constraints 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,057,121 1 
Buyout and 1,057,121 1 
central control 
Tax 1,057,121 1 
Subsidy 1,057,121 1 
Mix of tax and subsidy 1,057,121 1 
Marketable permits for 1,057,118 6 developed floodplains 
Regulation 1,057,118 6 
Marketable permits 
1,056,980 8 for development 
Table 6-2 I shows the values of social welfare when policy-makers 
completely know the constraints. Likewise, the 'buyout and central control' 
12 The values are slightly smaller than the social optimum. 
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policy provides the largest value. However, interestingly, the policies of tax, 
subsidy and the mix of them (price rationing policies) are clearly preferable to the 
policies of marketable permits for developed floodplains and the regulation 
(quantity rationing policies). As we indicated, under the quantity rationing policies, 
there is a room for landowners to exploit private net benefits by decreasing the 
amounts of restoration in the first year even though policy-makers set the correct 
deadlines for satisfying the requirements of permits. Figure 6-6 shows the path 
under the policies of marketable permits for developed floodplains and the 
regulation in the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial level 
(restoration is needed). Unlike the optimal path, the amounts of restoration in the 
first year are not at the maximum level (the constraints are not binding). 
Figure 6-6. Path under quantity policies 
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6.6.3 Irreversibility 
The irreversibility is shown by constraints on control variables and/or 
prohibitively high direct costs of floodplain restoration. Under the irreversible 
situation that it is impossible or too expensive to restore natural floodplains, the 
overdevelopment of floodplains may prove costly. Once floodplains are 
overdeveloped, the non-optimal state perpetuates forever. 
To begin with, we concretely show this by an example in the case that the 
irreversibility is shown by constraints on floodplain restoration in the following. 
y: = O(ha) s y; s y~ = 100(ha) (for all i) 
Table 6-22 shows the values of social welfare. Obviously, social welfare 
deteriorates in the case of irreversibility because the non-optimal situations cannot 
be improved in the zones where the optimal level is smaller than the initial level. 
Based on the results, it is important to avoid risks of overdevelopment for 
choosing policies under irreversibility. This is related to the analysis of policy 
scenarios under uncertainty in Section 6.7. 
Table 6-22. Social welfare under irreversibility 
Social Welfare 
Optimal path under no constraints (base case) 1,059,544 
Optimal path under the constraints 1,057,121 
Optimal path under irreversibility 1,056,980 
Next, we discuss the case where irreversibility is shown by prohibitively high 
direct costs of floodplain restoration. We still have no precise information on the 
costs of floodplain restoration. Thus, let us assume that they become ten times as 
high as the base case in the following. 
D(l)=191463.7353/ if l <0. (6-4) 
Let us derive the optimal path under the situation, and calculate the value of social 
welfare. Table 6-23 shows the optimal path under this type of irreversibility. In the 
optimal path as the base case, floodplains are restored in five zones while they are 
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restored in only one zone under this type of irreversibility. Table 6-24 shows the 
value of social welfare. The value of social welfare under irreversibility is smaller 
than that under no irreversibility. 
Table 6-23. Optimal path under irreversibility (high costs) 
Time( t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 137.358 0.116 0 a 0 0 
27002 1750.549 0.930 0 0 0 0 
27005 
-6.141 
-2.285 0 0 0 0 
27007 337.862 0.487 0 0 0 0 
27009 1103.936 0.681 0 0 0 0 
27034 53.073 0.203 0 0 0 0 
27043 131.983 0.109 0 0 0 0 
27053 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27069 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27071 364.027 0.710 0 0 0 0 
27075 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27083 1009.224 0.076 0 0 0 0 
27085 51.349 0.400 0 0 0 0 
27089 280.539 0.149 0 0 0 0 
27090 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Time (t) 
0 1 2 3 ... 30 
27001 99.394 236752 236.868 236.868 236.868 236.868 
27002 217.132 1967.681 1968.611 1968.611 1968.611 1968.611 
27005 14.388 8.247 5.962 5.962 5.962 5.962 
27007 155.264 493.126 493.613 493.613 493.613 493.613 
27009 308.466 1412.402 1413.083 1413.083 1413.083 1413.083 
27034 51.129 104.202 104.405 104.405 104.405 104.405 
27043 27.692 159.675 159.784 159.784 159.784 159.784 
27053 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 7.971 
27069 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 101.624 
27071 306.149 670.176 670.886 670.886 670.886 670.886 
27075 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 63.814 
27083 106.273 1115.497 1115.573 1115.573 1115.573 1115.573 
27085 60.063 111.412 111.812 111.812 111.812 111.812 
27089 35.183 315.722 315.871 315.871 315.871 315.871 
27090 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 67.094 
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Table 6-24. Value a/social welfare in case a/irreversibility 
Social Welfare 
Optimal path (base case) 1,059,544 
Optimal path under irreversibility 1,059,405 
When we are faced with irreversibility, precautionary principles are 
important. It may be appropriate to introduce a safe minimum standard into the 
processes of floodplain development. How much we should put the margin for a 
safe minimum standard depends on the size and type of uncertainty. In this respect, 
we conduct sensitivity analyses and evaluate the policy scenarios under 
uncertainty in Section 6.7. 
6.6.4 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Irreversibility 
Likewise, let us calculate the values of social welfare under the policy 
scenarios respectively and evaluate them. Under the first type of irreversibility 
shown by the constraints, the evaluation of the policy scenarios is quite similar to 
that under certainty (see Table 6-18). There are a few noticeable things. Under the 
policies of marketable permits and the regulation, landowners have no chance to 
exploit private net benefits by decreasing the amounts of restoration in the first 
year. Thus, social welfare under these policies does not deteriorate. In addition, 
the policy of marketable permits for development is equivalent to the policies of 
marketable permits for developed floodplains and the regulation of quota on 
development because of no restoration. Table 6-25 shows the values of social 
welfare. As a result, the policies are substitutable one another in terms of 
effectiveness (social welfare). 
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Table 6-25. Social welfare under irreversibility (no restoration) 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,056,980 1 
Buyout and 
central control 1,056,980 1 
Marketable permits for 
1,056,980 1 developed floodplains 
Regulation 1,056,980 1 
Marketable permits 
1,056,980 1 for development 
Tax 1,056,980 1 
Subsidy 1,056,980 1 
Mixottaxand subsidy 1,056,980 1 
Table 6-26. Social welfare under irreversibility (high costs) with no information 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,059,405 1 
Buyout and 1,059,405 1 
central control 
Tax 1,059,405 1 
Subsidy 1,059,405 1 
Mixoftaxand subsidy 1,059,405 1 
Marketable permits 1,059,398 6 for development 
Marketable permits for 1,059,027 7 
developed floodplains 
Regulation 1,059,027 7 
Next, we discuss the second type of irreversibility shown by prohibitively 
high costs of restoration. We distinguish the two cases. The evaluation of the 
policy scenarios is the same as that under certainty (see Table 6-18) if 
policy-makers have the information on the irreversibility. If not, the policies of tax, 
subsidy and the mix of them are better than the policies of marketable permits and 
the regulation (quantity rationing policies) because the optimal tax rates remain 
the same. The costs of restoration do not affect the unit tax rates (the marginal 
external costs). Under the quantity rationing policies, policy-makers will set 
inappropriate amounts of permits or quota if they cannot obtain relevant 
information. Moreover, interestingly, the policy of marketable permits for 
development is better than the policies of marketable permits for developed 
floodplains and the regulation. As policy makers do not care about restoration 
under the policy of marketable permits for development, the degree of 
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incorrectness about the amounts of permits is relatively small. Table 6-26 shows 
the values of social welfare. 
6.7 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we conduct the sensitivity of the policy outcomes to 
uncertainty. Practically, we calculate the sensitivity of the equilibrium to which 
the initial state converges, assuming that parameters or exogenous variables 
change by a certain percentage. We define the sensitivity (sv) as the following. 
sv= ~ = % change of X 
d% % change of a (6-5) 
where X is the size of developed floodplains in the equilibrium and a IS one 
of the parameters or exogenous variables. 
Then, let us simulate changes in social welfare under the policy scenarios, 
assuming that parameters or exogenous variables suddenly change by a certain 
percentage and that policy-makers cannot detect the changes or cannot change the 
values of policy variables immediately. We can interpret the assumption in a 
different way. That is, policy-makers cannot correctly know the values of 
parameters or exogenous variables, and they overestimate or underestimate them 
by a certain percentage when they set policies. Which policy scenario is more 
flexible and robust under these uncertain situations? 
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6.7.1 Sensitivity to Value of Ecosystem Services 
The value of ecosystem services cannot be given in real markets because of 
missing markets. Thus, the value is in itself a kind of decision variable. Practically, 
this relies on environmental valuations. The estimated value might be uncertain. 
In particular, we use a result of meta analysis of environmental valuation in our 
applied model. Hence, it is important to check the sensitivity to the value and 
evaluate the flexibility of policy scenarios. 
To begin with, it is difficult to treat the functional fonn (5-17) for the benefit 
function of ecosystem services in Chapter 5, because it contains three parameter 
values and the economic meaning of them is not clear. Then, let us mathematically 
simplify the functional form. Leaving out the log functions, we obtain the 
following simplified functional form. 
(6-6) 
Function (6-6) is equivalent to function (5-17). Thus, we can use function (6-6). 
This function fortunately includes only two parameter values, which are deeply 
related to the marginal opportunity cost of lost ecosystem services with respect to 
floodplain development (the marginal value of ecosystem services with respect to 
the size of natural floodplains). Here, we do the sensitivity analysis on the first 
parameter value (2704.868484). 
We are interested in the risk of overdevelopment. Thus, we assume that this 
parameter value increases by 50%. This implies that the marginal value of 
ecosystem services increases by 50%.13 As the knowledge of ecosystem services 
has been still limited, this amount of error seems to be plausible. Let us calculate 
the sensitivity values under the assumption. Table 6-27 shows the results. The 
sensitivity values are small. Even at the maximum, the optimal size of developed 
floodplains decreases by only 0.397% when the marginal value of ecosystem 
13 The marginal value is not constant with respect to the size of developed floodplains. Thus, to be 
precise, it implies that the marginal value for the same size of developed floodplains increases by 
50%. 
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services increases by 1 %. 
Table 6-27. Sensitivity to the value of ecosystem services 
SUbbasin Sensitivity value 0/0 change New Equilibrium 
Equilibrium (base) 
27001 -0.054 -2.679 230.524 236.870 
27002 -0.060 -2.992 1909.776 1968.685 
27005 
- - 0.000 0.000 
27007 -0.098 -4.918 469.319 493.596 
27009 -0.041 -2.037 1384.243 1413.031 
27034 -0.188 -9.400 94.585 104.398 




27069 -0.214 -10.682 57.494 64.370 
27071 -0.099 -4.931 637.778 670.857 
27075 -0.225 -11.248 36.999 41.688 
27083 -0.035 -1.758 1095.961 1115.574 
27085 -0.397 -19.833 89.624 111.796 
27089 -0.074 -3.706 304.167 315.874 
27090 -0.204 -10.224 48.341 53.846 
6.7.2 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Uncertainty about Value 
of Ecosystem Services 
Let us derive paths under the policy scenarios and evaluate them in terms of 
social welfare under the uncertain situation that policy makers underestimate the 
value of ecosystem services by 50% (the same situation as Section 6.7.1). In this 
case, the paths under the policy scenarios are respectively the same as those under 
certainty because individual landowners do not care the value of ecosystem 
services and policy makers do not precisely know it. However, the value of 
ecosystem services changes in reality. Thus, let us evaluate the paths under the 
new value of ecosystem services. 
As the optimal size of developed floodplains changes, the amounts of 
marketable permits and the quantity of development and restoration that 
policy-makers set as regulations are not appropriate. As the marginal external 
value changes, the unit tax rates that policy makers set are not appropriate as well. 
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In this case, the 'buyout and central control' policy is also inappropriate because 
policy makers manage development and restoration based on the underestimated 
value. Which is more inappropriate under such a situation? Table 6-28 shows the 
values of social welfare. The results are the same as those under certainty. The 
policies are equivalent except for marketable permits for development. 
Table 6-28. Social welfare under uncertainty of the value of ecosystem services 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,063,566 1 
Tax 1,063,545 2 
Subsidy 1,063,545 2 
Mix of tax and subsidy 1,063,545 2 
Buyout and 1,063,545 2 
central control 
Marketable permits for 1,063,545 2 delleloped floodplains 
Regulation 1,063,545 2 
Marketable permits 1,063,385 8 for dellelopment 
6.7.3 Sensitivity to Benefits of Developed Floodplains 
The benefit function of developed floodplains is crucial because it is only the 
function that positively evaluates floodplain development in the model. The 
sensitivity analysis to the parameter value in the function is important. The 
parameter value is estimated from economic rents of developed lands (land prices), 
but they fluctuate largely over time (see Table 5-35 in Chapter 5). As in the 
previous section, we focus on the risk of overdevelopment. We assume that the 
marginal (unit) benefits of developed floodplains decreases by 25%. This 
assumption is plausible because the average value during the five years 
1990-1994 decreases to the average value during the five years 1995-1999 by 
26.5% (see Table 5-35 in Chapter 5). Under the situation, let us calculate the 
sensitivity values. Table 6-29 shows the results. The sensitivity values are much 
higher than those in Section 6.7.1. In some zones, no development is optimal 
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under the new situation. Even at the minimum, the optima1 size of developed 
floodplains decreases by about 1 % if the benefits of developed floodplains 
decreases by 1 %. Thus, it is important to evaluate the flexibility of policies under 
uncertainty of the benefits of developed floodplains. 
Table 6-29. Sensitivity to the benefits of developed floodplains 
Subbasin Sensitivity value % change New Equilibrium 
Equilibrium (base) 
27001 1.089 -27.220 172.393 236.870 




27007 2.201 -55.016 222.040 493.596 
27009 1.076 -26.901 1032.914 1413.031 
27034 2.616 -65.389 36.133 104.398 




27069 4.000 -100.000 0.000 64.370 
27071 2.175 -54.364 306.149 670.857 
27075 4.000 -100.000 0.000 41.688 
27083 0.889 -22.219 867.704 1115.574 
27085 4.000 -100.000 0.000 111.796 
27089 1.065 -26.623 231.779 315.874 
27090 4.000 -100.000 0.000 53.846 
6.7.4 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Uncertainty about 
Benefits of Developed Floodplains 
In this section we consider changes in social welfare under the assumption 
that policy makers overestimate the benefits of developed floodplains by 25% (the 
same situation as Section 6.7.3). This case is slightly different from the case in 
Section 6.7.2 in that individual landowners consider the change in the benefits of 
developed floodplains and change their economic behaviour. 
The situations of the policy scenarios here are the same as those under 
uncertainty of the value of ecosystem services. The unit tax rates are 
underestimated while the amount of permits and quota are overestimated. Table 
6-30 shows the values of social welfare. Interestingly, the 'buyout and centra1 
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control' policy is the worst. This policy is a kind of planned economy system, and 
is susceptible to uncertainty. It is completely inflexible. The policies of marketable 
pennits for developed floodplains and the regulation (quantity policies) are worse 
than the policies of tax, subsidy and the mix of them (price policies). These 
findings imply that quantity-setting policies are relatively weak under uncertainty 
because these policies never use decentralized decisions by individual 
landowners. 
Table 6-30. Social welfare under uncertainty of 
the benefits of developedjloodplains 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,050,054 1 
Tax 1,050,035 2 
Subsidy 1,050,035 2 
Mix of tax and subsidy 1,050,035 2 
Marketable permits for 1,049,014 5 developed floodplains 
Regulation 1,049,014 5 





6. 7. 5 Sensitivity to Precipitation 
Precipitation is an important exogenous variable for the expected cost 
function of flood risk. We have obtained the observed data on precipitation, but 
we have to estimate its exceedance probability. It is not necessarily certain and 
exact. In addition, it is said that we have the risk of climate change in the future. 
The volume and intensity of rainfalls may increase in the future. Therefore, tt is 
important to conduct the sensitivity analysis to precipitation. 
Hulme et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive analysis and prediction with 
some scenarios about climate change in the future in the UK. They predict that 
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winter precipitation increases while summer precipitation decreases by the 2080s 
and that the total volume has little change. We are interested in wetter winters in 
the future because our interests are in flood risk. "Winter precipitation increases 
for all periods and scenarios, although these increases by the 2080s range from 5 
to 15 per cent for the Low Emissions scenario, to more than 30 per cent for some 
regions for the Medium-High Emissions and High Emissions scenarios" (Hulme 
et ai., 2002). Based on the information, we assume that precipitation increases by 
20%. 
As precipitation is an exogenous variable, we have to calibrate the parameter 
values of the expected cost function of flood risk again. The followings are the 
calibrated functions when precipitation increases by 20% (see Appendix D-3 for 
details). 
27001 C'~27001 =30.04626(Xi ) +26152.53996,LX j j=27005and27053 
j 
27002 C'~27002 =4.35800(Xi j + 3961.07442,LX} j=27043 
j 
27005 C~27005 = 151. 77984(X' j 
27007 C~27007 =8.11519(Xi ) + 5240.60216IXJ j=27034 
j 
27009 cw27009 =4.90695(X') +8033.70837IXi +6816.17875L Xk 
j k 
j = 27007 and 27034, k = 27069,27071, 27075,27085 and 27090 
27034 C i =27034 = 16.59264(X i ) 
27043 Ci =27043 = 34.94831(X'J 
27053 C=270S3 =9.04461(X') +868.37807IXj j=27005 
J 
27069 Ci~27069 = 26.48690(Xi ) 
27071 C=271J71 =6.22730(Xi j +5233.00159IX} 
27075 C i =27075 = 40.64391(X i r 
27083 C~27083 =7.63154(Xi j 
27085 Ci~27085 = 1O.40179(X i j 
j 
j = 27069, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
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27089 C=27089 = 27. 57896(XI Y + 463.50249I X j j = 27002 and 27043 
j 
27090 Ci=27090 = 32.55725(X'Y 
Selhy c=Selby = 1665552.34 + 47. 74673I Xl j = All 15 subbasins 
j 


















27009,27034,27053,27069,27071,27075,27083,27085 and 27090 
Table 6-31. Sensitivity to precipitation 
Sensitivity value % change New Equilibrium Equilibrium (base) 
-0.465 -9.303 214.835 236.870 
-1.305 -26.091 1455.036 1968.685 
- - 0.000 0.000 
-1.915 -38.301 304.546 493.596 
-0.290 -5.796 1331.136 1413.031 
-3.409 -68.172 33.228 104.398 
-1.086 -21.728 125.068 159.787 
- -
0.000 0.000 
-1.686 -33.713 42.669 64.370 
-1.291 -25.826 497.599 670.857 
-1.709 -34.178 27.440 41.688 
-1.263 -25.250 833.889 1115.574 
-2.314 -46.274 60.063 111.796 
-1.287 -25.731 234.595 315.874 
-1.743 -34.866 35.072 53.846 
Based on the functions above, let us calculate the sensitivity values. Table 
6-31 shows the results. The size of developed floodplains in the equilibrium is 
sensitive to precipitation although they are variable among subbasins. At the 
maximum, the optimal size of developed floodplains decreases by 3.49% if 
precipitation volume increases by I %. Like the benefits of developed floodplains, 
uncertainty about precipitation is important for evaluating the effectiveness and 
flexibility of policy scenarios. 
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6.7.6 Analysis of Policy Scenarios under Uncertainty about 
Precipitation 
Finally, let us derive paths under the policy scenarios and evaluate them in 
terms of social welfare under the uncertain situation that precipitation increases by 
20% (the same situation as Section 6.7.5). 
Likewise, let us evaluate the policy scenarios. Table 6-32 shows the values of 
social welfare. The 'buyout and central control' policy is again the worst because 
of its inflexibility. The policies of tax, subsidy and the mix of them are preferable 
to the others. They have the advantages that they use decentralized decisions 
(adjustments) by individual landowners. 
Table 6-32. Social welfare under uncertainty a/precipitation 
Scenario Social Welfare Rank 
Social Optimisation 1,053,328 1 
Tax 1,053,202 2 
Subsidy 1,053,202 2 
Mixoftaxand subsidy 1,053,202 2 
Marketable permits for 1,052,878 5 dewloped floodplains 
Regulation 1,052,878 5 




6.8 Linkage with Policy Implication 
from Static Decision Model 
The essential finding is that price policies are more robust to irreversibility 
and uncertainty than quantity policies. There are two reasons. First, price polices 
can utilise decentralized adjustment processes (decisions) of individual 
landowners (decision makers). Second, the appropriate unit tax (subsidy) rates do 
not change so much under uncertainty as compared with the optimal size of 
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developed floodplains (the quantity set by marketable permits or direct controls). 
The second point is related to the policy implication derived from the static 
decision model in Chapter 3. It tells that taxes are better than marketable permits 
if the absolute value of the slope of marginal private net benefit (MB) curve is 
larger than that of marginal external cost (MC) curve, and vice versa. The analysis 
in Chapter 3 assumes linear functions of MB and Me curves, which is slightly 
different from the situations in Chapter 6. We have a non-linear function for MC 
curve. Nonetheless, the essential proposition remains true for non-linear functions 
around the equilibrium. 
Table 6-33. Comparison of slopes between MB and MC curves 
Absolute value of slope of MB Absolute value of slope of Me 
(marginal private net benefit) (marginal external costs) 
27001 53.348 > 0.104 
27002 6.452 > 0.314 
27005 274.552 > 0.756 
27007 12.878 > 0.054 
27009 9.222 > 0.017 
27034 31.007 > 0.044 
27043 57.930 > 0.106 
27053 2.170 > 0.408 
27069 49.069 > 0.089 
27071 8.834 > 0.034 
27075 75.054 > 0.120 
27083 10.568 < 72.884 
27065 15.607 > 0.113 
27089 40.711 > 1.308 
27090 59.104 > 0.070 
Note: The Absolute value ofthe slope of Me curve is evaluated at the empirical equilibrium. 
Let us verify this under non-linear functions in the applied context. We can 
expect that MB curves are steeper than Me curves in most of subbasins because 
we obtain the result that taxes are better than marketable permits under uncertainty. 
We calculate the absolute values of the slopes of MB and MC curves. As MC 
curves are non-linear functions, the absolute values of the slopes of Me curves are 
evaluated at the empirical equilibrium to which the initial state converges. Table 
6-33 compares the slopes of MB and Me curves. In aI1 but Subbasin 27083, MB 
curves are steeper than Me curves. 
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This comparison of the slopes of the MB and MC functions is a consequence 
of the functional forms estimated for the individual equations which comprise MB 
and MC (expected cost of flood risk, etc.). Estimations of these functional 
equations are statistically strong and robust (see Chapter 5), adding evidence to 
our overall evaluation. Then, tax policies rather than quantity policies offer a more 
robust mechanism for dealing with the uncertainty surrounding floodplain 
development. 
6.9 Conclusion of Chapter 6 
Floodplain management is crucial for reducing the costs of flood risk. It will 
be costly if external costs are not appropriately considered. In real situations, there 
is the tendency that floodplains are overdeveloped in upstream zone in the Ouse 
catchment. Under such a situation, it is important to set an appropriate policy for 
floodplain management. 
Under certain situations, several policies such as tax, subsidy, the mix of 
them, marketable permits, a regulation and a central control work well. Under 
uncertainty and irreversibility, however, price rationing policies such as tax, 
subsidy and the mix of them are preferable to the other policies because the 
appropriate unit tax (subsidy) rates do not change a lot (as compared with the 
optimal size of developed floodplains) and because these policies use 
decentralized decisions by individual landowners (adjustments are possible). That 
is why they are more flexible and robust against uncertainty. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, we (1) define the appropriate social optimisation problem for 
floodplain management, (2) provide theoretical models for the static and dynamic 
problems, (3) develop an applied model and calibrate parameter values from data 
on the Ouse catchment, and (4) carry out simulations in the context of the Ouse 
catchment in order to evaluate several policy scenarios. The thesis attempts to 
make three main contributions. First, it has tried to improve understanding the 
essential problems of floodplain management (two types of environmental 
externalities). Second, it has tried to clarify the policy options for the optimal 
floodplain management. Third, it has explored methods for integrating the 
hydrology, ecology and economics of floodplains. 
Floodplains are multi-functional resources. They offer direct and indirect use 
values. They provide us with various ecosystem services. However, the way they 
are used generates environmental externalities. Our economic system does not 
have the way of recognizing and evaluating the indirect use values of many of the 
ecosystem services affected by decisions to develop floodplains in various ways. 
Without the appropriate policy interventions, the current condition of many 
floodplains will continue to deteriorate. Therefore, we develop an interdisciplinary 
integrated model that includes both direct and indirect use values in the optimal 
management of floodplains. The implications of this for different policy options 
are then tested through simulations. 
It is crucial to understand how ecosystem functions and human economic 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 277 
activities interact, and how human economic activities are affected by the 
ecosystem's characteristics and policy instruments. It is often pointed out that 
interdisciplinary integrated models are needed for solving this type of problem 
(Bockstael et aI., 1995; Costanza and Farber, 2002). The models developed in the 
thesis make such an attempt. The models have two important features. First, they 
integrate a hydrological sub-model into an economic model on the choice between 
flood mitigation and the economic development of floodplains. Second, they 
make it possible to conduct an environmental and economic analysis of the flood 
risk implications of alternative floodplain development options. 
This thesis is intended to help local decision makers to improve floodplain 
management in the following respects. First, it shows how and what we should 
consider for the optimal management of floodplains. Second, it provides a 
simulation model by which we can evaluate alternative management policies. We 
can test them under uncertainty and irreversibility. Third, it offers guidance on the 
choice of policy options under currently available data in the context of the Ouse 
catchment. Fourth, it indicates what data we need for make better decisions 
(environmental, physical and economic data). 
Let us summanze the main findings. In the static model, the optimal 
conditions show that we should choose the size of developed floodplains so that 
the marginal benefits are equal to the sum of the marginal costs and the marginal 
external costs. The crucial point is that we must take account of environmental 
externalities. There are two types of externalities. First, the development of 
floodplains has opportunity costs in terms of lost ecosystem services. Second, the 
development of floodplains increases flood risks to people downstream (imposes a 
unidirectional spatial externality). Just as many environmental problems are 
related to externalities, the overdeveJopment of floodplains is also the problem of 
externalities. Interestingly, the conditions of the optimal steady-state equilibrium 
in the dynamic model are the same as the optimal conditions in the static decision 
model. However, the local stability analysis indicates that the optimal steady-state 
equilibrium is unstable. This implies that the optimal conditions derived from the 
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static model cannot be satisfied in the dynamic context. Related to the instability, 
there are a few noticeable things to keep in mind. First, if the equilibrium is a 
saddle, it is still possible to control the dynamical system. Unfortunately, however, 
it is unknown whether it is a saddle in such a three or more dimensional model. 
Second, more importantly, the results of the local stability analysis depend on the 
assumptions made about the concavity and convexity of the underlying functions, 
although there is interestingly a gap between static and dynamic models under the 
same assumptions. That is why it is important to implement policy simulations in 
the applied model in the concrete context. 
Certainly, we cannot derive concrete and practical guidance for policy from 
the theoretical models except that we should intemalise externalities. What we 
have been able to do is to use an applied model to evaluate a number of policy 
options for the Ouse catchment. These lead to three general conclusions. First, the 
impact of floodplain development on the expected cost of flood risk is large. 
Second, floodplains in upstream zones tend to be overdeveloped currently because 
of unidirectional spatial externalities. Third, price policies (e.g. the Pigouvian tax 
policy) function well to internalise external costs and attain the optimal path, and 
are robust to irreversibility and uncertainties. 
Related to the third point, let us give several interesting findings in more 
detail. 
I. Under uncertainty, both price and quantity instruments have the 
potential to internalise externalities and accomplish the optimal 
path. 
2. If there are constraints on floodplain development and restoration, 
quantity policies such as marketable permits and regulations do not 
work well. Individual landowners have the incentive to delay the 
necessary restoration as long as possible because they can exploit 
their private net benefits. 
3. Under irreversibility, price policies such as the Pigouvian tax and 
subsidies are relatively robust because the optimal tax and subsidy 
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rates remain the same. 
4. Under uncertainty about the value of ecosystem services, price and 
quantity instruments are equivalent, but they cannot always achieve 
an efficient outcome. 
S. Under uncertainty about the benefits of developed floodplains, price 
policies get better results than quantity restrictions although they 
cannot completely achieve the optimal path. 
6. Under uncertainty about precipitation, price policies are better than 
other policies although they cannot completely accomplish the 
optimal path. 
In brief, price policies such as Pigouvian taxes are preferable in that they allow 
decentralized decisions (individual flexible adjustment processes) by landowners. 
7.2 Future Research 
In this section, we mention the limitations of this research and raise future 
research topics based on them. 
7.2.1 Interactions with Averting Behaviour 
We cannot cope with averting behaviour as a control variable in the applied 
model and simulations although we introduce it into the theoretical models. 
Indeed, averting behaviour plays almost the same role as floodplain development, 
but there are complex interactions between floodplain functions and averting 
behaviour. Ecosystem functions are not independent of averting behaviour. 
Averting behaviour may, for example, change hydrologic conditions and the 
physiochemical environment of floodplains. If so, the services offered by 
floodplains will change depending on the nature of averting behaviour. In this 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 280 
case, we need more complex models including the interactions between 
floodplains' ecosystem functions and averting behaviour. In order to investigate 
this, we need to expand the models to include interactions between ecosystem 
services with averting behaviour. 
7.2.2 Ecological Economic Modelling 
In this research, we use vanous modelling techniques - mathematical 
optimisation, GIS, econometrics, hydrological modelling, and frequency analysis -
to carry out policy simulations using an applied model. In our model, we can treat 
environmental or physical parameters and variables. However, it is not really an 
integrated model of the hydrology, ecology and economics in that we cannot 
'directly' control relevant hydrological and ecological parameters and variables in 
the main model. We mainly use an economic model, which indirectly employs the 
outputs from hydrological and ecological sub-models. Ideally, we should integrate 
them evenly so that we can directly control both environmental and economic 
variables in the main model. If we could create interdisciplinary integrated models, 
it would be easier to discuss ecosystem processes in terms of economic values. 
7.2.3 Environmental Valuation 
Amongst the most important data for estimating ecological economic models 
are the values of ecological or environmental goods and services. In our research, 
we use the results of meta analysis on the values of ecosystem services of 
wetlands, but they are neither certain nor precise. We need more environmental 
valuation researches. This requires a method that is practical and easy to execute. 
Without appropriate valuations, we are unable to make integrated models more 
significant and meaningful. 
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Environmental or ecological restoration may, for example be an important 
option. Unless situations are irreversible, restoration is potentially one of the most 
effective options for managing environmental and ecological resources. However, 
if we have no relevant information on costs of restoration, we cannot make 
appropriate decisions from the economic point of view. Valuation of 
environmental or ecological restoration is an important research challenge for the 
future. 
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Appendix A 
Appendices of Chapter 3 
A-1 Convexity of Expected Cost Function of Flood 
Risk 
We show the conditions for the convexity of the expected cost function with 
respect to all the control variables. 
The second-order differential, d 2z, should be everywhere positive semidefinite 
for its convexity. The second-order differential can be expressed by a 2m x2m 
array. The coefficients of the array can be shown by the symmetric Hessian that is 
properly arranged. The Hessian is the following. 
ci Ci Ci Ci C,. Ci 
XjXi Xiai XiXll X,Xjm_1 xiah x/a im-I 
Ci C,. Ci Ci C i Ci 
aix,. aja,. a,xh a,Xjm_1 a1ah Qiajm_l 
Ci Ci Ci Ci Ci Ci 
Xh X' XJl a, xhxh Xli xlm_1 xli all 
xii aim _1 













C i Ci Ci C~ x Ci C~ a 
ajm _Ix; alm __ 1aj alm _1 xi"! 1m-I Jm-I alm_IG il Jm-I Jml 
IHll,IH21,·· ·,IH2m l are its principal minors. 
Then, we need the condition that all the detenninants of 2m principal minors 
are non-negative for the convexity. 
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A-2 Meaning of Lagrange Multiplier 
The optimal value of Lagrange multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal 
utility of the size of floodplain. The Lagrange multiplier implies the imputed value 
or shadow price of the natural floodplain that can be developed. We 
mathematically show the reason why we can interpret the meaning of the 
Lagrange multiplier as such. 
To begin with, we assume that A', Xi and a i are the optimal values for 
all i. They can be expressed as a function of parameters L F (= (L~, L~,· . " L; )) 
(exogenous variables): A'(LF), xi(LF) and Zt(LF)' These optimal values 
satisfy the first-order necessary conditions (3-4), (3-5) and the constraint. 
U {dB + df _ ae i _ "ae} aq } _ A' = 0 (for all i) 
tr dX' (}X' ax' f;: aq ax' 
(A-2-1) 
u {- dg. _ aei _ "ae l ~} = 0 (for all i) 
1r ~, a-' i..J a a-I uG G }>i q a 
(A-2-2) 
E~ - x' = 0 (for all i) 
(A-2-3) 
z = U {7Z(X, a)} + f A' (E~ - Xi) 
1=1 
The function Z is a function of the parameters L F' Differentiating the 
function Z with respect to £F as a representative, 
= U Tn (dB + df _ ac k _ ael aq -)!J ayk 
1T ~ d,Xk d,Xk ~X-k L a a-k aiTi k-I U J>k q X LF 
+ AI + f a~ (L~ - yk) 
k~1 aLF 
= AI (because of (A-2-1), (A-2-2) and (A-2-3» 1 
Then, 
AI = az (= au J (for all i) 
ar ar F F 
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This implies that the Lagrange multiplier is the marginal utility of the size of 
floodplain. 
I The values of the parentheses are equal to zero. 
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A-3 Composite Concave Function 
If a function is a concave function of a concave function in relevant variables, 
it is a concave function in them. We will show the proof of the statement in the 
case that fits with the model we developed. Here, we focus on the case of two 
variables. 
Set the functions below. Both of them are continuous and twice differentiable 
with respect to relevant variables. 
W=U(Jr) 
where Jr = j(XI' X2) 
We assume that U(Jr) is concave III Jr and that j(XI ,X2) is concave III 
(Xl ,X2 )· 
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Then, under the assumptions we show that U(;r) is concave in (Xl' X2 ) jointly, 
= (U trtrf..2 + U trf..IXU trtrfz2 + U tr/22)- (U trtrJ;12 + U trJ;J2 
~U;(J,J22 - h;)+U.u .. hl{(f, -h ~: J +UJ'(J,Jzz - h;)}> 0 
(from A-3-1, A-3-2, A-3-3 and A-3-4) 
Hence, U(;r) is concave in (Xp X2 ) jointly. 
• 
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Appendix B 
Appendices of Chapter 4 
B-1 General Form of System of 
Differential Equations 
We show a general fonn of the system of di fferential equations in case of two 
zones (4-25) with the process of deriving it. We use a mathematics software 
program, 'Maple version 8.00' because it is too complicated to calculate and 
arrange the differential equations by hand. Thus, we provide Maple codes as the 
process of derivation. We omit the final results for the purpose of saving many 
sheets of papers because they provide four long equations. You can obtain the 
results if you copy and paste the following codes into Maple and execute the 
worksheet. 
> with(student): 
> Dy J :=diff(D(y J ),y 1): 













> MA I :=diff(M(A I ),A I): 
> MA2:=diff(M(A2),A2): 






> dhdAI :=diff(h(XI ,AI),AI): 
> yl t:=diff(yl (t),t): 
> y2t:=diff(y2(t),t): 
> a 1 t=diff( a 1 (t),t): 
> a2t:=diff(a2(t),t): 
> 
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eq I :=Dyl *Upp*(BXl *yl+BX2*y2+FXl *yl+FX2*y2-Dyl *ylt-Dy2*y2t-Gal *a 
I t-Ga2 *a2t-MA 1 *a 1-MA2 *a2-dC 1 dX 1 *y I-dC2dX2 *y2-dC 1 dA 1 *a I-dC2dA2 * a2 
-dC2dh*dhdXI *y l-dC2dh*dhdAI *al)=Up*(delta*DyI-Dyyl *ylt-BXI-FXI +dC 
IdXl +dC2dh*dhdXl): 
> 
eq2:=Dy2*Upp*(BXl *yl+BX2*y2+FXl *yI+FX2*y2-DyI *ylt-Dy2*y2t-Gal *a 
H-Ga2*a2t-MAI *al-MA2*a2-dCldXl *yl-dC2dX2*y2-dCldAl *al-dC2dA2*a2 
-dC2dh *dhdXl *y l-dC2dh*dhdA I *al )=Up*( delta*Dy2-Dyy2 *y2t-BX2-FX2+dC 
2dX2): 
> 
eq3:=Gal *Upp*(BXI *yI +BX2*y2+FXl *yl +FX2*y2-DyI *ylt-Dy2*y2t-Gal *a 
It-Ga2*a2t-MAI *aI-MA2*a2-dCldXl *yl-dC2dX2*y2-dCldA 1 *al-dC2dA2*a2 
-dC2dh*dhdXI *yl-dC2dh*dhdAI *al)=Up*(deIta*Gal-Gaal *alt+MAl+dCldA 
1 +dC2dh*dhdA I): 
Appendix B 289 
> 
eq4:=Ga2*Upp*(BXI *yl+BX2*y2+FXI *yl +FX2*y2-Dyl *ylt-Dy2*y2t-Gal *a 
1 t-Ga2*a2t-MA 1 *al-MA2*a2-dCldXI *yl-dC2dX2*y2-dCldA 1 *al-dC2dA2*a2 
-dC2dh*dhdXI *yl-dC2dh*dhdAI *al)=Up*(delta*Ga2-Gaa2*a2t+MA2+dC2dA 
2): 
> solve( {eq 1 ,eq2,eq3,eq4}, {y It,y2t,al t,a2t}); 
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B-2 Derivation of Jacobian Matrix 
Let us show the process of deriving Jacobian matrix (4-35) in this appendix. 
To begin with, we consider the first row of the matrix. We focus on the first 
differential equation in the system of differential equations (4-29). 
Y;=I = jl(y/=I,y/=2,X/=I,X;=2)= ~~ 
We have to differentiate this with respect to relevant arguments. 
In the beginning, let us differentiate this in a genera] form and evaluate the 
derivative in the optimal steady-state solution (y:=1 ,y;=2, X;=I, X;=2) in order to 
make the calculation easy and simple. Substituting conditions (4-3 I), (4-32), 
(4-33) and (4-34) into NR\, we get NRI = O. Utilising NRI = 0, we can obtain the 
following. 
" " 
( .;=1)'/ =(NRIJ = (NR1) ·DN -NRI . (DN) _ (NRJ 
y, f.X DN f.X (DN)' f.X DN f,X 
(B-2-1 ) 
We set the followings. 
d 2D {dF dB dD OCi=1 OC i=2} NR = - -. +0-.-+-.-+ _ 
II d( 1=2 \2 d)('=1 dX1=1 dvl=1 OX1=1 OX1-1 Y1 J t t :n t 1 
= I=I( dD d 2 D J(- dF _ dB + _OC_1_=1 + _aC_i_--2J 
NRI2 YI d i=1 (i=2 \2 dXi=1 dXi=1 OX1=1 OXi=1 ~ d~ J I I I 1 
( 
dD d 2D J( dF dB aCi=2J 
+ y;=2 dy;=1 d(y;=2 r -dX;=2 - dX/=2 + ax;=2 
+_dD __ d_V_(_ dF _ dB +_OC_i_=2J 
d 1=1 d 1=2 dX1=2 dX1=2 aXi=2 Yt YI I t 1 
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+( dD J2( dF + dB _ 8C1=1 _ 8C i=2J 
dy;=2 dX/=' dX;=' ax;=1 aX;=1 
Evaluating the derivative in (9:=1, ;;:=2, X:=\ X:=2 ), NRIJ = NR'2 = O. Then, we 
can further the calculation (B-2-1) by using these. 
Y'x 
y,X' DN 
, " , 




_ U 1r • (N Rll ) + U 1r1r • (N R'2 ) 
DN 
(B-2-2) 
Using equation (B-2-2) and the optimal steady-state solution (4-31), (4-32), 
(4-33) and (4-34), we can calculate the factors of the first row in the Jacobian 
matrix.' 
(B-2-3) 
8NRI2 (": 8 1=' = 0) 
~l --x y,. 
U . 8NR
" 
+ U . 8NR'2 




1 In addition, we can use dy~' I -dyd~2 = 0 , based on the assumption. 
1 y:=l=O f y;=' =0 
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(',' ~N~;l = aNR12 - 0) a 1=2 -
Yt -x Yt -x y, y,. 
u . aNRJI + U . aNR12 
1r axi=l 1r1r axi=l 
= ____ ~t ________ ~t_ 
ax i =l 
t yS DN 
Uff d 2D {d 2F d 2B a2c i =1 a2c1=2 } 
= DN . d{y;=2)' - d{X;=l) - d{X:=l) + a (x; =1 r + a(x;=l r 
(B-2-5) 
(',' aNR12 _ 0) 
ax;=' --
y,X 
U . aNR" +U 8NR12 
1r aX1=2 1r1r 8X1=2 U d 2 D a2c i=2 
= ___ ---:.t _______ --!-t _ _ 1r -.,_...,-. ___ _ 
ax;=2 y,X DN - DN d{y;=2 r ax;=lax;=2 
(B-2-6) 
(,,' 8NR, 2 _ 0) 
aX1=2 --
t y,X 
Likewise, we can treat the second differential equation in the system of 
differential equations (4-29), 










Using equation (B-2-7) and the optimal steady-state solution (4-31), (4-32), 
(4-33) and (4-34), we can calculate the factors of the second row in the Jacobian 
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matrix. 2 
u . 8NR21 + U . 8NR22 
7T 8 I=J 7T7T 8 i=1 
YI Yr =0 
DN 
= a 1=1 YI --x y •• 
(B-2-8) 
U . 8NR21 + U . 8NR22 
7T ~ ,i=2 7T7T a ;=2 
= VYr Yr 
= 
DN 
(B-2-9) (': a;~~2 = 0) 
YI --x y,. 
(B-2-10) 




2 dD I dD In addition, we can use dyz=l = dyz=2 = 0, based on the assumption. 
t y/=l=O r y;=2=O 
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(0: 8NR22 - 0) 8X,=2 _ 
t y,X 
It is easy to derive the factors of the third and fourth row in the Jacobian 
matrix. Hence, we can obtain the Jacobian matrix (4-35) from (B-2-3) - (B-2-6) 
and (B-2-8) - (B-2-11). 
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Appendix C 
Appendices of Chapter 5 
C-1 Visual Basic Code for Calculation of Baseflow 
Let us show the visual basic code on Microsoft Excel for the calculation of 
basetlow in this appendix. The raw data of daily discharge flow should be put 
from C 1 cell in the C column on a spread sheet of Excel. The following 
procedures are allocated to command buttons respectively. You can carry out all 
the code at a time as a general procedure if you adjust the variables appropriately. 
Procedure 1. Abstracting the minima 
The result will be shown in the column of 'D'. 
Private Sub CommandButton1_ClickO 
Dim i As Integer 
Dim a As Double 
Dim b As Double 
Dim c As Double 
Dim d As Double 
Dim e As Double 
For i = 1 To 1600 
If Cells(5 * i, 3)Value > 0 Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 4, 3).Value < Cells(5 * i - 3, 3)Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 4, 3).Value < Cells(5 * i - 2, 3)Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 4, 3).Value < Cells(5 * i - 1, 3)Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 4, 3)Value < Cells(5 * i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(5· i - 4, 4)Value = Cells(5 * i - 4, 3)Value 
Else 
Else 
Cells(5· i, 4).Value = Cells(5 * i, 3).Value 
End If 
If Cells(5· i - 1, 3).Value < Cells(5· i, 3).Value Then 
Cells(5· i - 1, 4).Value = Cells(5· i - 1, 3)Value 
Else 






If Cells(5 * i - 2, 3)Value < Cells(5' i - 1, 3).Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 2, 3).Value < Cells(5 * i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(5 * i - 2, 4)Value = Cells(5' i - 2, 3)Value 
Else 
Else 
Celis(5' i, 4).Value = Cells(5 * i, 3)Value 
End If 
If Cells(5 * i - 1, 3)Value < Cells(5 * i, 3)Value Then 
Celis(5' i - 1, 4)Value = Cells(5' i - 1, 3)Value 
Else 




If Cells(5' i - 3, 3)Value < Cells(5' i - 2, 3).Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 3, 3). Value < Cells(5 • i - 1, 3). Value Then 
If Cells(5 • i - 3, 3)Value < Cells(5 • i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(5' i - 3, 4)Value = Cells(5' i - 3, 3)Value 
Else 
Else 
Cells(5 • i, 4)Value = Cells(5' i, 3)Value 
End If 
Else 
If Cells(5 • i - 1, 3)Value < Cells(5 * i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(5' i - 1, 4)Value = Cells(5' i - 1, 3)Value 
Else 
Cells(S' i, 4)Value = Cells(5' i, 3)Value 
End If 
End If 
If Cells(5' i - 2, 3)Value < Cells(5' i - 1, 3)Value Then 
If Cells(5 * i - 2, 3)Value < Cells(5 • i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(5' i - 2, 4)Value = Cells(5' i - 2, 3)Value 
Else 
Cells(5' i, 4)Value = Cells(5 • i, 3)Value 
End If 
Else 
If Cells(5 • i - 1, 3)Value < Cells(5 • i, 3)Value Then 
Celis(5' i _ 1, 4)Value = Cells(5 * i - 1, 3)Value 
Else 
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Procedure 2. Choosing the ordinates in blocks 
The result will be shown in the column of 'E'. 
Private Sub CommandButlon2_ClickO 
Dim i As Integer 
Dim j As Integer 
Dim k As Integer 
Dim a As Double 
Dim b As Double 
Dim c As Double 
j = 1 
Do While i <= 6000 And j <= 6000 And k <= 6000 
i = j
Do While i <= 6000 
If Cells(i. 4)Value > OThen 
a = Cells(i. 4)Value 
Exit Do 
Else 
i = i + 1 
End If 
Loop 
j = i + 1 
Do While j <= 6000 
If CelisU. 4)Value > 0 Then 
b = CelisU. 4).Value 
Exit Do 
Else 
j = j + 1 
End If 
Loop 
k = j + 1 
Do While k <= 6000 
If Cells(k. 4)Value > 0 Then 






If 0.9 • b < a And 0.9 • b < C Then 
CelisU. 5)Value = CelisU. 4).Value 
End If 
Loop 
MsgBox ("This procedure is over. ") 
End Sub 
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Procedure 3. Linear interpolation 
The result will be shown in the column of 'F'. 
Private Sub CommandButton3_ClickO 
Dim i As Integer 
Dim j As Integer 
Dim k As Integer 
Dim a As Double 
Dim b As Double 
Dim c As Double 
j = 1 
Do While i <= 6000 And j <= 6000 
i = j 
Do While i <= 6000 
If Cells(i. 5).Value > 0 Then 
Else 
Cells(i. 6)Value = Cells(i. 5).value 
a = Cells(i. 5)Value 
Exit Do 
i = i + 1 
End If 
Loop 
j = i + 1 
Do While j <= 6000 
If CelisU. 5).Value > a Then 
Else 
CelisU. 6).Value = CelisU. 5).value 
b = CelisU. 5)Value 
Exit Do 
j = j + 1 
End If 
Loop 
c = (b - a) / U - i) 
If i <= 6000 And j <= 6000 Then 
For k = i + 1 To j - 1 




MsgBox (''This procedure is over. ") 
End Sub 
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Procedure 4. Modification of exceptional values 
The result will be shown in the column of 'G'. 
Private Sub CommandButton6_ClickO 
Dim i As Integer 
Dim j As Integer 
For i = 1 To 6000 
If Cells(i, 6).Value > 0 Then 
If Cells(i, 6)Value > Cells(i, 3)Value Then 
Cells(i, 7)Value :: Cells(i, 3)Value 
Else 




MsgBox ("This procedure is over. ") 
End Sub 
Procedure 5. Calculating BFI 
The result will be shown in the cell 'A4'. 
Private Sub CommandButton4_ Click() 
Dim i As Integer 
Dim a As Double 
Dim b As Double 
Dim c As Double 
a=O 
b=O 
For i = 1 To 6000 
Next 
If Cells(i, 7)Value > 0 Then 
a = a + Cells(i, 7). Value 
b:: b + Cells(i, 3)Value 
End If 
c = a / b 
Cells(4, 1 )Value = c 
MsgBox ("This procedure is over") 
End Sub 
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C-2 Location of Measurement Sites 
The locations of the measurement sites are provided by as grid system (m), 
They are collected on the relevant maps by ArcGIS software program, Table C- J 
shows them, 
Table C-l, Location of the measurement sites 
Subbasin Name of Stations Location 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 435059 456443 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mil Weir 425979 445960 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Resel"\A?ir 410745 472690 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 427383 478870 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 446140 463487 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 397973 489536 
27043 Wharfe at .Adding ham 398779 464658 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 419019 463349 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 432914 502574 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 434084 486579 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 422791 490287 
27083 Foss at Huntington 463470 464529 
27085 Cod Seck at Dalton Bridge 441747 486083 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 444830 445527 
27090 Swale at CaUerick Bridge 408154 497446 
York 460543 450684 
Selby 461610 432726 
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C-3 Data of Areas in Subbasins 
We calculate the areas of floodplains and the areas in each category of 
land-use in each subbasin by ArcGIS. Table C-2 shows the areas of subbasins and 
floodplains that we calculate. 1 Table C-3 shows the areas of categories of land-use 
in each subbasin that we calculate from LCM 1990 by ArcGIS. 
Table C-2. Areas o/subbasins andfloodplains 
Subbasin Name of Stations Area of Subbasin Area of Roodplain (Ila) (Ila) 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 26,124.8 1,359.7 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mil Weir 32,933.1 2,629.7 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite Reservoir 11,551.4 373.4 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 40,069.8 2,498.0 
27009 Ouse at Skelton 52,964.5 6,646.2 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 51,308.2 2,476.9 
27043 Wharfe atPddingham 42,824.3 1,402.5 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 10,629.8 348.0 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske 23,264.6 1,338.2 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 26,199.7 3,621.6 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming 16,854.4 1,029.1 
27083 Foss at Huntington 13,870.1 1,119.7 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 20,710.4 1,152.2 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 5,563.5 443.8 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 49,410.6 1,632.8 
1 The areas of subbasins that we calculate are slightly different from those provided by NWA. 
CaJculating values of variables based on the data of areas, we use the one that is a basis of the 
variables. In addition, we calculate vaJues of variables by using the ratios of relevant areas. 
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Table C-3. Areas of each land-use category injloodplains (ha) 
10 category 27001 27002 27005 27007 27009 27034 27043 270 53 
1 Sea / 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 00 
Estuary 
0.0 00 0..0 00 
2 Inland 
Water 
2 226.9 2.74 84 168.737 51.003 6.697 25.32 7 144.755 0.8 80 
3 Beach & 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coastal Bare 
0.000 
4 Saltmarsh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 Grass Heath 108.96 2 267.487 5.185 129.793 17.174 70.0.51 72.74 
8 50.052 
6 Mown/ 173.18 o 725.335 5.90 8 504.65 8 1213.97 6 396.93 1 117.34 
8 68.514 
Grazed Turf 
7 Meadow / Verge / 136.89 1 253.883 46.54 1 332.331 1185.97 7 879.77 8 512.93 
3 84.171 
Semi-natural 
8 Rough / 0.006 0.772 0.019 1.873 18.226 0.299 
0.628 0.086 
Marsh Grass 








Dense Shrub 0.000 2.739 0.311 0.000 
1.946 
Moor 
7.144 2.220 0.196 
12 Bracken 6.924 7.009 10.474 41.959 
99.820 26.415 28.153 2.338 
13 Dense Shrub 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Heath 
14 Scrub / 0.040 2.254 0.000 3.851 
6.331 0.000 0..000 0.778 
Orchard 
15 
Deciduous 78.138 321.376 18.405 299.385 158.187 
221.611 84.782 37.146 
Woodland 
16 
Coniferous 3.558 29.491 0.760 35.522 
34.990 18.947 7.449 1.498 
Woodland 
17 Upland Bog 0.000 0..032 0.709 
1.872 0.000 2.884 2.036 
0.355 
18 Tilled Land 713.951 463.419 37.780 
798.162 3279.341 621.813 228.630 
66.689 
19 Ruderal Weed 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.375 2.477 0.000 0.00.0 0.00.0 
20 Suburt>an / 79.303 143.444 4.629 122.0.0.1 
249.684 44.112 17.638 7.846 
Rural Development 
21 Continuous Urt>an 20..091 73689 9.759 
33.263 58.782 7.0.18 10.054 0.125 
22 I nland Bare 13.373 29.905 3.490 42.525 
112.964 2.422 5.869 0.001 
Ground 
23 F elled Forest 0.008 0.431 1.043 
0.612 4.591 0.015 1.343 0.321 
24 L o\AAand Bog 0.000 2.367 2.175 
2.493 2.854 17.0.79 11.774 1.057 
25 0 
pen Shrub 17.889 56809 0.000 37.745 62.767 
0.000 0..000 1.749 
H eath 
o U nclassified 4.599 8.963 12.532 
25.505 125.166 22.913 19.467 1.726 
The table is continued to the next page. 
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Table C-3. Areas of each land-use category in floodplains (ha) [continue] 
10 Category 




3 Beach & 
Coastal Bare 
4 Saltmarsh 
5 Grass Heath 
6 Mown/ 
Grazed Turf 
7 Meadow / Verge / 
Semi-natural 




10 Open Shrub 
Moor 
11 Dense Shrub 
Moor 
12 Bracken 
13 Dense Shrub 
Heath 






17 Upland Bog 
18 Tilled Land 
19 Ruderal Weed 
20 Suburban / 
Rural De\elopment 
21 Continuous Urban 
22 Inland Bare 
Ground 
23 Felled Forest 
24 Lowland Bog 
25 Open Shrub 
Heath 
o Unclassified 
27069 27071 27075 27083 27085 27089 27090 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 26.446 0.000 0.000 2.570 0.000 0.459 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
49.686 194.517 89.174 51.720 9.942 25.434 66.911 
473.975 707.355 285.256 188.484 346.488 123.492 154.878 
226.971 263.449 151.344 74.323 148.184 79.442 469.922 
0.892 0.125 0.458 0.123 0.000 0.307 1.117 
0.000 0.214 1.113 0.000 1.506 0.000 148.313 
0.223 0.000 2.170 0.000 2.016 0.000 29.173 
0.000 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.661 
29.704 30.063 0.418 19.379 89.288 0.522 36.518 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.178 0.026 0.000 0.000 
0.500 0.455 1.117 0.125 0.237 0.885 0.000 
43.333 159.108 61.920 7.421 30.573 58.911 93.981 
0.545 12.314 0.190 0.113 1.210 9.493 4.803 
0.000 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.581 
382.732 1807.957 362.344 614.526 410.460 95.289 509.906 
0.200 0.000 0.000 0.624 0.000 0.000 0.000 
96.132 272.438 61.708 96.596 43.458 28.297 65.243 
5.493 33.710 2.107 9.677 16.605 6.886 1.851 
7.475 34.264 3.470 21.606 5.324 1.604 1.708 
0.516 0.250 0.000 0.125 0.064 0.000 0.945 
0.000 3.095 0.739 0.120 0.000 0.000 16.900 
17.669 52.907 3.075 23.808 38.455 11.346 0.000 
2.170 22.945 2.179 10.719 5.744 1.882 15.924 
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C-4 Width and Height of Floodplains 
We measure the width of height of floodplains by using ArcGIS software 
program based on the relevant vector data and DEM. Table C-4 shows the data. 
Table C-4. Width and height a/floodplains 
Height of Height of 
Width of Width of left elevation right Elevation Average 
Subbasin left right Average floodplain of left floodplain of right height floodplain floodplain width above riverbank above riverbank (m) (m) em) riverbank (m) riverbank (m) 
(m) em) 
27001 13.41 17.75 15.58 2 34 2 34 2 
27002 336.81 356.48 346.65 3 43 2 43 2.5 
27005 21.96 28.01 24.99 0 150 1 150 0.5 
27007 20.73 410.27 215.50 0 45 1 44 0.5 
27009 201.58 109.95 155.77 1 14 1 14 1 
27034 67.16 136.37 101.77 2 198 2 197 2 
27043 64.55 28.23 46.39 0 178 6 178 3 
27053 193.68 13.33 103.51 1 98 3 98 2 
27069 42.63 23.92 33.28 0 39 2 39 1 
27071 250.64 497.03 373.84 -1 26 3 24 1 
27075 4.78 29.66 17.22 0 54 4 54 2 
27083 19.02 157.57 88.30 0 19 2 19 1 
27085 74.41 66.09 70.25 3 39 2 39 2.5 
27089 28.23 230.77 129.50 6 9 8 9 7 
27090 51.26 14.47 32.87 3 158 4 159 3.5 
Note: Refer to Table C-I about the locations of the measurement sites. 
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C-5 Availability of Observed Data 
The data of gauged daily flow (GDF) , catchment monthly rainfall (CMR) 
and gauged monthly flow (GMF) are provided by National Water Flow Archive 
(NWA) (managed by CEH). Table C-5 shows the availability of the data. 2 
Table C-S. Availability of observed hydrological data 
Gauged Catchment Gauged 
Subbasin Name of Stations Daily Monthly Monthly 
Row Rainfall Row 
27001 Nidd at Hunsingore Weir 1935-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 
27002 Wharfe at Flint Mill Weir 1955-2002 1991-2001 1991-2003 
1991-2002 
27005 Nidd at Gouthwaite ReseMir Missing in 1991-2001 1991-2002 
Mar 1999 
27007 Ure at Westwick Lock 1958-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 
1969-2002 1991-2004 
27009 Ouse at Skelton Mssing in 1991-2003 Missing in 
Jul-Dec 1991 fILIg-Sep 2004 
27034 Ure at Kilgram Bridge 1991-2004 1991-2001 1991-2004 
27043 Wharfe at Mdingham 1991-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 
27053 Nidd at Birstwith 1991-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 
1991-2002 
27069 Wiske at KirbyWiske Mssing in 1991-2001 1991-2002 
29-30 Dec 2001 
27071 Swale at Crakehill 1991-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 
1991-2002 
27075 Bedale Beck at Leeming Missing in 1991-2001 1991-2002 25 Feb - 8 Mar 
12-15 Mar 1999 
1991-1995 
27083 Foss at Huntington 1997-2002 1991-2001 1991-2002 Missing in 
12 Nov 1 995 
1991-2002 
Missing in 1991-2002 
27085 Cod Beck at Dalton Bridge 2 fILIg-1 Sep 1992 1991-2001 Missing in 
4-31 Oct 1992 fILIg-Oct 1992 
16-17 fILIg 2002 
27089 Wharfe at Tadcaster 27 Jun 1991-2002 1991-2001 Jul 1991-2002 
27090 Swale at Catterick Bridge 17 Dec 1992-2004 1991-2001 Dec 92-04 
2 The recent data are being updated by CEH. 
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C-6 Linkage of Data between Rain and 
Hydrological Gauging Stations 
We convert the data of catchment monthly rainfall into the daily data by 
using the data of daily rainfalI based on the nearest rain gauging stations that are 
managed by MET Office. Table C-6 shows the linkage of the data between rain 
and hydrological gauging stations. Table C-7 provides the explanation of the data 
type that is included in Table C-6. 
Table C-6. Linkage between rain and hydrological gauging stations 
Gauging Met Office Rainfall Approximate Data 
Station From Until Gauging Station Distance Type (km) 
J.AJ'.J,91 JUN,92 Long Marston South Park 8 WAD RAIN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data 
-
-
J.AJ'.J ,93 JUN,98 Long Marston South Park 8 WADRAlN 
27001 JUL,98 OCT,98 Mssing Data - -
NOV,98 DEC,98 Long Marston South Park 8 WADRAlN 
J.AJ'.J ,99 MA.Y,99 Mssing Data - -
JUN,99 AUG,99 Long Marston South Park 8 WADRAlN 
SEP,99 DEC,99 Mssing Data 
- -
J.AJ'.J,91 JUN,92 Bramham 6 WADRAlN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data - -
J.AJ'.J ,93 DEC,97 Bramham 6 WAD RAIN 27002 
J.AJ'.J,98 OCT,99 Bramham 6 DLY3208 
NOV,99 NOV,99 Mssing Data - -
DEC,99 DEC,99 Bramham 6 DLY3208 
J.AJ'.J,91 JUN,92 Gouthwaite RESR a WAD RAIN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data - -
J.AJ'.J,93 MA.Y,98 Gouthwaite RESR 0 WADRAlN 27005 
JUN,98 JUL,98 Grimwith RESR 9 WADRAlN 
AUG,98 OCT,99 Gouthwaite RESR a WADRAlN 
NOV,99 DEC,99 Mssing Data - -
J.AJ'.J,91 JUN,92 Ripon SWKS 5 WADRAlN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data - -
J.AJ'.J ,93 FEB,99 Ripon SWKS 5 WAD RAIN 
Mt\R,99 MA.R,99 Lower Dunsforth 8 WAD RAIN 27007 
APR,99 MA.Y,99 Ripon SWKS 5 WAD RAIN 
JUN,99 JUL,99 Lower Dunsforth 8 WAD RAIN 
AUG,99 OCT,99 Ripon SWKS 5 WAD RAIN 
NOV,99 DEC,99 Mssing Data 
- -
The table is continued to the next page. 
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Table C-6. Linkage between rain and hydrological gauging stations (continue) 
Gauging 
Station From Until 
Met Office Rainfall 
Gauging Station 
JAN.91 JUN.92 York. komb Landing TRWKS 
JUL.92 DEC.92 Mssing Data 
JAN.93 FEB.93 York. The Retreat 
APR.93 MAY.93 York. komb Landing TRWKS 
JUN.93 JUL.93 York. The Retreat 
27009 AUG.93 MAR.94 York. komb Landing TR.WKS 
APR.94 MAY.94 York. The Retreat 
JUN.94 JAN.96 York. komb Landing TR.WKS 
FEB.96 MAR.96 York. The Retreat 
APR.96 OCT.99 York. komb Landing TRWKS 
NOV.99 DEC.99 Mssing Data 
JAN.91 JUN.92 Little Crakehall 
JUL.92 DEC.92 Mssing Data 
27034 JAN.93 FEB. 99 Little Crakehall 
rvtAR.99 MAR.99 Mssing Data 
APR.99 OCT.99 Little Crakehall 
NOV.99 DEC.99 Mssing Data 
JAN.91 JUN.92 March Gh)41 RESR 
JUL.92 DEC.92 Missing Data 
JAN.93 T\N\Y.98 March Gh~1 RESR 
JUN.98 JUL.98 Bolton .Abbey 
AUG.98 AUG.98 Chelker RESR 
SEP.98 OCT.98 Bolton .Abbey 
27043 NOV.98 DEC.98 March Gh)41 RESR 
JAN.99 FEB.99 Bolton .Abbey 
1'AAR.99 MAR.99 Chelker RESR 
APR.99 JUL.99 March Gh~1 RESR 
AUG.99 SEP.99 Bolton .Abbey 
OCT.99 OCT.99 Chelker RESR 
NOV.99 DEC.99 Mssing Data 
JAN.91 NOV.91 Birstwith Hall 
DEC.91 DEC91 Scargill RESR 
JAN.92 JUN.92 Birstwith Hall 
JUL.92 DEC.92 Mssing Data 
JAN.93 NOV.97 Birstwith Hall 
DEC.97 JAN.98 Scargill RESR 
FEB.98 MAR.98 Birstwith Hall 
APR.98 MAY.98 Scargill RESR 
27053 JUN.98 SEP.98 Harrogate 
OCT.98 OCT.98 Harlow Hill RESR 
NOV.98 FEB.99 Scargill RESR 
1'AAR.99 MAR.99 Harrogate 
APR.99 MA.Y.99 Birstwith Hall 
JUN.99 JUN.99 Harrogate 
JUL.99 JUL.99 Birstwith Hall 
AUG.99 OCT.99 Harrogate 








7 WAD RAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
- -
6 WAD RAIN 
- -




4 WAD RAIN 
-
-
4 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
4 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
4 WAD RAIN 
5 WAD RAIN 
5 WADRAIN 
- -
2 WAD RAI N 
7 WAD RAIN 
2 WAD RAIN 
- -
2 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 
2 WAD RAIN 
7 WADRAIN 
8 DL Y3208 
9 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 
8 DL Y3208 
2 WADRAIN 
8 DLY3208 
2 WAD RAIN 
8 DLY3208 
- -
The table is continued to the next page. 
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Table C-6. Linkage between rain and hydrological gauging stations (continue) 
Gauging 
Station From Until 
Met Office Rainfall 
Gauging Station 
JMI,91 JUN,92 Thirsk South Villa 
JUL,92 DEC,92 rv1issing Data 
JMI,93 OCT,94 Thirsk South Villa 
27069 NOV,94 DEC,94 Leeming 
JMI,95 JAN,95 Thirsk South Villa 
FEB,95 MAR,95 Leeming 
APR,95 SEP,99 Thirsk South Villa 
OCT,99 DEC,99 Missing Data 
JMI,91 APR,92 Thirsk South Villa 
~Y,92 JUN,92 Dishforth Airfield (SArv'IOS) 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data 
JAN,93 JAN,95 Dishforth Airfield (SArv'IOS) 
FEB,95 NOV,95 Dishforth Airfield (SArv'IOS) 
DEC,95 DEC,95 Thirsk South Villa 
27071 JAN,96 FEB,97 Dishforth Airfield (SArv'IOS) 
r-..AA,97 DEC,97 Thirsk South Villa 
JMI,98 APR,98 Dishforth Airfield (SArv'IOS) 
rvlAY,98 DEC,98 Thirsk South Villa 
JMI,99 FEB,99 Topcliffe rvET.OFFICE 
r-..AA,99 SEP,99 Thirsk South Villa 
OCT,99 DEC,99 Missing Data 
JMI,91 JUN,92 Leeming 
JUL,92 DEC,92 rv1issing Data 
JMI,93 DEC,95 Leeming 
JMI,96 APR,96 Little Crakehall 
~Y,96 FEB,97 Leeming 
27075 r-..AA,97 DEC,97 Little Crakehall 
JAN,98 APR,98 Leeming 
~Y,98 FEB,99 Little Crakehall 
r-..AA,99 MAR,99 Mssing Data 
APR,99 OCT,99 Little Crakehall 
NOV,99 DEC,99 Mssing Data 
JAN,91 JUN,92 York, Acomb Landing TR.WKS 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data 
JAN,93 FEB,93 York, The Retreat 
r-..AA,93 tv\A.Y,93 York, Acomb Landing TR.wKS 
JUN,93 JUL,93 York, The Retreat 
27083 AUG,93 1\AAR,94 York, Acomb Landing TR.wKS 
APR,94 rvlAY,94 York, The Retreat 
JUN,94 JAN,96 York, Acomb Landing TR.wKS 
FEB,96 MAR,96 York, The Retreat 
APR,96 OCT,99 York, .Acomb Landing TR.WKS 






7 WAD RAIN 
- -
7 WADRAIN 










7 WAD RAI N 
5 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAI N 





1 WAD RAIN 
- -
1 WADRAIN 
7 WAD RAI N 
1 WAD RAIN 
7 WAD RAIN 










3 WAD RAIN 
4 WAD RAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
4 WADRAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
4 WADRAIN 
3 WAD RAIN 
- -
The tahle is continued to the next page. 
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Table C-6. Linkage between rain and hydrological gauging stations (continue) 
Gauging 
From Met Office Rainfall 
Approximate 
Data Until Station Gauging Station Distance Type (KM) 
J.AN ,91 JUN,9 2 Thirsk South Villa 5 WADRAIN 
JUL,92 DEC,9 2 Mssing Data 
-
-
JAN,93 OCT, 9 4 Thirsk South Villa 5 WADRAIN 
27085 NOV,94 DEC,94 Dishforth Airfield (SMOS) 7 NCM 
JAN,95 JAN,95 Thirsk South Villa 5 WAD RAIN 
FEB,95 MAR,95 Dishforth I>jrfield (SMOS) 7 WAD RAI N 
APR,95 SEP,99 Thirsk South Villa 5 WAD RAIN 
OCT,99 DEC,99 Missing Data 
-
-
JAN,91 JUN,92 Bramham 5 WADRAIN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 tv1issing Data - -
J.AN,93 FEB,98 Bramham 5 WAD RAIN 
MAR,98 JUN,98 Long Marston, South Park 7 WAD RAIN 
JUL,98 AUG,98 Bramham 5 WAD RAIN 
27089 SEP,98 NOV,98 Askham Bryan 8 DL Y3208 
DEC,98 DEC,98 Long Marston, South Park 7 WAD RAIN 
JAN,99 JAN,99 Bramham 5 DL Y3208 
FEB,99 OCT,99 Bramham 5 WAD RAIN 
NOV,99 NOV,99 Mssing Data - -
DEC,99 DEC,99 Bramham 5 DL Y3208 
JAN,91 JUN,92 Richmond, Green Howard RD 6 WAD RAIN 
JUL,92 DEC,92 Mssing Data - -
JAN,93 DEC,98 Little Crakehall 9 WAD RAIN 
JAN,99 JAN,99 Richmond, Green Howard RD 6 WAD RAIN 
27090 FEB,99 MAR,99 Little Crakehall 9 WAD RAIN 
APR,99 tlAAY,99 Richmond, Green Howard RD 6 WAD RAIN 
JUN,99 AUG,99 Little Crakehall 9 WAD RAIN 
SEP,99 OCT,99 Richmond, Green Howard RD 6 WAD RAIN 
NOV,99 DEC,99 Mssing Data - -
Note: The approximate distance is the distance between the hydrological gauging station and the Met Onice 
rainfall gauging station. It is automatically calculated on the BADC web site when we search thr the 
nearest Met Otlice rainfall gauging station on the basis of OS grid reterence. 
Table C-7. rype of rainfall data 
Data Type Comments Oescripition 
WADRAIN 
PreCipitation amount from daily Daily rainfall amounts from rainfall 
rainfall station. network. 
DLY3208 
Daily preCipitation amount from Elements from Metform 3208 -
ord inary cl imatolog ical station. fvbnthly Return of Daily Obs. 
Daily precipitation amount from Elements from National Climate 
NCM synoptic station (no 12-hour values Messages reports (including climate 
reported). reports pre 1982) -12 hourly. 
Source: Met Otlice - UK Land Surface Stations data from the British Atmospheric Data Centre (BADe) 
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C-7 Flow Comparison Graphs 
We calibrate the relevant hydrological parameter values based on the data in 
1993. Then, we check flow comparison graphs in 1994 as well. In this appendix, 
we show the results of the flow comparison graphs in 1993 and 1994. Figure C-l 
and C-2 shows them respectively. We use the software program HEC-DSS 
Microsoft Excel Data Exchange Add-In (USACE) for retrieving the data produced 
by the simulations on HEC-HMS. Using this, we can treat the data on Microsoft 
Excel as usual. 
Figure C-l. Flow comparison graphs in J 993 
27001 
160 













('I) ('I) ('I) ('I) ('I) ('I) ('I) 
OJ OJ OJ OJ q q OJ ~ c? ~ 0 I.\' "- ~ , , 









E 100 ~ 









('I) Sl ('I) Sl OJ OJ 
N M + 0 , , 
...... ...... ..... ..... 
Sl q ('I) Sl ('I) ('I) OJ OJ OJ 
ch , , , cD ";- q 0 ..... , , 
...... ...... ..... ..... ..... ..... , , 














..... NNW W .". gg:gg:gg:g 
















































~ W o .". o (]I o m o ---J o 




























{:5 w o ~ UI a ~ --J o 


























o ~ ~ ~ 8 
1-1-93 I~ , ~ 


























.....a. ...a. ...a. ...a. I\l 

































~ w o .,.. o 01 a gj 
























.... !\)!\) o~~8~~~oti 



























































- ~ -.a. ~ ~ ol::l~~~8~i)~~ 






















o (J1 0 en ~ N tAl (J1 0 






















































Appendix C 315 
27090 













M M M M M M M M M M M 
OJ OJ OJ OJ OJ O? OJ OJ OJ O? OJ ~ c? ~ 0 t9 "7- r:1J dJ 0 ~ N , , 






..... ~ ~ 0 0 Ul 0 Ul 1-1-93 . 
1-2-93 
1-3-93 





~IN a. '"'-4 ! 1-7-93 I g 







































..... IV IN ~ OJ 0 0 0 0> 
1-1-93 . 0 0 0 0 
1-2-93 
1-3-93 , 
1-4-93 ~ ..iJ.:!E: 
1-5-93 1 fr" I I I 
CJ) 
1~93]~ 2' 
! 1-7-93 : 
1m 
I~ 































~ .................. N o~g:Ul8~~Ul8 














c It Cf !!L w 


























---- ...... 1\.) o~::U)8~8~~g~8 
1-1-



























o 0 ~ ~ :. o (]I (]) o 0 
1-1-93 I:$'E 
1-2-93 ~~~ir' ===--



















o (JI ~ I\) U) (]I 0 
1-1-93 1 'L!::::I , -l 























e i • 
o ~ ~ 


































~~ O ..... NW-!>-UlO)--J():)(CJO ..... 
1-1-93 1 ") ':::t::1: 1 I;;J;; , , , , 










































- --" o~~gJ~8~~gJ~ 


























































o ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ t; 8 


























o IV ~ en en ............... o IV ~ en 































Appendix C 321 
C-8 Data of Precipitation Frequency Analysis 
We carry out precipitation frequency analysis in the subbasins. This appendix 
gives all the results of it as histograms and probability diagrams. Figure C-3 
shows the histograms and probability diagrams in each subbasin. 
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e-g Results of Regressions 
27001 
+-------------------------------------------------
----------------------+ I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_Ol Mean= 22694374.26 ,S.D.= 13822511.61 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 2. Deg.Fr.= 58 I 
I Res I dua Is: Sum of squares= . 1227720622E+ 16, Std. Dev. = 4600825. 67880 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .891089. Adjusted R-squared = .88921 I 
I Mode I test: F [1. 58] = 474. 54, Prob va I ue = . 00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1004.6240. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1071.1406 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 30.716, Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.554 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 






23.553 .0000 560485.77 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_02 Mean= 9506357.442 ,S. D. = 5625251.480 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg.Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .2360285321E+15. Std.Dev.= 2017289.62974 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .873576, Adjusted R-squared = .87140 I 
I Model test: F[ 1, 58] = 400.77, Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -955.1552, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1017.1987 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 29.067, Akaike Info. Crt.= 31.905 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




19.395 .0000 1962517.3 
6.614 .0000 735.86611 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
IDep var. =C_05 Mean= 2161548.172 ,S.D.= 1147661.520 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Oeg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .2464536573E+14, Std. Dev. = 646311. 11948 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .682857, Adjusted R-squared = .68286 I 
I Mode I test: F [1. 59J = 127.04, Prob va lue = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -887.3743, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -921.8263 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 26.775, Akaike Info. Crt.= 29.612 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO X05 137. 2757863 4.8590471 28.252 .0000 13007.425 
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27007 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_07 Mean= 18843308.88 . S.D.= 11255499.19 
27009 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = .2, Deg. Fr. = 58 I 
I Residuals. Sum of sQuares= . 730433~185E+15, Std. Dev. = 3548758.44855 I 
, FI t . R-squared= .902276, Adjusted R-squared = .90059 , 
I Mode I test F [1. 58J = 535. 51. Prob va I ue = . 00000 , 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -989.0458, Restricted(b=O) Log-l = -1058.8141 I 
, LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 30.197, Akaike Info. Crt. = 33.035 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t) I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X07 6.438809849 .28174347 22.853 .0000 2084693.1 
XS 3138.368126 512.25298 6.127 .0000 1321.3177 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_09 Mean= 121429938.2 ,S.D.= 71160439.53 
I Mode lsi ze: Observat ions = 60, Parameters = 3, oeg. Fr. = 57 I 
I Residuals: Sum of sQuares= . 2150059843E+17, Std. Dev. = 19421727.03954 I 
I Fit: R-sQuared= .928035, Adjusted R-squared = .92551 I 
, Model test: F[ 2. 57] = 367.53, Prob value = .00000 I 
, Diagnostic: Log-l = -1090.5117. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1169.4590 I 
I LogAmemi yaPrCrt. = 33.613. Akai ke Info. Crt. = 36.450 , 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 












. 0001 3588. 9758 
. 0048 2589. 8980 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
/ Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_09 Mean= 121429938.2 ,S.D. = 71160439.53 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 4. Deg.Fr.= 56 I 
I Residuals: Sum of sQuares= .2125165434E+17, Std. Dev. = 19480601.31048 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .928868. Adjusted R-sQuared = .92506 I 
I Model test: F( 3. 56] = 243.76, Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1090.1623, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1169.4590 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 33.634, Akaike Info. Crt. = 36.472 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 


















. 0000 16370091. 
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_34 Mean= 40857205.41 . S.D.= 22551177.62 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 1. Deg. Fr. = 59 I 
I Residuals Sum of squares= . 640912295IE+16. Std. Dev. = 10422533.40428 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .786397. Adjusted R-squared = .78640 I 
IModeltestF[ 1. 59]= 217.21. Probvalue= .000001 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1054.2009. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1100.5100 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 32.335. Akaike Info. Crt.= 35.173 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X34 15.50372215 .45933450 33.753 .0000 2269018.5 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_43 Mean= 21235821.35 . S.D.= 9508436.437 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = I. Deg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= . I 523575579E+I 6. Std.Oev.= 5081664.57907 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .714377. Adjusted R-squared = .71438 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 59J = 147.57. Prob value = .00000 I 
I 0 i agnost i c Log-L = -lOll. 1011. Restr i cted (b=O) Log-L = -1048.6935 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 30.899. Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.737 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
28. 96503911 .83776876 34.574 .0000 648268.17 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep var. = C_53 Mean= 53191.10199 . S. D. = 34241.71579 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 2. Deg.Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1205334945E+ll. Std. Dev. = 14415.83746 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .825761. Adjusted R-squared = .82276 I 
I Mode I test F [1. 58] = 274.88. Prob va I ue = . 00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -658.6842. Restricted (b=O) log-L = -711.1041 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 19.185. Akaike Info. Crt.= 22.023 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 








. 0000 32913. 926 
.0000 100.91424 
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27069 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep var. = C_69 . Mean= 16629034. 91 . S. D. = 10224777. 88 I 
I Model size. Observations = 60. Parameters = 1. Deg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals. Sum of squares= .1644808973E+16. Std. Dev.: 5279973.31286 I 
I Fit. R-squared: .733341. Adjusted R-squared : .73334 I 
I Mode I test: F [1, 59): 162.26. Prob va lue : .00000 I 
I D I agnost I c Log-L: -1013.3980. Restr i cted (b=O) Log-L = -1053. 0516 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.: 30.975. Akaike Info. Crt. = 33.813 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable: none I 
I Dep. var = C_71 Mean: 29180477.83 . S. D. = 17541714. 73 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters: 2. Deg.Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares: .1720480706E+16. Std. Dev. = 5446417.21203 I 
I Fit: R-squared: .905234. Adjusted R-squared : .90360 I 
I Model test: F( I. 58J: 554.03. Prob value: .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-l = -1014.7474. Restricted(b:O) log-L = -1085.4376 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 31.054. Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.892 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 








. 0000 4038213.7 
. 0000 2493. 8689 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable: none I 
I Dep. var. : C_75 Mean: 13744305.46 . S. D.: 8466511.286 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters: 1. Deg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .1117603505E+16. Std.Oev.= 4352290.46420 I 
I Fit: R-squared: .735743. Adjusted R-squared = .73574 I 
I Model test: F( 1. 59]: 164.27. Prob value: .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L: -1001.8049. Restricted(b:O) Log-L = -1041.7298 I 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.: 30.589. Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.427 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X75 37.52708497 1.3589053 27.616 .0000 296156.24 
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27083 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
/ Dep. var. = C_83 Mean= 2426382.209 ,S. D.= 1498428.229 
/ Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg.Fr.= 59 / 
/ Residuals Sum of squares= .3094102215E+14, Std. Dev. = 724171. 32243 / 
/ Fit: R-squared= .766433. Adjusted R-squared = . 76643 I 
I Mode I test: F [1. 59J = 193.60, Prob va lue = . 00000 / 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -894.1991, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -937.8277 / 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 27.002, Akaike Info. Crt. = 29.840 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio /P[ITI>tJ , Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep var. = C_85 Mean= 3964037.244 ,S. O. = 2529879.029 , 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1. Oeg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .8653277780E+14, Std.Oev.= 1211056.25420' 
I Fit: R-squared= .770845, Adjusted R-squared = .77085 , 
I Model test: F[ 1, 59J = 198.47, Prob value = .00000 I 
, Diagnostic: Log-L = -925.0523, Restr icted (b=O) Log-l = -969.2530 I 
I logAmemiyaPrCrt. = 28.031, Akaike Info. Crt.= 30.868 , 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
,Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
7.803441530 .26903611 29.005 .0000 414488.51 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_89 Mean= 2100439.905 ,S. O. = 1135195.792 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2. Oeg.Fr.= 58 , 
'Residuals: Sum of squares= .7973174590E+13. Std.Dev.= 370767.48431' 
I Fit: R-squared= .895133. Adjusted R-squared = .89333 , 
I Mode I test: F [1. 58J = 495.08. Prob va lue = .00000 , 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -853.5191. Restr icted (b=O) Log-L = -921. 1710 , 
, LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 25.679, Akaike Info. Crt.= 28.517 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
,Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratiO IP[IT1>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SQ_X89 20.35564286 
XS 342. 8375726 
.87812549 
35. 151949 
23.181 .0000 65359.427 
9.753 .0000 1944.2826 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Oep var. = C_90 Mean= 30832102.50 ,S. D. = 14598822.59 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg. Fr. = 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .4084947920E+16, Std. Dev. = 8320841.62952 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .675138, Adjusted R-squared = .67514 I 
I Mode I test F [1. 59] = 122.62, Prob va lue = ,00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L =. -1040.6885, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1074.4192 I 
I LogAmemlyaPrCrt. = 31.885, Akaike Info. Crt. = 34.723 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[IT1>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_SELBY Mean= 1577399.987 ,S. 0.= 370928.4745 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .4340093118E+13, Std. Dev.= 273549.24910 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .465354, Adjusted R-squared = .45614 I 
I Model test: F[ 1, 58J = 50.48, Prob value = . 00000 j 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -835.2735, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -854.0580 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 25.071. Akaike Info. Crt.= 27.909 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[IT/>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 





7.105 .0000 13925.856 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_YORK Mean= 11891807.80 ,S.D.= 1766124.756 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr.= 58 I 
/ Residuals: Sum of squares= . 8304948312E+14, Std. Dev.= 1196615.07596 j 
I Fit R-squared= .548724, Adjusted R-squared = .54094 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 58] = 70.52, Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -923.8197. Restricted(b=O) log-L = -947.6900 I 
/ LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 28.023. Akaike Info. Crt.= 30.861 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 







8.398 .0000 11755.649 
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Appendix 0 
Appendices of Chapter 6 
0-1 Expected Cost Function of Flood Risk under 
Different Assumptions 
Protection against floods with 4% and more exceedance probability 
27001 C~27001 = 52. 18253(Xi) +45424.08264LX f j=27005and27053 
.I 
27002 C=c700c =5.97383(Xi) + 6603.299772: X.I j=27043 
f 
27005 C,"c27005 = 249.09306(X'} 
27007 C~27007 =1 1.5631 I(X') +6499.999682: Xf )=27034 
j 
27009 C~27009 = 9.04258(X' Y + I 1 991.506092: XJ+ 14274.496752: Xk 
j k 
j = 27007 and 27034, k = 27069,27071,27075, 27085 and 27090 
27034 Ci =27034 = 29.97472(X'l 
27043 C'=27043 = 55.06877(X'1 
27053 C=27053 = 1.08513(Xi) + 123.998252: Xi )=27005 
j 
27069 C'=27069 = 47 .48196(Xi ) 
27071 C=27071 = 8. 79495(X; Y + 8111.081862: X j 
j 
27075 C;=27075 = 71.0672I(Xi) 
27083 CH7083 = 10. 55981(Xi)2 
27085 Cic27085 = 13. 79704(Xi r 
j = 27069, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
27089 C=27()X9 = 37.29225(X;)2 +634.35004LXi j=27002and27043 
j 
27090 C'=2709U = 56.02235(X' T 
Selby c=Selby = 1302679.815+ IOO.34526.IXJ j =AlI15 subbasins 
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York c=York:::: 14800517.68+594.5666162IX i j=27001, 27005, 27007, 
J 
27009,27034,27053,27069,27071,27075,27083,27085 and 27090 
Protection against floods with 10 % and more exceedance probability 
27001 C=2700} :::: 11S.62265(X') + 103265.9424IX.i j= 27005 and 27053 
.i 
27002 co::: 7002 ::::12.S5452(Xi } +1421S.25946IX.i j=27043 
j 
27005 Cio27005 = 584.54491(Xi r 
27007 C=27007:::: 22.55078(X'} + 13709.86037I X.i j=27034 
j 
27009 C=2701l9 ::::21.66655(X'} +19221.56211IXJ +38920.03753IX k 
j k 
j = 27007 and 27034, k = 27069, 27071, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
27034 C=27034:::: 67.80 163(Xi r 
27043 C=27043:::: 121.1068S(X' Y 
27053 C=27053 ::::1.08513(x1 +123.99825IXj j=27005 
j 
27069 C=27069:::: llO.65511(X i y 
27071 C=27071 ::::22.14088(XiJ + 19659.421232: Xj 
j 
27075 C=27075 ::::159.65159(Xi} 
27083 C=27083 = 20.03577(Xi)2 
27085 C=27085 :::: 28.41622(X') 
j = 27069, 27075, 27085 and 27090 
27089 C'=27089 :::: 78.28033(X i } + 1377. 77230L Xi j = 27002 and 27043 
j 
27090 C=27090:::: 126.05450(Xi r 
Selby c=Se'bY ::::468506.1841+296.37153L:Xi j=AlI15subbasins 
York C=York = 23485840.16 + 1802.101472: X J j = 27001, 27005, 27007, 
i 
27009,27034,27053,27069,27071,27075,27083,27085 and 27090 
0·2 GAMS Codes 
Social Optimisation (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Koichiro Mori 
Model I ing Hydrological. Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set time t. subbasins i and urban areas j 
*--------------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins /501.502.505.507,509,534,543,553, 
569, 571, 575, s83, s85, 589, 590/ 
j urban areas /selby. york/ ; 
*------------------------------------------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus, 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*---------------------------------------------
tfirst(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1) ; 
Display tfirst 
Display t ; 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set initial values etc. 
*-----------------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346, 502 2402.75427, 
s05 204.67004, 507 2447.00171, 509 6639.46521, 
534 2451.61496, 543 1257.75186, 553 347.13385, 
s69 1338.21609, 571 3595.16936, 575 1029.10755, 
s83 1119.66767, 585 1149.58292, s89 443.79102, 
s901632.33813/ 
xO(i) initial state variables /501 99.3936l s02 217.13234, 
s05 14.38793, 507 155.26437, s09308.46632, 
s34 51.12944, 543 27.69161, s53 7.97054, 
569 101.624t 571 306.14877, s7563.81431, 
583 106.27285. s85 60.06330, s89 35.18348, 
s90 67.09430/ ; 
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*------------------------------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*------------------------------------------------
Scalars a~j adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
dlsl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
bl parameter 1 of ecosystem benefit function /0.55978/ 
b2 parameter 2 of ecosystem benefit function /8.48302/ 
b3 parameter 3 of ecosystem benefit function /-0.168/ 
fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ 
dis2 = l/(l+disO ; 
*------------------------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*------------------------------------------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
d i s3 (t) = d i s2** (ord (t) -1) 
Display dis3 ; 
*----------------------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*------------------------------------------------
Scalars 
cOl_l parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
cOl_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /23654.05790/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
c02_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3562.36893/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005 /137.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c07_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /3138.36812/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009/4.61088/ 
c09_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /7049.52755/ 
c09_3 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /6578.54122/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034/15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c53_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /123.99826/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27071/4.41719/ 
c71_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27071 /4069.88547/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function in 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function in 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /20.35564/ 
c89_2 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /342.83757/ 
c90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090 /29.55194/ 
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csb_l parameter of flood cost function in Selby /B99343.7B42/ 
csb_2 parameter of flood cost function in Selby /48.69045/ 
cyk_l parameter of flood cost function in York /B477662.33/ 
cyk_2 parameter of flood cost function in York /290.42594/ ; 
*----------------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*------------------------------------
Variables 
xCi. t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i. t) floodplain development 
yr(i. t) floodplain restoration 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
eco(i. t) benefit of ecosystem services 
pro(i. t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i. t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i. t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i. t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j. t) expected cost of flood risk in urban 
*-----------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*-------------------------------------
Equations 
ecosystem(i. t) benefit function of ecosystem services 
dfp(i. t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_cost(i. t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i. t) cost function of floodplain development 
fld_Ol (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_07(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_09(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_34(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_43(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_53(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_69(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_71 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_75(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_83(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_B5(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_B9(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_90(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sb(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i. t) provision of intial conditions 
nconstl (i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i,t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function; 
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ecos~stem ( i , t) .. eco ( i, t) =e= b 1 * ( I f (i) -x (i , t) ) *exp (b2+b3* I og ( I f ( i) -x (i , t» ) 
dfp(l, t) .. pro(i, t) =e= fl*x(i, t) : 
r_cost(i,t) .. rest(i,t) =e= rl*yr(i,t) : 
d_cost(i,t) .. deve(i,t) =e= dl*yd(i,t) : 
f I d_Ol (t) .. risk C 501' ,t) =e= cOLI * (x C sOl' , t) **2) + 
cOl_2*(xC 505', t)+xC 553', t» 
f I d_02 (t) .. r i 5k C 502' ,t) =e= cOLI * (x C 502' , t) **2) + 
cOL2*x C s43' ,t) : 
f I d_05 (t) .. r i 5k C 505' ,t) =e= c05* (x C s05' , t) **2) : 
f I d_07 (t) .. r i 5k C 507' ,t) =e= c07 _1 * (x C 507' , t) **2) + 
c07 _2*x C 534' ,t) : 
fld_09 (t) .. r i5kC 509', t) =e= c09_1*(xC 509', t) **2) + 
c09_2*(xC 569', t)+xC 571', t)+xC 575', t)+ 
xC 585', t)+xC 590', t»+ 
c09_3*(xC 507', t)+xC 534', t» 
f I d_34 (t) .. r i 5k C 534' ,t) =e= c34* (x C 534' , t) **2) : 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk C 543' ,t) =e= c43* (x C 543' , t) **2) : 
fld_53(t) .. ri5kC 553', t) =e= c53_1*(xC 553', t)**2)+ 
c53_2*xC s05' ,t) : 
f I d_69 (t) .. r i 5k C 569' ,t) =e= c69* (x C 569' , t) **2) : 
fld_71Ct) .. r i5kC 571', t) =e= c7Ll*(x(' s71', t)**2)+ 
c71_2*(x(' 569', t)+xC 575', t)+ 
xC' 585', t)+xC590', t» 
fld_75 (t) .. r iskC s75', t) =e= c75*(xC 575', t)**2) : 
f I d_83 (t) ., risk C s83' ,t) =e= c83* (x C s83' , t) **2) : 
f I d_85 (t) .. risk C s85' ,t) =e= c85* (x C s85' , t) **2) : 
fld_89(t) .. risk('s89',t) =e= c89_1*(xCs89',t)**2)+ 
c89_2*(xC s02', t)+xC s43', t» 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk C s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x C s90' , t) **2) : 
uf I d_sb (t).. ur i 5k C se I by' ,t) =e= csb_l+csb_2* (x (' 501' , t) +x C s02' , t) + 
xC s05', t)+xCs07', t)+xC s09', t)+xC 534', t)+ 
xC 543', t)+xCs53', t)+xC 569', t)+xC 571', t)+ 
xC 575' ,t)+x C s83' ,t)+xC s85' ,t)+xC 589' ,t)+ 
xC 590', t» : 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskCyork', t) =e= cyk_l+cyk_2*(x(' 501' ,t)+xCs05', t)+ 
X(' s07', t)+x(' 509', t)+xC s34', t)+ 
xC s53', t)+x(' 569', t)+xC 571', t)+ 
xC s75', t)+xC 583', t)+xC s85', t)+ 
xC s90' , t) ) 
ini (i, tfirst) .. xCi, tfirst) =e= xO(i) : 
nconst 1 (i , t) ., yd ( i ,t) = I = If ( i ) -x ( i, t) : 
nconst2 (i , t) ., yr (i ,t) = I = x (i, t) : 
net (t).. nb (t) =e= sum (i, eco (i, t» +sum (i, pro (i, t» -sum (i, rest (i, t»-
sum(i, deve(i, t»-sum(i, risk(i, t»-sum(j, uriskU, t» 
disnet(t) .. disnb(t) =e= dis3(t)*2*«nb(t)+adj)**(1/2» 
mot ion (i, t+ 1) .. x (i, t+ 1) =e= x (i, t) +yd ( i, t) -yr (i, t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t,disnb(t» 
Model floodplain /all/ : 
option doml im :: 1000000 : 
option resl im :: 5400 : 
floodplain. iterl im = 10000000 : 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a smal I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*------------------------------------------------
x. lo(i. t) = 0.0001 : 
x. up(i. t) = If(i)-O.OOOI 
yd. lo(i. t) = 0.0001 
yr.lo(i.t) =0.0001: 
*------------------------------------------------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*--------------------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
Tax (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Ko i ch i ro Mor i 
Modell ing Hydrological. Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*----------------------------------------------
* Set time t. subbasins i and urban areas j 
*------------------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods 11990*20201 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins IsOl. s02. 505. s07. s09. s34. s43. s53. 
s69. 571.575.583. 585. 589. s90/ 
j urban areas Iselby. york/ : 
*------------------------------------------------
* The elements in the sets are str ings. Thus. 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*------------------------------------------------
tf i rst (t) = yes$ (ord (t) eq 1) : 
Display tfirst 
Display t : 
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*------------------------------------------------
* Set initial values et~ 
*-----------------------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346. 502 2402.75427. 
505 204.67004. 507 2447.00171. 509 6639.46521. 
534 2451.61496. 543 1257.75186. 553 347.13385. 
569 1338.21609. 571 3595.16936. 575 1029.10755. 
583 1119.66767. 585 1149.58292. 589 443.79102. 
590 1632.33813/ 
xO(i) initial state variables /501 99.39369. 502 217.13234. 
505 14.38793. 507 155.26437. 509 308.46632. 
534 51.12944. 543 27.69161. 553 7.97054. 
569 101. 6242. 571 306.14877. 575 63.81431. 
583 106.27285. 585 60.06330. 589 35.18348. 
59067.09430/ 
txr(i) tax rate /501 1030.9442.502 1202.78708.505 25037.64832. 
s07 7547. 76757. 509 873. 20209. 534 10666.99101. 
s43 4648.04262. s53 24835.47271. s6912135.56239. 
s71 7977. 45707. 575 12165.16123. s83 2115.08188. 
s85 12159.27972. s89 1044.79636. s90 12111.60695/ : 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* va lues in the funct ions. 
*----------------------------------------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
disl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
f1 parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function 119146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function 11914.63735/ : 
dis2 = 1/(I+disf) ; 
*---------------------------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*--------------------------------------------
Parameters 
di53(t) discount factor in time t 
dis3(t) = dis2**(ord(t)-l) 
Display dis3 : 
*---------------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*--------------------------------------------
Scalars 
cOl_' parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
cOS parameter of flood cost function in 27005/137.27578/ 
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c07_1 parameter of flood cost function n 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function n 27009/4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function n 27034/15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function n 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function n 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function n 27069/24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function n 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function n 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function n 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /20.35564/ 
c90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090 /29.55194/ 
csb_1 parameter of flood cost function in Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_1 parameter of flood cost function in York /8477662.33/ ; 
*------------------------------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*---------------------------------------
Var iab I es 
xli, t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yr(i, t) floodplain restoration 
tx (i, t) tax 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
pro(i, t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i,t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i, t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i, t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j, t) expected cost of flood risk in urban 
*-----------------------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*--------------------------------------
Equations dfp(i, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain development 
tax(i, t) tax function 
fld_01 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_07(t) expected cost function of flood risk ·n subbasin 
fld_09(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_34(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_43(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld 53(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld-69(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld=71 (t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld 75(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld-S3(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld-S5(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld-S9(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
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fld_90(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sb(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconstl (i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti lity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i,t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function 
dfp(i, t) .. pro(i, t) =e= fhx(i, t) : 
r_cost(i,t) .. rest(i,t) =e= rl*yr(i,t) 
d_cost(i,t) .. deve(i,t) =e= dl*yd(i,t) 
ta x ( i , t) .. tx ( i ,t) =e= tx r (i) *x (i, t) : 
fld_Ol(t) .. riskCsOl',t) =e= cOl_l*(xCs01',t)**2) 
f I d_02 (t) .. risk(' s02' ,t) =e= cOL h (x C s02' , t) **2) 
f I d_05 (t) .. risk C s05' ,t) =e= c05* (x C s05' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_07 (t) .. risk C s07' ,t) =e= cOL 1 * (x C s07' , t) **2) 
f I d_09 (t) .. risk (' s09' ,t) =e= c09_1 * (x C s09' , t) **2) 
f I d_34 (t) .. risk (' s34' ,t) =e= c34* (x C s34' , t) **2) : 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk C s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x C s43' , t) **2) : 
f I d_53 (t) .. risk C s53' ,t) =e= c53_1 * (x C s53' , t) **2) 
f I d_69 (t) .. risk C s69' ,t) =e= c69* (x (' s69' , t) **2) ; 
fld_71 (t) .. riskC s71', t) =e= c7Ll*(xC s71', t)**2) 
fld_75(t) .. riskC s75', t) =e= c75*(x(' s75', t)**2) 
fld_83(t) .. riskC s83', t) =e= c83*(x('s83', t)**2) : 
f I d_85 (t) .. risk (' s85' ,t) =e= c85* (x (' s85' , t) **2) : 
f I d_89 (t) .. risk (' s89' ,t) =e= c89_1 * (x (' s89' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk (' s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x (' s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. uriskC selbY', t) =e= csb_1 : 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskC'york', t) =e= cyk_l : 
ini (i, tfirst) .. xCi, tfirst) =e= xO(i) : 
nconst 1 (i , t) .. yd ( i ,t) = I = If (i) -x (i, t) : 
nconst2 (i , t) .. yr (i ,t) = I = x (i, t) : 
net (t) .. nb (t) =e= sum (i, pro (i, t» -sum (i, rest (i, t)) -sum (i, tx (i, t»-
sum (i , deve (i, t» -sum (i , risk (i, t) ) -sum (j, ur i sk (j, t» 
d i snet (t) ., d i snb (t) =e= d i s3 (t) *2* «nb (t) +adj) ** (1/2» 
mot i on ( i, t+ 1) .. x (i , t+ 1) =e= x (i, t) +yd (i, t) -yr( i, t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t,disnb(t» 
Model floodplain /al 1/ : 
option doml im = 1000000 : 
option resl im = 5400 : 
floodplain. iterlim = 10000000 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a small value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*------------------------------------------------
x.lo(i, t) = 0.0001 ; 
x.up(i,t) = If(i)-0.0001 
yd.lo(i,t) = 0.0001 : 
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yr. lo(i, t) = 0.0001 : 
*----------------------------------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*--------------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
Subsidy (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Ko i ch i ro Mor i 
Model I ing Hydrological. Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*-------------------------------------------
* Set time t. subbasins i and urban areas j 
*---------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins IsOl. 502. 505. 507. s09. 534. 543. s53. 
s69. s71. 575.583. 585. s89. 590/ 
j urban areas /selby. yorkl ; 
*--------------------------------------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus. 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*----------------------------------------
tf i rst (t) = yes$ Cord (t) eq 1) 
Display tfirst 
Display t ; 
*-----------------------------------------------
* Set initial values etc. 
*---------------------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346. 502 2402.75427. 
s05 204.67004. 507 2447.00171. 509 6639.46521. 
534 2451.61496. 543 1257.75186. 553 347.13385. 
s69 1338.21609. 571 3595.16936. 575 1029.10755. 
583 1119.66767. 585 1149.58292. 589 443.79102. 
590 1632.33813/ 
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xO(i) initial state variables /501 99.39369, 502 217.13234, 
505 14.38193, 501 155.26431, 509 308.46632, 
534 51. 12944, 543 21.69161, 553 1.97054, 
569 101.6242, 511 306.14877, 575 63.81431, 
583 106.27285, s85 60.06330, s89 35.18348 
s9067.09430/ ' 
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ssr(i) subsidy rate /501 1030.9442,502 1202.78708,505 25037.64832 
507 1547.76157, 509 813.20209, 534 10666.99101, ' 
543 4648.04262, 553 24835.47271, 569 12135.56239, 
571 7977.45707, 575 12165.16123, s832115.08188, 
585 12159.27972, s89 1044.79636, s90 12111.60695/ ; 
*-----------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*-----------------------------------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
dis1 periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ 
dis2 = l/(l+disl) ; 
*------------------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*------------------------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
d i 53 (t) = d i 52** (ord (t)-1) 
Display dis3 ; 
*------------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*------------------------------------
Scalars 
cOl_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /21.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 21002 /3.22602/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005 /131.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034/15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 21043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function in 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function in 27083 /5.28391/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /20.35564/ 
e90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090/29.55194/ 
csb_1 parameter of flood cost function in Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_1 parameter of flood cost function in York /8477662.33/ ; 
*--------------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*------------------------------------
Variables 
xCi, t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yr(i, t) floodplain restoration 
ss (i, t) subs idy 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
pro(i, t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i, t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i, t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i,t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j, t) expected cost of flood risk in urban 
*---------------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*----------------------------------
Equations 
dfp(i, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain development 
subsidy(i, t) subsidy function 
fld_01 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_07(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_09(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_34(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_43(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_53(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_69(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_71 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_75(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_83(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_85(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_89(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_90(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sb(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconstl (i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i, t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function; 
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dfp (i , t) .. pr 0 ( i ,t) =e= f 1 *x (i, t) ; 
r_cost(i, t) .. rest(i, t) =e= rl*yr(i, t) 
d_cost (i, t) .. deve (i, t) =e= d1*yd (j, t) 
subs i dy (i , t).. ss (i, t) =e= ssr (i) * (I f (i) -x (i, t)) 
fld_01 (t) .. r iskC sOl', t) =e= cOU*(x (' sOl', t)**2) 
f I d_02 (t) .. risk C s02' ,t) =e= c02_1 * (x C s02' , t) **2) 
f I d_OS (t) .. risk C s05' ,t) =e= cOS* (x C 50S' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_07 (t) .. risk C s07' ,t) =e= cOL 1 * (x C s07' , t) **2) 
fld_09 (t) .. r iskC s09' ,t) =e= c09_1*(x C s09', t)**2) 
f I d_34 (t) .. risk (' s34' ,t) =e= c34* (x C s34' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk C s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x C s43' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_S3 (t) .. risk C s53' ,t) =e= c53_ h (x C s53' , t) **2) 
f I d_69 (t) .. risk C s69' ,t) =e= c69* (x C s69' , t) **2) : 
fld_71 (t) .. riskC s71', t) =e= c7L1*(xC s71', t)**2) 
fld_7S(t) .. riskC s75', t) =e= c75*(xC s7S', t)**2) 
f I d_83 (t) .. risk C s83' ,t) =e= c83* (x C s83' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_8S (t) .. risk (' s85' ,t) =e= c8S* (x (' s8S' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_89 (t) .. risk (' s89' ,t) =e= c89_1 * (x (' s89' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk (' s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x (' s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. uriskCselby' ,t) =e= csb_1 ; 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskCyork', t) =e= cyk_1 ; 
ini(i,tfirst) .. x(i,tfirst) =e= xO(i) ; 
nconst 1 (i , t) .. yd ( i ,t) = I = If ( i ) -x ( i, t) : 
nconst2 (i , t) .. yr (i ,t) = I = x (i, t) ; 
net (t) .. nb (t) =e= sum (i, pro (i, t)) -sum (i, rest (i, t)) +sum (i, ss (i, t))-
sum (i , deve (i , t) ) -sum (i, risk (i, t)) -sum (j, ur i sk (j, t) ) 
d i snet (t) .. d i snb (t) =e= d i 53 (t) *2* ((nb (t) +adj) ** (1/2)) 
mot ion (i , t+ 1) ., x ( i , t+ 1) =e= x (i, t) +yd (i, t) -yr (i. t) 
we I fare.. z =e= sum (t, d i snb (t)) 
Model floodplain /all/ ; 
option doml im = 1000000 ; 
option resl im = 5400 ; 
floodplain. iterl im = 10000000 ; 
*-------------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a smal I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*-------------------------------------
x. lo(i, t) = 0.0001 : 
x.up(i,t) = If(i)-O.OOOl 
yd.lo(i,t) = 0.0001 
yr.lo(i,t) =0.0001; 
*-------------------------------------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*-----------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
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Mix of Tax and Subsidy (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Koichiro Mori 
Model I ing Hydrological, Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set time t, subbasins i and urban areas j 
*------------------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirstCt) first period 
i subbasins /501, s02, s05, 507, s09, s34, s43, 553, 
569,571,575,583,585,589,590/ 
j urban areas /5elby, york/ ; 
*------------------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus, 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*--------------------------------------------
tfirstCt) = yes$CordCt) eq 1) : 
Display tfirst 
Display t : 
*-------------------------------------------------
* Set initial values et~ 
*------------------------------------------------
Parameters 
IfCi) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346, s02 2402.75427, 
505 204.67004, s07 2447.00171, s096639.46521, 
5342451.61496, s43 1257.75186, 553347.13385, 
s69 1338.21609, s71 3595.16936, 575 1029.10755, 
583 1119.66767, s85 1149.58292, s89 443.79102, 
590 1632.33813/ 
xO C i) in i t i a I state var i ab I es /501 99. 39369, 502 217. 13234, 
505 14.38793, 507 155.26437, 509 308.46632, 
534 51.12944, 543 27.69161, 553 7.97054, 
569 101.6242, 571 306.14877, s7563.81431, 
583 106.27285, 585 60.06330, 58935.18348, 
59067.09430/ 
rateCi) rate /501 1030.9442, s02 1202.78708,505 25037.64832, 
507 7547.76757, 509 873. 20209, 534 10666.99101, 
543 4648.04262, 553 24835.47271, s69 12135.56239, 
571 7977. 45707, 575 12165.16123, 583 2115.08188, 
585 12159.27972, 589 1044.79636, 590 12111.60695/ 
targetCi) standard /501 99.3936~ 502 217. 1323~ 
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s05 14.38793, s07 155.26437, s09308.46632 
s34 51. 12944, s43 27.69161, s53 7.97054 ' 
s69 101. 6242, s71 306.14877. s75 63.81431 
s83 106.27285, s85 60.06330, s89 35. 18348: 
s90 67.09430/ ; 
*-----------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*--------------------------------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
disl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ ; 
dis2 = 1/(1+disl) ; 
*------------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*--------------------------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
dis3(t) = dis2**(ord(t)-l) 
Display dis3 ; 
*------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*---------------------------------
Scalars 
cOLl parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005 /137.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034 /15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function 'n 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function n 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function n 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function n 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function n 27089 /20.35564/ 
c90 parameter of flood cost function n 27090 /29.55194/ 
csb_l parameter of flood cost function n Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_l parameter of flood cost function In York /8477662.33/ ; 
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*---------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*-----------------------------
Variables 
xli, t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yrCi, t) floodplain restoration 
ptyl (i, t) penalty 
nbCt) net benefit 
disnbCt) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
proCi. t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i, t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i, t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i. t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
uriskCj. t) expected cost of flood risk in urban 
*-----------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*---------------------------
Equations 
dfp(i, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_costCi. t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain development 
fld_Ol (t) expected cost function of flood risk 'n subbasin 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_05Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_07Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_09Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_34Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_43Ct) expected cost function of flood risk In subbasin 
fld_53Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_69Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_71 Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_75(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_83(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_85(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_89(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_90Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sbCt) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
penall (i,t) penalty 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconstl Ci, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2 C i, t) natura I constra i nts on restor at i on 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnetCt) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i, t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function 
dfp(i, t) .. proCi, t) =e= fl*x(i, t) : 
r_costCi,t) .. restCi,t) =e= rl*yr(i,t) 
d_costCi,t) .. deveCi,t) =e= dl*yd(i,t) 
fld_01Ct) .. riskCsOl',t) =e= cOU*CxCsOl',t)**2) 
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f I d_02 (t) .. risk (' 502' ,t) =e= cOL 1* (x (' 502' , t) **2) 
f I d_05 (t) .. risk C s05' ,t) =e= c05* (x (' s05' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_07 (t) .. risk (' s07' ,t) =e= c07_1 * (x (' s07' , t) **2) 
f I d_09 (t) .. risk C s09' ,t) =e= c09_1 * (x (' s09' , t) **2) 
f I d_34 (t) .. risk C s34' ,t) =e= c34* (x (' s34' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk C s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x (' s43' , t) **2) ; 
fld_53(t) .. riskC s53', t) =e= c53_1*(x(' s53', t)**2) 
f I d_69 (t) .. risk C s69' ,t) =e= c69* (x (' 569' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_71 (t).. r i s k (' s 71' ,t) =e= c 7 C 1 * (x (' s 71' , t) **2) 
fld_75(t) .. riskCs75',t) =e= c75*(x('s75',t)**2) 
f I d_83 (t) .. risk C s83' ,t) =e= c83* (x (' s83' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_85 (t) .. risk C s85' ,t) =e= c85* (x (' s85' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_89 (t) ., risk C 589' ,t) =e= c89_1 * (x (' s89' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk (' s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x (' s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. urisk('selby' ,t) =e= csb_l ; 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskCyork', t) =e= cyk_l ; 
pena 11 (i, t) .. pty 1 (i, t) =e= rate (j) * (x ( i, t) -ta r get (i) ) 
ini (i, tfirst) .. x(i,tfirst) =e= xO(i) ; 
nconst1(i,t) .. yd(i,t) =1= If(i)-x(i,t) ; 
nconst2 (i , t).. yr ( i ,t) = I = x (i ,t) ; 
net (t) .. nb (t) =e= sum ( i, pro (i, t» -sum (i, rest (i , t) ) -sum (i , pty 1 (i, t» 
-sum(i, deve(i, t»-sumCi, risk(i, t»-sumU, uriskU, t» 
d i snet (t) .. d i snb (t) =e= d i 53 (t) *2* ((nb (t) +adj) ** (1/2» 
motion(i,t+1) .. x(i,t+1) =e= x(i,t)+yd(i,t)-yr(i,t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t,disnb(t» 
Model floodplain /all/ ; 
option doml im = 1000000 ; 
option resl im = 5400 ; 
floodplain. iterlim = 10000000; 
*---------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a smal I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*--------------------------------
x.lo(i,t) = 0.0001 ; 




* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*-------------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
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Marketable Permits for Development (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Ko i ch i ro Mor i 
Model I ing Hydrological. Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*---------- ------------
* Set time t. subbasins and urban areas j 
*------------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins /sOl. 502. 505.507. s09, s34, 543, 553, 
569.571,575,583. s85. s89,s90/ 
j urban areas /selby. york/ : 
*-----------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus, 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*----------------------------------
tf i rst (t) = yes$ (ord (t) eq 1) ; 
Display tfirst 
Display t ; 
*----------------------------------
* Set initial values et~ 
*---------------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346. s02 2402.75427, 
s05 204.67004. s07 2447.00171. s096639.46521. 
s34 2451.61496, s43 1257.75186, s53 347.13385. 
s69 1338.21609, s71 3595.16936, s75 1029.10755, 
s83 1119.66767, s85 1149.58292, s89 443.79102, 
590 1632.33813/ 
xO(i) initial state variables /sOl 99.39369, 502 217.13234, 
505 14.38793, s07 155.26437, 509 308.46632, 
s34 51.12944, s43 27.69161, s53 7.97054, 
s69 101. 6242, 571 306.14877. 575 63.81431, 
583 106. 27285, 585 60. 06330, 589 35. 18348. 
590 67.09430/ 
mp(i) marketable permits for development /501 139.79714, 
502 1770.14972, 505 0.0031. 507 348.12915, 
509 1118.3071, s34 57.34874, 543 134.27139, 
s53 0.0031. 5690.0031. 571378.99932, 
575 0.0031, 583 1010.56003, 585 59.79422, 
589 283.6966, 590 0.0031/ ; 
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*------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*--------- -----------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
disl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ 
dis2 = 1/(1+disl) : 
*------------ --------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*----------------------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
dis3(t) = dis2**(ord(t)-l) 
Display dis3 : 
*-----------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*--------------------------
Scalars 
cOl_l parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005/137.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034/15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function in 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function in 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089/20.35564/ 
c90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090 /29.55194/ 
csb_l parameter of flood cost function in Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_l parameter of flood cost function in York /8477662.33/ ; 
*----------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*----------------------------------------
Variables 
x(i. t) area of developed floodplains 
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yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yr(i, t) floodplain restoration 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
pro(i, t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i, t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i, t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i, t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j, t) expected cost of flood risk in urban; 
*-----------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*------------- ._-- -----------
Equations 
dfp(i, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain development 
fld_01 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_07(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_09(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_34(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_43(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_53(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_69(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_71 (t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_75(t) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_83(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_85(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_89(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_90(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sb(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconst1 (i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
mpconst(i) marketable permits for development 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i, t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function 
dfp(i, t) .. pro(i, t) =e= f1*x(i, t) ; 
r_cost(i,t) .. rest(i,t) =e= r1*yr(i,t) 
d_cost(i, t) .. deve(i, t) =e= d1*yd(i, t) 
fld_01(t) .. riskCsOl',t) =e= cOL1*(xC sOl' ,t)**2) 
fld 02(t) .. riskCs02',t) =e= cOL1*(xCs02',t)**2) 
f I d -05 (t) .. risk C s05' ,t) =e= c05* (x (' s05' , t) **2) ; 
f I d -07 (t) .. risk C s07' ,t) =e= c07 _1 * (x C s07' , t) **2) 
fld-09(t) .. riskCs09',t) =e= c09_1*(xCs09',t)**2) 
f I d=34 (t) .. risk (' s34' ,t) =e= c34* (x C s34' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk (' s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x (' s43' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_53 (t) .. risk (' s53' ,t) =e= c53_1 * (x (' s53' , t) **2) 
f I d_69 (t) .. risk C s69' ,t) =e= c69* (x (' s69' , t) **2) ; 
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fld_71(t) .. riskCs71',t) =e= c7U*(xCs71',t)**2) 
fld_7S(t) .. riskCs75',t) =e=c75*(x('s75',t)**2) , 
f I d_83 (t).. risk (' s83' ,t) =e= c83* (x (' s83' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_85 (t) " risk (' s85' ,t) =e= c85* (x (' s85' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_89 (t) .. risk (' s89' ,t) =e= c89_h (x C s89' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk (' s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x C s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. uriskCselby',t) =e= csb_1 ; 
uf I d_yk (t).. ur i sk (' york' ,t) =e= cyk_l ; 
ini(i,tfirst) .. x(i,tfirst) =e= xO(i) ; 
nconst I (i , t) .. yd (i ,t) = I = If (i) -x ( i, t) 
nconst2 (i , t) ., yr (i ,t) = I = x ( i, t) ; 
mpconst (i) .. sum (t, yd ( i , t» = I = mp (i) ; 
net (t) .. nb (t) =e= sum (i, pro (i, t» -sum (i, rest (i, t) )-
sum (i , deve (i, t» -sum (i , risk ( i, t» -sum (j, ur i sk (j, t» 
d i snet (t) .. d i snb (t) =e= d i s3 (t) *2* «nb (t) +adj) ** (1/2» 
motion(i,t+I) .. x(i,t+1) =e= x(i,t)+yd(i,t)-yr(i,t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t, disnb(t» 
Model floodplain /all/ ; 
oPtion doml im = 1000000 ; 
option resl im = 5400 ; 
floodplain. iter lim = 10000000 : 
*------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a smal I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*-------------------------------
x. lo(i, t) = 0.0001 : 
x.up(i,t) = If(i)-O.ooOI 
yd.lo(i,t) = 0.0001 
yr.lo(j,t) = 0.0001 ; 
*-----------------_._-_._-------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*-------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
Marketable Permits/or Developed Floodplains (base) 
STitle Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Koichi ro Mor i 
Modell ing Hydrological, Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
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'----------------
* Set time t. subbasins i and urban areas j 
*---------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins /sOI, 502, s05, 507,509,534,543, 553, 
s69,s71,s75,583,585,s89,s90/ 
j urban areas /selby,york/ ; 
*------------------------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus, 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*--------------------------------------
tfirst(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1) ; 
Display tfirst 
Display t : 
*-----------------------------
* Set initial values et~ 
*---------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346, s02 2402.75427, 
505204.67004, s07 2447.00171, 509 6639.46521, 
5342451.61496, 543 1257.75186, 553347.13385, 
s69 1338.21609, 571 3595.16936, 575 1029.10755, 
583 1119.66767, 585 1149.58292, 589443.79102, 
590 1632.33813/ 
xO(i) initial state variables /501 99.39369, 502 217.13234, 
505 14.38793, 507 155.26437, 509 308.46632, 
534 51. 12944, 543 27.69161. 553 7.97054, 
569 101.6242, 571 306.14877, 57563.81431, 
583 106.27285, 585 60.06330, 58935.18348, 
s9067.09430/ 
mp(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains / 
501 236.87, 502 1968.685, 505 0.0002, 
507 493.596, 509 1413.031, s34 104.398, 
543 159.787, 553 0.0002, 56964.37, 
571 670.857, 575 41.688, 583 111~ 574, 
585 111.796, 589 315.874, 590 53.846/ ; 
*----------------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*---------------------------------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for util ity function /1000000000/ 
disl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor 
fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
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rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
d1 parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ 
dis2 = 1/(1+dis1) ; 
*---------------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*-------------------------------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
dis3(t) = dis2**(ord(t)-l) 
Display dis3 ; 
*----------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*-------------------------------------
Scalars 
c01_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005 /137.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034 /15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function in 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function in 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085/7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /20.35564/ 
c90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090 /29.55194/ 
csb_l parameter of flood cost function in Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_l parameter of flood cost function in York /8477662.33/ ; 
*----------------------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*-------------------------------------
Variables 
x(i, t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yr(i, t) floodplain restoration 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted util ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
pro(i, t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i,t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i,t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i, t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j, t) expected cost of flood risk in urban; 
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*------------------------------------------------
* Oef i ne equat ions in the mode I. 
*-----------------------------------------
Equations 
dfpCi, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_costCi, t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_costCi, t) cost function of floodplain development 
fld_01 Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_02Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_07Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_09Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_34Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_43Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_53Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_69Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_71 Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_75Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_83Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_85Ct) expected cost function of flood risk n subbasin 
fld_89Ct) expected cost function of flood risk In subbasin 
fld_90Ct) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sbCt) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconst1 (i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
mpconst1 Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst2(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst3Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst4(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst5Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst6Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst7 C i) marketab I e permi ts for deve loped f I oodp I a i ns 
mpconst8 C i) marketab I e permi ts for deve loped f loodp I a i ns 
mpconst9Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst10Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst11 Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst12Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst13Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst14(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst15(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst16(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst17Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst18Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst19Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst20(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst21 (i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst22Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst23Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst24Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst25(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst26Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst27Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst28Ci) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
mpconst29(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
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mpconst30(i) marketable permits for developed floodplains 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i, t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function; 
dfp(j,t) .. pro(i,t) =e= fhx(i,t) ; 
r_cost(i,t) .. rest(i,t) =e= rl*yr(i,t) : 
d_cost(i,t) .. deve(i,t) =e= dl*yd(i,t) : 
f I d_Ol (t).. risk (' sOl' ,t) =e= cOL 1* (x C sOl' , t) **2) 
f I d_02 (t).. risk (' s02' ,t) =e= cOZ_1* (x C s02' , t) **2) 
f I d_05 (t) .. risk (' s05' ,t) =e= c05* (x C s05' , t) **2) : 
f I d_07 (t). risk (' s07' ,t) =e= cOLI * (x C s07' , t) **2) 
f I d_09 (t).. risk (' s09' ,t) =e= c09_1* (x C s09' , t) **2) 
f I d_34 (t) ., risk (' s34' ,t) =e= c34* (x C s34' , t) **Z) ; 
f I d_ 43 (t) .. risk C s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x (' s43' , t) **2) : 
f I d_53 (t) .. risk C s53' ,t) =e= c53_1* (x (' s53' , t) **2) 
f I d_69 (t) .. risk C s69' ,t) =e= c69* (x (' s69' , t) **2) : 
fld_71 (t) .. riskC s71', t) =e= c71_1*(xC s71', t)**Z) 
fld_75(t) .. riskC s75', t) =e= c75*(xC s75', t)**2) ; 
f I d_S3 (t) .. risk C sS3' ,t) =e= cS3* (x (' sS3' , t) **2) : 
f I d_S5 (t) .. risk C sS5' ,t) =e= cS5* (x (' sS5' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_S9 (t) ., risk C sS9' ,t) =e= cS9_1 * (x C sS9' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t) .. risk C s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x C s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. uriskCselby' ,t) =e= csb_l ; 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskCyork', t) =e= cyk_l ; 
ini (i, tfirst) .. xCi, tfirst) =e= xO(i) : 
nconst 1 (i , t) .. yd ( i ,t) = I = If ( i ) -x ( i, t) 
nconst2 (i , t) .. yr ( i ,t) = I = x (i, t) ; 
mpconstl (i) .. x (i,' 1991') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst2(i) .. x(i,' 1992') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst3(i) .. x(i,' 1993') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst4(i) .. x(i,' 1994') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst5(i) .. x(i,' 1995') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst6(j) .. x(i,' 1996') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst7(i) .. x(i,' 1997') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst8 (i) ., x (i, ' 1995') = I = mp (i) 
mpconst9(i) .. x(i,' 1999') =1= mp(i) 
mpconstl0(i) .. x(i,'2000') =1= rop(i) 
mpconstl1(i) .. x(i,'200l') =1= rop(i) 
mpconstlZ(i) .. xli, '2002') =1= rop(i) 
mpconst 13 (i) .. x (i , ' 2003') = I = rop (i) 
mpconst14(i) .. xli, '2004') =1= rop(i) 
mpconst15(i) .. xli, '2005') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst16(i) .. x(i,'2006') =1= rop(i) 
mpconst 17 (i) .. x ( i , ' 2007') = I = mp ( i) 
mpconstlS(i) .. x(i,'200S') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst19(i) .. x(i,'2009') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst20(i) .. xli, '2010') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst21 (i) .. x ( i, ' 2011') = I = mp (i) 
mpconst2Z(i) .. xli, 'Z012') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst23 (i) .. xli, '2013') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst24 (i) .. xli, '2014') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst25(i) .. x(i,'2015') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst26(i) .. x(i,'2016') =1= mp(i) 
mpconst27 (i) .. xli, '2017') =1= rop(i) 
mpconst2S(i) .. xli, '201S') =1= mp(i) 
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mpconst29 (i).. x (i, ' 2019') =1= "" (j) ; 
mpconst30(i) .. x(i,' 2020') =1= /l1)(i) ; 
net (t) .. nb(t) =e= sum(i, pro(i, t»-sum(i, rest(i, t»-
sum ( i, deve ( i, t» -sum (i, risk ( i, t) ) -sum (j, ur i sk (j, t» 
d i snet (t).. d i snb (t) =e= d i 53 (t) *2* «nb (t) +adj) ** (1/2» 
motion(i,t+l) .. x(i,t+t) =e= x(i,t)+yd(i,t)-yr(i,t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t.disnb(t» 
Model floodplain /all/ ; 
option domlim = 1000000 ; 
option resl im = 5400 ; 
floodplain. iterl im = 10000000 
*--------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a smal I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*------------------------------------------
x.lo(i,t) =0.0001; 
x.up(i, t) = If(i)-O.OOOI 
yd. 10 (i, t) = 0.0001 
yr.lo(i,t) =0.0001; 
*-----------------------------------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
Regulation (base) 
$Title Model of Optimal Floodplain Management 
$Ontext 
Ko i ch i ro Mar i 
Model ling Hydrological. Ecological and Economic 
Interactions in River Floodplains 
A Case Study of Ouse Catchment 
$Offtext 
*-------------------------------------------
* Set time t. subbasins i and urban areas j 
*--------------------------------------------
Sets 
t time periods /1990*2020/ 
tfirst(t) first period 
i subbasins /501.502.505.507.509.534.543,553. 
s69, 571. 575. 583. 585. s89, s90/ 
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j urban areas /selby, york/ : 
*----------------------------
* The elements in the sets are strings. Thus, 
* we have to convert the strings into the 
* numbers so that we can use the time t to 
* calculate the discounting factor. 
*---------------------------------
tf i rst (t) = yes$ (ord (t) eq 1) : 
Display tf i rst 
Display t : 
*--------------------------------------
* Set initial values etc. 
*------------------------------------
Parameters 
If(i) area of floodplains /501 1356.91346, 502 2402.75427, 
505 204.67004, 507 2447.00171, s096639.46521, 
534 2451.61496, 543 1257.75186, s53 347.13385, 
s69 1338.21609, 571 3595.16936, s75 1029. 10755, 
s83 1119.66767, 585 1149.58292, 589443.79102, 
s901632.33813/ 
xO(i) initial state variables /501 99.39369, 502 217.13234, 
s05 14.38793, 507 155.26437, s09308.46632, 
534 51. 12944, s43 27.69161, 553 7.97054, 
s69 101.6242, s71 306.14877, s7563.81431, 
583 106.27285, 585 60.06330, s89 35.18348, 
590 67.09430/ 
mp(i) quota on development / 501 137.47631, s02 1751.55266, 
s05 0.0031, 507 338.33163, s091104.56468, 
534 53.26856, s43 132.09539, s53 0.0031, 
s69 0.0031, s71 364.70823, 575 0.0031, 
s83 1009.30115, s85 51.7327, 589 280.69052, 
s900.0031 / 
md(i) duties on restoration / 
sOl 0.0031, 5020.0031, 505 14.38793, 
s07 0.0031, s09 0.0031, s340.0031, 
s43 0.0031, s53 7.97054, s6937.2542, 
571 0.0031, s75 22.12631, s830.005, 
s85 0.0031, 5890.0031, 590 13.2483/ : 
*-------------------------------------
* Set discount factor and common parameter 
* values in the functions. 
*------------------------------------
Scalars 
adj adjustment factor for uti I ity function /1000000000/ 
disl periodic discount rate /0.05/ 
dis2 discount factor fl parameter of FP development benefit function /14030.80048/ 
rl parameter of restoration cost function /19146.37353/ 
dl parameter of development cost function /1914.63735/ 
dis2 = 1/(1+disl) : 
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*----------------------------
* Calculate the discount factor in time t. 
*-------------
Parameters 
dis3(t) discount factor in time t 
dis3(t) = dis2**(ord(t)-t) 
Display dis3 : 
*--------------------------------
* Set parameter values included in 
* the expected cost function of flood risk. 
*-----------------------------------
Scalars 
cOl_l parameter of flood cost function in 27001 /27.17415/ 
c02_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27002 /3.22602/ 
c05 parameter of flood cost function in 27005 /137.27578/ 
c07_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27007 /6.43880/ 
c09_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27009 /4.61088/ 
c34 parameter of flood cost function in 27034/15.50372/ 
c43 parameter of flood cost function in 27043 /28.96503/ 
c53_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27053 /1.08513/ 
c69 parameter of flood cost function in 27069 /24.53457/ 
c71_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27071 /4.41719/ 
c75 parameter of flood cost function in 27075 /37.52708/ 
c83 parameter of flood cost function in 27083 /5.28397/ 
c85 parameter of flood cost function in 27085 /7.80344/ 
c89_1 parameter of flood cost function in 27089 /20.35564/ 
e90 parameter of flood cost function in 27090 /29.55194/ 
csb_l parameter of flood cost function in Selby /899343.7842/ 
cyk_l parameter of flood cost function in York /8477662.33/ 
*-------------------------------------
* Define control and state variables. 
* Set other necessary variables. 
*-----------------------------------
Variables 
xCi, t) area of developed floodplains 
yd(i, t) floodplain development 
yr(i, t) floodplain restoration 
nb(t) net benefit 
disnb(t) discounted uti I ity of net benefit 
z objective function 
pro(i, t) benefit of developed floodplains 
rest(i, t) cost of floodplain restoration 
deve(i, t) cost of floodplain development 
risk(i,t) expected cost of flood risk in subbasin 
urisk(j, t) expected cost of flood risk in urban; 
*------------------------------------
* Define equations in the model. 
*------------------------------------
Appel/dix IJ 360 
Equations 
dfp(i, t) benefit function of developed floodplains 
r_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain restoration 
d_cost(i, t) cost function of floodplain development 
f I d_01 (t) expected cost funct i on of f I Dod risk in subbas in 
fld_02(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_05(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_07(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_09(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_34(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_43(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_53(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_69(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_71 (t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_75(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_83(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_85(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_89(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
fld_90(t) expected cost function of flood risk in subbasin 
ufld_sb(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ufld_yk(t) expected cost function of flood risk in urban 
ini (i, t) provision of intial conditions 
nconst1(i, t) natural constraints on development 
nconst2(i, t) natural constraints on restoration 
mpconst(i) marketable permits 
mdconst(i) marketable duties 
net(t) net benefit function in time t 
disnet(t) discounted uti I ity function of net benefit in time t 
motion(i, t) equations of motion 
welfare definition of objective function 
dfp(i, t) .. pro(i, t) =e= f1*x(i, t) ; 
r_cost(i,t) .. rest(i,t) =e= r1*yr(i,t) 
d_cost(i,t) .. deve(i,t) =e= d1*yd(i,t) 
fld_01 (t) .. riskC sOl', t) =e= cOL1*(xC sOl', t)**2) 
f I d_02 (t).. risk C s02' ,t) =e= cOL 1* (x C s02' , t) **2) 
f I d_05 (t) .. risk C s05' ,t) =e= c05* (x C s05' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_07 (t) .. risk C s07' ,t) =e= cOL 1 * (x (' s07' , t) **2) 
f I d_09 (t).. risk C s09' ,t) =e= c09_1 * (x C s09' , t) **2) 
f I d_34 (t) .. risk C 534' ,t) =e= c34* (x C s34' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_ 43 (t).. risk C s43' ,t) =e= c43* (x C s43' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_53 (t) .. risk C 553' ,t) =e= c53_1 * (x (' s53' , t) **2) 
fld_69(t) .. riskC s69', t) =e= c69*(xCs69' ,t)**2) ; 
fld_71 (t) .. riskCs71',t) =e= c7Ll*(xC 571' ,t)**2) 
fld_75(t) .. riskC 575', t) =e= c75*(xC s75', t)**2) 
f I d_83 (t).. risk C s83' ,t) =e= c83* (x C s83' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_85 (t) .. risk C s85' ,t) =e= c85* (x (' s85' , t) **2) ; 
f I d_89 (t) .. risk C s89' ,t) =e= c89_1 * (x C s89' , t) **2) 
f I d_90 (t).. risk C s90' ,t) =e= c90* (x (' s90' , t) **2) 
ufld_sb(t) .. uriskC selby', t) =e= csb_l ; 
ufld_yk(t) .. uriskCyork', t) =e= cyk_l ; 
ini (i,tfirst) .. x(i,tfirst) =e= xO(i) ; 
nconst 1 (i, t) .. yd (i ,t) = I = If ( i ) -x (i, t) 
nconst2 (i, t) .. yr (i ,t) = I = x (i ,t) ; 
mpconst (i) .. sum (t, yd (i , t» = I = mp (i) ; 
mdconst(i) .. yr(i,'1990') =g= md(i); 
net (t) .. nb (t) =e= sum (i, pro (i, t» -sum (i, rest (i, t»-
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sum(i, deve (i, t) )-sum(i, risk (i, t) )-sum(j, ur isk (j. t)) 
disnet(t) .. disnb(t) =e= dis3(t)*2*((nb(t)+adj)**(1/2)) 
mot i on (i, t+ 1).. x (i, t+ 1) =e= x (i, t) +yd (i, t) -yr (i, t) 
welfare .. z =e= sum(t,disnbtt)) 
Model floodplain /al 1/ ; 
option doml im = 1000000 ; 
option resl im = 5400 ; 
floodplain. iterl im = 10000000 
*------------------------------------------------
* Set the constraints on control and state 
* variables. We should note that we give 
* a sma I I value to the lower bounds so that 
* we can avoid function evaluation errors 
* in the procedures in GAMS. 
*------------------------------------------------
x. lo(i, t) = 0.0001 ; 
x. up(i, t) = If(i)-O.OOOI 
yd. lo(i, t) = 0.0001 
yr.lo(i,t) = 0.0001 ; 
*------------------------------------------------
* Attempt to solve the problem. 
*------------------------------------------------
Solve floodplain maximizing z using nip 
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0-3 Expected Cost Function of Flood Risk in Case 
of the Increase in Precipitation 
27001 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
/ Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_Ol Mean= 25092499.81 ,S.D.= 15283509.78 
/ Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .1500852700E+16, Std.Dev.= 5086921.53300 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .891097, Adjusted R-squared = .88922 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 58J = 474.58, Prob value = .00000/ 
/ Diagnostic: Log-L = -1010.6503, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1077. 1692 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 30.917, Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.755 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 






23.554 .0000 560485.77 




/ Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none / 
I Dep. var. = C_02 Mean= 12136406.91 ,S.D.= 7480309.735 / 
/ Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 58 J 
/ Residuals: Sum of squares= .3053043200E+15, Std.Dev.= 2294312.00705 I 
/ Fit R-squared= .907521, Adjusted R-squared = .90593 I 
/ Model test F[ 1, 58J = 569.17, Prob value = ,00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -962.8759, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1034.2992 / 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 29.325, Akaike Info. Crt. = 32.163 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 









. 0000 735. 86611 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep var. = C_05 Mean= 2374597.299 ,S. D. = 1280844.151 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg. Fr. = 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .2753929044E+14, Std, Dev. = 683203.94807 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .715483, Adjusted R-squared = .71548 / 
I Model test: F[ 1. 59J = 148.37, Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -890.7050, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -928.4139 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 26.886, Akaike Info. Crt. = 29.724 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
/Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t) I Mean of Xl 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep var. = C_07 Mean= 25829213.86 . S.D.= 14323356.38 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 2. Deg. Fr. = 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .1815307468E+16, Std. Dev.= 5594497.70969 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .850029. Adjusted R-squared = .84744 I 
I Mode I test: F [1. 58] = 328. 74. Prob va I ue = . 00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1016.3569. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1073.2762 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 31.107. Akaike Info. Crt. = 33.945 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X07 8.115190155 .44415905 18.271 .0000 2084693.1 
XS 5240.602168 807.54950 6.490 .0000 1321.3177 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
IOep. var. = C_09 Mean= 129692331.3 . S.D.= 75388077.06 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 3. Oeg. Fr.= 57 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= . 2558954187E+17. Std. Dev.= 21188188.47825 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .923686. Adjusted R-squared = .92101 I 
I Model test: F( 2. 57] = 344.96. Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1095.1348. RestrictedCb=O) Log-L = -1112.9217 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 33.181. Akaike Info. Crt.= 36.624 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 











. 0000 16370091. 
.0006 3588. 9758 
.0017 2589. 8980 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Oep. var. = C_34 Mean= 43726755.04 . S.O.= 24135210.59 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 1. Oeg. Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .7340879717E+16. Std. Dev. = 11154447.10020 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .786404. Adjusted R-squared = .78640 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 59] = 217.22. Prob value = .00000 I 
I D iagnost i c: Log-L = -1058. 2730, Restr i cted (b=O) Log-L = -1104. 5830 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 32.471. Akaike Info. Crt.= 35.309 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
16.59264269 .49159088 33.753 .0000 2269018.5 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_43 Mean= 25607081.20 . S. D.= 11498825.18 
I Model siz~: Observations = 60. Parameters = 1. Deg.Fr. = 59 I 
I R~slduals. Sum of squares= .2206266515E+16. Std. Dev. = 6115091.79864 I 
I Fit. . R-squared= .717187. Adjusted R-squared = .71719 I 
I Mode I test: F[ 1. 59] = 149.62. . Prob va lue = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic. Log-L =. -1022.2083. Restr Icted (b=O) Log-L = -1060.0974 I 
I LogAmemlyaPrCrt.= 31.269. Akaike Info. Crt.= 34.107 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_53 Mean= 421812.7600 . S. D.= 287146.6070 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 2. Deg. Fr. = 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .7281709573E+12. Std. Dev.= 112047.63129 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .850316. Adjusted R-squared = .84774 I 
I Mode I test: F [1. 58] = 329.48. Prob va lue = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -781.7200. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -838.6970 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 23.286. Akaike Info. Crt.= 26.124 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 






19.312 .0000 32913.926 
4.568 .0000 100.91424 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_69 Mean= 17969735.67 . S. D. = 11027903.72 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 1. Oeg.Fr. = 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .1940938810E+16. Std. Dev. = 5735614.00085 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .729496. Adjusted R-squared = .72950 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 59] = 159.11. Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1018.3644. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1057.5885 I 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 31.141. Akaike Info. Crt.= 33.979 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X69 26.48690175 .96842057 27.351 .0000 545723.23 
Appendl); f) 366 
27071 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = C_71 Mean= 39718419.90 ,S. D.= 24482883.42 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .2684742564E+16, Std. Dev. = 6803577.36065 I 
I Fit: R-squared= . 924085, Adjusted R-squared = . 92278 I 
, Mode I test: F [1. 58] = 706.02, Prob va lue = .00000 I 
, D I agnost I c: Log-L = -1028.0968, Restr i cted (b=O) Log-L = -1105. 4412 , 
, LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 31.499. Akaike Info. Crt.= 34.337' 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable ,Coefficient 'Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X71 6.227308270 .27649221 22.523 .0000 4038213.7 




'Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none , 
I Dep. var. = C_75 Mean= 14885759.63 ,S. D. = 9169794.763 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg.Fr. = 59' 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1310904754E+16, Std. Dev.= 4713674.21988 , 
I Fit: R-squared= .735759, Adjusted R-squared = .73576 I 
I Model test: F[ 1, 59] = 164.28, Prob value = .00000 , 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -1006.5908, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1046.5176 I 
, LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 30.748, Akaike Info. Crt. = 33.586 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
'Variable I Coefficient 'Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of Xl 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X75 40.64391775 1. 4717393 27.616 .0000 296156.24 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
'Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none , 
I Dep. var. = C_83 Mean= 3504168.820 ,S. D.= 2164384.433 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg.Fr.= 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares=. 6451137581E+14, Std. Dev. = 1045663.97532 I 
I Fit: R-squared= . 766592. Adjusted R-squared = . 76659 I 
I Mode I test: F [ 1, 59] = 193. 78, Prob va I ue = . 00000 , 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -916.2419, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -959.8909 I 
I LogAmemi yaPrCrt. = 27. 737, Aka i ke I nfo. Crt. = 30. 575 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient ,Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SO_X83 7.631545266 .25909337 29. 455 . 0000 378024. 33 
Appendix /) 367 
27085 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_85 Mean= 5283904.399 ,S. D.= 3372330.547 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = I, Deg. Fr. = 59 I 
I Residuals: Sum of sQuares= . 1 537404707E+I 5, Std. Dev. = 1614239.97272 I 
I Fi t: R-sQuared= .770873, Adjusted R-squared = .77087 I 
, Mode I test: F [ 1, 59] = 198.50, Prob va lue = .00000 I 
, Diagnostic: log-l = -942.2946, Restricted(b=O) log-l = -986.4990 I 
I logAmemiyaPrCrt.= 28.605, Akaike Info. Crt.= 31.443 , 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 




I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_89 Mean= 2847261.318 ,S.D.= 1532964.486 , 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .1493707985E+14, Std.Dev.= 507479.91044 I 
, Fit: R-squared= .892267, Adjusted R-squared = .89041 I 
I Model test: F[ 1, 58] = 480.37, Prob value = .00000 I 
, Diagnostic: log-L = -872.3520. Restricted(b=O) Log-l = -939.1949' 
, logAmemiyaPrCrt.= 26.307, Akaike Info. Crt.= 29.145 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 






22.946 .0000 65359.427 
9.634 .0000 1944.2826 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
,Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none , 
, Dep. var. = C_90 Mean= 33967493.46 ,S. D. = 16083601.46 , 
, Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 1, Deg. Fr.= 59 , 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= . 4957887225E+16, Std.Oev.= 9166896.24996 I 
, Fi t: R-squared= .675154, Adjusted R-squared = .67515 I 
, Mode I test: F [1. 59) = 122. 62, Prob va lue = . 00000 , 
I Diagnostic: log-l = -1046.4987. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -1080.2307 I 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 32.079, Akaike Info. Crt. = 34.917 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
'Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
SQ_X90 32. 55725064 1.0582777 30. 764 . 0000 891152. 11 
StJlby 
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep. var. = C_SELBY Mean= 2330466.429 ,S. D. = 343628.1044 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .3334157137E+13, Std. Dev. = 239761.27269 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .521418, Adjusted R-squared = .51317 I 
I Model test: F[ 1. 58J = 63.19. Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -827.3632. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -849.4710 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 24.808. Akaike Info. Crt.= 27.645 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tJ I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Constant 1665552.340 




7.949 .0000 13925.856 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
I Dep var. = C_ YORK Mean= 14707246.01 . S. D. = 1551439. 865 I 
I Model size: Observations = 60. Parameters = 2. Deg. Fr.= 58 I 
I Residuals: Sum of squares= .6164201671E+14. Std.Dev.= 1030918.71242 I 
I Fit: R-squared= .565935. Adjusted R-squared = .55845 I 
I Model test: F[ I. 58J = 75.62. Prob value = .00000 I 
I Diagnostic: Log-L = -914.8769. Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -939.9137 I 
I LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= 27.725. Akaike Info. Crt.= 30.563 I 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of Xl 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 







.0000 11755. 649 
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